Introduction

China’s application of armed coercion against its neighbours in the South China Sea (SCS) and the East China Sea (ECS) region has emerged as a preeminent threat to regional security. Each individual action is not severe enough to provoke war, but cumulatively, they have shaped ground realities to China’s advantage, improving its military position and negotiating leverage.

This paper considers China’s approach as a ‘below-the-threshold’ strategy, a subset of ‘gray zone’ operations. Gray-zone warfare aims to alter an adversary’s behaviour through non-lethal means, operating in the spectrum between war and peace. It encompasses a wide range of activities, including covert and sabotage actions for preparing the ground for invasion, to low-intensity cyber exploitation and disinformation campaigns aimed at reshaping politico-diplomatic dynamics. By leveraging informational, economic, military, and political means short of war, Gray-zone operations pursue political and strategic objectives without triggering an open conflict. However, as a broad concept, Gray-zone warfare is less useful in explaining China’s activities in its near-sea region; the more specific ‘below-the-threshold’ strategy provides a better framework for analysis.

Other theoretical terms, including ‘proxy war’, ‘hybrid war’, ‘irregular war’, ‘fifth-generation war’, and ‘unconventional war’, each define different facets of a modern conflict. However, they all denote the changing character of war itself, especially an active conflict with kinetic actions. Gray-zone warfare, in contrast, generally avoids a full-blown conflict while employing strategies like below-the-brink provocations, fait accompli actions, salami-slicing jabs, and hostile cyber operations, among others, to achieve its objectives.

The ‘below the threshold’ strategy, as applied by China in East Asian naval disputes, operates as a protracted campaign of pressure, using coercive means to wear down smaller adversaries and make resistance, over time, seem futile. Through relentless actions by its Coast Guard, naval forces, and aviation assets, China projects an overwhelming power disparity at its adversary to quash opposition without initiating an open conflict, embodying its ancient ‘winning without fighting’ doctrine.

To achieve optimum efficiency, China consolidated its various maritime law enforcement agencies in 2013, creating the China Coast Guard (CCG).^[1] This new force integrated the Ministry of Public Security’s maritime branch, China Marine Surveillance, the Ministry of Agriculture’s Fisheries Law Enforcement Command, and the General Administration of Customs’ maritime anti-smuggling force. Initially, the consolidated force was under the State Oceanic Administration (SOA); in 2018, its administrative control was transferred to the People’s Armed Police (PAP) force under the authority of the Central Military Commission (CMC), providing it with enhanced authority and administrative clarity, facilitating deeper coordination with China’s naval forces.^[2] Since then, the CCG has played a proactive role in China’s harassment operations in contested waters and serves as a key instrument of its maritime armed coercion strategy.

However, this ‘below-the-brink’ strategy has limitations; its cost-benefit ratio becomes unfavourable beyond a certain point. The reluctance to escalate, after frequent and consistent harassment, into an active conflict, risks portraying China’s power displays as mere posturing, diminishing its military aura. This approach aims to nudge adversaries toward negotiations, yet it frequently backfires, as smaller states respond by augmenting their internal capabilities or bandwagoning with great powers outside the region to balance the Chinese threat. This paper will show that the success of this strategy relies heavily on the individual dispositions of the affected states, their leaders’ attitudes toward China, and the extent of their determination to resist. The strategy’s efficacy is inconsistent, as demonstrated in different cases.

A Single Theatre

Although Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei are also involved in potential SCS conflicts, China has primarily focused on the Philippines, Taiwan, and Japan over the last decade. China did engage in a brief conflict with Vietnam over the Paracel Islands in the mid-1970s, successfully seizing control.^[a] However, since then, sporadic naval disputes have not significantly disrupted their broader political and economic relationship. Similarly, tensions with Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei over maritime territories have remained at a low level, with occasional naval encounters. Malaysia, for example, has largely overlooked Chinese naval activities in its claimed territories, raising concerns only sporadically. Both Malaysia and Brunei have followed a ‘silent claimant’ approach and notably avoided military confrontations, addressing their issues with China in political and regional forums instead.

In contrast, disputes involving the Philippines, Taiwan, and Japan exhibit markedly different dynamics. As seen in Map 1, China perceives its sovereign claims over the maritime region encompassing the ECS, Taiwan Strait, and the SCS, as interrelated. Its inroads into one area will have implications for the other two as well. Over the past decade, its actions have sought to test the thresholds of conflict. China has deployed aviation assets to probe Japan’s air defence systems, frequently sent government vessels into the waters around the Japan-controlled Senkaku Islands, harassed Philippine vessels within their exclusive economic zones, blocked access of resupply missions of Filipino forces to disputed islands, built artificial islands for military use and engaged in frequent displays of military aggression around Taiwan. These actions reflect a tailored approach, calibrated to these three states’ military capabilities and alliances. This paper analyses the Chinese approach to two of the three states, Taiwan and the Philippines, in detail.

Map 1: South China Sea, Taiwan Strait and East China Sea as a Single Combat Theatre

Source: Author’s own 

Case 1: Taiwan

On 14 October 2024, from 5:02 a.m. to 6:04 p.m., the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s Eastern Theatre Command conducted a joint military exercise of its Navy and Coast Guard titled ‘Joint Sword 2024-B’^[3] in the northern, southern, and eastern seas of Taiwan, including the Taiwan Strait.

The exercise involved approximately 125 PLA aircraft and 34 naval vessels, split evenly between the PLA Navy and the Chinese Coast Guard. Units from the PLA’s army, air force, and rocket forces also participated. Notably, the Chinese Coast Guard carried out maritime law enforcement inspection patrols^[4] using four vessels, numbered 1303, 1305, 2102, and 2901, equipped with activated Automatic Identification Systems (AIS), in the waters around Taiwan Island.

Chinese state media framed the exercises as “punishment” for Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te’s ‘Double-Ten Day’ speech^[5] on 10 October 2024 (Taiwan’s National Day), in which he declared that neither Taiwan nor China was subordinate to the other, and that China had no authority to represent Taiwan. (However, the naming of this exercise as 2024-B, following a similar drill in May 2024 titled 2024-A, indicates that the exercise was planned well before Lai’s speech, only serving China with a convenient pretext to advance its strategy of normalising incremental aggression.) China has consistently employed such tactics against Taiwan in recent years to create a new status quo aligned with its goal of unification.

Again, in December 2024, Lai visited the Marshall Islands, Palau, and Tuvalu, three of just the 12 countries that still maintain official diplomatic ties with Taiwan. During this trip, Lai also transited through US territories with stopovers.^[6] In response, Chinese naval forces conducted a naval exercise in mid-December, in which more than 90 naval vessels participated—probably the largest naval deployment to date.

As Table 1 shows, the October and December 2024 provocations were only the last two in a series of Chinese naval exercises around Taiwan since 2015 which showcased China’s capacity to quarantine, blockade, and conduct a large-scale invasion of Taiwan, if it so chose. The frequency of the harassment, particularly in 2023 and 2024, the number of participating Chinese agencies, the incremental erosion of Taiwan’s sovereignty, and China’s overall threatening tone, were unparalleled.

Table 1: Chinese Military/Non-Military Actions Against Taiwan (2015- )

Date	Exercise	China’s agencies involved	Location	Possible reasons
March 2015[7]	Air Operations Drill	PLA Air Force	Western Pacific through Bashi Channel	Various US actions
September 2015[8]	Live Fire Exercise	PLA Army	Zhejiang Coast	Taiwan’s presidential election
January 2016[9]	Landing Drill	31st Group Army of PLA, PLA Navy	Fujian Coast	Tsai Ing-wen’s victory in the Taiwan presidential election
May 2016[10]	Landing Assault	31st Group Army of PLA, PLA Navy, PLA Air Force	Xiamen Coast	President Tsai Ing-wen’s inaugural speech
11 December 2017[11]	Taiwan Encirclement Patrol	PLA Air Force	Taiwan Strait, Bashi Channel, Miyako Strait	Regular patrol exercise
18 April 2018[12]	418 Military Exercise[13]	PLA Navy, PLA Air Force	Taiwan Strait	Lai Ching-te’s Taiwan independence remark[14]
July 2018	6-day Live Fire Drills[15]	PLA Navy, PLA Air Force	Coasts of Xiangshan, Zhejiang, Wenzhou	US-Taiwan proximity, China considers separatist sentiments being encouraged in Taiwan
July 2019[16]	Joint Sea Air Drills	PLA Navy, PLA Air Force	Fujian Coast, Bohai and Yellow Sea	Annual training
August 2020[17]	Live Fire Exercise	PLA Navy, PLA Air Force	Taiwan Strait	Trump’s support for Taiwan, US Health Secretary Alex Azar’s visit to Taipei
April 2021	Joint Landing Exercise	PLA Navy	Amphibious assault	US Navy transit through the Taiwan Strait
4-9 August 2022[18]	Multi-Domain Exercise	PLA Navy, PLA Strategic Support Force, PLA Air Force, PLA Rocket Force	Taiwan Strait and around Taiwan[19]	US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taipei
October 2022	Air Force Exercise	PLA Air Force	Air Operations	Nancy Pelosi visit, US military actions
January 2023[20]	Joint Combat Readiness Security Patrol	Multi-Service	Waters and air space around Taiwan	China considers pro-independence sentiments provoked in Taiwan
April 2023	United Sharp Sword Exercise	PLA Navy, PLA Strategic Support Force, PLA Air Force, PLA Rocket Force	Simulated invasion	Tsai Ing-wen meeting US House Speaker Kevin McCarthy
July 2023	Night -time Drill	PLA Navy, PLA Air Force	Air-Sea night operations	US military support to Taiwan
August 2023	Life Fire Drill	PLA Navy, PLA Air Force	Air-Sea operations	Taiwan VP Lai Ching-te's visit to the US
May 2024	Joint Sword 2024-A	Multi-Service	Taiwan Strait; North, East and South of Taiwan	President Lai Ching-te’s inauguration speech
October 2024	Joint Sword 2024-B	Multi-Service	Taiwan Strait; North, East and South of Taiwan	Lai Ching-te’s ‘Double Ten’ speech
December 2024[21]	unnamed	PLA Navy	Around Taiwan, the largest to date	Lai Ching-te’s first international visit to Palau, etc., transiting through the US

Source: Author’s own

Shades of Hostility (1995-2015)

In 1995–96, China conducted large-scale military exercises, sparking the ‘Third Taiwan Strait Crisis’ and prompting a decisive US response.^[b],[22] The crisis was triggered by the US granting Taiwan's then-President Lee Teng-hui a visa (effectively recognising Taiwan as a separate country), which enabled him to pay a visit to Cornell University in New York, his alma mater, in what was perceived as an official capacity. Beijing viewed this as a direct affront to its One China Principle. War between the two seemed in the offing, leading Taiwan’s stock market to plummet. The US conducted an intense diplomatic outreach and deployed two aircraft carrier battle groups in the Taiwan Strait. China drew back, causing a loss of face for the Chinese leadership. At the time, Chinese forces were no match for US strength deployed in the region. The crisis, however, led to China hastening the build-up of its armed strength, especially its Navy—a pre-eminent goal.

Relations between China and Taiwan under Lee Teng-Hui’s successor, Chen Shui-bian (2000-2008), also remained full of suspicion and hostility. Initially, President Chen promised to keep the status quo, but as domestic political pressure mounted on him following multiple controversies, he sought a referendum on Taiwan’s independence. China, much alarmed, used its political channels with the US government to control Taiwanese actions.^[23] Fortunately for China, the George Bush Jr administration, already embroiled in Afghanistan and Iraq, was averse to new hostilities appearing in East Asia, and effectively scuttled Chen’s political adventurism.^[24] Notably, during this period, China’s anti-Taiwan actions remained in the political and diplomatic domain, without any military action.

China and Taiwan relations became relatively cordial under Chen Shui-bian’s successor, Ma Ying-jeou (2008–2016), as both sides sought engagement, culminating in a historic meeting between Xi Jinping and Ma Ying-jeou on 7 November 2015.^[25] Military tensions were notably absent during Ma’s entire term. In September 2015, for instance, when the PLA conducted a live-fire exercise^[26] in the Taiwan Strait (close to China’s coastal areas in Zhejiang) Chinese media adopted a subdued and non-threatening tone. Earlier reports of PLA drills simulating decapitation attacks on Taiwan’s presidential office were now even ridiculed in the Chinese media.

Hardening Attitude (2015-25)

As Table 1 shows, China’s official rhetoric and media tone began to harden from late 2015, as Tsai Ing-wen, leader of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), gained political momentum ahead of Taiwan’s 2016 presidential election. Her victory in January 2016 marked a turning point, with the PLA staging a military exercise in the Taiwan Strait shortly afterwards. This was not only because China considered the rise of the DPP, with Tsai’s pro-independence inclination, as conspicuously hostile to its core interests^[27], but also because it wanted to demonstrate that its naval modernisation efforts had begun yielding results. China had, in the 30 years since the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, inducted an aircraft carrier, multiple nuclear submarines, and principal warships into its navy, undergoing during this period what was perhaps the fastest naval vessel induction process globally.^[28] This growing naval and military confidence gave China an effective tool for engaging in salami-slicing tactics and sub-threshold activities, culminating in its military exercises around Taiwan, alongside intensified political and diplomatic rhetoric.

Since then, Chinese military activities in the eastern seas around Taiwan have evolved into, first mid-size, and later large-scale, joint exercises of its various wings. This escalation has coincided with the DPP’s prolonged rule, and the consistent refusal of successive Taiwanese presidents to accommodate Beijing’s demands.

China has been particularly hostile towards current President Lai Ching-te (who succeeded Tsai Ing-wen in May 2024), right from when he was Taiwan’s Premier in 2017-19, and claimed to be a “pragmatic worker for Taiwan's independence”.^[29] His elevation to Taiwan’s presidency has been especially unpalatable to Beijing.

China’s ‘Signalling’ Minuet

As shown in Table 1, China’s recent military manoeuvres have been frequent and comprehensive, but have never appeared moving towards an active conflict. Signalling remains their main purpose. The Joint Sword 2024-B exercise exemplified this restraint, as nearly 90 Chinese aircraft and 12 Coast Guard ships entered Taiwan’s ‘reaction’ zone^[30] – a section of Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ), located between the Median Line^[c] and the 24-nautical-mile contiguous zone. Chinese aircraft also crossed the Median Line,^[31] which Beijing had always tacitly acknowledged in the past, though not officially.

China also deployed Coast Guard vessels to assert its claim that the entire Taiwan Strait constituted its internal waters, and that its relationship with Taiwan was an internal matter. The Chinese Coast Guard even released a patrol map around Taiwan in the shape of a heart symbol,^[32] blending intimidation with black humour.

Misinformation was also prominently used. Chinese websites propagated rumours that oil tankers en route to Taiwan had been intercepted and redirected, sparking fears of an imminent fuel shortage on the island. Later, evidence emerged that much of the footage of drills that were claimed to be ‘live’ was in fact pre-recorded^[33] and selectively used to exaggerate China’s military capabilities. These multi-domain activities lasted barely a day or two but showcased immense preparation for signalling and propaganda purposes.

Taiwanese Resilience

The US has a large number of military bases in the Western Pacific, as depicted in Map 2. There is substantial naval, air and army deployment; a potential Taiwan invasion has numerous times been the topic of US war games. The extended deterrence capability of US forces is a factor limiting China’s options in an active conflict. 

Map 2: US Bases in Western Pacific

Source: Congressional Research Service^[34]

However, Taiwan is not a treaty ally of the US—their Mutual Defence Treaty ended in 1980. Since then, the US has supported Taiwan based on its Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which is a domestic law. No doubt, Taiwanese defence is important to the US and the US Congress would easily reach a consensus of supporting Taiwan should the need arise, but there is no guarantee as such that the US will assist Taiwan militarily in an armed conflict across the Taiwan Strait. With Donald Trump’s return as President, Taiwan cannot be complacent based on the TRA alone.^[35] Experts maintain that Taiwan has the muscle power to fight for at least a month without US support, as it deems the US Congress may take that much time to force the hand of any US President to support Taiwan.^[36]

Moreover, outwardly, Taiwan has remained unaffected by China’s threatening gestures. In contrast to its response to the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995, Taiwan’s stock market barely reacted to China’s Joint Sword 2024-B, with the TAIEX index^[37] opening at 22,947 on 14 October 2024 and closing slightly higher at 22,975. By 15 October, it had climbed even further, reaching 23,292. The market’s performance suggests that China’s exercises were perceived in Taiwan as inconsequential.

Taiwan’s population too, remained largely unfazed.^[38] Its will to fight had been heightened, owing perhaps to the example set by Ukraine in resisting Russia’s invasion, the country’s decades-long preparation for a PLA invasion, and constant international support. Through its Defence Resilience Committee, a body China views as being pro-independence, Taiwan has also promoted a “whole-of-society” defence approach.^[39] Normal life in Taiwan continued uninterrupted, and even its military response was measured and limited.

Reasons for China’s Restraint

This interplay between China’s hesitancy to escalate from below-the-threshold to active conflict, and Taiwan’s complacency, reflect regional security dynamics. Both sides appear to have calculated the costs of deterrence, which still favour Taiwan. The island commands a strong economy with a near dominance in high-tech industries, particularly semiconductor production, coupled with its strong trade and investment profile. This financial muscle opens up options for military capability augmentation. Taiwan has been purchasing crucial weapons systems from the US and its other security partners and developing strategies to counter potential Chinese invasion. Although it often receives suggestions to follow the Porcupine Strategy, the Honey Badger Strategy or even the Capybara Strategy,^[d] its security dynamics calculations remain distinct.^[40]

Taiwan’s self-defence preparedness, the US forces’ extended deterrence and the PLA’s limitations in amphibious landing operations and urban warfare—all contribute to China’s hesitancy to use force against Taiwan. Moreover, China often claims that only a small minority in Taiwan support independence, while the ethnic Chinese majority remain inclined toward reunification.^[41] Consequently, a full-blown invasion would impose hardship on everyone in Taiwan, causing a blow to Xi's prestige.

An added recent reason could be the chaos and instability that have arisen from anti-corruption drives within the PLA,^[42] as explained later in this paper. Internal challenges within the Chinese military, compounded by the PLA’s widespread corruption, have complicated the Chinese leadership’s assessment of the PLA’s chances of success.

Case 2: The Philippines

Disputes between China and the Philippines over small reefs, shoals and islands in the SCS,^[e] with China seeking to extend its coastal territory and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), had occurred earlier, especially in early 1994, when a typhoon forced the Philippine Navy to postpone its patrols in the Spratly Islands for some time. Taking advantage of the lull, China built stilt-supported concrete structures on Mischief Reef—a reef around 100 km north of the Spratly Islands, and regarded as part of them—and captured the territory. Despite numerous protests from the Philippines, it did not vacate, claiming the entire Spratly Islands as its sovereign territory.

Responding in 1999, Philippine forces deliberately ran aground their own naval warship, BRP Sierra Madre, on the Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratly Islands, and stationed their marines permanently on it to mark their presence in the region.^[f],[43] The dispute simmered for years, yet remained relatively minor until President Benigno Aquino III, now deceased, assumed office in the Philippines.

Aquino Ups the Ante

During Aquino’s tenure (2010-2016), bilateral relations between China and the Philippines turned markedly confrontational (Table 2). China occupied the Scarborough Shoal^[g] in July 2012 and refused fishermen from the Philippines entry. Despite a deal mediated by then US President Barack Obama for both countries to withdraw militarily from the area, which the Philippines complied with, China did not leave, but instead surrounded the shoal with multiple layers of vessels, belonging to its fishing fleet, maritime administration, and the Coast Guard among others, in what has been called a ‘cabbage strategy’.^[h],[44]

In response, Aquino’s administration officially renamed the SCS as the West Philippine Sea in a symbolic move to assert its sovereignty.^[45] It also filed an international arbitration suit before the Permanent Court of Arbitration of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), challenging China’s expansive claims within the Philippines’ EEZ.^[46]

China retaliated in two ways: first, it built concrete structures on reefs and atolls of the Spratly Islands, established official administrative zones there, and deployed air defence systems. It built airstrips and set up military installations on some of the artificial islands it had created in the vicinity, facilitating military aircraft visits and further cementing its presence. Second, Chinese naval vessels from all its maritime agencies and the PLA Navy began regularly harassing Filipino forces all across the SCS, interrupting their resupply missions, chasing their fishermen, using military-grade lasers and dangerous sea and air manoeuvres against them. China has also kept up the political, diplomatic and economic heat on the Philippines.

Table 2: China-Philippines Armed Skirmishes Since 1996

Dates	Incident	Participants	Outcome
January 1996	Capture of Mischief Reef -Capones Island	3 Chinese naval vessels; 1 Philippines’ gunboat	US-Philippines military ties resume
June 2011	Chinese naval incursions near Iroquois Bank with construction material and crew	Multiple Chinese naval and civilian vessels	Philippines summons Chinese ambassador[47]
October 2011	Incursions in the Philippines EEZ	Chinese naval ships and aircraft	South China Sea renamed as West Philippines Sea
April 2012	Scarborough Shoal Incident	Chinese surveillance ships and fishing boats, Filipino warship	China-Philippines trade in bananas affected, PLA Navy stays in the region
January 2013	Philippines moves UNCLOS for international arbitration	Permanent Court of Arbitration on behalf of UNCLOS, Philippines government	Loss of face for China, potential internationalisation of conflict
April 2014	US-Philippines Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) signed, ushering in a 10-year mutual defence partnership	US, Philippines governments	Increased rotation of US troops aimed at restraining China; Philippines provides US access to bases; US provides intelligence to Philippines
July 2016	Permanent Court of Arbitration in Hague rejects most of China’s claims, terms its ‘9-dash line’ illegal	Permanent Court of Arbitration, China	Further loss of face for China, which trashes the judgment and even particular judges; other countries also reject Chinese claims in SCS.
April 2019	Thitu island incursions by China	More than 200 Chinese ships	China-Philippines tensions increase
February 2020	China appears to threaten use of force in Spratly Islands	Chinese naval ship aims its gun control director at Filipino warship	China asserts claims aggressively; its administrative steps invite condemnation
March 2021	China closes in on Whitsun Reef, part of the Philippines’ EEZ, with 200 ships	China, Philippine governments	US Vice President Kamala Harris visits Manila
August 2023	China releases ‘Ten Dash Line’ map, which includes all of Taiwan and Spratly Islands as China territory	Chinese government	Regional condemnation of China
June 2024	Second Thomas Shoal supply disruption, Chinese ships repeatedly ram Philippines’ boats; Filipino soldier injured	Chinese ships, Philippines’ boats	Major escalation in the China-Philippines naval dispute
August 2024	Chinese ship rams into Philippines’ ship at Sabina Shoal	Chinese ship, Philippines’ ship
Nov-Dec 2024	China Coast Guard ship 5901 deployed near Zambales	Chinese Coast Guard	Philippines considering whether to go to UNCLOS again

Source: Author’s own, using various open sources

The Philippines’ Multifaceted Advantages

Rodrigo Duterte, who succeeded Aquino as president, initially faced less Chinese hostility, as he sought to strengthen ties with China, while distancing the Philippines from US policies in the Indo-Pacific. However, the cordiality proved short-lived. As Duterte refused to budge on the Philippines’ territorial claims in the SCS, especially after the Permanent Court of Adjudication’s judgment of July 2016 that trashed China’s Nine-Dash Line claim,^[i] Chinese military harassment of the Philippine Navy resumed.^[48]

These confrontations have continued since President Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos Jr. took over from Duterte in 2022. Indeed, Marcos Jr. has adopted a more pro-US stance than Duterte and taken a harder line against China. Bilateral relations have deteriorated under his leadership, with a corresponding rise in Chinese military harassment of the Philippines.

One of the main advantages for the Philippines in its dispute with China is that it is a treaty ally of the US, and successive US presidents have affirmed that this treaty covers its dispute in the SCS, including the BRP Sierra Madre.^[49] Even President Donald Trump doubled down on this relationship during his first term, saying that he considered the Philippines “the most prime piece of real estate from a military standpoint.”^[50] Trump’s senior aides, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and National Security Advisor Mark Waltz, are active supporters of the Philippines; Admiral Samuel Paparo, who heads the United States Indo-Pacific Command (US INDPACOM), has even suggested that US forces could escort the Philippines’ resupply missions—which are often harassed by the CCG—if needed.^[51] So far, Manila has not asked for active US military help, though the US continues to support its capability enhancements, holding joint naval exercises with it while enhancing its own defence readiness and increasing access to nearby bases. US-led patrols continue in the region, emphasising Freedom of Navigation Operations, putting constraints on China’s ambitions.^[52]

Another preferred strategy for Manila is legal recourse, especially after its success in the case it lodged with UNCLOS in 2013. As Chinese vessels repeatedly harass its Coast Guard vessels, the Philippines has threatened to approach the international court again.^[53] China is alarmed, and has warned the Philippines against doing so.^[54]

The Philippines has also been enhancing its defence infrastructure and weapons systems. For one, the grounded, dilapidated BRP Sierra Madre has received reinforcements and structural enhancements.^[55] China has been waiting nearly 25 years for the old, rusty ship to eventually break apart and float away from the reef; however, in multiple clandestine moves, the Philippines has been repairing it, and it now stands in better shape, increasing China’s frustrations. The Philippines has also been acquiring some of the latest weaponry, including fighter aircraft, new and second-hand naval vessels, and anti-ship missiles. It has bought 12 South Korean FA-50 light fighter aircraft (delivered by 2017), and also received second-hand C-130 transport aircraft from its allies. It is also likely to soon get 40 additional advanced fighter aircraft.^[56] The Philippine Navy has received three former US Coast Guard Hamilton-class cutters, and bought three new landing platform docks from Indonesia and two frigates from South Korea. The US Military Assistance Programme is also playing a role in vessel transfers to the navy.

The Philippines has also improved its missile capability, especially of the anti-ship variety. It has bought a number of missiles from different sources, the most significant being Brahmos supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles from India. So far, three Brahmos missile batteries have been delivered to its India-trained marine operators, presumably in the Zambales, Luzon, and Calayan provinces. It is negotiating to buy another nine Brahmos missile batteries, which would raise the heat in the SCS. These missiles, deployed from Calayan to Palawan Islands, will have the area from the Taiwan Strait to the Spratly Islands within their range. China realises that any hostile action from its side could trigger a forceful response.

Passive vs. Active Conflict

China’s military manoeuvres in the region may appear as direct threats to its smaller neighbours, but the situation is more complex. China primarily uses its sabre-rattling to score political points, aiming to compel regional adversaries to seek diplomatic dialogue and a sort of modus vivendi with it. While this may affect trade with these countries, it serves two military purposes: it tests the reactions and preparedness of adversaries; with smaller states, the constant harassment tends to exhaust their resources, demonstrating to them the futility of engaging in confrontation with China.

Each instance of harassment sets a new baseline and creates a new normal that helps China enlarge its territorial claims. Therefore, even China does not have strong incentives to initiate an active conflict,^[57] which would disrupt this apple cart. The Philippines is a treaty ally of the US, while Taiwan is covered through the TRA. An active conflict with either of them would invariably draw international attention and a US military response.

Most states in the region would offer moral and diplomatic support to China’s adversary as they all fear a similar outcome in their own cases. The US and other global powers could gain in this changed geopolitical realignment as smaller states would coalesce towards them. The relevance of minilaterals such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), and Australia-UK-US (AUKUS)^[j] among others, would increase, invariably harming China and making it a regional villain.

Further, China remains uncertain of its ability to confront US military power. It has made advances, not only with its navy, but also in every kind of material and weapons systems development, be it aerospace, drones, electromagnetic warfare, and cyberspace. Yet its conventional military capabilities, particularly in subsurface warfare, combat aviation, and other traditional domains, remain relatively weak. Many of China’s military assets are untested in combat; indeed, its multiple military exports have been getting rejected by buyers. China would further be required to fight amphibious and urban wars, especially if it invades Taiwan. These are two combat capabilities, where the PLA cannot yet claim much efficiency.

Since 2023, the PLA has also been undergoing an extensive anti-corruption drive in which more than 15 top officials, including defence ministers and two Central Military Commission (CMC) members, have so far been indicted.^[58] The crackdown has created chaos and disgruntlement, which has reduced President Xi Jinping’s trust in the PLA’s higher command leadership. Xi has instituted structural reforms in the PLA by creating new branches. As a result, the joint combat philosophy and interoperability he had introduced in the PLA during a major restructuring in 2015, appears not to have stabilised yet.

Finally, the Chinese economy too, has cooled in the last few years, and handling domestic socio-economic problems arising out of the slowing economy, growing international de-coupling efforts, and high levels of unemployment, warrant the exclusive focus of the Chinese leadership. The return of President Trump has further enhanced China’s discomfort and apprehension. As a result, the Chinese political leadership remains cautious about using the PLA in regional conflicts.

Arms Race in East Asia

China’s harassment of smaller maritime neighbours and the consequent pushback have intensified regional security dynamics. Crucial trends include the strengthening of coast guard forces by its neighbours, accelerated acquisition of advanced weapon systems, an emerging arms race in the region, and the rise of various minilaterals where smaller states have banded together to deter China.

The Philippines, South Korea, Malaysia, and Vietnam are all expanding their coast guard forces and substantially augmenting their brown water defence capabilities through new vessel acquisitions and weapons system inductions, as well as by enhancing their human resource and logistical components. They increasingly participate in joint naval exercises with the US, Japan, and India. The Balikatan military exercise between the US and the Philippines in April-May 2024 stands out as a notable example, as it took place outside the territorial waters of the Philippines, and the sheer size of participating troops, the range of operations and the new weapons systems deployed signalled a challenge to Chinese claims in the region.

The rise of minilateral organisations further reflects the region’s fluid security landscape. Confidence in multilateral institutions for conflict resolution, particularly in the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), has declined, given its prolonged delay—the negotiations started in 2018 and are still continuing—in evolving a Code of Conduct in the SCS, and other protracted peace-building initiatives, largely due to conflict of interest of its members. Smaller states are increasingly hedging against China, adopting both internal and external balancing measures to strengthen their security. Consequently, an arms race is accelerating in the region, with states purchasing cutting-edge missiles, warships, coast guard cutters, and air defence assets to counter China.

 

Conclusion

China’s military capabilities have grown over the recent years, with visible advancements across all domains. The PLA has showcased these capabilities to demonstrate its ability to conduct joint operations of its various wings along its periphery, as well as in distant regions where China’s national interests are at stake. At the same time, China’s leadership has largely chosen to flaunt its combat capabilities and issue indirect threats rather than cross the threshold into active conflict.

Similarly, launching an active conflict in its near seas—against Taiwan, the Philippines, or any other of its smaller neighbours—does not appear advantageous to China’s political and military elite. China has made incremental territorial gains through constant skirmishes, naval harassment, and other below-the-brink tactics. This has given China increasing control over numerous islands and expanded its influence in its adjacent waters. Hence, China would prefer to advance along the same path rather than jeopardise its gains through a full-blown war. Unless the security environment in the region changes dramatically, affecting China’s national security, the possibility of an active conflict against Taiwan or the Philippines remains low.

Endnotes

• International Affairs
• China Military
• China
• The Pacific, East and Southeast Asia
• below the brink military strategy
• below the threshold strategy china
• china military aspirations
• china military capabilities
• china relations with neighbouring countries
• china's gray zone tactics
• chinese grey zone warfare tactics
• foreign relations of china
• gray zone warfare china

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