Introduction

Unconditional cash transfers (UCTs) to women—considered as a mechanism for social welfare—have emerged as a popular electoral strategy among state governments in India to mobilise female voters. During the 2025 Delhi assembly election, for example, female voter turnout reached 60.92 percent—exceeding the male turnout of 60.21 percent for the first time in the country’s history.^[1] Analysts have attributed the turnout to so-called “competitive welfarism”, with both the incumbent government and opposition parties announcing monthly cash transfers for women. Since the election, the Delhi government has launched “Mahila Samriddhi Yojana”, a cash transfer programme that offers INR 2,500 per month for women ages 18 to 60 with an annual household income of less than INR 3 lakh.^[2]

At present, nearly 15 states and Union Territories (UTs) run such programmes (see Table 4). The number has grown over the past two years, and more states are expected to adopt similar schemes.^[3] UCTs now reach one-fifth of India’s adult female population, according to a recent estimate by the private sector bank, Axis Bank.^[4] Recent elections in states like Maharashtra and Jharkhand, where women voters have outnumbered men, show that cash transfers are driving up either female voter turnout or the vote share of incumbent or opposing parties.^[5],[6]

The widespread adoption of UCTs is linked with a number of interrelated factors. The first is the expanding influence of women voters on electoral outcomes. In the 2024 Lok Sabha election, of the 642 million total voters, 312 million were women.^[7] The gender gap in voting—pronounced until around two decades ago—has  closed, with female voter turnout rising due to improved literacy, media access, voter enrolment drives by the Election Commission, efforts by civil society and women’s organisations, and greater grassroots collectivisation.^[8] With the rise of women as a political force, parties have customised welfare policies for women. This is reinforced by a broader policy framework, both globally and in India, where women are seen as recipients of welfare under what is referred to as the “patriarchal welfare state”.^[9]

The second factor is the adoption of digital public infrastructure for social welfare and subsidies, which has improved efficiency, transparency, and accountability in welfare delivery by national and state governments.^[10] Female beneficiaries of Direct Benefit Transfer (DBT)—under which benefits from 325 programmes nationally are transferred directly into beneficiaries’ bank or postal accounts—report positive outcomes, including increased household savings and disposable incomes, improved children’s education, stable household food supply, and better health outcomes.^[11]

The third factor is the marginalisation of women from all levels of economic participation in the country. Such a phenomenon stems from a lack of access to the formal economy and essential productive resources like credit, land, and assets; the excessive burden of unpaid care work; and prevalent gender biases and norms that exclude women from employment, education, and skills development. Indeed, women in India are disproportionately affected by poverty compared to men, and a majority of women who work are in insecure, low-wage jobs.^[12] The annual Periodic Labour Force Survey (2023-24) shows that women’s participation in rural India in regular salaried employment has fallen from 10.5 percent in 2017-18 to 7.8 percent in 2023-24.^[13] Given these constraints, UCTs offered by state governments—though modest, ranging from INR 1,000 to INR 2,500 per month—provide essential support to beneficiaries.

This brief argues that UCT programmes play an essential role in India’s political economy. It sets the context for the debate on basic income for poverty eradication and inclusive growth, and explains how states have adopted a “UBI for women”, which was proposed by the Economic Survey of India in 2016-17. The brief outlines state programmes that offer UCTs to low-income women, along with targeting and exclusion criteria and crucial trends. It reviews emerging research on impacts on households, economic well-being, and gender equality and concludes with a summary of potential drawbacks and opportunities. The analysis is based on secondary literature and interviews with key stakeholders.

Universal Basic Income: The Context for Developing Countries

The scaling up of cash transfers in India aligns with the rise of social cash transfers in the Global South, across countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, as an instrument for combating poverty. This is referred to as the “entitlement revolution”, as cash transfers reframe the relationship between citizens and the state, and enable the poor to become rights-bearing citizens.^[14] The COVID-19 pandemic served as a catalyst for cash transfers, which were scaled up in 186 countries, reaching one in every six people worldwide in 2020.^[15]

Studies from low- and middle-income countries show that both conditional and unconditional cash transfers targeting women can enhance household well-being and food security while also enhancing women’s economic empowerment. These outcomes include increased income generation, greater labour market participation, enhanced control over resources, and a stronger role in economic household decision-making.^[16]

Cash transfers, both conditional and unconditional, contribute to accelerating progress on multiple Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (see Tables 1 and 2).

Table 1: Conditional Vs. Unconditional Cash Transfers

Types of Transfer	Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs)	Unconditional Cash Transfers (UCTs)
Modality	Transfers given if recipients fulfill certain conditions, like minimum attendance of children in school, or performing regular health check-ups.	Transfers given without any conditions. There is no attempt to influence individual or household preferences.
Goals	Promote long-term gains in education and health goals.	Provide immediate financial support towards poverty alleviation.
Potential drawbacks	May end up reinforcing gendered division of labour by targeting women as mothers and caregivers.	Commonly perceived as “handouts” or “freebies”, there is a risk of short-term impact, of fostering culture of dependency, and being misused as a political tool.

Source: Author’s own

Table 2: Cash Transfers and SDGs

Sustainable Development Goals	Cash Transfers-Linked Targets
SDG 1 (No poverty)	Reduce the proportion of women and children living in poverty.
SDG 2 (Zero hunger)	Address nutritional needs of women and children.
SDG 3 (Health and well-being)	Improve access to healthcare and support better health outcomes.
SDG 4 (Quality education)	Enable families to invest in children's education.
SDG 5 (Gender equality)	Empower women through direct access to income and resources.
SDG 6 (Clean water and sanitation)	Support household access to services like clean water and sanitation.
SDG 8 (Decent work and economic growth)	Promote inclusive economic participation.
SDG 10 (Reduced inequalities)	Improve access to basic needs, essential services and human capital investments.

Source: Author’s own

India has a mixed approach with both conditional and unconditional cash transfers offered by national and state governments. These can be broadly categorised under schemes for the girl child, education, maternity and family benefits, social protection, female empowerment, and farmer welfare (see Table 3).

Table 3: Key CCTs and UCT Initiatives in India 

Types of Transfer	Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs)	Unconditional Cash Transfers (UCTs)
National-level initiatives	Janani Suraksha Yojana (launched in 2005) – The largest CCT programme in the world, it aims to reduce maternal and neonatal mortality by providing cash incentives to promote institutional births.                         Pradhan Mantri Matru Vandana Yojana (launched in 2017, replaced an existing scheme from 2010) – Financial support for pregnant and lactating mothers to improve the health and nutrition for mother and child as well as compensation for wage loss, if any.	PM-KISAN (launched in 2019) – Income support to small and marginal land-holding farmer families in three instalments per year. It aims to ensure economic stability and encourage agricultural productivity.       Indira Gandhi National Old Age Pension Scheme (launched in 2007, replaced an existing scheme from 1995) – A pension scheme designed to provide monthly financial assistance to elderly individuals living below the poverty line.
State-level initiatives	Bhagyalakshmi Scheme, Karnataka (launched in 2006) – Financial assistance to the girl child through her mother/father/guardian, subject to certain conditions. The scheme offers benefits like health insurance, annual scholarships, and financial assistance for marriage.       Mukhya Mantri Shramik Seva Prasuti Sahayata Yojana, Madhya Pradesh (launched in 2018) –Maternity support to pregnant women over 18 years of age who are registered as unorganised workers.             Kalyana Lakshmi, Telangana (launched in 2014) – Monetary assistance to parents subject to conditions; the aim is to prevent child marriage.	Gruha Lakshmi, Karnataka (launched in 2023) – Unconditional monthly financial support to women to empower them and raise their standard of living.         Ahaar Anudan Yojana, Madhya Pradesh (launched in 2017) –Unconditional monthly assistance to tribal women to support nutritional security.       Rythu Bharosa, Telangana (launched in 2019, replacing an existing scheme from 2018) – Formerly called Rythu Bandhu, a bi-annual cash disbursal to farmer families.

Source: Author’s own

Note: This list is representative and not exhaustive, meant to highlight key policy considerations.

The Case for UBI for Women

The spread of UCTs by state governments has added traction to the argument for implementing UBI in India. UBI is a mechanism for income support intended to reach all (or a very large portion of the population) with minimal conditions, if at all.^[17] Its appeal lies in reducing exclusion errors and lowering administrative costs by eliminating eligibility verification. India’s own experience shows that targeting can be inefficient and inequitable, although digital technology has improved the management of social registries.^[18],[19]

Since 2016-17, the Economic Survey of India^[20] has provided a detailed roadmap for adopting UBI, arguing that it would be feasible in India if pegged at modest levels, still delivering welfare gains. It estimated an annual transfer of INR 7,620 in 2016-17 (to be adjusted for inflation annually) to 75 percent of the population to achieve quasi-universality and eradicate poverty. The Survey advocated for gradually replacing existing public programmes like the Public Distribution System (PDS) and the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) to create fiscal space for UBI.^[21] While advocating UBI’s potential to reduce misallocation, leakage, and exclusion errors, it also acknowledged the risks associated with phasing out programmes like the PDS and MGNREGA on food security and the labour market.

The Survey provided a middle ground by endorsing a “UBI for women.”^[22] It acknowledged the barriers for women in employment opportunities, education, health, and financial inclusion, as well as the multiplier effects of investing in women at the household level. Most importantly, it would reduce the fiscal cost of financing a UBI to about half the population. It is this argument that has been remodelled and adopted by state governments, which offer a quasi-UBI for women.

While the model proposed by the Survey has not been tested at the national level, targeted transfers by state governments are inspired by the “UBI for women” argument. However, unlike a true universal basic income, these schemes include multiple exclusion criteria. Across states, female beneficiaries are identified based on income and age, with government employees and income tax payees typically excluded. Though there are gaps in targeting welfare and subsidies around the world, there is consensus that in developing countries, targeting can be more effective than universal allocation. A 2018 study using data from Indonesia and Peru showed that in developing countries, targeted transfers lead to higher welfare gains than universal programmes, as they deliver higher transfers to the poor for a given programme budget.^[23]

Programmes by State Governments

Goa was the first state to offer targeted UCTs, aimed at addressing “spiraling prices and to provide support to the housewives/homemakers from middle, lower middle and poor section of the society, support married women,” according to the state website.^[24] Beginning in 2020, other states started adopting the model. Assam introduced UCTs for women in late 2020, followed by West Bengal in early 2021—ahead of their respective assembly elections. These schemes were strategically timed to enhance female voter participation. Since 2023, the introduction of UCTs by various states has been closely aligned with elections, demonstrating the link between policy rollout and election outcomes. Table 4 outlines programme details along with targeting and exclusion criteria.

Table 4: Targeted UCTs by State Governments

Number	State	Programme	Target Beneficiaries	Exclusion Criteria	Monthly benefits
1.	Goa	Griha Aadhar (launched in 2013)	Must be married, including widows, divorced and abandoned women.   Permanent resident for at least 15 years.	Household income below INR 3 lakh per annum.   Must not be employed by government or spouse employed by government.	INR 1,500
2.	Assam	Orunodoi Scheme (launched in 2020)	Women ages 18 and above.   Permanent resident.	Household income below INR 2 lakh per annum.	INR 1,250
3.	West Bengal	Lakshmir Bhandar (launched in 2021)	Women ages 25 to 60 years.   Permanent resident.   Must be enrolled under ‘Swasthya Sathi' health scheme.	Must not be employed by government.	INR 1,200 (SC/ST) INR 1,000 (General and other categories)
4.	Madhya Pradesh	Mukha Mantri Ladli Behna Yojana (launched in 2023)	Women ages 23 to 60 years.   Must be married, including widows, divorced and abandoned women.	Must not be employed by government or be a taxpayer.   Household income below INR 2.5 lakh per annum.	INR 1,250
5.	Karnataka	Gruha Lakshmi (launched in 2023)	Women must be listed as head of the family on the ration card.	Must not be taxpayer or filer of GST returns.	INR 2,000
6.	Tamil Nadu	Kalaignar Magalir Urimai Thittam (launched in 2023)	Women ages 21 and above.   Permanent resident.	Household income below INR 2.5 lakh per annum.   Land-holding women should own no more than 5 Acre of irrigated land or 10 acres of non-irrigated land.   Annual electricity consumption of family must be below 3600 units.
7.	Telangana	Mahalakshmi scheme (launched in 2023)	Woman must be listed as head of family or household.   Scheme is bundled with free bus travel and subsidy of INR 500 for gas cylinder.	Household income below INR 2 lakh per annum.   Must not be employed by government or be a taxpayer.	INR 2,500
8.	Chhattisgarh	Mahatari Vandan Yojana (launched in 2024)	Women ages 21 to 60 years.   Must be married, including widows, divorced and abandoned women.	Must not be employed by government or be a taxpayer or hold public office.	INR 1,000
9.	Jharkhand	Maiya Samman Yojana (launched in 2024)	Women ages 18 to 50 years.   Permanent resident.	Must not be employed by government or be a taxpayer.   Must not get benefits of other social security pension schemes by government.	INR 2,500
10.	Maharashtra	Mukhya Mantri Majhi Ladki Bahin Yojana (launched in 2024)	Women ages 21 to 65 years.	Household income below INR 2.5 lakh per annum.   If family member has a four-wheeler (excluding a tractor) registered in their name.   If family member is a present or former MP/MLA.	INR 1,500
11.	Odisha	Subhadra Yojana (launched in 2024)	Women ages 21 to 60 years.   Permanent resident.   To incentivise digital transactions by women, the scheme offers additional INR 500 to 100 women in every Gram Panchayat/Urban Local body with highest number of transactions.	Household income below INR 2.5 lakh per annum.     Must not be owner of a 4-wheeler motor vehicle except tractors, mini-trucks, small commercial vehicle.	Total INR 50,000 over a period of 5 years (INR 10,000 annually between 2024-25 to 2028-29)
12.	Himachal Pradesh	Indira Gandhi Pyari Behna Sukh Samman Nidhi Yojana (launched in 2024)	Women ages 18 to 59 years.   Permanent resident.	Must not be employed by government or be a taxpayer monk permanently staying in monasteries.   Contractual employees, daily wagers, part-time employees, anganwadi workers and helpers, Asha workers, mid-day meal workers, and monks living in Buddhist monasteries are excluded.	INR 1,500
13.	Delhi	Mahila Samriddhi Yojana (to be launched)			INR 2,500
14.	Haryana	Lado Lakshmi Yojana (to be launched)			INR 2,100
15.	Andhra Pradesh	Aadabidda Nidhi Scheme (to be launched)			INR 1,500

Source: Axis Bank Economic Research;^[25] author’s own.

State Schemes: Key Trends

Labelled Vs. Unlabelled Transfers

Assam is an outlier as the only state with a “labelled” cash transfer programme. While the transfer is unconditional, labelling guides recipients on how to spend the money. For example, the Orunodoi scheme suggests INR 400 for procuring medicines, INR 200 for pulses, and INR 150 for fruits and vegetables, implicitly promoting household spending on health and nutrition. There are no comparative studies yet to know if the model in Assam is more effective than those in other states. However, a 2014 study from Morocco found that labelled cash transfers tied to education were more effective than conditional cash transfers in improving school participation and learning.^[26]

Financing Basic Income Transfers 

A 2024-25 PRS Legislative Research report showed that nine states budgeted over one lakh crore rupees for implementing these programmes.^[27] Karnataka and Maharashtra were the highest spenders, while Assam and Chhattisgarh were among the lowest. Concerns about fiscal sustainability are growing but lie beyond this brief’s scope. In Punjab, the administration has raised concerns about the burden on the exchequer, though the government committed to providing INR 1,100 per month to women before the assembly election in the state.^[28]

Promoting Women’s Empowerment

All UCT programmes are accompanied by messaging on promoting gender equality and poverty eradication by state governments. Maharashtra, for example, prioritises women’s health, nutrition, and decision-making within the family. Madhya Pradesh promotes UCTs on the basis of the health and nutrition of women and children. West Bengal, meanwhile, advocates for making women financially independent. For its part, Tamil Nadu highlights the economic value of women’s work and the need to acknowledge and recognise the unquantified efforts of women.

Mothers, Wives, Sisters, and Daughters

Programme names such as “Ladli Behna”, “Majhi Ladki Bahin Yojana”, “Gruha Lakshmi”, “Lakshmir Bhandar”, and “Maiya Samman”, are couched in the language of patriarchy, and emphasise women’s roles as mothers, wives, sisters, and daughters. It reflects the patriarchal approach of the welfare state, which emphasises women’s roles as beneficiaries rather than equal participants and rights-bearing citizens.

Early Evidence

Increased household spending: Across states, most beneficiaries use transfers for basic household expenses. According to research by Axis Bank, the boost to income for beneficiaries from UCTs is between 5 and 40 percent, leading to higher household consumption.^[29] A report by the West Bengal government on the Lakshmir Bhandar scheme found that women, as primary household runners, spent the money on groceries, vegetables, cooking oil, and cooking gas.^[30] They also used it for children’s education, family health, and investing in farming activities or small businesses. Though the amounts are small, beneficiaries—mostly from subsistence-level households—value the regular monthly payments for better spending planning. 

Compensating women for time poverty: The latest Time Use Survey (January–December 2024) highlights the acute burden of unpaid work on women, which includes domestic work and care work. It shows that Indian women spent 289 minutes a day on domestic work compared to 88 minutes for males and an additional 137 minutes a day on caregiving activities compared to 75 minutes spent by males.^[31] This unpaid work remains unrecognised and undervalued, limiting women’s participation in paid work. A study in Tamil Nadu on the Kalaignar Magalir Urimai Thittam (KMUT) scheme—the only state programme explicitly linking income transfers to unpaid work—found that beneficiaries were aware of the gendered division of labour and were eager for change.^[32] The report concludes that income transfers that bestow “freedom, dignity, pride, and respect” can help recognise, reduce, and redistribute women’s unpaid workload. Comparable to programmes that address women’s time poverty, like access to cooking gas, piped water, and toilets, they can help women renegotiate the division of labour within marriages.

Improved decision-making and self-empowerment: Gendered cash transfers around the world improve women’s decision-making power and choices in the domestic sphere, though this does not spill over in the public sphere.^[33] Improved household decision-making for women has wider consequences on household health, education, and overall family welfare. An assessment of Assam’s Orunodoi scheme found that access to cash even improved women’s bargaining power within the household, likely due to increased recognition by men of women’s contributions to household expenses, thereby reducing their economic dependence.^[34] Female beneficiaries in West Bengal reported an enhanced sense of self-worth and confidence by not having to ask for money from husbands or families.^[35]

Growth in savings: Women are committed savers, with savings in their bank accounts in India nearly 3 percent higher than those of men.^[36] A 2018 field experiment in Chhattisgarh demonstrated that receiving income directly into bank accounts improved savings behaviour.^[37] The study from Tamil Nadu showed that although the transfer amounts are modest and utilised mostly for household expenses, women were still saving small amounts like INR 200 or INR 500 with self-help groups, or investing in post office schemes or national savings certificates.^[38] Research by the State Bank of India on the Ladli Behna scheme in Madhya Pradesh showed similar trends: 87 percent of beneficiaries maintained an account balance below INR 7,500, while 13 percent had an average balance above INR 7,500, suggesting growing awareness and habit formation around savings.^[39]

Last-mile infrastructure gaps: India reports the highest number of inactive or dormant bank accounts, a majority of which belong to women. Many of these women lack financial literacy and face barriers in accessing bank accounts, including distance to banks, and lack of trust in the banking system, and restricted access to mobile phones and the internet.^[40] A report on the Gruha Lakshmi scheme in Karnataka estimated that out of 32,026 villages surveyed under Mission Antyodaya, launched in 2023, only 3,995 villages had bank access—less than 12 percent of Karnataka villages have a bank available within the village itself. This has had a direct impact on women’s access to and utilisation of resources despite receiving monthly benefits.^[41] There is a need to strengthen financial infrastructures in rural areas with a gender-focused strategy for beneficiaries.

Conclusion

UCT programmes for women, widely adopted by state governments in India, are often dismissed in popular discourse as “freebies” or “handouts”. Their increasing association with electoral outcomes has led to heightened scrutiny over potential risks, including the political manipulation of voters and the financial burden on the state exchequer. Further questions are being raised on how they provide short-term relief instead of building long-term resilience. With the high-decibel debates that surround UCTs, there has been a lack of rigorous evidence-gathering to evaluate the impact of existing programmes on women’s empowerment, well-being, and broader development outcomes.

These programmes have taken hold in a context where women face excessive barriers to economic participation and rarely have access to money. As this brief shows, targeted unconditional transfers—though modest in amount—protect women from shocks and stresses such as disease outbreaks and climate-related events. They also contribute to improving household well-being, food security, education of children, and family health, while promoting savings and enhancing women’s empowerment.

On its own, however, targeted basic income cannot lift women and families out of poverty. For the country to achieve inclusive growth and sustained poverty reduction, cash transfers must be complemented with sustained investments in robust social protection systems and expanded access to employment, education, and skills development—particularly for women.

Sunaina Kumar is Senior Fellow, Centre for New Economic Diplomacy, Observer Research Foundation.

The author thanks the Women’s Economic Empowerment team at MicroSave Consulting for sharing their insights on the subject of this brief.

Endnotes

^[1] Mallica Joshi, Jatin Anand, “Delhi Polls: In a first, Turnout of Women Voters Higher Than That of Men,” The Indian Express, February 8, 2025, https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/delhi/delhi-polls-in-a-first-turnout-of-women-voters-higher-than-that-of-men-9823972/

^[2] Saman Husain, “Delhi Clears Rs 2,500 Monthly Payout for Women, Earmarks Rs 5,100 Crore,” The Indian Express, March 9, 2025, https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/delhi/delhi-mahila-samridhi-yojana-provide-rs-2500-month-women-9875687/

^[3] Tushar Chakrabarty and Shrusti Singh, State of State Finances, PRS Legislative Research, November 2024, https://prsindia.org/files/budget/State_of_State_Finances-2024-25.pdf

^[4] Axis Bank, Expenditure-switching Financing Income Transfer Schemes, Axis Bank Economic Research, November 2024, https://research.axiscapital.co.in/researchPortal/Report/GetEmailReport/?code=795fe067-825c-4b5d-bffb-af6dab58776f

^[5] Vinaya Deshpande Pandit, “Women Voters: The ‘Silent Voter’ Factor in the Maharashtra Election,” The Hindu, November 24, 2024,

https://www.thehindu.com/elections/maharashtra-assembly/women-voters-the-silent-voter-factor-in-the-maharashtra-election/article68905819.ece

^[6] Sanjay Sahay, “Women Voters Outnumber Men in 85% Assembly Constituencies,” The Times of India, November 21, 2024, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/ranchi/women-voters-dominate-jharkhand-assembly-elections-with-85-outnumbering-men/articleshow/115537744.cms

^[7] “Women Voters Scripted History in 2024 Lok Sabha Polls': CEC Rajiv Kumar,” Money Control, June 3, 2024, https://www.moneycontrol.com/elections/lok-sabha-election/women-voters-scripted-history-in-2024-lok-sabha-polls-cec-rajiv-kumar-article-12739346.html

^[8] Praveen Rai, “Electoral Participation of Women in India: Key Determinants and Barriers,” Economic and Political Weekly, January 15, 2011, https://www.csds.in/uploads/custom_files_new/1529066526_Electoral%20Participation%20of%20Women%20in%20India.pdf

^[9] Carole Pateman, “The Patriarchal Welfare State: Women and Democracy” (Paper Presented at a Seminar at the Center for European Studies on March 13,1987), http://bev.berkeley.edu/ipe/Pateman%20the%20Patriarchal%20Welfare%20State.pdf

^[10] Cristian Alonso et al., “Stacking up the Benefits: Lessons from India’s Digital Journey,” International Monetary Fund, no. 078, March 31, 2023,  https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2023/078/article-A001-en.xml

^[11] MicroSave Consulting, DBT Diagnostic Study: Female Beneficiaries’ Experience of Receiving DBT, September 2022, https://www.microsave.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/221110_DBT-diagnostic-study-Female-beneficiaries-experience-of-receiving-DBT.pdf

^[12] Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Government of India, Women and Men in India 2022 (New Delhi: Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, 2022), https://mospi.gov.in/sites/default/files/publication_reports/women-men22/ParticiptionEconomy22.pdf

^[13] Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Government of India, Annual Report 2023-2024: Periodic Labour Force Survey (New Delhi: Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, 2024), https://www.mospi.gov.in/sites/default/files/publication_reports/AnnualReport_PLFS2023-24L2.pdf

^[14] Lutz Leisering, The Global Rise of Social Cash Transfers: How States and International Organizations Constructed a New Instrument for Combating Poverty (Oxford University Press, 2018), https://academic.oup.com/book/7171/chapter-abstract/151773057?redirectedFrom=fulltext

^[15] Ugo Gentilini, Cash Transfers in Pandemic Times: Evidence, Practices, and Implications from the Largest Scale Up in History, World Bank Group, 2022, https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099800007112236655/pdf/P17658505ca3820930a254018e229a30bf8.pdf

^[16] “Designing Financial Services and Social Protection Programs to Enhance Women’s Economic Empowerment,” Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab, February 2021,

https://www.povertyactionlab.org/policy-insight/designing-financial-services-and-social-protection-programs-enhance-womens-economic

^[17] Maura Francese and Delphine Prady, “What is Universal Basic Income,” International Monetary Fund, December 2018, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fandd/issues/2018/12/what-is-universal-basic-income-basics

^[18] Alan Gelb and Anit Mukherjee, Digital Technology in Social Assistance Transfers for COVID-19 Relief: Lessons from Selected Cases, Center for Global Development, September 2020,  https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/digital-technology-social-assistance-transfers-covid-19-relief-lessons-selected-cases.pdf

^[19] Sunaina Kumar, Strengthening Digital Financial Inclusion in Government-to-Person Payments to Women: Lessons for Emerging Economies, T20 India, 2023, https://t20ind.org/research/strengthening-digital-financial-inclusion-in-government-to-person-payments-to-women-lessons-for-emerging-economies/

^[20] India Budget, Ministry of Finance, Government of India, Economic Survey 2016-17 (New Delhi: Ministry of Finance), https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/budget2017-2018/es2016-17/echap09.pdf

^[21] India Budget, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey 2016-17

^[22] India Budget, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey 2016-17

^[23] Rema Hanna and Benjamin A. Olken, Universal Basic Incomes vs. Targeted Transfers: Anti-Poverty Programs in Developing Countries, Harvard Kennedy School, HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series RWP18-024, August 2018, https://www.hks.harvard.edu/publications/universal-basic-incomes-vs-targeted-transfers-anti-poverty-programs-developing#:~:text=The%20results%20suggest%20that%2C%20despite,higher%20transfers%20to%20the%20poor.

^[24] Directorate of Women and Child Development, Government of Goa, Government of India, Griha Aadhar Scheme (Goa: Directorate of Women and Child Development), https://dwcd.goa.gov.in/uploads/Ghrihaaadhar.pdf

^[25] “Expenditure-switching Financing Income Transfer Schemes, Axis Bank Economic Research”

^[26] Najy Benhassine et al., Turning a Shove into a Nudge? A “Labeled Cash Transfer” for Education, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, July 1, 2014, https://economics.mit.edu/sites/default/files/2022-08/Morocco_Tayssir_LCT.2014.pdf

^[27] “State of State Finances”

^[28] Vibhor Mohan, “Rs 12,000 Crore/Year Needed: Can Punjab Afford Rs 1,100 Allowance for Women?,” The Times of India, February 13, 2025, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/chandigarh/can-punjab-afford-1100-allowance-for-women/articleshow/118189032.cms

^[29] “Expenditure-switching Financing Income Transfer Schemes, Axis Bank Economic Research”

^[30]Pratichi (India) Trust, What Counts: Myriad Voices on Uses of Lakshmir Bhandar: A Collection of Case Studies, https://socialsecurity.wb.gov.in/lokkhiBhandar/storage/app/public_doc/Case%20Studies.pdf

^[31] Ministry of Statistics & Programme Implementation, Government of India, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2106113

^[32] Prabha Kotiswaran, Women’s Work, Never Done, Now Paid: Assessing Tamil Nadu’s Urimai Thogai Scheme, World Development, 2025,

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X25000324

^[33] Claire A Simon, The Effect of Cash-Based Interventions on Gender Outcomes in Development and Humanitarian Settings, UN Women, 2019, https://www.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/Headquarters/Attachments/Sections/Library/Publications/

2019/Discussion-paper-Effect-of-cash-based-interventions-on-gender-outcomes-en.pdf

^[34] Prabha Kotiswaran, “Revaluing Unpaid Work, The Case of the Orunodoi Scheme in Assam,” Economic and Political Weekly, June 25, 2022,

https://www.epw.in/journal/2022/26-27/commentary/revaluing-unpaid-work.html

^[35] “What Counts: Myriad Voices on Uses of Lakshmir Bhandar: A Collection of Case Studies”

^[36] Sonal Jaitly and Ankita Bhat, “Why Women’s Savings Don’t Translate Into Credit,” MicroSave Consulting, September 24, 2024,

https://www.microsave.net/2024/09/24/the-silent-shortfall-why-womens-savings-dont-translate-into-equal-credit/#_ftn1

^[37] Vincent Somville and Lore Vandwalle, “Saving by Default: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Rural India,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2018, https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/app.20160547

^[38] World Development, Women’s Work, Never Done, Now Paid: Assessing Tamil Nadu’s Urimai Thogai Scheme, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X25000324

^[39] “State Bank of India Research,” December 14, 2023, https://sbi.co.in/documents/13958/36530824/141223-Women+Empowerment+%26+Ladli+Behna_Dec23.pdf/af4d25d5-90a7-95ce-8480-2d3b41ea752b?t=1702555704443

^[40] Sunaina Kumar, “Financial Inclusion of Women: Current Evidence from India,” Observer Research Foundation, August 17, 2023,

https://www.orfonline.org/research/financial-inclusion-of-women-current-evidence-from-india

^[41] Anshul Rai Sharma, “The Promise of Gruha Lakshmi: Challenges of An Ambitious Scheme,” Citizen Matters, September 15, 2023, https://citizenmatters.in/gruha-lakshmi-yojana-congress-five-guarantees-direct-bank-transfer-women-health-aadhaar-bank-accounts-self-help-groups/

• Gender
• India
• cash transfers and poverty
• conditional cash transfers
• digital public infrastructure
• direct benefit transfer scheme
• mahila samriddhi yojana
• ubi for women
• uct programmes for women
• unconditional cash transfers
• unconditional cash transfers to women
• universal basic income
• universal basic income india

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