Introduction

While Beijing’s foreign policy is not focused on the Middle East—or ‘Western Asia’, the term used more frequently by the Chinese to refer to Turkey, the Levant, Iraq, Iran, and the Gulf countries—its footprint in the region is expanding. Many of the People’s Republic of China’s short-term aims, such as securing energy, have remained unchanged since the Cold War, but the country’s rise on the global stage is increasingly creating a need for a long-term strategy suited to the changing world order. Since the start of the Gaza war, Chinese diplomats have adopted a more vocal stance on Middle East issues like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, leveraging tensions with the West to boost their country’s public image and try to undermine United States dominance. This stance, however, comes with new risks and responsibilities. The strong regional presence of the US, which is increasingly engaging in global power competition with China and trying to curb its influence, presents additional limitations. The aim of this brief is to map Chinese interests in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) to better understand possible strategies for the future against the backdrop of turbulent global politics.

China uses a hierarchical system of international partnerships. Five MENA countries have comprehensive strategic partnerships with China—Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—and thus enjoy the closest relations. Israel, meanwhile, has a unique ‘innovative comprehensive partnership’, whereas the remaining countries in the region maintain various lower levels of partnership. In terms of multilateral cooperation, China has the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF), the China-GCC Strategic Dialogue with the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which includes North African countries. It has also helped expand intergovernmental organisations to the region. BRICS now includes Iran, Egypt, and the UAE, while the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) includes Iran with Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE as dialogue partners.

The rest of this brief explores China’s interests in the region: the economic basis for its partnerships; Beijing’s approach to issues of regional security; and the implications for the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy worldwide and how the MENA region plays into its larger aim of establishing a new world order.

China’s Economic Stakes in the Middle East

China’s current priorities in the Middle East are primarily economic, led by Beijing’s long-term vision for building prosperity through economic strength, and its desire to prevent another ‘century of humiliation’—the period between the devastating First Opium War and the founding of the People’s Republic of China, during which the decline of Imperial China led to subjugation by Japan and the West. The modern Chinese economy is built on manufacturing and industry, making it the world’s biggest importer of oil and natural gas, with the Middle East as a crucial source. Beyond energy, the region also provides an export market to absorb surplus Chinese goods and offers exciting investment opportunities for Chinese enterprises.

The Middle East has six of the world’s top oil-producing countries and around half of all known oil reserves.^[1] China is its largest consumer, with demand expected to increase in the next five years as the planned peak of carbon emissions in 2030 approaches, and the country scrambles to meet its ambitious output goals.^[2] In 2024, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the UAE, Oman, and Kuwait accounted for an estimated 232.56 million metric tons of Chinese oil imports, and a large amount of sanctioned Iranian oil was also imported through Malaysia and other transit hubs.^[3] Saudi Arabia was China’s top supplier until the sanctions imposed by the West in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, restructured the global energy market by reducing the demand for Russian oil, thereby making it cheaper. In 2024, Russia exported an impressive 108.5 million metric tons to China as opposed to Saudi Arabia’s 78.64 million metric tons, despite steep Saudi price cuts.^[4] For China, diversification away from Middle Eastern hydrocarbons—even to a limited extent—presents strategic advantages given US dominance in the region and the legacy of regional instability. Still, as it stands, the country is only able to decrease its dependence to a very limited extent. Gas imports reflect a similar trend to oil, while cooperation on nuclear and other forms of energy, like hydrogen, is increasing.

China’s ability to continuously expand its economy is the root of its global power, and domestic overcapacity makes it critical to secure export markets abroad. Despite the common perception that the vast majority of its economic ties with the Middle East are related to energy imports, Chinese exports to the region reached nearly US$229 billion in 2022, compared to US$278 billion in imports.^[5] Moreover, China is a top-five source for imports in every country in the region.^[6] The region also serves as a transit hub—60 percent of China’s trade with Europe and Africa passes through the UAE alone.^[7] The trade relationship is favourable for China, as it exports a wide range of consumer and industrial products in exchange for the region’s hydrocarbons, and plays an outsized role in the local economies. The trade balance is more concerning for Middle Eastern countries, especially those looking to build post-hydrocarbon economies. And while the affordability of Chinese products is good for consumers, local companies often cannot compete with China’s economies of scale. These tensions have prevented China from securing a beneficial free trade agreement (FTA) with any local country, despite negotiations on a China-GCC FTA underway since 2004.^[8]

Figure 1: China’s Trade Footprint in the Middle East

Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace^[9]

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched in 2013 propelled China to become the primary foreign investor in the Middle East by 2016—a position it has held on to since.^[10] While BRI investments were initially focused on the energy sector, they have since expanded to include infrastructure projects like desalination plants or railways and eventually technology like 5G mobile networks or artificial intelligence, much of which is dual-use technology. Western investors work within extensive regulatory frameworks, seek external financing, and are slow to conclude agreements, so Chinese companies have filled the gap. To be sure, these investments have sometimes been met with US pressure—in December 2023, for example, major Abu Dhabi AI company G42, which is led by the country’s national security adviser, suddenly announced that it would divest from its extensive cooperation with Chinese companies and instead sign a major deal with Microsoft following negotiations between the UAE and the US.^[11] Still, China has generally been successful in portraying itself as an essential partner for local countries, and in some cases, even pushing others out.^[12] It has also secured investments from the richer Gulf countries. Several Gulf sovereign wealth funds have significant Chinese investments—in 2022, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, one of the world’s largest sovereign wealth funds, joined the top 10 shareholders in Shenhua Energy, China’s biggest coal company.^[13]

Chinese Security Interests in the Region

Although China has extensive economic ties to the Middle East, Beijing has generally been careful not to become embroiled in the region’s conflicts or come in direct competition with the United States, which still dominates the region militarily. The Indian Minister of External Affairs, S. Jaishankar, summed it up as follows: “For the last 20 years, the United States has been fighting but not winning in the Middle East, and China has been winning but not fighting in the Middle East.”^[14] Still, China has security interests in the region, and it is taking an increasingly bold approach to the region’s security issues. Mediation is one front, with Beijing playing a key role in securing agreements between Saudi Arabia and Iran and between the Hamas and Fatah Palestinian factions in the past two years.

China’s dependence on Middle Eastern hydrocarbons makes it necessary to protect energy production and ensure its safe transportation to China, as well as other global shipping. While it was unwilling to directly intervene in the Red Sea crisis following the outbreak of the Gaza war in October 2023, the Chinese reportedly negotiated safe passage for Chinese ships.^[15] Chinese business relies heavily on the security infrastructure propped up by the United States to protect their interests, but the nation also maintains a naval base with 200 marines in Djibouti at the strait connecting the Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea for anti-piracy operations. It has even sponsored a joint maritime force with Saudi Arabia, Iran, the UAE, and Oman—although it has yet to commit ships to the effort.

While combatting terrorism is in the interest of the entire international community, it is especially important for China because of its concerns that a rise in terrorism—especially the Islamic terrorism prevalent since the 2004 US invasion of Iraq— ­­­­­­­­­­­­­could spark an escalation in the Muslim Uyghur majority’s use of jihad against the government in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region in western China. Such a conflict could destabilise the region and undermine China’s reputation abroad.^[16] Uyghur fighters from the Chinese mainland are present throughout the Middle East, especially in Syria, where some have even been given positions in the new government due to their role in toppling the Assad regime and their longstanding ties to the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham group currently in power.^[17]

The government has also alleged that al-Qaeda and other groups like the Taliban have trained, financed, and supplied Uyghur fighters with weapons.^[18] China is increasingly exposed to terrorist threats as it expands its global presence: the 2015 execution of a Chinese citizen by ISIS and the massacre of 22 by a group affiliated with al-Qaeda just days later was a wake-up call.^[19] China has been slowly adopting a more serious approach to counterterrorism, although its efforts are still in the early stages. For now, these are generally limited to the SCO, which conducts joint military exercises, cooperation in areas such as Internet surveillance, and other activities.^[20]

China is the fourth-largest arms exporter in the world, with many of these arms going to the Middle East. Unlike the West, Beijing is willing to sell military technologies including drones, fighter jets, and ballistic missile systems without domestic strings attached, making it a valuable alternative supplier. Chinese defence products also have the advantage of affordability and accessibility despite the Russo-Ukrainian and Gaza wars, which have constrained US and European sales. The Middle East’s cooperation with the Chinese could even be used as a negotiation tactic to secure deals with the West.^[21] Besides weapons, China is also exporting technology like BeiDou, a competitor to the American GPS system, for military use by local countries. While preference is still given to US defence products, China is expanding its share of the market and slowly expanding joint training programmes and defence exercises.

Some of these defence products end up in Iran, which has been dramatically weakened by Israel’s attacks on it and its proxies like Hamas and Hezbollah since the 7 October Hamas attack. China has an interest in supporting Iran’s efforts to regain its strength because it stands to benefit from a regional balance of power that is difficult to achieve without Iran as a pillar. Iran is China’s partner in countering US influence in the Middle East, and its systematic weakening could allow the American grip to strengthen. US sanctions provide an obstacle to increased cooperation, but China can use illicit trade and various forms of diplomatic support to strengthen Tehran. Support for Iran can, however, weaken China’s public image, which is in contradiction with its broader strategy.

Some analysts go as far as to characterise this strategy as one of ‘wedging’, whereby China tries to deliberately exploit divisions between the US and the countries of the Middle East to increase its own power on the global stage.^[22] Indisputably, China is trying to position itself as the champion of the Global South and the ‘coalition of the oppressed’—a posture that originates in the ideology of Mao Zedong, the founder of the People’s Republic.^[23] China seems to have learned from the so-called Arab Spring, during which it was initially reluctant to take a strong stance because it perceived the uprisings to be detrimental to its own domestic stability, leading to a loss of credibility in the eyes of local populations.^[24] When the Gaza war broke out, Chinese diplomats had a very different strategy and openly criticised Israel’s actions, reaffirming the Palestinians’ right to armed struggle as a means for self-determination, even in international institutions like the United Nations and the International Court of Justice.^[25]

Still, there have been very few concrete actions. China’s current policy thus both frustrates many Arabs in the region and causes tensions with Israel, an important trade partner. One explanation is that China sees the Gaza crisis as a setback for the reconciliation process between Israel and the Arab countries, of which it does not see itself as a benefactor because of the expected results, such as normalisation between Israel and Saudi Arabia, and the US security pact that comes with it. If achieved, this could undermine the balance of power as well as China’s efforts to create a new regional security architecture that would displace US supremacy by facilitating greater intra-regional responsibility for defence and prevent the emergence of a ‘Middle East NATO’. Such a security architecture would enable China to play an increasingly significant role without having to replace the US as a security guarantor.

An Opportunity to Expand Chinese Legitimacy

China also has an interest in promoting ties with the Middle East to boost its international legitimacy. It seeks to promote a world order more favourable to the People’s Republic of China than the existing neoliberal order led by the US—and its messaging focused on creating a more equitable world order resonates in the Arab world.^[26] Cooperation with the MENA countries allows China to familiarise more of the world with its diplomatic initiatives, and set itself apart as a leader of the future. China’s first Arab policy paper in 2016 already highlighted the consensus between China and the Arab States on state sovereignty, as well as similar positions on reforming the United Nations and the Doha Round negotiations.^[27] In more recent years, policy papers and joint declarations with MENA countries have focused on the Xi Jinping government’s new initiatives—part of Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy, the current foreign policy doctrine of the People’s Republic—namely the Global Security Initiative (GSI), the Global Development Initiative (GDI), and the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI).^[28] While these contain principles rather than concrete policies, their spread increases Chinese soft power in the diplomatic sphere.

The region is now a key source of votes for China in international forums. For example, 22 of the 30 states that supported China’s position in the 2016 Permanent International Court of Arbitration case^[a] regarding the South China Sea were Arab League members.^[29] As a whole, the Arab States support the One China Principle and are some of the few that affirm that Taiwan is an integral part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China.^[30] About 10 Middle Eastern countries also consistently defend China’s position on the Uyghur human rights issue when it comes up at the UN Human Rights Committee nearly every year. At a more practical level, cooperation with the Middle East helped legitimise BRI projects in regions where Gulf countries already have legitimacy and facilitated ambitious projects by reducing the amount of risk that any one party had to bear. In Central Asia, for instance, China and the Gulf countries cooperate on investments in the renewables market.^[31] The benefit for China is significant, since the BRI is a foundational element of Chinese foreign policy but it has been losing momentum in recent years.

A key threat to Chinese global ascendance, of course, is the increasing US-China competition. In the new Trump era, MENA countries that are especially close to China may be forced to either realign their positions in favour of the West or seek more from China to compensate for the cost of not doing so. Western pressure will only increase as China’s presence in the region grows, which means that its current strategy is greatly increasing its risks. Still, if the US continues to lose legitimacy given its stances on issues like the Palestinian question, China could gain, especially as it tries to position itself as a supporter of national sovereignty and local strategic autonomy in the eyes of the Global South. The West, of course, is not the only concern. India, for example, which is already in a strategic rivalry with China in South Asia, is also taking on a larger role in the Middle East as it rises on the global stage. It, too, has an interest in maintaining the status quo and is supporting new initiatives that threaten Chinese economic power, such as the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor.^[32]

Conclusion

Even though Beijing’s foreign policy is not focused on the Middle East, China has clear interests in the region. Given its national strategy of building prosperity through economic strength, economic interests provide the basis for its partnerships: the Middle East is a crucial source of oil and natural gas, provides an export market to absorb surplus Chinese goods, and presents funding and investment opportunities for Chinese enterprises. In terms of security, China has tried not to get embroiled in the region’s many conflicts, but its expanding footprint makes both its citizens and goods increasingly vulnerable. China also has new opportunities to engage in this sphere, even if it remains mindful to avoid perceptions that it is infringing on national sovereignty the way the US is often. Finally, China could use its engagement with the Middle East to boost its legitimacy and gain support in international forums.

As China rises on the global stage and faces significant geopolitical headwinds, its ability to adapt its Middle East playbook to maintain the current delicate balancing act will be a crucial test of its broader ambitions on the global stage. The ambitions of other countries like the US could limit its ability to expand its regional influence, especially as global power competition increases. However, it seems to also have opportunities to make strides in the current geopolitical environment, albeit with new risks. The Middle East could prove to be both an opportunity and a liability for China as it seeks to redefine its role in the world.

Endnotes

^[a] Both China and the Philippines claim the Scarborough Shoal, one of the most contested maritime features in the South China Sea. The Philippines brought the case to the Permanent Court of Arbitration following an escalation in the dispute in 2012, since which the Chinese coastguard has maintained a constant presence in the area. China did not consent to the arbitration and was supported by 30 others in opposing it, two-thirds of which were from the MENA region: Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, the State of Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the UAE, and Yemen. Despite their claims that the court lacked the necessary jurisdiction to arbitrate the case, it ultimately ruled in favour of the Philippines in 2016. Since then, 27 governments including the Philippines, India, and many OECD members have publicly called for the ruling to be respected, but many countries continue to oppose the ruling. In the MENA region, Syria has opposed it, while the others have remained silent.

^[1] Ekrem Biceroglu, Muhammed Emin Canik, Ahmet Dursun, “Middle East Plays Vital Role in Global Oil Production,” Anadolu Agency, November 8, 2023, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/economy/middle-east-plays-vital-role-in-global-oil-production/2965593.

^[2] Climate Action Tracker, “China,” September 17, 2024, https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/china/.

^[3] Chen Aizhu, “China’s Crude Oil Imports from Top Supplier Russia Reach New High in 2024,” Reuters, January 20, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/chinas-crude-oil-imports-top-supplier-russia-reach-new-high-2024-2025-01-20/.

^[4] Aizhu, “China’s Crude Oil Imports from Top Supplier Russia Reach New High in 2024”

^[5] China–Arab States Cooperation Forum, “China-Middle East Economic and Trade Cooperation Is Going to Be a Big Success!,” February 6, 2023, http://www.chinaarabcf.org/zagx/sssb/202302/t20230206_11019989.htm.

^[6] Jonathan Fulton and Michael Schuman, “China’s Middle East Policy Shift from ‘Hedging’ to ‘Wedging,’” Atlantic Council, September 5, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/chinas-middle-east-policy-shift-from-hedging-to-wedging/.

^[7] Jon Alterman, “China and the Middle East,” April 19, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-and-middle-east.

^[8] Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, “China-GCC FTA,” March 8, 2025, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/engcc.shtml.

^[9] Amr Hamzawy, “The Potential Inroads and Pitfalls of China’s Foray into Middle East Diplomacy,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 20, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2023/03/the-potential-inroads-and-pitfalls-of-chinas-foray-into-middle-east-diplomacy?lang=en.

^[10] Camille Lons, Jonathan Fulton, Degang Sun, and Naser Al-Tamimi, “China’s Great Game in the Middle East,” European Council on Foreign Affairs, October 21, 2019, https://ecfr.eu/publication/china_great_game_middle_east/.

^[11] Ben Bartenstein, Mackenzie Hawkins, Nick Wadhams, and Dina Bass, “G42 Made Secret Pact with US to Divest from China Before Microsoft Deal,” Bloomberg, April 16, 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-04-16/g42-made-secret-pact-with-us-to-divest-from-china-before-microsoft-deal.

^[12] Xia Sun, “Will China Engage More on Middle East Security?,” Middle East Council on Global Affairs, April 24, 2025, https://mecouncil.org/blog_posts/will-china-engage-more-on-middle-east-security/.

^[13] Shi Weijun, “Meeting in the Middle,” Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business, April 2, 2024, https://english.ckgsb.edu.cn/knowledge/article/meeting-in-the-middle/.

^[14] Jon Alterman, “China and the Middle East,” April 19, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-and-middle-east.

^[15] “Houthis Grant ‘Safe Passages’ for Russian, Chinese vessels amid Red Sea chaos,” New Arab, January 19, 2024, https://www.newarab.com/news/russia-china-ships-granted-safe-passage-yemens-houthis.

^[16] Mordechai Chaziza, “China’s Counter-Terrorism Policy in the Middle East,” in Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in China: Domestic and Foreign Policy Dimensions, ed. Michael Clarke (Oxford University Press, 2018), 141–156.

^[17] “Militant Uyghurs in Syria Threaten the Chinese Government,” The Economit, January 9, 2025, https://www.economist.com/china/2025/01/09/militant-uyghurs-in-syria-threaten-the-chinese-government.

^[18] Liu Xiaoxiao, “‘Dongtu’ Kongbu Zhuyi yu Zhongguo Zhengfu Duice” (“‘East Turkistan’ Terrorism and Chinese Government Countermeasures”), XueshuTansuo 10 (2004):86.

^[19] Mathieu Duchâtel, “Terror Overseas: Understanding China’s Evolving Counter-Terror Strategy,” European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2016, https://ecfr.eu/wp-content/uploads/ECFR_193_-_TERROR_OVERSEAS_UNDERSTANDING_CHINAS_EVOLVING_COUNTER_TERROR_STRATEGY.pdf.

^[20] Yamei Xue and Benjamin Mwadi Makengo, “Twenty Years of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Achievements, Challenges and Prospects,” Open Journal of Social Sciences 9 (2021): 10.

^[21] Liu Xuanzun, “Chinese Aviation Equipment Attracts Middle Eastern Interest at Dubai Airshow,” Global Times, November 14, 2023, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202311/1301817.shtml.

^[22] Jonathan Fulton and Michael Schuman, “China’s Middle East policy shift from ‘hedging’ to ‘wedging,’” Atlantic Council, September 5, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/chinas-middle-east-policy-shift-from-hedging-to-wedging/.

^[23] James Gethyn Evans, “Maoism, Anti-Imperialism, and the Third World,” Made in China, November 8, 2021, https://madeinchinajournal.com/2021/11/08/maoism-anti-imperialism-and-the-third-world/.

^[24] Ahmed Kandil, “China and the ‘Arab Spring’: A New Player in the Middle East?,” European Institute of the Mediterranean, July 5, 2012, https://www.iemed.org/publication/china-and-the-arab-spring-a-new-player-in-the-middle-east/.

^[25] Kandil, “China and the ‘Arab Spring’: A New Player in the Middle East?”

^[26] Hasan Alhasan, “Contesting the West: China’s Middle East strategy,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, June 25, 2024, https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2024/06/contesting-the-west-chinas-middle-east-strategy/.

^[27] The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s Arab Policy Paper,” January 13, 2016, https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/publications/2016/01/13/content_281475271412746.htm.

^[28] Masaaki Yatsuzuka, “Current Status of China-Middle East Relations: What Xi Jinping’s Visit to Saudi Arabia Means,” The Japan Institute of International Affairs, January 23, 2023, https://www.jiia.or.jp/en/column/2023/01/middle-east-africa-fy2022-03.html.

^[29] Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, “Arbitration Support Tracker,” July 18, 2023, https://amti.csis.org/arbitration-support-tracker/.

^[30] “Riyadh Arab-China Summit for Cooperation and Development Issues Final Communique,” Saudi Press Agency, December 9, 2022, https://www.spa.gov.sa/w1824646.

^[31] Dawud Ansari, Jacopo Maria Pepe, and Rosa Melissa Gehrung, “The Gulf States, China, and Central Asia’s Green Energy Sector,” German Institute for International and Security Affairs, January 22, 2025, https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/the-gulf-states-china-and-central-asias-green-energy-sector.

^[32] Alberto Rizzi, “The Infinite Connection: How to Make the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor Happen,” European Council on Foreign Affairs, April 23, 2024, https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-infinite-connection-how-to-make-the-india-middle-east-europe-economic-corridor-happen/.

• International Affairs
• China Foreign Policy
• China
• Middle East
• china interest in middle east
• china middle east strategy
• china partnership in middle east
• china trade with middle east
• china’s growing role in middle east
• chinese economic interest in middle east
• chinese influence in middle east
• mena countries
• mena region

The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.