As China’s two-ocean push looms large, India and the Philippines are closing ranks
Image Source: X/@indembmanila
India and the Philippines may be thousands of kilometres apart, but their shared maritime concerns, particularly China’s aggression, are bringing them closer than ever.
Under the respective governments of Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr and India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi, there has been a growing appetite for broadening and institutionalising the countries’ emerging bilateral defence partnership.
On 16 December, India and the Philippines successfully concluded their first track 1 bilateral Maritime Dialogue in Manila. The meeting was headed by Marshall Louis Alferez, the assistant secretary of Maritime and Ocean Affairs in the Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), and Muanpuii Saiawi, joint secretary for Disarmament and International Security Affairs in India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). The inaugural meeting coincided with the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two Indo-Pacific democracies. Furthermore, both sides called for “full and faithful compliance” with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the 2016 Arbitration Award. It is important to note that several developments in the bilateral security realm preceded the inaugural track 1. For instance, the fifth meeting of the India-Philippines Joint Defence Cooperation Committee (JDCC) in September was co-chaired by the defence secretaries for the first time, indicating an elevation from the joint secretaries’ level during the 2023 JDCC in Delhi. Additionally, as a push for deeper defence coordination, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Indian Coast Guard (ICG) and the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) was signed in August 2023. This maturing of state-level strategic relations highlights how both democracies are becoming more confident in going beyond basic-level engagements to more sophisticated forms of defence cooperation. These efforts are geared to better address similar challenges and pursue shared goals in the region. More importantly, the strengthening of maritime security ties between the two countries represents the highly interdependent security dynamics of the Indian Ocean and the greater South China Sea. Furthermore, closer coordination will allow both nations to address China’s unfolding two-oceans strategy, which aims to project greater power and control over the Indo-Pacific.
The strengthening of maritime security ties between the two countries represents the highly interdependent security dynamics of the Indian Ocean and the greater South China Sea.
While the balance of power in the Indian Ocean is still in India’s favour due to its geographical advantage, military capabilities, and maritime assets, China has been increasing its naval presence in the Indian Ocean over the last decade. In addition to establishing its first offshore naval base in Djibouti, China has also secured military access to ports in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka, while also investing in terminal development projects in Sudan, Kenya, and the United Arab Emirates. Moreover, Beijing has expanded its illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing activities in the Western Indian Ocean, exacerbating economic concerns for littoral countries. These disruptive activities significantly impact the Indian Ocean’s security architecture. China’s deepening military, political, and commercial engagements in the Indian Ocean aim to assert dominance in the eastern section of the Indo-Pacific. On the other side of the geographic spectrum, China’s escalatory behaviour in the West Philippine Sea centres on occupation—by exercising de facto control over key features of Philippine waters and denying access to Filipinos. While the Second Thomas or Ayungin Shoal— a submerged reef located within the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)—was initially the point of tensions between Manila and Beijing, China’s belligerence has recently shifted to the Sabina or Escoda Shoal and the Scarborough Shoal or the Bajo de Masinloc, both of which are also positioned well within the West Philippine Sea. In this context, Manila has been endeavouring to formulate a practical and effective approach to address China’s expansionism. The Philippines’ contemporary maritime security outlook is anchored on the Comprehensive Archipelagic Defence Concept (CADC), which was implemented and operationalised by its armed forces in March. The CADC provides a blueprint for the country’s armed forces and coast guard to more effectively secure the 200-nautical-mile EEZ, territorial waters, and archipelagic waters to preserve the inalienable right of every Filipino to use the resources of the West Philippine Sea. Moreover, Marcos Jr signed the Maritime Zones Law and the Archipelagic Sea Lanes Law in November to strengthen his government’s rules-based approach in the West Philippine Sea. These laws show how the Philippines’ rights over its maritime entitlements are in line with UNCLOS and the 2016 Arbitral Award. However, they also empower the PCG and Philippine military to enforce the laws within the nation’s EEZ.
The CADC provides a blueprint for the country’s armed forces and coast guard to more effectively secure the 200-nautical-mile EEZ, territorial waters, and archipelagic waters to preserve the inalienable right of every Filipino to use the resources of the West Philippine Sea.
A vital component in operationalising the CADC and maritime legislation lies in physical presence, material capabilities, and assets. This is where cooperation with like-minded partners becomes crucial for Manila. In the past two years, the Philippines has strengthened its maritime security ties with both traditional and non-traditional partners, including the United States, Japan, Australia, France, the United Kingdom, and Canada. Manila has leveraged these ties by spearheading collaborative maritime patrols and exercises in the West Philippine Sea to keep the waters free, open, and rules based. Moreover, in a bid to have one of the largest coast guards in Southeast Asia, Manila has approved the acquisition of 46 ships in total from France and Japan, which are expected to arrive within seven years. The Philippines has also been exploring ways to maximise its maritime security partnership with India. As mentioned, the past few years have witnessed considerable developments in the bilateral defence cooperation relationship. In the past few months alone, there have been several high-level interactions between both sides, with one of the most recent being a bilateral meeting between Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and Philippine Secretary of National Defence Gilberto Teodoro in November. As like-minded democracies with shared regional interests, India and the Philippines are natural partners. India, as a rising great power committed to preserving the Indo-Pacific’s rules-based order and contributing to the Global South’s security and development of the Global South, has been working to bolster its role in Southeast Asia in line with its Act East Policy. In relation to the West Philippine Sea, a rising India’s position on China’s adventurism and provocations—in the South China Sea, in general, and the West Philippine Sea, in particular—has become more pronounced.
While there has been progress, the room to deepen bilateral defence collaboration further remains quite large. Both sides need to prioritise a reinvigorated focus on capacity building, information sharing, and interoperability. For instance, by implementing the Self-Reliant Defence Posture Law in October, the Philippines intends to develop its defence manufacturing capacities. This opens opportunities for New Delhi to enhance its partnership with Manila, leveraging its experience and growing track record in technology development and defence manufacturing under the Aatmanirbhar Bharat vision. Moreover, given the Philippines’ desire to revitalise its shipbuilding industry, India can also share best practices and collaborate on building ship maintenance facilities across the West Philippine Sea to supplement Manila’s objective of increasing its maritime presence. India also has an opportunity to become a stakeholder in Southeast Asian plans to expand maritime-oriented infrastructure. In fact, Adani Ports and Special Economic Zone Limited (APSEZ Ltd) is planning to invest in a port development project in Bataan, which faces the West Philippine Sea. Amid the deepening and broadening of bilateral security relations, Manila and New Delhi must continue to explore critical areas for collaboration while institutionalising activities to ensure continuity in the long term, especially as Beijing expedites its two-oceans’ strategy in the Indo-Pacific.
This commentary originally appeared in The Print.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
Professor Harsh V. Pant is Vice President – Studies and Foreign Policy at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. He is a Professor of International Relations ...
Read More +
Don McLain Gill is a Philippines-based geopolitical analyst author and lecturer at the Department of International Studies De La Salle University (DLSU). ...
Read More +
PREV
