Exercise Sanghe Shakti, held over one week in Punjab in May 2006, was designed to test the Indian Army's new concept for offensive operations in the plains. This was the most recent in a series of annual exercises that have included Poorna Vijay (2001), Vijay Chakra, Divya Astra, Vajra Shakti (May 2005) and Desert Strike (November 2005), all of which were all aimed at concentrating and coordinating firepower and fine-tuning Army-Air Force joint operations in a strategic setting that was premised on operations in a nuclear environment. </font> </p> <p align="justify" class="greytext1"> <font size="2" class="greytext1"> </font> </p> <p align="justify" class="greytext1"> <font size="2" class="greytext1">The COAS had said during Exercise Vajra Shakti that it had been conducted with a nuclear backdrop, and that battle procedures had been refined and 'high synergy' had been achieved with the IAF. <br /> <br /> The offensive doctrine prior to Operation Parakram was to employ massive Strike Corps combat potential to advance deep into Pakistani territory to capture strategic objectives, and to bring to battle and destroy Pakistan's Army Reserve (North) and Army Reserve (South), so as to substantially degrade its war machinery. <br /> <br /> This concept was evolved in 1981-82 and tested in Exercise Digvijay when General Krishna Rao was Army Chief. It was further refined during the famous Exercise Brass Tacks IV in 1987 by General K. Sundarji as Army Chief, and was accepted as the army's offensive doctrine for war in the plains. After India's nuclear tests of May 1998, there have been several attempts to refine the army's doctrine so that it is suitable for offensive operations with a nuclear backdrop. <br /> <br /> The Indian Army's new concept of offensive operations is a combination of "cold start" - the ability to launch quick strikes across the International Boundary (IB) without prior warning by moving rapidly to battle positions from the cantonments - and integrated "battle groups". These are offensive forces formed at divisional level to penetrate across the IB over a wide front but not necessarily too deeply. <br /> <br /> The new doctrine is in marked contrast with the old concept of launching massive Strike Corps operations for deep strikes across the IB as Pakistan's nuclear threshold is perceived to be low. Achievement of the military aim in the next war in the plains, while ensuring that operations do not escalate to nuclear exchanges, poses a unique strategic challenge in the planning and conduct of defensive and offensive operations. <br /> <br /> The need to be able to mobilise quickly ("cold start") and launch multi-pronged offensives deep into Pakistan, as well as the need to mass firepower rather than forces when planning to fight in a nuclear environment, prompt the need for some fresh thinking about force structures for offensive operations. As is well known, India has three Strike Corps. Because of their massive size, the present Strike Corps are difficult to concentrate, side-step, deploy and manoeuvre and this virtually rules out surprise and deception. During Operation Parakram the Strike Corps had taken too long to move to their concentration areas. <br /> <br /> However, if the Indian Strike Corps are going to be employed only to achieve small, operational or even tactical-level gains, why have them at all? In the coming decades, Indian military genius will lie in finding a suitable via media for launching meaningful offensive operations as well maintaining strong countervailing forces. <br /> If a fleeting opportunity is to be exploited, the strike formations must be capable of launching an offensive operation from a cold start. Within 72 to 96 hours of the issue of the order for full-scale mobilisation, three to five strike division "battle groups" must cross the IB straight from the line of march. They should be launching their break-in operations and crossing the "start line" even as the holding (defensive) divisions are completing their deployment on the forward obstacles. Only such simultaneity of operations will unhinge the enemy, break his cohesion and paralyse him into making mistakes from which he will not be able to recover. <br /> <br /> One of the options that the army is reported to be considering is to split the three Strike Corps into several division-size, integrated "battle groups" of the size and capabilities of Russia's famed OMGs (operational manoeuvre groups), that were designed to be launched after a "break-in" had been affected. While one "battle group" each could be allotted to the holding (pivot) corps for providing an offensive punch to them, the others will need to be so structured that they are capable of independent action. These could also be designated as theatre and Army HQ reserves. <br /> <br /> Each one will need to be specifically structured to achieve designated objectives in the terrain in which it is expected to be launched and yet be flexible enough for two or more of them to fight dispersed under a corps HQ to bring to bear the combined weight of their combat power on a common military objective deep inside enemy territory. Hence, at least two out of the three Strike Corps HQ must be retained and should be capable of taking under command strike battle groups at short notice to achieve laid down military objectives. <br /> <br /> The "pivot" or holding Corps have been provided significant offensive capability that is now integral to them. According to the COAS, "they have been assigned roles, which are offensive as well as defensive… The decision-making has been left to theatre commanders, depending on their assessment and evaluation of the situation." If the peace time locations of offensive army formations can be changed to areas that are closer to the western border, these will be in a better position to launch trans-IB operations from the line of march to achieve surprise even as the pivot Corps to which these belong is still in the process of deploying in its defences. <br /> <br /> Only innovative measures of this type will lead to success in short and sharp future Indo-Pak conflicts that may spill over to the plains. The art of generalship will lie in achieving India's military aims quickly without crossing Pakistan's nuclear threshold, before the international community blows the whistle for a cease-fire. <br /> <br /> </font> <font size="2" class="greytext1"> <em>The writer is Director, Security Studies, and Senior Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. <br /> <br /> Source: The Tribune, June 23, 2006. <br /> </em> <br /> <br /> <em>* Views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Observer Research Foundation.</em> <br />
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