Introduction
Global growth has been markedly resilient in recent years. Despite rising trade restrictions,[a] sudden economic stops related to the COVID-19 pandemic, two hot wars in Europe and the Middle East, the energy crisis in Europe and the corollary shocks to price stability—global growth has held up reasonably well, hovering at around 3.2 percent. Even though central banks across the globe embarked upon an unprecedented monetary tightening campaign, labour markets have proven resilient, and the consumer within many societies and across income brackets has been a driving force of growth, increasingly propelling services-oriented consumption.
With the change in administration in Washington, however, investors, executives, and policymakers are asking: How long can the good times last? Can US equity markets continue their inexorable rise? Might some of the policies announced on the campaign trail actually hamper the trajectory for growth in the US? Should Trump 2.0 embark upon an escalation of tariffs, what might the impact be upon other countries, including America’s largest trading partners?
As shall be seen in this report, there are potential winners and losers from the prospective changes in trade policy. Many countries—including ‘third nations’[b] such as Japan, Singapore, India, and Vietnam—as well as companies, have navigated the rise in geo-economic fragmentation remarkably well. At the same time, the US consumer (and hence the US economy) may suffer shocks in the short, medium, and longer term.
This report also explores the key macro theme of fiscal imbalance for 2025, and beyond. Turmoil in bond markets throughout 2024 and at the start of 2025 is a clear indication that investors are repricing risk amongst record piles of debt within G7 economies. Accordingly, policymakers face a Teufelskreis—or devil’s circle—of how to balance rising levels of debt with the demands of their electorates, all while contending with the risk appetite of investors.
Related to this, as many governments are tapped out of cash, this report highlights the key investing theme for the year: the dormancy of sustainability. Whether for ideological reasons in the US, or for reasons of energy security in Europe, many governments, companies, and investors seemed to have turned their back on the green agenda. Nevertheless, the world continues to roil from the impacts of climate change—whether through an increase in the intensity and frequency of storms, or extreme temperatures, heat stress, wildfires, and flooding. As the cost of insurance skyrockets—creating effectively a carbon tax on the rich[c]—households, governments, and organisations will likely continue to face elevated costs resulting from climate change. As such, green might be ‘dormant’, but not dead; and 2025 (and perhaps the years ahead) present a potential dislocation and opportunity for investing in sustainability—a mantle currently assumed by some Asian companies—and some investors and executives armed with foresight and agility.
I. Market Moves and Macro Currents: The Outlook for Markets, Activity, Inflation, and Monetary Policy
The United States
In assessing the exuberance surrounding US equity markets, it is important to note that the top 10 percent of America own US$48 trillion worth of corporate equities and mutual fund shares (see Figure 1); meanwhile, the bottom 50 percent own US$0.48 trillion of stocks.[1] Thus, whilst animal spirits continue to soar, the trickle-down effect may not necessarily be felt by the bulk of America’s population.
Figure 1. Assets in the US, by Wealth Percentile Group (in US$ trillion, Q3 2024)
Source: US Federal Reserve[d]
Thus, there are clear social implications of using the stock market as a barometer of ‘economic dignity.’[e] While equity markets may continue their inexorable rise in 2025, the divergent fortunes between America’s richest and the bottom 50 percent of its people are likely to continue to be felt.
In considering the outlook for economic activity, growth in the US may slow to 2.3 percent for 2025. Expanding at 3 percent is about the top end of where an advanced economy can grow—and much will depend upon how the policy see-saw of the second Trump administration plays out. To what degree will some of the policies on trade and immigration touted on the campaign trail actually be implemented, and will such moves precede any changes in deregulation and tax cuts?
Certainly, there are questions as to how durable the US consumer might be should something like a universal tariff (of 10-20 percent)—or an escalation of tariffs on goods from China (to 60-100 percent)—actually be implemented. Although core inflation has receded from 40-year highs, producer prices are rising.[2] Shelter costs remain stubbornly high: the cost of housing represented nearly 40 percent of the increase in the November 2024 consumer price index.[3] With the cost of basic assets of need—such as housing—remaining historically high, there is very little room for wallets to be further stretched. One leading industry body posits that the proposed new rounds of tariffs could cost the US between US$46-78 billion in purchasing power per year.[4] Recognising that about 68 percent of US GDP growth comes from consumption,[5] the health of the US consumer remains absolutely central to the economic outlook for America.
Potential changes to US immigration policy could have deleterious impacts on the domestic economy in the short, medium, and longer term. In the short to medium term, any meaningful reduction of the US labour force has the potential to put pressure on wages, and hence may contribute to higher inflation. Should the new administration deliver upon its promises to curtail immigration, one estimation is that this would reduce employment by 0.5 percent per year, culminating in a total reduction of 5 percent.[f] Curtailing immigration could cause a shortage in workers in critical industries such as construction,[g] and in services jobs such as accommodation and hospitality. Accordingly, the Fed would then need to hold rates higher for longer: together with the prospect of an escalation of tariffs, the Fed may hold rates steady around 4.25 percent through 2025. To be sure, however, there will be knock-on effects of holding rates in a higher for longer environment, as households, corporates, funds, and the government navigate higher debt service costs.
Looking beyond these short- to medium-term effects, a meaningful curtailment of immigration in the US has the potential to negatively impact innovation. Research by Burchardi et al. actually shows that in the case of the US, immigration has had a positive impact on innovation: counties receiving higher numbers of immigrants churn out a higher number of patents over time.[6] This is especially the case for higher-skilled migrants.
Europe
The outlook for Europe remains rather bleak for 2025. In 2024, within the Eurozone’s two largest economies, a weakening economic outlook in Germany spurred a dramatic shift in the political situation; in France, political gridlock has led to heightened uncertainty within the domestic economy, and a corollary plunge in declining business investment (see Figure 2).
Figure 2. Business Climate in Information-Communication and in the Capital Goods Industry (Jan. 2015 – Dec. 2024)
Source: Insee[h]
Note: Values are standardised with mean 100.
For eurozone exporters, the external environment also remains highly uncertain as the threat of the return of tariffs from the US looms, dampening economic prospects for the European Union which has strengthened its trade ties to the US in recent years. In 2025, growth may hover at 0.6 percent in Germany, and 1.1 percent in France. On the bright side, Spain and Portugal lead the growth outlook for Europe,[7] as tourism and domestic consumption bolster both economies (sectors which are also less sensitive to a potential escalation of tariffs from Washington).
Fiscal Cliff Diving?
If 2024 was a bumper election year in which a record number of people around the world went to the polls, it is also a year marked by record levels of government debt within G7 economies. Within most advanced economies, tallies of public debt have been mounting since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). During the COVID-19 pandemic, many governments and their central banks came to a tacit agreement to “do whatever it takes” to shore up their economies. In part, responding to the experience of the last crisis, policymakers acted upon the conviction that nothing was too small to save. Accordingly, fiscal spigots gushed. And—just as prices began to stabilise within North America and Europe—Russia invaded Ukraine, and European governments (including the usually abstemious Germany) needed to step up spending once more in order to support households and companies in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Looking beyond advanced economies, some emerging market economies have also increased their government debt—notably including Brazil and India.[8]
In 2025, policy officials might find themselves in a bit of a Teufelskreis as they seek to balance the realities of mounting fiscal deficits with the demands of their electorates—as well as maintaining the confidence of investors that they will be able to service their debt. With regard to electorates, in the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic, household incomes across income quintiles actually improved within some advanced economies (due to a combination of elevated savings rates, policy support, and a tight labour market or a ‘jobs rich recovery’).[i] However, several years on, inequality of both wealth and income is deepening and widening within many advanced economies—such as Canada[9]—as well as emerging market economies, including Brazil.[10] And in the case of the US, even when wages (or income) has been improving, sticky inflation (notably in the categories of assets of need, including housing and healthcare) continues to diminish purchasing power. This erosion of income, combined with profound wealth inequality,[j] has led some households to feel more economically insecure.
Thus, looking out across 2025 and beyond, many governments face a conflagration of structural challenges (such as lackluster productivity and the digital divide), demographic headwinds (ageing populations, declining fertility rates, challenges to immigration) and secular woes (namely, the lower, slower growth resulting from the shift away from ‘old’, heavy industrial manufacturing growth towards services-oriented production and consumption). Added to that, policymakers confront heightened uncertainty surrounding the external outlook, as they navigate dynamics including geo-economic fragmentation, the geopolitics of energy security, and the effects of climate change on their societies and their peoples.
Accordingly, policymakers imbued with a (rare) practice of fiscal rectitude are likely to be forced to make concessions and to backtrack in order to satisfy electorates and coalition partners—which has been the case in France over the last year. As bond yields rise and ratings agencies issue downgrades, a corollary rise in sovereign borrowing costs further curtails the government’s ability to spend to satisfy electorates or coalition partners—therefore, the Teufelskreis. Such political gridlock and dislocation is also likely to further spur the rise of the right.
In this regard, it is important to note that the ‘new right’ in many jurisdictions, including the US, does not necessarily portend a culture of fiscal conservatism. We have certainly witnessed this in the first Trump term, and investors will wait to see whether the second administration manages to deliver upon some of the campaign trail promises to reduce America’s fiscal deficit. Nevertheless, thanks to the role of the US dollar as the world’s reserve currency, America continues to enjoy its exorbitant privilege:[k] absent any meaningful alternative, investors are unlikely to vote with their feet and shed the dollar in 2025. Rather, it is the potential medium- and longer-term challenges that might result from a continued negligence of America’s deficit problem which should concern investors and policymakers in the years to come.
On the upside, and looking beyond bond markets, fiscal belt tightening (and a relatively higher interest rate environment) might prompt some governments (and companies) to offload real assets. With the second highest level of public debt in the G7, the Italian government continues to sell assets—even a castle that belonged to Holy Roman Emperor Charles V.[11] Also, as the Bank of Japan is likely to continue its tightening cycle, Japanese corporates may shed real estate (added to that, such an offloading might be accelerated by a rise of shareholder activism).[12] Thus, even though residential real estate transaction volumes may remain stagnant,[l] some infrastructure and hospitality investors and developers may be able to acquire trophy assets at a discount, as some governments (and firms) might look for simple ways to reduce their debt loads—offering a perhaps rare glimpse of asset price dislocation in an otherwise inflated asset price environment.
II. The Geopolitical Landscape: Potential Winners and Losers in Trade Tensions
Surveying the geopolitical scene for 2025, the world is braced for a potential range of outcomes from Trump 2.0 on the global trading system. Certainly, some market participants seem to be markedly rosy about the potential trajectory of trade policy and the impact on the US and the global economy. Such halcyon perspectives are based upon the assumption that the new administration may not implement the full range of tariffs which were touted on the campaign trail. Interestingly enough, the dollar slips upon such hopes[13] – as the strength of the greenback is often tethered to investors’ need for a safe haven amidst economic or geopolitical uncertainty. Thus, the prospect that the administration would not necessarily go ‘full bore’ on tariffs reduced investor demand for safety.
As 2025 takes off, the world faces a record amount of trade restrictions. As Figure 3 shows, restrictions on goods—the often emotionally-tinged category of trade—remain high. However, in recent years, the world has also witnessed rising restrictions on services and cross-border investment flows.
Figure 3. New Trade Restrictions Per Year (2009-2023)
Source: Reserve Bank of India, based on Global Trade Alert data[m]
Amidst this sharp rise in protectionism, some countries and companies have fared remarkably well. Looking to Asia, the ‘third nations’—or those caught between the US-China tensions—have actually been net beneficiaries of rising trade tensions between the world’s two largest economies. High-income Asian countries such as Japan and Singapore continue to magnetise billions of dollars of investment flows into infrastructure such as data centres, as well as industry-leading human capital to support it.
Within emerging Asia, India, the Philippines, and Vietnam are poised to be some of the fastest-growing economies for 2025, projected to expand at about 6.2 percent, 5.9 percent, and 6.1 percent, respectively. Each of these countries continues to benefit from the ‘China plus one’ strategy—as foreign manufacturers (and indeed their Chinese counterparts) diversify their supply chain and production footprint outside of the mainland. In considering the change in administration in Washington—and the prospect of an increasingly isolationist America—the US is likely to continue to court friendships within the Indo-Pacific region in its strategic rivalry with China. Thus, rising protectionism and isolationism does not necessarily spell the end of trade between the US and Asia, and geo-strategic tension will likely propel Washington to court relations with some of the region’s fastest-growing economies for the long term.
Some companies, too, have managed to navigate the US-China trade tensions adroitly, and continue to diversify their supply chain activity. Even when companies have maintained a production presence in mainland China, executives are prepared with how to navigate a potential rise in tariffs, and can respond with agility within their operations to shift to quantum pricing, and to actively manage their currency exposures.[n] It must also be stated that even amidst the potential escalation of tariffs between Washington and Beijing, China is not necessarily poised to lose. In recent years, China has advanced to dominate the global battery electric vehicle (BEV) export market.[o] Even if the global taste for BEVs moderates in 2025, Beijing’s ability to export not only low-cost but also high-quality clean tech renders it a robust trading partner of many countries in the world, beyond the US and Europe.
III. The Sector-Specific Environment: Key Investing Theme of the Year: Dormancy of Sustainability
Our key investing theme for 2025 is the dormancy of sustainability. Whether for ideological reasons in the US or reasons of energy security in Europe, some market participants and commentators have claimed that ESG is “dead.”[q] Indeed, many of the US globally systemic important banks (GSIBs) and asset managers have withdrawn from notable climate finance groups.[r] In Europe, the prolonged energy crisis resulting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has prompted a culture of realpolitik when it comes to energy policy (with some countries even reverting to the use of coal for power generation). While some governments have warned that this is a temporary retrenchment on net-zero goals in support of economic security, some of the largest lenders have de-emphasised their sustainability practices, and have continued to lend toward traditional forms of energy.
Nevertheless, the global economy continues to face severe challenges resulting from the impact of climate change. The hottest days on earth were recorded in July 2024, and leading regulators and industry bodies have stepped up their warnings about the impact of heat stress on productivity.[s] While flooding in Spain has caused extreme ‘human and physical capital losses’,[14] the worst wildfires in California’s history are ravaging the city of Los Angeles, with damages estimated to surpass US$150 billion. Climate change is also impacting housing markets: A recent exodus from Florida—from both residents and insurers—is evidence of the extent to which insurance has truly become a game-changer in determining location for habitation.
Erst-Mover Advantage: Asia in the Lead?
While ideology and crises might have shifted preferences and mandates for investors, executives, and policymakers in the US and Europe, climate change remains ever exigent. Opportunity arises for countries, companies, and funds—perhaps even erstwhile investors—to take advantage of a dislocation in the market. On a regional basis, some Asian countries have assumed the mantle of leadership to push the climate agenda forward. Japan and Australia, for example, have joined the majority of ASEAN countries to advance a regional framework for cutting carbon emissions in the Asia Zero Emissions Community (AZEC).[15]
Companies are also following suit. One Japanese firm is working to build the world’s largest ship recycling programme[16] – an initiative that will likely dovetail with emerging EU climate regulations on shipping.[17] Another Japanese organisation is also supporting the net-zero goals for the Port of Los Angeles, facilitating a shift to the use of hydrogen for the country’s largest port.[18] Meanwhile, a carbon capture company based in San Francisco is attracting investments from some of Japan’s and Sweden’s leading companies.[19] Such opportunities also highlight the extent to which the US remains a highly federalised system: Even though the sentiment on climate from Washington or Wall Street might shift, the innovation on the ground, the demand for climate tech from certain cities and states—and the adventure-minded capital to support it—persist.
Conclusion
In sum, viewing the scene for markets and the macroeconomic environment for 2025, there should be clear acknowledgment that the global economy is remarkably resilient, despite the number of geo-economic (and climate-related) shocks reverberating across the planet. As all eyes turn to the US, which has hitherto been the single engine propelling growth within advanced economies, it is important to note that the stock market is not necessarily the economy. Gains from equity indices remain overwhelmingly in the hands of the top 10 percent of America’s income distribution and thus, the effects of the rally do not trickle down to the bottom 50 percent of the population.
Widening forms of wealth and income inequality are also a trigger point for the potential ‘fiscal cliff diving’ that might be witnessed in 2025. The fissures resulting from the collision of record-high levels of government debt with the demands of electorates are likely to continue to play out, potentially dispelling investors, and placing policymakers in a deeper bind. While asset sales might present a dislocation opportunity for property and infrastructure investors, policymakers should also focus on how to use fiscal policy creatively to address structural issues—such as the crisis of affordability in housing. Rather than a Teufelskreis, such policies can create a virtuous circle of growth.
Looking to the geopolitical arena, even though many investors, executives, and policymakers are fearful about potential changes in trade policy emanating from Washington, we do well to recall that we have already encountered a record number of trade restrictions in recent years. Foresighted countries and companies have managed to navigate trade ructions remarkably well, and perhaps set an example of organisational agility for others, should uncertainty in trade relations with Washington prevail.
Lastly, this report spotlights the key investing theme for the year, which is the dormancy of sustainability. As many of the US GSIBs and asset managers withdraw from net-zero affiliations—and as Europe continues to confront lower, slower growth, in part, resulting from the energy crisis—green may no longer be the new black. However, the energy-avaricious nature of powering services activity today—namely, through data centres supporting GenAI—or indeed by powering transportation and mobility—will demand all forms of energy. Added to that, as the global community faces the downside economic impacts of climate change—felt through wildfires, heat stress, cold snaps, severe storms, and flooding—we will continue to need to work for solutions to reduce environmental degradation. As Europe and America may wait in the wings, Asia is in pole position to assume the lead on this front on a regional basis. Notwithstanding, opportunities to collaborate with some of the world’s most dynamic firms in clean tech still abound in pockets of the US—indicating that an undercurrent of innovation can persist beneath ideological winds.
Endnotes
[a] See, for example, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news24_e/trdev_11dec24_e.htm
[b] That is, countries caught between the trade tensions of the US and China.
[c] See, for example, https://www.ft.com/content/7745d8ba-d498-4b1c-b877-e42a691b954f
[d] Graph culled from US Federal Reserve website: https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/dataviz/dfa/compare/chart/
[e] See, for example, https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/622816/economic-dignity-by-gene-sperling/
[f] See https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economics/2024/how-will-trumponomics-work-out
[g] See, for example, https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/blog/rebuilding-construction-trades-workforce
[h] Graph culled from Insee: https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/serie/001786504#Telechargement; https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/serie/001786555#Telechargement
[i] For example, in France: https://www.insee.fr/en/outil-interactif/5543645/details/30_RPC/35_CEM/35A_Figure1; on the US, see: https://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/BSZ2022.pdf
[j] On the US, see, for example, https://www.stlouisfed.org/community-development-research/the-state-of-us-wealth-inequality
[k] For further reading, see, for example, https://www.weforum.org/stories/2024/07/king-dollar-dethroned-usd-dominance-geoeconomic-fragmentation/
[l] See, for example, https://www.lesechos.fr/industrie-services/immobilier-btp/immobilier-les-ventes-de-logements-anciens-au-plus-bas-depuis-2015-2138066
[m] Graph from RBI: 0FSRJUN2024_270620242B95CB128D1847A3ACAB5B5A4BEBF0DF.PDF
[n] See, for example, https://wwd.com/beauty-industry-news/beauty-features/beauty-tariffs-trump-administration-1236751217/
[o] See data from NBEF and the Bundesbank: https://www.unicreditgroup.eu/content/dam/unicreditgroup-eu/documents/en/business/OurInvestmentInsights/DEF_ENG_MO.pdf
[p] The elusive taxonomy of ESG and sustainability is arguably a stumbling block for the entire climate finance industry. For the purposes of this article, we refer to the environmental component of ESG and sustainability—namely, the renewable, energy efficiency, and clean tech space.
[q] See, for example, https://www.morningstar.com/sustainable-investing/is-esg-dead-why-perception-looks-different-reality
[r] Including the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero (GFANTZ ) and Net Zero Asset Managers. See, for example, https://www.esgtoday.com/bloomberg-carney-led-climate-finance-group-restructures-after-string-of-high-profile-departures-from-net-zero-coalitions; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-01-09/blackrock-leaves-major-climate-group-amid-wall-street-exodus
[s] See, for example, https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/the-heat-is-on-heat-stress-productivity-and-adaptation-among-firms_19d94638-en.html
[1] Federal Reserve, “DFA: Distributional Financial Accounts—Assets By Wealth Percentile Group in 2024: Q3,” https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/dataviz/dfa/compare/chart/
[2] Trading Economics, “United States Producer Prices Change,” https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/producer-prices-change
[3] U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, https://www.bls.gov/news.release/cpi.htm
[4] National Retail Foundation, https://nrf.com/media-center/press-releases/trump-tariff-proposals-could-cost-americans-78-billion-annual-spending
[5] FRED, “Shares of Gross Domestic Product: Personal Consumption Expenditures,” https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DPCERE1Q156NBEA
[6] Konrad B. Burchardi et al., “Immigration, Innovation, and Growth,” Working Paper 27075, National Bureau of Economic Research, May 2020, http://www.nber.org/papers/w27075
[7] International Monetary Fund, “Real GDP Growth,” https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDP_RPCH@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD
[8] Trading Economics, “Brazil Government Gross Debt to GDP,” https://tradingeconomics.com/brazil/government-debt-to-gdp; Trading Economics, “India Government Debt to GDP,” https://tradingeconomics.com/india/government-debt-to-gdp
[9] Statistics Canada, “Distributions of Household Economic Accounts for Income, Consumption, Saving and Wealth of Canadian Households, Second Quarter 2024,” October 10, 2024, https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/241010/dq241010a-eng.htm
[10] Carlos Meneses, “Inequality Worsens in Brazil as Elites Concentrate More and More Wealth,” EFE, January 20, 2024, https://efe.com/en/economy/2024-01-20/inequality-worsens-in-brazil-as-elites-concentrate-more-and-more-wealth/
[11] Josephine McKenna, “Italy Auctions off Holy Roman Emperor’s Castle to Tackle Public Debt,” Yahoo News, August 10, 2024, https://www.yahoo.com/news/italy-auctions-off-holy-roman-115856526.html
[12] Mitsuru Obe, “Japan Property Sales Likely to Hit Decade High in 2025, Analysts Say,” Nikkei Asia, December 31, 2024, https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Markets/Property/Japan-property-sales-likely-to-hit-decade-high-in-2025-analysts-say
[13] Carter Johnson and Greg Ritchie, “Dollar Pares Losses After Trump Denies Curbed-Tariffs Report,” Bloomberg, January 6, 2025, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-01-06/dollar-falls-most-in-two-months-on-report-trump-to-limit-tariffs?utm_source=google&utm_medium=bd&cmpId=google
[14] OECD, “Spain,” in OECD Economic Outlook, Volume 2024 Issue 2, December 4, 2024, https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-economic-outlook-volume-2024-issue-2_d8814e8b-en/full-report/spain_99cebb3f.html
[15] Rieko Miki, “Japan, ASEAN to Hammer Out Shared Rules on Cutting Carbon Emissions,” Nikkei Asia, October 12, 2024, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Environment/Climate-Change/Japan-ASEAN-to-hammer-out-shared-rules-on-cutting-carbon-emissions
[16] Keiichi Furukawa, “Japan’s NYK Line Eyes World’s Largest Ship Recycling Operation,” Nikkei Asia, November 26, 2024, https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Transportation/Japan-s-NYK-Line-eyes-world-s-largest-ship-recycling-operation
[17] Jack Wittels, “Imminent EU Climate Rule for Ships Is Set to Add to Fuel Bills,” Bloomberg, December 19, 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-12-19/imminent-eu-climate-rule-for-ships-is-set-to-add-to-fuel-bills
[18] Takoko Fujiu, “Los Angeles Port Turns to Hydrogen to Meet Zero-Emissions Goals,” Nikkei Asia, November 22, 2024, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Environment/Climate-Change/Los-Angeles-port-turns-to-hydrogen-to-meet-zero-emissions-goals
[19] Shin Watanabe, “U.S. Carbon Capture Pioneer Taps Japan’s Mitsui, Mitsubishi for Funds,” Nikkei Asia, December 5, 2024, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Environment/Climate-Change/U.S.-carbon-capture-pioneer-taps-Japan-s-Mitsui-Mitsubishi-for-funds
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