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Instead of responding with counterterror operations, which are conservative and contained, operations such as Operation Sindoor will be the new norm
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After many days of being on the precipice of an all-out war, both India and Pakistan agreed to a tentative cessation of hostilities. While President Donald Trump was first to announce the stopping of hostilities, New Delhi announced that Pakistan’s director general of military operations (DGMO) contacted his Indian counterpart at 3:35 pm on May 10 following which it was agreed that all military action from “land, air and sea” will cease.
More crucially, India announced a major strategic shift an hour prior to ceasing the military action. New Delhi said any future act of terror against India will be considered as an “act of war”. This means that instead of responding with counter terror operations, which are conservative and contained in nature, operations such as Operation Sindoor will be the new norm.
As part of Operation Sindoor, the Indian military took direct aim at Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba’s (LeT) strongholds across the border in Bahawalpur and Muridke. For years, India has tried to bring Pakistan-promoted terrorism to the forefront of international discourse with limited success. While diplomacy and politics will remain as a core part of its toolkit, penetrative strikes deep inside Pakistan targeting the ideological and operational arteries of the likes of JeM and LeT are expected to be normalised.
India’s counter terror operations across the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir have been consistent over the decades and have as a matter of habit repelled incursions by cadres of LeT, JeM, and others.
The first phase of Operation Sindoor in the early hours of May 7, led by a kinetic response to the Pahalgam terror attack which claimed 26 lives, is in part a breakdown of India’s patience of prioritising the diplomatic and political routes in its efforts to tame Pakistan-based terrorist entities. India’s counter terror operations across the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir have been consistent over the decades and have as a matter of habit repelled incursions by cadres of LeT, JeM, and others. However, the strategic choices taken today have arguably added a new dimension to how New Delhi intends to respond moving forward, aiming to differentiate between terror targets from civil and military targets. If Pakistan retaliates, narrate that it is protecting terrorism.
The targeting of JeM facilities in Bahawalpur, a town just over 100 km from the international border using standoff weapons is the deepest the Indian military has struck inside Pakistan since the 1971 war. Within an escalatory policy, this act brings India’s penchant to upscale counter terror strikes since the previous operations, namely the 2016 surgical strikes and the 2019 Balakot strikes. Both these were in response to terror attacks against Indian military installations in Uri and Pathankot and were done publicly instead of clandestinely as special operations.
JeM and LeT alike have reportedly taken significant casualties, including family members of the group’s founder Masood Azhar, one of the most wanted men by India since his release from a Kashmiri prison during the hijacking of IC 814 in 1999. Pictures of Pakistani military officials attending funerals of slain terrorists draped in the State flag were displayed by India during a press conference headed by the foreign secretary. In essence, this strategy is the opposite of the dossier diplomacy that India attempted following the Mumbai terror attacks in 2008 to rally global support. In an era of hyper-information, old rule books stand obsolete. While the current operations are unlikely to dismantle JeM or LeT in the long term, they do normalise administrating big costs on the Pakistani State for actions taken by its proxies who have had a free hand and safe havens there for a long time. However, much like 2016 and 2019, installation of long-term and systemic deterrence may remain elusive and the likes of JeM and LeT may use their losses to force multiply cadres, financing, and intent. Further declarations of support from peers of Pakistani groups, such as a public backing by Al Qaeda in Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) is also a reminder for the international community that terrorism remains a global scourge with Pakistan as its heart.
Washington itself has now struck a deal with the Taliban, and more recently, has attempted talks with both Hamas and the Houthis.
International terrorism has been dealt with through a gamut of different strategies over the decades. In the 1960s and 1970s, aircraft hijackings were a chosen method by pro-Palestine factions. Kashmir faced the brunt of terrorism across the 1990s, and the 2001 9/11 attacks against the US changed the global narrative of countering terrorism led by American mobilisation of unchallengeable political and military power. Today, the global US-led security blanket against terrorism is eroding. Washington itself has now struck a deal with the Taliban, and more recently, has attempted talks with both Hamas and the Houthis. While many see this as a fracture of global counter-terror mechanisms, it can be an opportunity for India to both lead and double down on anti-terror designs in multilateral forums with its partners ranging from the United Nations to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. All this while ensuring that kinetic costs keep the potential of a long-term conventional conflict both a rarity while remaining well below the nuclear threshold with Rawalpindi’s nuclear sabre rattling bluff having been called out.
Finally, while countering terrorism remains a priority, within strategic and political thinking, Pakistan and its support for terror should not become India’s strategic identity. New Delhi must continue to de-hyphenate from Pakistan while maintaining its larger geopolitical goals. Rawalpindi’s aim is to drag India down to its level of irrelevance. Such trappings should be dismissed.
This commentary originally appeared in Hindustan Times.
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Kabir Taneja is a Deputy Director and Fellow, Middle East, with the Strategic Studies programme. His research focuses on India’s relations with the Middle East ...
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