Introduction

In the aftermath of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India in October 1947, inner-party struggles arose within the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference (NC) over the distribution of portfolios and the defeat of the official candidate, G. R. Renzu, which forced G.M. Sadiq and his group to break away from the NC and form the Democratic National Conference (DNC). Both Sadiq and Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, once subordinates of Sheikh Abdullah, aspired to fill the power vacuum.

The DNC demanded financial integration, extension of the Supreme Court and labour laws to the state, abolition of the Permit system, and bringing the State's election commission under the Central Election Commission. Its members pressed these demands in the assembly while building a strong people's movement outside it, which gradually grew into a groundswell. Kashmiris were demanding the rights enjoyed by other Indians under the Constitution.

The rest of this report is based on confidential correspondence, documents, and aide memoires from the author’s private archives, bequeathed to him by his grandfather, K N Bamzai, a functionary who handled Kashmir Affairs for Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and the Government of India.

The Bakshi Conundrum

Sheikh Abdullah's dramatic arrest in Gulmarg in August 1953 sent cataclysmic shockwaves through the Kashmir Valley. His lieutenant, Mirza Afzal Beg, formed the Plebiscite Front On 9 August 1955, demanding a plebiscite to decide the state’s accession and Abdullah’s unconditional release. Abdullah was briefly freed but soon re-arrested on conspiracy charges. Meanwhile, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad had assumed office as Prime Minister of J&K. By 1957, tensions peaked with the creation of DNC, a breakaway group from the ruling party, headed by G.M. Sadiq. The state was in ferment.

The flashpoint came with the Sahyar incident in July 1953, before Sheikh's arrest. A National Conference meeting was held at Nawakadal, though it remains unclear at whose behest. Sheikh Abdullah observed the proceedings from a nearby school. When Mohidin Karra asked the audience, "What do you want?," around 50 people stood up and declared their support for Pakistan. Karra responded that he too, wanted Pakistan. The people later formed a procession that ended in the Civil Lines area, creating commotion in the Valley and unsettling the Central leadership. The same Karra had earlier opposed reconverting the NC into the Muslim Conference.

The launch of the DNC was a defining moment in Kashmir's contemporary history. It was the first attempt to introduce competitive politics in Kashmir and democratise its electoral process. The DNC demanded financial integration, the extension of the Supreme Court, and the application of labour laws to the state. It also called for the abolition of the Permit system and bringing the State's election commission under the Central Election Commission. In the assembly, DNC members pressed for these measures, while outside they mobilised a popular movement to pressure both the state and the Central government. Kashmiris demanded the rights enjoyed by other people under the Indian Constitution. The movement succeeded: Bakshi, initially hostile, eventually yielded. In 1952, the bill extending central laws was passed, receiving public approval. For closer integration at the administration and economic level, political integration was essential.

Since J & K's history is dotted with events where the tyranny of the unelected has prevailed over the will of the people, Delhi was anxious with the emergence of the splinter group, DNC. After all, a pliant Bakshi had been foisted on the State in 1953. Now there was a fresh challenge. The man most concerned was Congress President U. N. Dhebar. With fissiparous tendencies on the rise, Dhebar intervened to find a solution. He was informed by key functionaries handling Kashmir in Delhi that a confidential note detailing such tendencies had been shared with Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru as far back as December 1957, which was ignored.

The note highlighted the need for a high-ranking Congressman trusted by both Panditji and Bakshi to serve as a political liaison in Kashmir. These sentiments were also shared with Indira Gandhi, with Feroze Gandhi’s name suggested for the role. As the prime minister did not respond, the idea stalled. By February 1959, a concerned Dhebar proposed fresh names, including himself, Jaiprakash Narayan, and Morarji Desai; he said Bakshi might prefer Desai. Dhebar added that he would raise the matter with Panditji and recommend Desai as a suitable intermediary.

In February 1959, a functionary handling Kashmir approached Home Minister G.B. Pant, briefing him on the circumstances in J&K. He highlighted the Jan Sangh’s call to observe Kashmir Day nationwide to draw attention to maladministration in the state and press for faster integration with India. The emergence of the DNC, dissent within the NC, and quarrels within Bakshi’s family had made him defensive and suspicious of the Centre’s intentions, requiring careful reassurance. Pant, however, saw no need to issue a statement, despite it being a timely moment to make Bakshi aware of emerging challenges and discussions on new constitutional safeguards for the state.

Pant was briefed on the situation but requested another meeting for updates. Reports from Raider’s Radio in Pakistan, which criticised Nehru's statement in Parliament regarding Bakshi, were also shared with him, but without effect. In this tense environment, Pant's reference to Kashmir in the Rajya Sabha on 17 February 1959 unsettled Bakshi. Pant said:

“About Kashmir, considerable progress has been made during the last four or five years, and we have now, so far as Kashmir is concerned, all these fundamental rights that we have in our Constitution are also incorporated in the Constitution of Kashmir. The CAG is also in charge of the accounts and audit of Kashmir, as he is of the rest of India. Similarly, the Services - IAS and IPS have been integral and now form part of all India cadres of these services. Other steps have also been taken - Judges of the High Court are appointed by the President. The question of the extension of the jurisdiction of the Election Commission was also referred to and I think the PM of India once said that there was no urgency about it. After all no election is going to be held in the immediate future - general election, at least - and this is a matter which can be considered by him in due course.”

“There was also a reference about a section of the Constitution relating to the Supreme Court. That too has received the PM's attention. However, I would like to submit one thing - The position of J & K is that the Constitution of Kashmir gives us power only up to a point. We know that Kashmir has its own legislature and there is also an opposition there now. So, all these matters affecting Kashmir can be brought to the notice of the Kashmir government, but we should not cause unnecessary embarrassment to that Govt.”

All this rattled Bakshi, who felt the Centre was encroaching on his authority. From a position of single-party dominance, he now faced growing opposition in the State. Of the 75-member legislature, the NC held 49 seats, while the DNC had 20, the Praja Parishad five, and the Harijan Mandal, one—giving the opposition 25 members.

As corruption scandals, including one involving his brother, weakened Bakshi’s position, many still argued he had kept a sizeable pro-Pakistan element in check. Pant's speech, however, deepened his insecurities, prompting him to send an emissary to Delhi to meet the OSD handling Kashmir. Over four days, the two held multiple meetings. The OSD told the emissary that urgent corrective measures were needed. He listed malpractices in the state—corrupt business dealings by Bakshi’s brothers, electoral manipulation, torture of opposition members, and inefficiency in the secretariat. The emissary was also warned that Bakshi’s loose talk at press conferences, misconduct at Pahalgam, and implied resistance to extending the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and Election Commission, should not recur. Finally, he was instructed to deliver this “truth serum” unfiltered to Bakshi.

The Kashmir Affairs functionary duly reported the meetings to Home Minister Pant while accompanying him to the Parliament House. Pant was clear: Bakshi should be told that Kashmir’s internal weaknesses were not only embarrassing the Centre but also weakening the Congress organisation. He stressed that Bakshi had already been warned about his course, and the emissary should meet him in Jammu to make it clear that Delhi’s public support must not be mistaken for satisfaction with his governance.

Amidst these developments, the Kashmir Affairs functionary met U.N. Dhebar again at a dinner hosted by Hafiz Mohd Ibrahim in February. Dhebar told the functionary that G.B. Pant was in complete agreement with his plan to appoint an interlocutor between Nehru and Bakshi. Pant felt that top-level political leaders from the Centre should personally convey to Bakshi the shortcomings in State administration and fissures within the NC, and suggest remedial measures sympathetically. A meeting between the Prime Minister, Home Minister, and Dhebar was scheduled for 2 March 1959 to advance the plan. In the interregnum, the OSD was directed to visit Jammu for a fresh ground assessment and report to the Home Minister. Dhebar also asked the OSD that he would like to visit the State at the invitation of Bakshi.

Ironically, the much-anticipated meeting between the Prime Minister, Home Minister, and Congress President proved inconclusive, and Delhi's interventionist approach continued.

Trust Deficit and Reconciliation

In Kashmir's chequered politics, leaders could be removed without warning, owing to Delhi’s strategic approach of denial, distraction, and counterattack. Little seems to have changed over the years, as unelected figures in Delhi continue to dominate Kashmir's daily functioning through policy and tactical directives. The post-Sheikh Abdullah years were particularly fraught, as ambitious leaders and political heirs jostled relentlessly for power at the top.

By 1950, the political turmoil in Kashmir had become an embarrassment for Delhi, already burdened with managing a young nation and rising public aspirations. The state was gripped by a fierce power struggle after G.M. Sadiq and his group broke from the Cabinet and the NC to form the splinter Democratic NC. Bitter attacks between the NC and DNC only strengthened anti-India and anti-social elements. Supporters of India within the state, along with Delhi’s Kashmir pointmen, sent feelers to both Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad and G.M. Sadiq for reconciliation, even as Pakistan intensified its disinformation in the United Nations. No tangible results emerged, as both sides remained adamant.

In a confidential note to Prime Minister Nehru on 20 October 1950, the key interlocutor on Kashmir affairs delivered an indictment of the prevailing situation. He wrote, “Although on several occasions I have made attempts to bring Bakshi Saheb face to face with the consequences which were likely to happen as a result of the present policies pursued by NC and DNC, I found him not only averse to discussing the said subject but also quick to misunderstand my approach. Recently while in Srinagar when the annual session of NC was being held in Baramulla and preparations were being made to fight the by-elections of the state legislature for the first time under the Central Election Commission, I took a fresh opportunity to broach the subject. This time I found Bakshi Saheb to be responsive, and I was finally able to persuade him to a positive course of action.”

Bakshi sought a meeting with Sadiq, who agreed to a rapprochement. D.P. Dhar was brought in as a peacemaker, and Sadiq consented to a breakfast on 14 October 1950 at Bakshi's residence. The meeting was cordial, and both sides agreed to hold a longer session on 17 October to resolve differences. Sadiq and Bakshi also agreed to portray the first meeting as routine and without agenda to prevent sabotage by elements in both camps. However, on 15 October, Kashmir Post broke the story, scuttling the planned second meeting. Kashmir's pointman, refusing to be disheartened, persuaded Bakshi and Sadiq to meet again privately, this time in Delhi. The meetings were held on 5 and 7 November 1950. The negotiations soon stalled, though Sadiq, on returning to Srinagar, sought another meeting with Bakshi that did not materialise.

The Kashmir Affairs pointman landed in Srinagar again, meeting Bakshi and Sadiq individually several times to work out a merger between the NC and DNC. Bakshi, however, refused to meet D.P. Dhar, agreeing only after Dhar assured him he would not seek office in the organisation or Cabinet. On the morning of 20 November at Dachigam, Bakshi appeared to be amenable to Dhar's suggestions on the merger’s procedural steps. It was further decided that Dhar and Syed Mir Qasim would meet Bakshi together to finalise the details:

• Bakshi would issue a statement appealing to all secular forces in the state to
• Sadiq, in response to his meetings with Bakshi, would issue a statement welcoming Bakshi's appeal and agreeing to dissolve the DNC.
• Bakshi and Sadiq would issue a joint policy statement outlining the aims and objectives of the merger, appealing to NC and DNC workers to unite on the same platform.
• All prominent DNC workers would be either nominated or co-opted into various NC bodies by the party president.

Regarding administration, two possibilities were discussed:

• Increasing the Cabinet’s strength from seven to 11 to include members from the
• Three Cabinet ministers would be dropped and replaced by new (Here, both Bakshi and Sadiq agreed that the final decision would rest with Panditji and Pant.)

Since Bakshi was keen to reconstitute the Cabinet by 15 December 1950, he scheduled a visit to Delhi on 28 November to consult the leadership, with 8 December kept as a backup date during the National Development Council meeting. The Prime Minister, apprised of these developments, wrote to Bakshi on 24 November, noting that reconciliation would strengthen him and his government and that unity would be a positive development against disruptionist forces in J&K and across the country.

By 1 December, however, reports from the Valley indicated opposition within a small but vocal section of the DNC. This group sought guidance from the Communist Party of India and objected to Sadiq's reference in his statement that “the security of northern borders was being threatened now from an altogether unexpected quarter.” Sadiq’s tone and tenor came as a bombshell, signalling that the DNC had accepted separation. D.P. Dhar alerted the pointman that it was imperative for Nehru to make a public statement on the merger or write to Sadiq to endorse the unity move. Nehru promptly wrote to both Sadiq and Bakshi, expressing his pleasure at the development and asking the pointman to fly to Kashmir to convey his support. On 7 December 1950, the NC Working Committee adopted a resolution on the merger. However, newspapers disapproved of the move and attacked Bakshi, even as he campaigned to cleanse the administration and the party.

The process of integrating the NC and DNC was triggered by a report in the prominent Urdu daily Anjan which, on 3 February 1950, published a front-page story alleging corruption by Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, said to have been raised by Sadiq on the floor of the assembly. However, no such resolution was moved. The report likely stemmed from D.P. Dhar’s speculation in December 1959 that the DNC was preparing a chargesheet to present in the Jammu and Kashmir assembly.

In mid-March 1950, matters took an ugly turn when Bakshi arrived in Delhi en route to Hyderabad. Distracted after a meeting with Prime Minister Nehru, who shared with him a Karachi daily cutting, he lashed out at those he suspected of leaking this story to Anjan. Much of the ensuing drama at 5 Prithviraj Road set in motion the merger process. The conflagration eased once Bakshi accepted that he had resolved all outstanding domestic disputes with his brothers, including the corruption charges levelled by Sadiq’s camp. He detailed his movable and immovable properties, declaring them bequeathed to his son, Bakshi Bashir, and ensuring his brothers could no longer lay claim.

A secret note dated 31 December 1950 brought the Prime Minister up to speed on the rapprochement between the Bakshi and Sadiq factions.

The swearing-in was scheduled for the next day at 11 a.m. in Jammu. After much wrangling, portfolios were allocated as follows:

• M. Sadiq — Education
• L. Dogra — Finance
• Syed Mir Qasim — Irrigation and Power
• D.P. Dhar — Planning and Industrial Organisation

This marked the end of the most acute power struggles in Kashmir’s history.

Strife in the Palace: Inheritors Battle Over Sheikh's Legacy

Jammu and Kashmir remained unsettled, haunted by the spectre of the incarcerated Sheikh Abdullah, the state’s tallest leader and the man most responsible for its accession, having opposed Jinnah's theological doctrine of an Islamic nation. By the summer of 1957, rumours of a palace coup were circulating in Delhi. A classified memo for Nehru, dated 5 August 1957, referred to these manoeuvres as the G.M. Sadiq faction began to stir.

Sheikh Abdullah's impending release loomed large, unsettling the National Conference leadership. As rumours spread, party alignments shifted. Concern over CRPF deployment and the state government’s sudden order to move all offices to Jammu—superseding previous orders to move camp offices—was seen as an attempt to monitor political movements, creating unease. The heightened vigilance reinforced the belief that Abdullah’s release was imminent, and rumour-mongering grew intense. Both factions of the former National Conference—Bakshi’s NC and Sadiq’s Democratic National Conference—were on edge. The DNC, alarmed by suggestions from the Centre that Abdullah should be freed, sought to pre-empt other political formations by reaching out to people close to him. This effort reflected a belief that Abdullah had yet to decide his future course of action and might align with groups critical of the state’s administrative structure.

The thinking was that by forging a common platform around the demand for greater civil liberties, an alignment of ideas could emerge under India’s standby plan of action. With Sheikh's towering presence, the DNC could then topple Bakshi. Clashes between NC and DNC supporters followed, with land tenancy becoming a flashpoint as Sadiq promised allotments in perpetuity.

Meanwhile, the ruling dispensation's biggest concern in this climate of uncertainty was the threat of President's Rule. Hostile elements inimical to India's interests feared Bakshi was perpetuating this rationale to allow the Centre greater control over the state's functioning. At the same time, a worsening food situation—especially in the main paddy crop for winter—was becoming alarming in rural Kashmir, perhaps the worst since 1947. Even these hostile groups wanted Delhi to take greater interest in day-to-day administration, recognising that accession was irrevocable and beyond dispute.

Against this backdrop, on 3 August 1957, Bakshi wrote a confidential letter to Sadiq, which he also sent to Home Minister G.B. Pant:

“I have all along held that differences of opinion on certain administrative and organisational problems should in no way affect unity of purpose and action on fundamental issues. Such minor differences appear to me to be a normal feature of democratic functioning. But when these are made to sow suspicion and bitterness among comrades and colleagues, they imperil the collective and smooth functioning of the Govt and Organisation.”

Bakshi added that he had always taken Sadiq and others into confidence since 1953: “But alas certain colleagues have tried to introduce fissiparous tendencies which have resulted in schisms and group rivalries... you will agree that in 1953, we jointly acted precisely to arrest such a drift.” Bakshi went on to highlight the role of opportunist elements seeking to deepen the divide, while insisting that the NC had grown stronger. Responding to Sadiq’s criticism over the election contests of Ghulam Rasool Renzu and Dina Nath Nadim, Bakshi dismissed Renzu’s conduct:

“From the start Renzu conducted himself in a manner so as to cause serious misgivings among the workers and the majority of them were provoked by the vituperative and vilifying features of his campaign. Renzu did little to dispel such a feeling and did not hesitate to seek support from elements who are being regarded as hostile to the very principles of NC... As you are aware, for most of this period, I was away in Jammu, I could not, however, resist the feeling that the personal manner in which Renzu conducted his campaign was unfortunate”

The relationship between Bakshi and Sadiq became more fractious with Nadim’s contest. In another letter, Bakshi wrote to Sadiq: “In Nadim's case, as you know, NC decided it should not be associated with the election as such an association would be undesirable administratively. This was no doubt a correct decision. Anyway a few minor incidents which may have occurred during the recent election can in no way warrant the assertion that NC is encouraging communal tendencies. Such an accusation would appear to be extremely unfair keeping in view the courageous stand taken by NC against communal organisations like Plebiscite Front... You have referred to the working of the administration in not very complimentary terms, I am sorry I am unable to share your view that it is in a state of collapse. I am surprised to hear this from you for the first time.”

On corruption, Bakshi wrote: “You are aware that we inherited a system which was thoroughly conducive to the existence and spread of corruption. Consequently, the primary task which engaged our attention was to do away with institutions and procedures which bred corruption. In this connection, the abolition of Mujawaza, controls etc. which served as the breeding ground for corruption proved advantageous. Besides, we took other measures to root out this evil.”

He then listed measures to improve agriculture, irrigation, and procurement, and progressively reduce food grains imports to make the state self-sufficient. He also wrote about improving the standard of living of farmers. Controversy arose when, despite Bakshi's reservations against Renzu, Sadiq sponsored him for a seat in the Legislative Council, seen as a backdoor entry after his defeat in the general elections. Bakshi was furious, accusing Sadiq of acting surreptitiously, and Renzu's nomination became a new battleground.

Bakshi's absence from Srinagar allowed Sadiq and D.P. Dhar to sow dissent within the NC and foment trouble for the party. Bakshi briefed both the Prime Minister and Home Minister Pant on the rapidly evolving state of affairs in J&K, with the Sadiq faction openly rebelling against him. Renzu and Syed Mir Qasim added to the unrest by supporting Sheikh’s release, while D.P. Dhar opposed it, even urging Delhi not to proceed. In a top-secret note to Nehru dated 19 December 1957, these contentious issues were laid out. It recorded that Bakshi, in private conversations with Nehru’s pointman on Kashmir, was under stress—uneasy about Sheikh Abdullah's release and the dissonance within NC that led to Sadiq’s breakaway group, the DNC. The pointman’s report to Nehru stated, "Glimpses of the working of his mind which appeared to me a painful departure from his past and hence very disturbing... I feel that notice may be taken of my lurking fears of Bakshi Saheb's weakened will.”

He then listed pointers for the Prime Minister on a hemmed-in Bakshi, who seemed disturbed and yet bullish over Sheikh’s release:

• Sheikh detests the DNC and will not be amenable to reason or adopt the stand he took in

• Despite the DNC and CPI supporting his release, this will not influence Sheikh, even if they have the potential for mischief. Just before or after his release, Mir Qasim and D.P. Dhar should be
• Criticism from outside Kashmir would not last long after such action, and it is not necessary to consult Delhi.
• A meeting between Krishna Menon and Sheikh in jail would raise Sheikh’s stature and strengthen his bargaining position. Instead, I should meet him. Sheikh may record the conversation, as he did with Union Transport and Communications Minister Dr Subbarayan, and quietly release it so it does not remain a secret.
• Bakshi’s inner voice told him that Sheikh’s release would not cause much

• I am firmly of the opinion that Sheikh should be released now or in December

• I have told Panditji that if Sheikh wishes to return to power, I am prepared to step aside. While Panditji agreed to rehabilitate Sheikh, he did not want him to head the state government. I am keen to be relieved and look forward to someone else taking my place. Vishnu Sahay (Secretary, Kashmir Affairs) does not understand the implications of my thinking; he is not a politically minded officer.

In sum, it seemed that Bakshi, who played his part in toppling Sheikh in 1953, was now doing a volte-face, cornered by circumstances and seemingly arriving at an understanding with Sheikh. The confidential note to the Prime Minister outlined two reasons:

• First, he had tried his utmost to postpone Sheikh’s

• Second, having failed, perhaps in sheer desperation he had struck a Faustian bargain with Sheikh on terms which would help him escape his future responsibility while restoring Sheikh to his former position.

The crucial question was whether this alarming move, only four years after Sheikh’s abrupt imprisonment, served India’s interests or undermined them. Bakshi’s change of heart followed several secret meetings with prominent leaders of the Plebiscite Front. Sheikh Feroz Din, in charge of the Kud camp where Sheikh was confined, also met Bakshi at odd hours, acting as Sheikh’s emissary. Just before Nehru’s OSD departed Jammu on 15 December 1957, Sheikh Feroz Din delivered a confidential letter to Bakshi, which Bakshi claimed Sheikh had written to him “on bended knees.” The final nail being these words: “I cannot shed the fear that something sinister may be developing against the Govt of India.”

Before being passed to the Prime Minister, the note was shown to M.O. Mathai. Panditji did not show the note to anyone except mentioning its contents to Krishna Menon. On 22 December 1957, the OSD for Kashmir briefed Menon on all aspects, after which they conferred with Bakshi on military trunks. It was felt important that Menon should speak to Panditji, who was in Shantiniketan, and in parallel Bakshi would also connect with him. Yuvraj Karan Singh’s invitation was also considered.

Things moved at a frenetic pace, and on 8 January 1959, Sheikh Abdullah—one of the most important political prisoners at that time—became a free man and a force again in his native Kashmir. After four and a half years in detention, he was released from his guarded bungalow at Kud, 150 miles across the mountains from Srinagar. Known as ‘the Lion of Kashmir’, Sheikh had been arrested without formal charges on 9 August 1953 and removed from his post. The decision stemmed from suspicions by Indian and Kashmiri officials that he was veering away from loyalty to India and pursuing independence.

The circumstances of his release were strange. Late at night, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, who took over the prime ministership after Abdullah’s arrest in 1953, told a large group of correspondents that Abdullah would be brought to Srinagar and freed there. This assurance was repeated by other officials when correspondents told them they wanted to be able to interview the Sheikh. At about 5:30 p.m., Bakshi informed them that Abdullah had in fact been released at Kud, offered transportation to Srinagar, but had declined and moved into a rest house.

As with much in J&K’s politics, there was a twist. Abdullah’s release was very brief; he was soon taken back into custody on charges related to the Kashmir Conspiracy case. He remained imprisoned during the long legal proceedings until his final release on 8 April 1954. The Government of India, notably Delhi, had won this round, playing the long game, while Bakshi’s manoeuvres unravelled—the best-laid plans going awry.

Conclusion

Sheikh Abdullah, despite his lengthy incarceration for anti-India activities under the Kashmir Conspiracy case, remained Baba-e-Quam (father of the state)—a centrifuge in Kashmir politics much like a Phantom or Banquo's ghost who haunted Macbeth. As the man who unfurled the rebellion against Maharaja Hari Singh in his quest for self-rule, he aligned himself with Nehru's idea and ideal of India by being a key functionary in the All India States People's Conference. Nehru's anti-monarchical stance, however, prevailed ultimately and men like Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah became the fulcrum of the opposition to the Princes.

J & K's accession to the Dominion of India disrupted Jinnah's grandiose plan to usurp the Princely State, but that was only half the battle won. For Sheikh's dream of an independent “eastern Switzerland” wedged between the Great Powers, Russia and China and sequestered between India and Pakistan—was contrary to a unified India incorporating the Provinces and Princely States. This incompatibility led to his arrest in August 1953, which resulted in a new Pandora's Box being opened by his subordinates. Vested interests conspired to reach the top of the political pyramid for years, as Bakshi and Sadiq factions squabbled with one another. A fragile peace was maintained in the sensitive border state coveted by Pakistan by key Government of India mandarins, even as another of Sheikh's key men, Mirza Afzal Beg, espoused the case of an independent Kashmir by forming the Plebiscite Front. The manoeuvring of the Kashmir policy mavens in Delhi was responsible for keeping a delicate balance of power involving Bakshi and Sadiq. 

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Sandeep Bamzai is former Visiting Fellow, ORF.

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All views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author, and do not represent the Observer Research Foundation, either in its entirety or its officials and personnel.

• Domestic Politics and Governance
• India
• Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad
• Delhi engagement
• Democratic National Conference
• G.M. Sadiq
• Jammu and Kashmir
• National Conference
• political rivalry
• post-accession governance
• regional instability
• Sheikh Abdullah

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