Introduction
As the competition between the United States (US) and China intensifies, sea power has emerged as a crucial component of state power. Many contested areas, including the South China Sea and the East China Sea, are maritime regions. Advanced technologies, including unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) and anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), which offer cost-effective ways of targeting high-value assets such as aircraft carriers, have certain limitations; warships, therefore, remain vital to sea power.
At present, neither the US nor China possesses sufficiently developed technology to deploy large-scale UUVs for blue-water operations or ASBMs capable of striking moving targets beyond 1,800 kilometres.[1] As a result, for China, these technologies are insufficient for operations outside the South China Sea and the East China Sea. For the US, the geographical distance of contested areas in the Indo-Pacific region from its naval bases poses a critical challenge.
Both China and the US rely on conventional warships until technological advancements make newer assets viable for long-range operations. Reflecting this need, both countries are making heavy investments in shipbuilding. Their warship acquisition race is unprecedented, with projections indicating that by 2040, the US and China will together possess over 700 warships—about 150 more vessels compared to 2020.[2] The US, which had 296 battle force ships in 2020, plans to add 82 ships by 2040, bringing the total to 378.[3] This goal requires building approximately four ships every year, raising concerns about whether Washington’s current shipbuilding capacity can meet this demand given recent declines.
If the US fails to meet this demand, the gap in conventional warship capabilities between Washington and Beijing will widen further. The US is already lagging in the naval arms race; as of 2022, Beijing possessed 39 more warships than the US.[4] Moreover, many US warships, such as the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers (DDGs), remain in service well beyond their intended lifespans due to insufficient shipbuilding capacity.[5] With the first Arleigh Burke-class ship commissioned in 1991, these vessels are now over 30 years old, indicating a decline in the US conventional surface warship capabilities. The US Navy (USN) is already struggling to balance its budget across multiple new shipbuilding programmes. Without substantial improvements in shipbuilding capacity, the gap in surface warship capabilities will continue to grow, even as the US prioritises surface warship programmes.[6]
Due to the shortage in shipbuilding capabilities, the US has begun exploring coordination with its capabilities to bridge the gap. The Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan are two of the US’s most capable partners in shipbuilding. A number of officials, including US Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro, have emphasised the potential for collaboration.[a] His visits to South Korea and Japan in February 2024 demonstrate the US’s interest in these countries’ shipbuilding capabilities, suggesting that their industries are now pivotal in the US-China sea-power competition in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, US President Donald Trump has mentioned the importance of shipbuilding cooperation with South Korea, and National Security Advisor Mike Waltz has also emphasised the need for coordination with allies like South Korea and Japan.[7] This suggests that the strategic importance of South Korean and Japanese shipbuilding capabilities in the US-China competition will continue during the Trump administration.
However, how does the shipbuilding capability of South Korea compare to that of Japan? What are the strengths and differences of each model? How do these two countries influence the naval arms race in the Indo-Pacific? Although some research and commentary exist on their shipbuilding industries, direct comparisons are limited.[8] This brief explores their similarities and analyses their differences. It assesses both models in the context of US-China strategic competition, with conclusions drawn from the comparative analysis.
Background
In an earlier article, this author argued that South Korea’s commercial shipbuilding industry has been instrumental in sustaining its warship production, using the sector’s continued strength since the 1990s.[9] That article explored how South Korea’s shipbuilding capabilities continued to ascend after the Cold War, attributing this resilience to the role of the private shipbuilding industry.
Similar to Western countries, South Korea’s shipbuilding capability was supposed to be influenced by the collapse of the Soviet Union since, as the Korean People’s Navy, supported by Moscow, had been a critical maritime threat to Seoul. Nonetheless, South Korea’s shipbuilding industry remained robust. The integration of commercial shipbuilding production, such as oilers and tankers, with warship construction within the same shipbuilding companies created an ecosystem that sustained its shipbuilding capabilities, even as government demand declined.[10]
By the 1990s, South Korea’s commercial shipbuilding sector had already become a vital part of the national economy. As a result, South Korean shipbuilders were able to maintain their capabilities, contrasting sharply with the decline of Western shipbuilding during the same period.[11]
Peter Banseok Kwon delves deeper into the connection between the private sector and the development of warship-building capabilities, examining South Korea’s defence industry and its role in the modernisation of the Republic of Korea (ROK).[12] Kwon highlights former President Park Chung Hee’s Heavy and Chemical Industrialization (HCI) policy, officially launched in 1973, which drove South Korea’s economic development during that era. Indeed, even before the official announcement of the HCI policy, President Park emphasised the importance of the industrialisation of South Korea, and it was one of the key drivers of Seoul’s economic development.[13]
A key focus of the HCI policy was the shipbuilding industry, driven by South Korea’s growing need to export goods via maritime trade. This led the ROK government to make substantial investments in the shipbuilding sector.[14] For these investments, President Park selected renowned and capable chaebol enterprises, including Hyundai Heavy Industries (now known as HD Hyundai), to lead the development of both commercial and military shipbuilding. Initially subsidised by the government, these companies acquired the sufficient capabilities needed to thrive in the global shipbuilding market. As a result, they maintained their shipbuilding capacities even after the end of the Cold War.
Kwon observes that South Korea’s model of mobilising chaebols for commercial and military shipbuilding is not entirely unique but draws inspiration from Japan’s pre-Second World War practices. He links this concept to the legacy of Japanese colonial rule over the Korean Peninsula (1910 to 1945). In Japan, these conglomerates are known as zaibatsu, a term that shares the same characters and meaning as Korea’s chaebol, translating to “family conglomerate”. During the Second World War, the Japanese government relied on zaibatsu to support the expansion of war-related heavy industries, and a few Korean entrepreneurs participated in the process.[15] This historical connection suggests that President Park’s mobilisation of chaebols for the development of both economic and security-related industries may have been influenced by the Japanese model.
Seymour Broadbridge (1977) explained the role of zaibatsu in Japanese shipbuilding development. Similar to the heavy subsidies for South Korean chaebol, renowned Japanese zaibatsu like Mitsubishi and Kawasaki benefitted from substantial investments during the Meiji period (1868–1912). Indeed, 98 percent of the support these companies received from the government occurred during this period, illustrating the early stages of Japanese shipbuilding on state subsidies.[16]
Ironically, Japanese demand for commercial shipbuilding peaked only after the Second World War. Until then, Japanese zaibatsu shipbuilders mostly relied on government-driven warship-building demand, shaped by the geopolitical environment. From the Russo-Japanese War through the Asia-Pacific War against the US, Japan’s government consistently invested in sea power, reducing the need for zaibatsu to focus on commercial shipbuilding.
This dynamic shifted after the Second World War, when the Imperial Japanese Navy was dissolved, and Article 9 of the Constitution—the “Peace Constitution”—renounced war, effectively ending government-driven demand for warships.[17] In the 1950s and 1960s, the export boom in the Japanese economy increased demand for commercial shipbuilding. By the 1960s, commercial ship exports significantly contributed to Japan’s economy.[18]
Despite being partially dissolved due to their wartime involvement, zaibatsu shipbuilders like Mitsubishi and Kawasaki capitalised on the growing demand for merchant ships and continued their operations. These companies rebranded as keiretsu (subsidiary companies), distancing themselves from their wartime legacy. Today, they remain key warship builders for the Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force. This suggests that South Korea’s shipbuilding model is not entirely unique; Japan followed a similar path, blending government support with private-sector adaptability to sustain its shipbuilding capabilities.
Similarities Between the South Korean and Japanese Shipbuilding Models
This raises the question of whether integrating commercial and warship-building capabilities is unique. Many advanced shipbuilding countries, such as the US and the UK, typically do not produce commercial ships, despite having strong warship-building capabilities. The primary reason is economic: commercial shipbuilding is highly labour-intensive. For most developed economies, where the average cost of labour is high, maintaining a commercial shipbuilding industry is not economically viable. Without significant automation or specialisation in high-value commercial ships—such as liquefied natural gas (LNG) carriers and cruise ships—commercial shipbuilding becomes a low-value-added sector. Countries with cheaper labour can easily outpace developed economies in this arena.
Over time, South Korea began to dominate the global shipbuilding industry, surpassing Japan in 1999 due to its lower labour costs. By 2022, Chinese shipbuilding capabilities overtook South Korea’s, leveraging even cheaper labour.[19] This progression demonstrates the challenge for developed economies to remain competitive in commercial shipbuilding, even as they sustain warship production for security purposes. Once a country becomes a developed economy, its ability to maintain a competitive edge in commercial shipbuilding diminishes, reinforcing the distinction between the two sectors.
Another unique aspect of the South Korean and Japanese shipbuilding models is their ability to transition from government-subsidised industries to self-sustaining ecosystems capable of surviving without continued government investment. This transition is particularly challenging for late-industrialising countries, where intense competition and weaker initial capabilities often hinder progress.
A contrasting example is Canada, which failed to achieve such a transition. While Canada experienced a golden age of shipbuilding during the 19th century, this success did not carry into the 20th century due to the shift from wooden to iron and steel-hulled ships. The Second World War temporarily revitalised the Canadian shipbuilding industry as government subsidies and high demand for warships laid a foundation for modernisation.[20] However, this momentum was short-lived.
Following the war, the decline in sea-based threats reduced government interest and investment in the industry. By the 1970s, the Canadian shipbuilding sector entered a gradual decline, which continued in the 1990s after the Cold War. Unlike South Korea and Japan, Canada was not competitive enough in the international commercial shipbuilding market.[21] Canadian shipbuilders depended heavily on government demand for warships, and when these investments diminished, the industry was unable to sustain itself.
In contrast, South Korea and Japan developed balanced ecosystems where both commercial and warship-building sectors contributed to long-term resilience. On the other hand, Canada failed to develop a balanced industry. Its reliance on warship-building alone meant the Canadian shipbuilding sector lacked the resilience to survive after the decline of sea-based threats.
Non-sustainable shipbuilding capabilities result in unstable delivery times for warships. A business model that relies solely on warship-building, without diversification into commercial shipbuilding may exacerbate this issue, affecting the naval arms race. When companies cannot sustain their operations, shipbuilding workers, including engineers and technicians, leave the sector. This phenomenon became evident in the US during the 1990s when the end of the Cold War prompted a reduction in defence budgets and a corresponding decline in demand for warship-building. The workforce that left the shipbuilding industry during this period has not returned, even as the government has increased shipbuilding demand due to intensified strategic competition with China.[22] This workforce gap has led to uncertainties in warship delivery schedules.
The USN is currently experiencing delays across its planned warship programmes, including submarines, guided-missile destroyers, and aircraft carriers. On average, the delivery timeline for new USN warships is delayed by 26 months, jeopardising its ability to meet its shipbuilding schedule and effectively counter the rapidly growing Chinese fleet.[23]
In contrast, South Korean and Japanese shipbuilders have demonstrated relatively stable delivery timelines. For example, Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (now Hanwha Ocean) experienced its first delivery delay only in 2014—an impressive feat considering the company was established in 1978.[24] Similarly, HD Hyundai delivered the BRP Antonio Luna to the Philippine Navy a month ahead of schedule.[25] This stability can be attributed to a sustainable business model that integrates both commercial and warship-building operations.
This is not to say that South Korean and Japanese shipbuilding industries have not faced their own challenges. In 2020, Japanese shipbuilder Mitsui struggled to sustain its operations, including its naval shipbuilding segment. Instead of dissolving entirely, Mitsui sold its warship-building division to Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, illustrating how strategic consolidation within the industry can help maintain shipbuilding capabilities even in the face of adversity.[26] This case highlights the importance of diversification and a sustainable business model. Even when a major shipbuilding enterprise grapples with difficulties, its capabilities can be preserved and revitalised through partnerships with more robust companies that benefit from a balanced portfolio of commercial and naval shipbuilding.
The dual production of merchant and warships is a crucial aspect of South Korean and Japanese shipbuilding models, setting them apart from their Western counterparts. Having robust capabilities in these two distinct sectors ensures the stability of the shipbuilding industry, even in the absence of government demand. This healthy ecosystem has also contributed to the retention of shipbuilding expertise during challenging periods, enabling consistent delivery of warships within the required timelines. Unlike many Western shipbuilders, South Korea and Japan are well-positioned to meet the US’s warship repair and construction needs. This capability can impact the naval arms race between the US and China, favouring the US by enhancing its naval combat readiness.
Differences Between the South Korean and Japanese Shipbuilding Models
The ROK’s and Japan’s shipbuilding models share commonalities, yet their business models are different, particularly in their approaches to warship exports. Japan’s hesitancy in exporting weapons, including warships, stems from its Peace Constitution, even as Article 9 does not provide for an explicit ban. In 1967, the Japanese National Diet enacted the Three Principles of Defense Equipment and Technology, citing the Peace Constitution, which has posed challenges to Japanese businesses exporting weapons.[27] These principles include: “Cases where the defense equipment and technology are destined for a country party to a conflict”—a clause that can be highly subjective.[28] These principles have hindered Japanese shipbuilders from gaining experience in exporting warships internationally, a factor that contributed to Japan’s failure to secure Australia’s 2016 submarine acquisition programme.[b],[29]
While Japan’s shipbuilders, such as Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Kawasaki Shipbuilding Corporation, have the technical capability to produce advanced vessels like the Soryu-class submarines, their focus on domestic orders and lack of international experience made them less competitive compared to other countries.[30] In 2016, Australia’s decision to select a French design over Japan’s Soryu-class submarines highlights how Japan’s limited export track record and concerns over delivery delays, compounded by its bureaucratic processes, led to missed opportunities. Japan’s difficulty in securing international contracts underscores the impact of its restrictive defence export policies and its relatively narrow experience in global defence markets.
South Korea’s experiences with weapon exports, particularly warships, are in contrast with those of Japan’s. Over the past decade, South Korea has witnessed a dramatic rise in arms exports, with a 177-percent increase from 2017 to 2021—the largest increase amongst the top 25 weapon exporters worldwide.[31] While South Korea’s initial warship exports were modest, its capabilities have grown. The country’s first combatant ship export occurred in 1998 with the construction of the BNS Bangabandhu, a 2,500-tonne frigate in terms of full displacement. However, South Korea’s combatant ship exports remained inconsistent in the following decade, with no such sales during 2000s aside from some replenishment vessels.
Combatant ship exports resumed in 2011 when Indonesia agreed to purchase three South Korean-built conventional submarines, with the first, KRI Nagapasa (1,580-tonne submerged displacement), delivered in 2017.[32] Greater attention to South Korea’s warship exports emerged in 2016 when HD Hyundai signed a contract to deliver two frigates to the Philippines,[33] marking a notable development in the market. This deal was particularly notable because, before this, Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (now Hanwha Ocean) had been the sole South Korean company with experience in combatant ship exports. With HD Hyundai entering the market, South Korea gained more than one company capable of exporting warships, fostering domestic competition.
The competition between HD Hyundai and Hanwha Ocean has spurred innovation in warship export strategies. For example, in 2024, HD Hyundai introduced a package deal that bundled maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) services with the export of warships.[34] This approach was a response to growing competition with Hanwha Ocean and the rising importance of the MRO sector in the defence industry. The significance of MRO services aligns with global defence trends, particularly in the US. For instance, the 2024 US defence budget allocated US$13.9 billion for MRO projects, highlighting the potential for substantial revenue for companies awarded these contracts.[35] This financial incentive, combined with interest from key US figures such as President Trump and National Security Advisor Waltz in South Korea’s shipbuilding capabilities, has driven both HD Hyundai and Hanwha Ocean to enhance their offerings.[36] HD Hyundai’s MRO-inclusive package deal exemplifies a market-driven approach, setting South Korea’s combatant shipbuilding sector apart from Japan’s.
While South Korea’s market-driven strategy has spurred innovations and positive outcomes, including securing more contracts, this model does not necessarily guarantee superior outcomes over Japan’s government-supported model. Following the failure of the Soryu-class submarine export to Australia, the Japanese government revised its approach to defence exports. In October 2015, the Japanese government established the Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA), a dedicated body to oversee weapon exports. This move highlighted Japan’s growing interest in promoting its defence industry. Furthermore, the Japanese government amended the Three Principles of Defense Equipment and Technology, allowing the export of domestically produced lethal weapons,[37] including surface warships and submarines internationally. In addition to these measures, the Japanese government has actively promoted its defence industry, organising events like the Indo-Pacific International Maritime Exhibition hosted by the Australian government in November 2023, where ten Japanese companies participated. Notably, none of the South Korean companies participated in the event.[38] This demonstrates that Japan has adopted a government-led approach to defence exports, taking into account the constraints of its Peace Constitution. As the Japanese government has intensified its focus on weapon exports, Japanese shipbuilders are aligning with the government’s objectives.
This led to a different outcome in Australia’s recent call for general-purpose frigates. In February 2024, the Australian government announced its Surface Fleet Review, (officially titled Enhanced Lethality Surface Combatant Fleet: Independent Analysis of Navy’s Surface Combatant Fleet), which included plans to acquire seven to 11 general-purpose frigates. Amongst the candidate models, there were South Korea’s Daegu-class guided-missile frigates, with a full displacement of approximately 3,600 tonnes, and Japan’s Mogami-class frigates, with a full displacement of around 5,500 tonnes.[39] Both South Korea and Japan actively competed for the deal, given the project’s estimated value of around US$7.2 billion, but Japan ultimately outperformed South Korea in this instance.[40] By November 2024, Australia released its shortlist of finalists for the programme and South Korea’s Daegu-class frigates were notably absent. Instead, Japan’s Mogami-class and Germany’s Meko A-200 frigates made it to the final selection.
South Korea’s exclusion stemmed from its regulatory framework. Japan, on the other hand, expedited bureaucratic processes that had hindered its 2016 Soryu-class bid. Furthermore, the Japanese government supported its businesses by offering to collaborate with Australia on shipbuilding, strengthening Canberra’s industry. In contrast, South Korea did not provide similar support, and its regulatory delays—particularly in securing security clearance for weapon exports—caused setbacks in submitting required documents to the Australian government.[41] Ultimately, South Korea’s market-driven approach to weapon exports ironically hindered its chances despite its innovative industries.
Conclusion
This brief has examined the South Korean and Japanese shipbuilding models, focusing on their similarities and differences. The key similarities between the two models are: (1) the dual production of merchant and combatant ships, and (2) the establishment of a sustainable ecosystem that enables chaebols and keiretsu to operate without government subsidies. These two aspects are interconnected. A sustainable ecosystem thrives when countries pursue dual production of commercial ships and warships, as an increase in demand on one side can offset losses on the other. This approach preserves the shipbuilding industry and retains the workforce during downturns in warship construction.
Although the two countries share similar shipbuilding models, there are also notable differences. These include: (1) the degree of experience influenced by Japan’s Peace Constitution, and (2) the contrasting market-driven and government-driven models of warship exports. Japan’s self-imposed restrictions on warship exports, guided by Article 9 of its Constitution, limited its weapons export capabilities compared to South Korea. This divergence ultimately shaped the market-driven approach in South Korea and the government-driven approach in Japan. Without legal constraints, South Korea’s chaebols expanded their shipbuilding industries to include overseas exports, fostering innovation to stay competitive in the domestic market. In contrast, Japanese keiretsu focused solely on meeting domestic government demand, resulting in a lack of experience in exporting warships. This deficiency contributed to Japan’s failure to secure the Soryu-class submarine deal with Australia. However, the Japanese government has since reformed its government-driven model, achieving success in its recent bid for Australia’s general-purpose frigate project. Ironically, South Korea failed to secure this project, largely due to challenges stemming from its entirely private sector-driven approach to warship exports.
The outlined features could impact the US-China competition in warship-building capabilities. As the US aims to involve both South Korea and Japan in its shipbuilding industry, both countries must adapt their models to meet US demands effectively. For South Korea, insufficient government support to streamline bureaucratic processes may delay the delivery of documentation or warships. Adopting aspects of Japan’s government-to-government approach could mitigate these challenges, as the excessive domestic competition amongst South Korean companies undermines its warship export efforts. Therefore, the ROK government should foster collaboration amongst chaebols, creating a unified “one team” approach to enhance its competitiveness in the international defence market.
For its part, Japan can also take valuable lessons from the South Korean model. Japanese keiretsu should recognise that defence exports can benefit their businesses. South Korean chaebols have already acknowledged the importance of warship exports in strengthening their operations, and Japanese keiretsu should similarly appreciate the potential of this sector. However, government support alone is insufficient; successful outcomes require enterprises to actively align with and support government initiatives.
If both the ROK and Japan strengthen their models by learning lessons from each other, they could better meet US demands. Considering the size of the US project in terms of both value and volume, it could become the largest foreign project for either state. Successfully fulfilling the US government’s requirements would help Washington achieve its proposed shipbuilding goals by 2040 while providing Seoul and Tokyo with unprecedented revenues. However, if past mistakes are repeated, both countries risk undermining the project, which could hinder the US meeting its strategic demands. Such an outcome, which would affect the US-China competition, will underscore the need for innovation and reform in South Korea’s and Japan’s shipbuilding industries.
Endnotes
[a] In February 2024, Secretary Del Toro visited HD Hyundai, one of South Korea’s leading shipbuilders, at its shipyard in Ulsan. During his visit, he expressed interest in integrating South Korean shipbuilding expertise into US naval operations. Following his trip to South Korea, he immediately flew to Japan, where he held meetings with Japanese shipbuilding companies such as Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Japan Marine United. He also visited shipyards involved in the maintenance of a USN oiler. Finally, during the Navy League conference in April 2024, after his visits to South Korea and Japan, Secretary Del Toro stated: “Our Korean and Japanese allies build high-quality ships…[W]e were floored at the level of digitalization and real-time monitoring of shipbuilding progress…We have an opportunity to attract the most advanced shipbuilders in the world to open U.S.-owned subsidiaries”. See: https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/Press-Releases/display-pressreleases/Article/3690336/secretary-of-the-navy-del-toro-meets-with-leaders-of-hd-hyundai-and-hanwha-in-t/; https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/Press-Releases/display-pressreleases/Article/3693545/secnav-del-toro-engages-japanese-shipbuilding-execs/; https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2024/11/113_372543.html
[b] In 2016, the Australian government expressed interest in acquiring Japanese Soryu-class submarines, which are air-independent propulsion submarines capable of longer submerged operations compared to conventional submarines, to replace the aging Collins-class submarines scheduled for decommissioning starting in 2026. However, instead of selecting the Japanese model, Australia ultimately chose a French design, which was later replaced by the AUKUS agreement in 2021. The Japanese bid was unsuccessful because Japanese shipbuilders were outmanoeuvred by their French counterparts, and they lacked the production capabilities to meet the demands of overseas clients.
[1] For large UUVs, see Ronald O’Rourke, Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2024). There is an ongoing debate on whether China has developed ASBMs, such as the DF-26B, that can target moving warships at ranges up to 4,000 kilometres. However, no consensus has been reached, and therefore this article refers to the DF-21D, which is generally understood to be capable of striking moving targets at approximately 1,800 kilometres. For further information on this debate, see US Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019 (Washington D.C.: US Department of Defense, 2019), 44. See also Peter Suciu, “China’s Test of Aircraft Carrier-Killer Missiles (DF-21D and DF-26B), Explained,” The National Interest, August 28, 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/chinas-test-aircraft-carrier-killer-missiles-df-21d-and-df-26b-explained-167917.
[2] Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities – Background and Issues for Congress (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2024), 12.
[3] O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization, 12.
[4] O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization, 12.
[5] Mallory Shelbourne, “Navy Extending Service Lives of 12 Flight I Arleigh Burke Destroyers,” USNI News, October 31, 2024, https://news.usni.org/2024/10/31/navy-extending-service-lives-of-12-flight-i-arleigh-burke-destroyers.
[6] Shelbourne, “Navy Extending Service Lives of 12 Flight I Arleigh Burke Destroyers.”
[7] Dong-woo Chang, “S. Korean Shipyards Anticipate Greater U.S. Biz Opportunities after Trump’s Call for Cooperation,” Yonhap News Agency, November 14, 2024, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20241114003000320.
[8] For South Korea’s shipbuilding, see, Dongkeun Lee, “Influences behind the Development of South Korea’s Shipbuilding Industry from the 1960s to the 2000s,” Marine Policy 167, (2024): 1-8; Peter K. Lee, “Australia’s Shipbuilding Ambitions and South Korea’s Experience,” United States Studies Centre, October 31, 2024, https://www.ussc.edu.au/australias-shipbuilding-ambitions-and-south-koreas-experience. See also, Abhishek Sharma, “South Korean Shipbuilding: Capabilities, Competition, and Constraints,” Observer Research Foundation, September 11, 2024, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/south-korean-shipbuilding-capabilities-competition-and-constraints. For Japan’s shipbuilding capabilities, see George O. Totten, “The Reconstruction of the Japanese Shipbuilding Industry,” in Japan and the New Ocean Regime, edited by Robert L. Friedhelm (Oxon: Routledge, 2018), 130-172. See also, Sinichiro Otsubo, “進化する造船業 [Evolving Shipbuilding Industry],” Journal of Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism 134, (2015): 4-11. [in Japanese]
[9] Lee, “Influences behind the Development of South Korea’s Shipbuilding Industry from the 1960s to the 2000s,” 1-8.
[10] Lee, “Influences behind the Development of South Korea’s Shipbuilding Industry from the 1960s to the 2000s,” 1-8.
[11] Lee, “Influences behind the Development of South Korea’s Shipbuilding Industry from the 1960s to the 2000s,” 1-8.
[12] Peter Banseok Kwon, Cornerstone of the Nation: The Defense Industry and the Building of Modern Korea under Park Chung Hee (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2024), 62-115.
[13] Peter Banseok Kwon, Cornerstone of the Nation: The Defense Industry and the Building of Modern Korea under Park Chung Hee (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2024), 62-115.
[14] Kwon, Cornerstone of the Nation, 62-115.
[15] Kwon, Cornerstone of the Nation, 117-120.
[16] Seymour Broadbridge, “Shipbuilding and the State in Japan since the 1850s,” Modern Asian Studies 11, no. 4 (1977): 605-607.
[17] Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “The Constitution of Japan,” Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, November 3, 1946, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html.
[18] Seymour, “Shipbuilding and the State in Japan since the 1850s,” 612-613.
[19] Gyewan Cho, “한국 조선업, 일본에 17년 만에 추월당해 [South Korean Shipbuilding Industry Is Surpassed by Japanese Shipbuilding Industry for the First Time in 1999],” The Hankyoreh, January 4, 2017, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/economy/economy_general/777357.html. [in Korean] See also, Hyoji Lee, “韓 조선업 경쟁력, 중국에 추월…종합 전략 시급 [South Korean Shipbuilding Competency Was Surpassed by China… There Needs to Be an Overall Strategy],” Yonhap Infomax, May 13, 2024, https://news.einfomax.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=4309268. [in Korean]
[20] James Pritchard, A Bridge of Ships: Canadian Shipbuilding During the Second World War (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2011), 3-7.
[21] Reynald Bourque, “Industrial policy and the crisis in shipbuilding in France and Canada,” International Review of Administration Sciences 62, no. 2 (1996): 239-254.
[22] Alexander Grey, “The Submarine Workforce Crisis: Admitting Realities and Restructuring Long-term Strategy,” War on the Rocks, April 4, 2024, https://warontherocks.com/2024/04/the-submarine-workforce-crisis-admitting-realities-and-restructuring-long-term-strategy/.
[23] Chris Panella, “As It Looks to Keep Its Edge Over Rivals, the US Navy's Biggest Shipbuilding Projects are Delayed by Years, New Review Finds,” Business Insider, April 4, 2024, https://www.businessinsider.com/biggest-us-navy-shipbuilding-projects-are-delayed-by-years-2024-4.
[24] Yonhap News Agency, “‘통영함’ 인도 지연…‘오명’에 속타는 대우조선 [Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering is Struggling with the Late Delivery of ‘ROKS Tongyeong’],” Yonhap News Agency, November 26, 2014, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20141126148400052. [in Korean]
[25] Jiseung Jang, “HD현대중공업 건조 필리핀 호위함, 3년 만에 한국 방문 [Philippines Navy Frigate Built by HD Hyundai Visits South Korea After Three Years of Delivery],” Seoul Economic Daily Co. Ltd, June 15, 2023, https://www.sedaily.com/NewsView/29QV5FZZEJ. [in Korean]
[26] Nikkei, “三菱と三井が財閥越えて艦艇事業死守 苦境の防衛産業 [Protecting Naval Shipbuilder by Merging Two Zaibatsu, Mitsubishi and Mitsui],” Nikkei, November 2, 2021, https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXZQOUC2959K0Z21C21A0000000/. [in Japanese]
[27] Japan Ministry of National Defense, “平成２２年日本の防衛：防衛白書 [2010 Japanese Defence White Paper],” Japan Ministry of National Defense, accessed November 19, 2024, http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2010/2010/datindex.html. [in Japanese]
[28] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan’s Security Policy,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, December 5, 2023, https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page1we_000083.html.
[29] Franz-Stefan Gady, “Why Japan Lost the Bid to Build Australia’s New Subs,” The Diplomat, April 27, 2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/why-japan-lost-the-bid-to-build-australias-new-subs/.
[30] Gady, “Why Japan Lost the Bid to Build Australia’s New Subs.”
[31] Korea Development Institute, “한국 방위 산업, 어느 수준에 와 있을까? [How Far Has the South Korean Defence Industry Grown?],” Korea Development Institute, 2023, https://eiec.kdi.re.kr/material/pageoneView.do?idx=1666#:~:text=2017%EB%85%84%EB%B6%80%ED%84%B0%202021%EB%85%84,%EC%96%B5%20%EB%8B%AC%EB%9F%AC%EB%A1%9C%20%EA%B8%89%EC%A6%9D%ED%96%88%EC%8A%B5%EB%8B%88%EB%8B%A4. [in Korean]
[32] The Korea Maritime News, “대한민국 잠수함 수출국 됐다…대우조선, 첫 건조 성공 [Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering Successfully Built Submarines for Export…South Korea Has Become a Submarine Exporter],” The Korea Maritime News, August 4, 2017, http://www.haesanews.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=79429. [in Korean]
[33] The Korea Maritime News, “HD현대중공업 부사장 “ 수출 함정에 MRO 패키지 접목할 것” [The Vice President of HD Hyundai Announces “Connecting MRO Package to Exporting Warships”],” The Korea Maritime News, September 26, 2024, http://www.haesanews.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=125126. [in Korean]
[34] The Korea Maritime News, “HD현대중공업 부사장 “ 수출 함정에 MRO 패키지 접목할 것” [The Vice President of HD Hyundai Announces “Connecting MRO Package to Exporting Warships”]. [in Korean]
[35] Bokyeong Kim, “미국 MRO 20조원 시장 열린다…HD현대重·한화오션 경쟁 치열 [The US is Looking for Companies for 139 USD Values of MRO Project… HD Hyundai and Hanwha Ocean are Competing],” Yonhap News Agency, November 13, 2024, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20241113135900003. [in Korean]
[36] Kim, “미국 MRO 20조원 시장 열린다…HD현대重·한화오션 경쟁 치열 [The US is Looking for Companies for 139 USD Values of MRO Project… HD Hyundai and Hanwha Ocean are Competing].” [in Korean]
[37] NHK, “防衛装備品の輸出ルール緩和なぜ“積み残し”起きたか [Why Did the Amendment of the Defence Equipment and Technology Export Rule Still “Left the Questions”?],” NHK, December 27, 2023, https://www.nhk.or.jp/politics/articles/feature/104936.html. [in Japanese]
[38] The JoongAng, “「韓国が刺激」防衛産業輸出規制解いた日本の進撃、韓国パートナーも狙う（１）[“South Korea Stimulated Japan.” Japanese Defence Industries Rise After the Amendment of the Principles. This Can Threaten South Korean Businesses (1)],” The JoongAng, March 20, 2024, https://japanese.joins.com/JArticle/316421?sectcode=300&servcode=300. [in Japanese]
[39] Australian Government, Enhanced Lethality Surface Combatant Fleet: Independent Analysis of Navy’s Surface Combatant Fleet (Australian Government, 2024), 4 and 9.
[40] Cheoloh Cho, Heewon Jeong, and Daehoon Kim, “[단독] “한국만 골든타임 놓쳤다”… ‘10조 사업’ 날린 이유가 [[Exclusive] “It Is only South Korea that Missed the Golden Time”… The Reason Behind Missing ‘7.2 USD Worth Project’],” The Korea Economic Daily, November 17, 2024, https://www.hankyung.com/article/2024111769841. [in Korean]
[41] Cho, Jeong, and Kim, “[단독] “한국만 골든타임 놓쳤다”… ‘10조 사업’ 날린 이유가 [[Exclusive] “It Is only South Korea that Missed the Golden Time”… The Reason Behind Missing ‘7.2 USD Worth Project’].” [in Korean]
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