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Davit Antonyan, “A Blueprint for Shaping India–Armenia Economic Partnership,” ORF Issue Brief No. 837, Observer Research Foundation, October 2025.
In recent years, India has emerged as one of the most important foreign policy partners for Armenia. The development has been fuelled by India’s arms exports to Armenia,[1] which have made it Armenia’s largest provider of military and defence equipment. The relationship continues to grow, bolstered by the two countries’ shared geopolitical interest in regional stability.[2] However, progress so far has been largely confined to the defence realm, with other domains lagging.
Stronger ties with New Delhi are part of Yerevan’s ongoing foreign policy diversification, through which it seeks to geopolitically and geoeconomically broaden its relationships.[3] After Moscow failed to fulfil its security obligations to Yerevan under their alliance framework following the 2021 and 2022 Azerbaijani incursions into sovereign Armenian territory, Armenia moved to reduce its dependence on Russia, particularly in the security domain.[4] Since then, India has stepped in, supplying around 70 percent of Armenia’s weapons imports.[5] Confronted with threats from the government of Azerbaijan, including its reluctance to finalise the peace deal thus far and hostile official rhetoric against Armenians, Armenia’s diversification policy aims to strengthen its resilience, raise its international profile, and build deterrence. The economic domain is important to this policy.[6]
Advancing the relationship will be mutually beneficial, reinforcing India’s outreach in the Eurasian region and strengthening Armenia’s deterrence capacity. Bilateral trade in 2024 stood at only US$270 million, at a deficit for Armenia (86 percent of trade comprised Indian imports), largely consisting of a few goods including precious stones and precious metals.[7] Enhanced private-sector collaboration, supported by stronger trade relations and investments, is essential to transforming the current partnership of opportunity into one of shared interests.
Armenia’s domestic market of three million people is small. However, it is a gateway—its membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), combined with its proximity to Iran, an important partner of India, as well as the vibrancy of its IT sector and its diaspora[8] collectively provide a larger economic opportunity for India in a key region of interest. Additionally, New Delhi’s current foreign policy seeks to expand India’s global footprint, particularly towards Europe, Russia, and the Middle East. This is demonstrated by investments in connectivity projects such as the International North–South Transport Corridor and the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor. India’s launch of free-trade association negotiations with the EAEU follows this interest.[9] In this context, establishing a stronger physical and economic presence in the South Caucasus can serve as a strategic bridge for projecting Indian economic power into these regions.
For Armenia, strengthened economic cooperation with India can help elevate its investment environment by attracting larger foreign investments and addressing its foreign direct investment troubles, while also building large-scale projects that can serve as “asset deterrence.” This is a predicament wherein the risk of aggression against Armenia may be reduced, due to the consequences of attacking strategic assets. This “asset deterrence” strategy, in line with its diversification policy, aims to draw the interest and financial stake of major foreign partners and multinational companies in its economic development. This reflects broader geopolitical processes underway in Washington, which attach a corporate dimension to geopolitical support.[10]
To build a stronger economic relationship, India and Armenia should prioritise sectors in which they can be value-added partners in alignment with each country’s security and development strategy. These include technology, clean energy, infrastructure, mining, agriculture, and tourism. Collectively, these sectors hold the potential to strengthen human capital, build technical capacities, reinforce sovereignty over critical assets, and deepen people-to-people ties. Such an approach represents a strategic blueprint for a new model of partnership between India and Armenia—one built on innovation, resilience, and connectivity.
As part of this blueprint, a partnership in the technology domain can serve as the foundation for enhancing technical capacities in both countries. Certain shared defence-technology initiatives already exist and both countries have agreed to continue cooperation in the high-technology sector, focusing on microelectronics, research and design, digitisation, and information technologies.[11] Armenia has positioned itself as the “Silicon Valley of the South Caucasus.”[12] It maintains strong R&D capabilities, particularly in microelectronics, leveraging the presence of companies such as Synopsis, Nvidia, and Siemens, along with its legacy as a major technological centre of the Soviet Union.[13] Following an influx of Russian migrants after the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine war, many of whom worked in the IT sector, Armenia experienced a surge in tech-sector professionals.[14] This enabled the country to rapidly increase its technological ambitions and strengthen its IT capabilities. This gives it a slight edge in deploying tech-literate R&D specialists in high-tech fields.
Moreover, its startup ecosystem punches far above its weight, with both homegrown and diasporan tech companies (such as Picsart and ServiceTitan) offering artificial intelligence- and machine learning-powered products in consumer-facing technologies.[15] Unveiled in June of this year, Armenia will also join the inaugural cohort of countries hosting their own AI factories, putting Armenia firmly on the global AI innovation map.[16] Backed by Nvidia, this AI factory—to be launched in 2026—positions Armenia among only a few countries in the world with the capacity to generate artificial intelligence at scale, enabling innovations in biotechnology, agritechnologies, and more.
Armenia’s technological potential is further supported by key government initiatives that seek to elevate the country’s technological portfolio.[17] Abroad, Armenia’s notable diaspora presence in Silicon Valley and other places facilitate a steady flow of capital and expertise into its domestic tech industry, while strengthening ties with other diasporas, including India’s.[18]
As part of India’s technological transformation and objectives, Armenia’s talent pool, research base, and diasporan network in the tech centres in the United States (US) offer added value to Indian technology companies seeking to enter international markets. For Armenia, India provides a market for its consumer products and a potential base of skilled workers who can ease the strain of labour shortages faced by Armenian tech companies.[19] This tech collaboration could also yield results in the AI and IT education sectors, where Armenia boasts of several international AI education programmes.[20] Additionally, Indian tech manufacturers exploring ventures in Armenia can also benefit from Armenia’s “Alliance” free economic zone, which offers exemptions from profit tax, value added tax, excise tax, and customs fees, requiring the payment of only income tax.[21]
One specific area for collaboration is Armenia’s dual initiative of the ‘Engineering City’ and the ‘Factory City at Engineering City.’ ‘Engineering City’ is a public–private partnership initiative based in Yerevan that provides shared resources, infrastructure, and industry- oriented education for high-tech companies to develop complex engineering solutions.[22] The next phase of this project, the ‘Factory City at Engineering City,’ aims to develop a manufacturing hub that can capitalise on the high-tech innovations developed in ‘Engineering City’ and produce the corresponding hardware within a shared infrastructure space. To launch the project, Armenia is seeking a key multinational anchor company to develop a manufacturing base in Yerevan. India could play a key role, particularly if one of its major tech manufacturers were to set up a factory in Armenia.[23] For India, this would provide an additional manufacturing base in a strategically connected region, given Armenia’s membership in the EAEU, while also boosting its global presence.
In the realm of innovation, faced with the challenges brought about by climate change and a need to diversify its energy resources, Armenia is witnessing a shift to promote clean energy across the country. With the additional expected electricity demand brought on by its pivot towards technological output, the government’s strategy includes a mix of an expansion of solar energy production, refurbishing and upgrading the electricity grid, revamping its nuclear energy capacities, and increasing small-scale hydro and wind energy output.[24]
Hydroelectric power and solar energy, followed by wind and geothermal, are Armenia’s leading renewable energy sources. Most of these plants are small in scale and generally environmentally friendly, with a few megaprojects underway. Additionally, Armenia is also a net electricity exporter, supplying power to Georgia, and to Iran under a natural gas for electricity exchange arrangement, making projects that enhance its electricity transport and output potentially valuable.[25]
India’s goal of meeting 50 percent of its electricity needs through renewable energy by 2030 has galvanised a robust and growing clean energy technology sector, with the country securing the fourth position globally for renewable energy capacity installations in 2022.[26] Indian renewable energy leaders can contribute to Armenia’s energy resilience and also demonstrate India’s commitment to being the climate justice leader for the Global South.[27]
Areas for investment and capacity-building in Armenia include building storage facilities and batteries, and transferring technological solutions to enable Armenia to store its excess production of solar energy; developing Armenia’s electricity and energy transport infrastructure to expand its export capacity; and developing megaprojects, particularly in wind and solar.[28] The joint production of biogas, leveraging Armenia’s relatively cheap imports of wheat and grain from Russia, has the potential to succeed.
To solidify the physical link that can drive trade and transit between the two countries, a strategic partnership in infrastructure development in Armenia is needed. Two tailwinds reinforce the point of infrastructural cooperation between Armenia and India.
First, for India, the diversification of trade routes is a primary motivation for much of its outreach in West and Central Asia, for greater access to Eurasian and European markets.[29] Its proposed International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) is a major avenue of this trade route diversification.[30] While the original INSTC passes through Azerbaijan, which has advanced infrastructure linkages between Russia and Iran, an alternative has been proposed involving Armenia and Georgia under the “Persian Gulf–Black Sea Corridor.”[31] This route leverages Armenia’s growing involvement at the Chabahar port,[32] a major facility being developed in Iran’s Persian Gulf with the support of India, and the recent establishment of the India–Iran–Armenia trilateral connectivity format.[33] Additional moves by the Armenian government to unblock communications routes in the region under the auspices of the “Crossroads of Peace” concept and a potential opening of the border with Turkey can further strengthen Armenia’s potential as a logistics and transit hub.[34] Growing American,[35] European,[36] Russian,[37] and Chinese[38] interests in the South Caucasus as a transit hub also necessitate a closer examination by India of how to engage this potential. The newly-revealed “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity,” a transport link through southern Armenia, and subsequent unblocking of transit in the South Caucasus, will necessitate further review for India’s own interests, with potential opportunity for Indian companies to take part in building some of the infrastructure of this route.[39]
Second, for Armenia, building up its own internal infrastructure and highway and railway networks is vital for its positioning as a transit hub between North and South, and East and West. Given the vast experience of Indian companies in building up the infrastructure of countries in the Global South, Indian expertise and investment would certainly be welcome in Armenia’s key infrastructure,[40] including bridges and tunnels through its mountainous landscape, highways, telecommunications, and core structures such as schools and administrative buildings.
Armenia’s largest infrastructure project is the North–South Road Corridor, a major project to upgrade the highway running from its southern border with Iran to the northern border with Georgia.[41] The project is being financed in multiple tranches, with each one divided into individual sections for which the Armenian government announces open tenders. Funding for the project is provided by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Investment Bank, the Eurasian Fund for Stabilisation and Development, and the Asian Development Bank. Iranian and Chinese firms are currently constructing parts of the project. One Indian infrastructure company, Dineshchandra R Agrawal Infracon Pvt. Ltd, is involved in constructing an 8-km stretch of this corridor and has been awarded a total contract of US$21.4 million. Indian infrastructure firms should continue to participate in these tenders,[42] leveraging their experience in complex terrain and large-scale road construction to strengthen regional connectivity and trade.
As part of the India–Armenia economic blueprint, sustainable cooperation in extractive industries can be a way to connect the countries’ need for innovation with strengthening national resilience. Mining is integral to Armenia’s economic growth, contributing to 28 percent of its industrial output and 5.5 percent of its GDP, while employing over 11,000 people.[43] Three key minerals make up Armenia’s strategic reserves: gold, copper, and molybdenum.[44] The country holds 2 percent of the world’s reserves in molybdenum and contributed nearly 4 percent of global molybdenum production in 2021; it also supplied 0.4 percent of the world’s copper supply.[45] These figures are likely underestimated, as the last geological survey was conducted during the Soviet era. Smaller reserves of certain rare earth minerals may also exist but remain unmapped.[46] A key underexplored area, near the existing Kajaran copper–molybdenum mine is estimated to contain 2 billion tonnes of copper ore.[47] While the regulatory environment for mining has been subject to a series of fluctuations, the Armenian government adopted a concrete 10-year development strategy in 2023 to remove uncertainties about the future viability of the mining sector.[48] Efforts are ongoing to adopt new geological reporting standards.[49]
India’s efforts to strengthen domestic manufacturing in the defence sector,[50] coupled with its growing renewable energy and electric vehicle sector will make a partnership in key minerals with countries such as Armenia even more vital, given that it is reliant on the imports of these critical materials.[51]
Armenia’s access to capital remains mostly restricted to Russia. While the government owns a stake in the major mines, capital for the development of mining assets—from extraction to processing—remains limited.[52] As part of its overall diversification strategy, Armenia is actively seeking additional sources of capital (in the form of investments and joint ventures) to upgrade its current mines to world-class environmental, social, and governance (ESG) standards, and to develop new processing plants and extraction sites.[53] Indian conglomerates such as Reliance and Hindalco could play a pivotal role in this effort. Additionally, there are various underdeveloped mines in Armenia—such as the Teghut copper–molybdenum mine—that could benefit from Indian involvement. For India, this presents an opportunity to secure some of its critical mineral needs through a mutually beneficial joint venture in Armenia.
Beyond capital, these Indian conglomerates could also facilitate the transfer of key mining and processing technologies and equipment to Armenia—both enhancing India’s position as an export hub and also encouraging downstream investment into Armenia’s mining sector. This capacity development could also include an educational component, with Indian institutions specialising in mechanical engineering sharing expertise and developing exchanges and research centres with Armenia’s Polytechnic University.
Agriculture is an economic pillar for both India and Armenia. The potential of Armenia’s agricultural sector remains largely underdeveloped.[54] While certain successful innovations in agritech have emerged from Armenia, unlocking the country’s agricultural capacities requires sufficient investment, collaboration, and strategic vision.[55] Government initiatives have been launched to foster a favourable environment for the growth of Armenia’s agricultural sector, particularly around large-scale agribusiness and animal husbandry, yet the sector remains mostly small-scale and ripe for development.[56] As Armenia builds up on its agricultural potential, Indian companies have an opportunity to set up joint ventures in Armenia in large-scale, modern agricultural projects that can increase its agricultural output. This collaboration could also bolster food security in the broader region, especially in the Gulf countries which have shown interest in securing their food supplies from the South Caucasus in the past few years.[57] Focus on export-oriented products such as fruits and vegetables, nuts, flowers, halal meats, fish, and processed products can be other profitable ventures. Moreover, Armenia’s membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Eurasian market’s position as the largest export destination of Armenian food products can make Indian joint ventures in Armenia particularly attractive for customs-free trade with the bloc, especially in prepared food items such as snacks, dried goods, and beverages (while India negotiates its own free trade agreement with the EAEU).
A key area for trade could be wine and brandy. Armenia’s reborn winemaking industry and its legacy producers of award-winning brandy have broad appeal for their quality and lower cost when compared to its European counterparts. In India, wine consumption is rising with a year-on-year increase of 29 percent in 2022.[58] However, high customs duties on alcohol and wine imports—despite recent reductions[59]—prevent competitive entry into the market. Mechanisms to facilitate the export of Armenian wines and brandies to the growing and the largely untapped Indian market should be explored, both through the EAEU and private partnerships with Indian alcohol distributors.
As the world’s largest agrarian economy, India has invested heavily in developing its agricultural sector, not only through human capital but also through technological initiatives that increase crop yield, enhance pest resistance, and mitigate climate change impact. Armenia is well positioned to adopt such agritech for three key reasons:
Armenia can also serve as a testing ground for agricultural innovations emerging from India. One specific avenue for collaboration is through a scaling of the Telangana state government’s “Saagu Baagu” initiative,[60] in Armenia. This programme uses AI to analyse the challenges plaguing farmers’ crop yields and gives real-time, tailored recommendations depending on the maturity and state of certain crops. Pilot implementation could take place in existing small farms and experimental facilities in Armenia to test and validate innovative solutions.
Additionally, given that Armenia is itself working to develop a similar AI-based solution for predicting crop yield and preventing disease, there is a possibility of creating joint agritech startups that can help both Armenian and Indian farmers solve these issues. Both countries are also currently developing agro-robotic solutions. Collaborative research and design in this domain could offer strategic benefits to both sides.
Lastly, fostering educational exchanges between Armenia’s National Agrarian University (ANAU) and Indian agricultural institutions could further contribute to workforce development in the two countries and enhance research capacities, driving downstream investments. ANAU, for example, is developing specific English-language courses in precision agriculture, agricultural robotics, sustainable agriculture, and food safety that could attract Indian students.
To further strengthen people-to-people ties and develop their economic relationship, Armenia and India have significant potential to increase tourism numbers. Armenia’s strong tourism potential—with offerings in culture, nature, gastronomy, and adventure—makes it an attractive destination for India’s growing middle class. However, the major barrier to increasing Indian tourist numbers in Armenia is the lack of direct air connectivity. While several Armenian airlines have explored the New Delhi–Yerevan route, none have successfully launched operations.[61]
India is already among the top five sources of tourists to Armenia,[62] though many are Indian-origin travellers from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which has direct flights to Yerevan. Extending this connectivity to India itself would significantly increase tourist inflow—which is particularly important as Armenia faces a decline in visitors from Russia, its largest tourist group.[63]
A useful case study is the recent launch of direct Yerevan–Urumqi flights by China Southern Airlines,[64] which has led to a surge of Chinese tourist arrivals in Armenia.[65] Direct flights, ideally facilitated by an Indian carrier, could boost Armenia’s tourism sector, as Indian travellers visit year-round and appreciate its winter attractions, helping offset the low season.
Beyond direct flights, additional initiatives could strengthen tourism ties, such as regional travel packages that include Armenia alongside neighbouring countries, wedding tourism (which has been growing in popularity),[66] and expanded ecotourism options. Conversely, India’s relatively simplified visa process makes it an appealing destination for Armenian travellers, who are often constrained by lack of visa access to many other countries for tourism.
The reinforcement of ties between India and Armenia depends largely on the will and actions of the two countries’ governments. Building on the success of the partnership in defence, the relationship can be further strengthened by cooperating more in strategic economic projects that leverage Armenia’s membership in the EAEU and India’s outreach in the Middle East, Europe, and Russia. Joint economic investments and ventures in strategic sectors can support the respective countries’ economic action plans, as well as help drive stability in the South Caucasus.
This brief makes the following recommendations:
Davit Antonyan is Senior Associate Fellow, Applied Policy Research Institute of Armenia (APRI Armenia).
All views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author, and do not represent the Observer Research Foundation, either in its entirety or its officials and personnel.
[1] Syed Fazl-e-Haider, “India Becomes Armenia’s Largest Defense Supplier—Jamestown,” The Jamestown Foundation, September 12, 2024, https://jamestown.org/program/india-becomes-armenias-largest-defense-supplier/.
[2] Nvard Chalikyan, Verej Isanians, and Benyamin Poghosyan, “The Geopolitical Aspects of the India–Armenia Partnership,” Observer Research Foundation, December 9, 2024, https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-geopolitical-aspects-of-the-india-armenia-partnership.
[3] Benyamin Poghosyan, “Armenia’s Foreign Policy after the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War: Diversification in the Post-Unipolar World,” Applied Policy Research Institute of Armenia (APRI Armenia), May 2025, https://doi.org/10.71308/ESAH1639.
[4] Anahide Pilibossian and Leonid Nersisyan, “Leaving the ‘Post-Soviet’ Behind: Redefining Armenia’s Deterrence Strategy,” The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, December 17, 2024, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/leaving-post-soviet-behind-redefining-armenias-deterrence-strategy.
[5] Insights from expert interviews; see also: Leonid Nersisyan, “Reassessing Armenia’s Deterrence Strategy in 2025,” Applied Policy Research Institute of Armenia, June 11, 2025, https://apri.institute/reassessing-armenias-deterrence-strategy-in-2025/.
[6] Giuliano Bifolchi and Silvia Boltuc, “Today’s Economy of Armenia: Interview with Gevorg Papoyan,” SpecialEurasia, June 24, 2024, https://www.specialeurasia.com/2024/06/24/armenia-economy-gevorg-papoyan/.
[7] Statistical Committee of the Republic of Armenia, armstat.am.
[8] “NA Vice President Hakob Arshakyan Participates in Global Diaspora Forum in San Francisco,” National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia, December 11, 2024, http://www.parliament.am/news.php?cat_id=2&NewsID=21560&year=2024&month=12&day=11&lang=eng.
[9] Ministry of Commerce & Industry, Government of India, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2158480.
[10] Heidi Crebo-Rediker, “What’s the Deal with Trump’s Ukraine Mineral Agreement?,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 1, 2025, https://www.cfr.org/article/whats-deal-trump-ukraine-mineral-agreement.
[11] “Armenia and India Share a Wide Scope of Cooperation and Potential: Mkhitar Hayrapetyan Received Ambassador of India to Armenia Ms. Nilakshi Saha Sinha,” Ministry of High-Tech Industry of the Republic of Armenia, August 30, 2024, https://hightech.gov.am/en/tegekatvakan-kentron/ayl/norutyunner/armenia-india-cooperation.
[12] Rayhan Demytrie, “How Armenia is Trying to Build a Silicon Valley in the Caucasus,” BBC, April 28, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c2ew48p13y0o.
[13] Craig Smith, “Soviet Mainframes To Silicon Mountains: Armenia As A Tech Powerhouse,” Forbes, December 8, 2023, https://www.forbes.com/sites/craigsmith/2023/12/08/soviet-mainframes-to-silicon-mountains-armenia-as-a-tech-powerhouse/.
[14] Benyamin Poghosyan, “How Russian Migration Fuels Armenia’s IT Sector Growth,” Italian Institute for International Political Studies, November 6, 2023, https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/how-russian-migration-fuels-armenias-it-sector-growth-151311.
[15] “Successful Startups from Armenia to Watch for in 2025 and Beyond: Driving Innovation and Redefining the Future Together,” Volo, January 20, 2025, https://volo.global/blog/news/successful-startups-from-armenia.
[16] Ani Toroyan, “Bringing AI Home: What a $500M Data Center Could Mean for Armenia,” EVN Report, July 9, 2025, https://evnreport.com/creative-tech/bringing-ai-home-what-data-center-means-for-armenia/.
[17] Ministry of High-Tech Industry of the Republic of Armenia, https://hightech.gov.am/en/.
[18] “Global Diaspora Forum: The India-Armenia Edition,” Observer Research Foundation, https://orfamerica.org/recent-events/global-diaspora-forum-the-india-armenia-edition.
[19] Insights from expert interviews.
[20] Davit Antonyan, “Promoting South–South Partnerships: The Potential of India–Armenia Collaboration in AI Education and Research,” Observer Research Foundation, May 13, 2025, https://www.orfonline.org/research/promoting-south-south-partnerships-the-potential-of-india-armenia-collaboration-in-ai-education-and-research.
[21] “Operating Free Economic Zones,” Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Armenia, https://mineconomy.am/en/page/360.
[22] Engineering City, https://engineeringcity.am/.
[23] Insights from expert interviews.
[24] “Republic of Armenia Energy Sector Development Strategic Program to 2040,” https://energyagency.am/public/uploads/news/pdf/EnergyStrategy_angleren.pdf?fbclid=IwAR3Yf9Vbt2UVcJrqvmD_Y9heyktnvJ-ydSPQa5tCrhNe6iLVWZCBKglJ3Do.
[25] Insights from expert interviews.
[26] Energy and Environment, Government of India, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressNoteDetails.aspx?id=154717&NoteId=154717&ModuleId=3.
[27] Christophe Jaffrelot and Hemal Thakker, “On Climate Change, India’s Challenges Leading the Global South,” The Indian Express, December 20, 2023, https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/a-climate-paradox-9075115/.
[28] Insights from expert interviews.
[29] Angelos Delivorias with Dorothée Falkenberg, “India's Connectivity Initiatives: A Multi-faceted Strategy,” European Parliament, October 2024, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2024/762471/EPRS_BRI(2024)762471_EN.pdf.
[30] Dipanjan Ray Chaudhury, “Eurasian Connectivity: India–Iran–Armenia Trilateral Meet to Foster Close Cooperation on INSTC,” The Economic Times, December 12, 2024, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/eurasian-connectivity-india-iran-armenia-trilateral-meet-to-foster-close-cooperation-on-instc/articleshow/116260997.cms?from=mdr.
[31] Aram Sargsyan, “Countries Involved in Iran’s Persian Gulf-Black Sea Transit Corridor Initiative Close to Approval of Agreement- Embassy,” Armenpress, November 19, 2021, https://armenpress.am/en/article/1068604.
[32] “Armenia Is Considering the Possibility of Becoming a Chabahar Port Operator,” Radar Armenia, June 5, 2024, https://radar.am/en/news/politics-2635114967/.
[33] “2nd India-Iran-Armenia Trilateral Consultations,” Ministry of External Affairs Government of India Media Center, December 12, 2024, https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/38757/2nd+IndiaIranArmenia+Trilateral+Consultations.
[34] Orbeli Center, “The Crossroads of Peace,” Orbeli Analytical Research Center, April 25, 2025, https://orbeli.am/en/post/1411/2025-04-25/The%20Crossroads%20of%20Peace.
[35] James Jay Carafano, “U.S. Eyes Greater Influence in the South Caucasus,” GIS, June 9, 2025, https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/south-caucasus-united-states/.
[36] Tinatin Akhvlediani, “The EU and the South Caucasus: Geoeconomics at Play,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 2, 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/10/the-eu-and-the-south-caucasus-geoeconomics-at-play?lang=en.
[37] Ирина Федоровская, “Проблемы транспортных проектов Южного Кавказа,” Russian International Affairs Council, February 16, 2024, https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/problemy-transportnykh-proektov-yuzhnogo-kavkaza/.
[38] Xu Wenhong, “Assessing China’s Interest in the South Caucasus,” (speech, 2025 APRI Forum, June 12, 2025), Applied Policy Research Institute of Armenia, https://apri.institute/video-gallery/assessing-chinas-interest-in-the-south-caucasus/.
[39] APRI Armenia, “The Washington Summit: Implications for Armenia and the Region,” Applied Policy Research Institute of Armenia, August 14, 2025, https://apri.institute/the-washington-summit-implications-for-armenia-and-the-region/.
[40] “Infrastructures,” Enterprise Armenia, https://enterprisearmenia.am/why-armenia/infrastructure/.
[41] “North–South Road Corridor Investment Program,” Road Department of the Republic of Armenia, https://armroad.am/en/projects/north-south-road-corridor-investment-program.
[42] “Tenders,” Road Department of the Republic of Armenia, https://armroad.am/en/tenders.
[43] Pavel Bilek and Dinara Saparova, “Armenia’s Mining Sector: State of Play and Recent Developments,” German Economic Team, December 2023, https://www.german-economic-team.com/en/newsletter/armenias-mining-sector-state-of-play-and-recent-developments/.
[44] Bilek and Saparova, “Armenia’s Mining Sector: State of Play and Recent Developments.”
[45] Insights from expert interviews.
[46] Insights from expert interviews.
[47] Insights from expert interviews.
[48] “Ռազմավարություն Հանքարդյունաբերության ոլորտի զարգացման (մինչեւ 2035 թվականը) [Strategy for the Development of the Mining Sector (until 2035)],” Ministry of Territorial Administration and Infrastructure of the Republic of Armenia, May 2023, https://api.mtad.am/api/file/download/page/5522.
[49] Insights from expert interviews.
[50] Siddharth Subudhi, “Ferro Molybdenum: Key to India’s Defence Aspirations but Threatened by Imports, Govt Must Bring Fair Competition,” Economic Times Government, March 1, 2024, https://government.economictimes.indiatimes.com/blog/ferro-molybdenum-key-to-indias-defence-aspirations-but-threatened-by-imports-govt-must-bring-fair-competition/108124634.
[51] Jaijit Bhattacharya, “Why Securing Ferro Molybdenum, other Critical Minerals is Critical for India’s Industrial Growth,” Economic Times Government, November 7, 2023, https://government.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/policy/why-securing-ferro-molybdenum-other-critical-minerals-is-critical-for-indias-industrial-growth/105035150.
[52] Insights from expert interviews; see also: Ani Avetisyan, “Who are the Russian Owners of Armenian Mines,” Civilnet, November 27, 2023, https://www.civilnet.am/en/news/758037/who-are-the-russian-owners-of-armenian-mines/.
[53] Insights from expert interviews.
[54] Hovhannes Nazaretyan, “Agriculture in Armenia: An Overview,” EVN Report, September 22, 2020, https://evnreport.com/magazine-issues/agriculture-in-armenia-an-overview/.
[55] “Armenia Country Commercial Guide: Agriculture,” International Trade Administration, November 29, 2023, https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/armenia-agriculture.
[56] “Program on ‘Subsidizing the Interest Rates on Loans Provided to the Agricultural Sector,’” Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Armenia, https://mineconomy.am/en/page/1340.
[57] Insights from expert interviews; see also: Naira Badalian, “Under EAEU–UAE Economic Partnership Agreement, 95% of Armenia’s Current Exports to Emirates will Receive Preferential Coverage,” Finport, June 26, 2025, https://finport.am/full_news.php?id=53486&lang=3.
[58] Liz Tach, “Wine In India – Consumption Rates Increasing Along With Wine Knowledge,” Forbes, October 4, 2023, https://www.forbes.com/sites/lizthach/2023/10/04/wine-in-india--consumption-rates-increasing-along-with-wine-knowledge/.
[59] TNN, “Govt Slashes Duty on Bourbon, Some Wines Amid US Threat,” The Times of India, February 15, 2025, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/govt-slashes-duty-on-bourbon-some-wines-amid-us-threat/articleshow/118258481.cms.
[60] Janakiram MSV, “How Indian Farmers Are Using AI To Increase Crop Yield,” Forbes, February 1, 2024, https://www.forbes.com/sites/janakirammsv/2024/02/01/how-indian-farmers-are-using-ai-to-increase-crop-yield/.
[61] Siranush Ghazanchyan, “First Direct Flights Between Yerevan and Delhi to be Launched from February 21,” Public Radio of Armenia, January 27, 2025, https://en.armradio.am/2025/01/27/first-direct-flights-between-yerevan-and-delhi-to-be-launched-from-february-21/.
[62] “Armenia’s Tourism Sees 4.6% Drop in 2024,” The Armenian Report, February 7, 2025, https://www.thearmenianreport.com/post/armenia-s-tourism-sees-4-6-drop-in-2024.
[63] “Armenia’s Tourism Sees 4.6% Drop in 2024.”
[64] “For the First Time Flights to be Operated from Yerevan to China’s Urumqi City,” Armenpress, July 10, 2024, https://armenpress.am/en/article/1195404.
[65] “Armenia’s Tourism Sees 4.6% Drop in 2024.”
[66] “Grand Indian Wedding at Seven Visions, The Dvin,” Lurer.com, April 26, 2024, https://lurer.com/article/592401/en.
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Davit Antonyan is Senior Associate Fellow, Applied Policy Research Institute of Armenia (APRI Armenia), Yerevan. ...
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