Introduction

The National People’s Congress is one of the most important annual political events in the policymaking landscape of China. The week-long yearly meetings are commonly referred to as “the two sessions” (Liang hui) named after the meeting of the two central bodies, the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC).

The third session of the 14^th NPC meetings took place from 4 to 11 March 2025. The meetings are particularly relevant at a time of hard policy choices confronting the leadership, including: reviving domestic consumption or strengthening technological self-reliance; sticking to its state capitalism model or according due recognition to the private sector to boost innovation; focusing on development (or ‘common prosperity’) or economic growth (new production forces); and centralising or decentralising and to what extent.

With the next party congress due in 2027, the party-state’s leadership, headed by Xi Jinping, has made its priorities clear. Xi is keen on further ‘Xintralisation’^[a] in decision-making. China’s policymaking will be motivated by the principle of ‘politics in command’ on the domestic front. For Xi, this translates to ‘regime security’.^[1]

‘Regime security’ was discussed in a group study session of the Communist Party’s decisive monthly politburo meeting^[b] on 28 February 2025, a few days before the NPC meeting. At the meeting, Xi drew the attention of politburo members to “national political security” and “national regime security”.^[c] The two sessions have traditionally focused on domestic matters. However, due to the current global environment, the two sessions received unprecedented attention from delegates. This indicates that the current leadership perceives serious external threats to its regime security and that international developments will influence its domestic policies. Given the priorities and political considerations, it was unsurprising that the expectations of notable policy initiatives to address domestic economic challenges, as highlighted in Premier Li Qiang’s Government Work Report (GWR), did not materialise.

In his presentation of the GWR, Premier Li stated that, domestically, the Chinese economy continues to suffer from weak demand, sluggish consumption, challenges to job creation, and economic slowdown.^[2] Li announced that Beijing would launch a comprehensive crackdown on neijuan^[d] (involution); this was the first time that neijuan was mentioned in a GWR.^[e] Further, Li drew the delegates’ attention to current fiscal problems and how they have impacted domestic demand. He may have been referring to the struggle caused by the de-real-estatisation^[f] of the economy and the dwindling revenue sources of provinces due to their inability to sell land to players in the real estate sector.^[g] The limited revenue streams and growing expectations of the centre to expand social welfare programmes for investment and job creation purposes impact demand. Further, 2025 marked the final year of the 14^th five-year plan, and this year’s NPC sessions provided a window to the broad contours of the 15^th five-year plan for 2026-2030.

Premier Li also highlighted certain challenges that China is facing due to external developments. Without mentioning the United States (US), Li pointed out that the Chinese economy faces external challenges from growing unilateralism, protectionism, and tariff barriers—all of which are undermining the stability of global supply chains. In this context, four critical themes that were discussed in the weeklong NPC sessions stand out: the Chinese leadership’s plans to revive the economy, the re-engagement of private tech players, the emphasis on realising the nation’s technological self-reliance, and Beijing’s response to the current external developments.

The Relevance of the Two Sessions

The third session of the 14^th NPC witnessed the participation of 3,000 delegates, appointed by the local congresses every five years at the end of every party congress.^[3] The other important body is the CPPCC, which saw participation from over 2,000 delegates in 2025. It brings together various political parties from the country, individuals without party affiliation, people’s organisations, and individuals from all ethnic groups. CPPCC membership comprises a range of actors from diverse backgrounds, including literature/arts, science, and technology; leading experts in social science disciplines; economists; and representatives from the autonomous regions of Hong Kong and Macau.^[4] The CPPCC provides key mechanisms for multi-party cooperation and political leadership under the aegis of the communist party.^[h]

Since Xi Jinping’s appointment, critics have been critical of the two sessions, contending that they are merely “rubber stamp” meetings that approve decisions which have already been taken by other, more influential bodies.^[5] These concerns have lately gained wider acceptance, reinforced by developments. Previously, the annual sessions witnessed healthy participation alongside constructive criticism, but they have since become an occasion to further consolidate Xi’s leadership. Additionally, while the two sessions were held earlier for over a week, they are now planned well in advance. Unlike when these sessions used to take place for 10 days with the active participation of the delegates and their constructive criticism, of late, the sessions close precisely a week before the inauguration.^[6] The discontinuation of the customary press conference by the Premier at the end of the two sessions since 2024 provides evidence of the Xintralisation of decision-making.

Reviving the Domestic Economy

Reviving domestic demand has been a concern in the Chinese economy. Like the previous year, Premier Li Qiang has set an ambitious target of 5 percent growth in GDP.^[7] Li also set a 2-percent consumer price inflation target compared to last year’s 3 percent. Despite the absence of any remarkable fiscal stimulus, Beijing has set a budget deficit target of 4 percent.^[i] The economic targets laid down by Beijing were as expected. Given the current headwinds against China and its focus on ‘regime security’, China does not want to deviate from its current policies despite the leadership being keen to revive the economy.

As some analysts^[8],[9] have pointed out, China’s focus is on storing ammunition to confront any situation created by the Trump administration in the US. In 2024, China barely achieved its 5-percent growth target, and this was due only to its exports. Will it be possible to achieve the 5-percent GDP growth rate target in 2025?

Owing to the tariffs imposed by the US and other developed markets, China would find it impossible to increase its exports. Even with the increase in exports to non-Western markets, China’s exports will hit a saturation point because the importing countries’ governments would impose tariffs to protect their domestic industries. This has only reinforced the urgency of reviving domestic demand. China’s household spending is less than 40 percent of its annual economic output and 20 percentage points below global average.^[10] To address this issue, Li announced specific measures in the GWR to boost consumption, including extending a programme for trading in old appliances; creating jobs and raising wages, especially for lower-income groups; and expanding elderly care. The government also shared that it will make special fiscal arrangements to ensure that rural residents under various local governments are paid on time and have adequate opportunities to rest. The work report also discussed the government’s plans to transform select cities into international consumption centres. However, it remains to be seen whether these measures will deliver the desired results.

According to analysts,^[11],[12] though these measures indicate the eagerness of policymakers to revive China from its deflationary state, the country will struggle to achieve its growth targets in 2025. First, given the vast party-state machinery, implementing various new guidelines will be challenging, as with previous policies. For instance, one concern is whether the recapitalisation of the state banks with CNY 500 million will be channelled in the right direction. Second, it remains to be seen how local governments will respond to the new initiatives. One example is the Special Purpose Bonds for local governments, worth CNY 4.4 trillion, which are meant to be spent on buying back unsold homes owing to the property-sector crisis and buying inventories to help complete pending projects. With the centre expecting local governments to increase their social welfare measures and simultaneously boost domestic consumption, new friction points in centre-province ties are bound to arise.^[j] In the absence of fiscal autonomy to raise local taxes owing to current policies being tilted towards the centre, the fiscal options for the provinces are restricted. To fulfil their obligations, local governments would be compelled to hold wages, delay payments to contractors, and not raise salaries. Moreover, they increasingly rely on non-tax sources to increase their revenue. Limited fiscal resources and the inability to expand their tax base will result in the latest measures failing to boost domestic consumption.

Experts^[13],[14] closely studying the latest measures are of the view that although Xi is keen to address China’s economic woes, his unchallenged position enables him to make decisions that he thinks are best for China’s interests in the long term. Despite suggestions by leading Chinese economists, Beijing has desisted from introducing major fiscal stimulus because Xi is determined to spur China to achieve tech self-reliance, while everything else is secondary. He is not keen to introduce new challenges in the form of a major fiscal stimulus, which may lead to corruption and wastage of resources. The message to the various domestic constituencies is that if China is to achieve greatness, it must undergo struggles and exercise patience (chi ku nai lao).

Considering this whole-of-society approach to realising the ‘China dream’, and given the potential of the private sector in reviving domestic consumption, Xi has extended an olive branch to the private sector, especially tech moguls. The initiative is expected to encourage them to work with the party-state leadership to realise China’s tech ambitions.^[15] In his February 2025 symposium, Xi assured private players that the current challenges they are facing are temporary and that they will be given a level playing field in an ecosystem otherwise dominated by state-backed players. Further, Xi pledged laws centring on promoting the private economy, stating, “It is necessary to resolutely remove all kinds of obstacles to equal use of production factors and fair participation in market competition.”^[16]

The Re-Engagement of Private Tech Players

Buoyed by the success of DeepSeek,^[k] Beijing is keen to recalibrate its relationship with the private sector, if not altogether reverse its policy. The party leadership expects the private sector to “think local, act national”.^[17],[18]

Premier Li’s GWR has stated that the government is keen to re-engage private tech players to boost China’s technology self-reliance. Well before the NPC meetings began, People’s Daily  carried an article^[19],[20] that signalled Xi’s interest in a rapprochement with private players, especially the technopreneurs who had been out of party favour until recently. Experts are of the view that Xi’s engagement of private players is led by his desire to achieve tech self-sufficiency. However, this engagement is accompanied by the caveat of “two unwavering”, which was referred to in the 16^th, 17^th, and 18^th party Congress, emphasising that the party “will unwaveringly consolidate and develop the public sector of the economy, and unwaveringly encourage, support, and guide the development of the non-public sector of the economy.”^[21]

Before the NPC sessions, Xi Jinping had a meeting at a symposium in February 2025, which was attended by four of the seven Politburo Standing Committee members. The symposium was attended by tech players, including Lei Jun of Xiaomi, Ma Huateng of Tencent, Ren Zhengfei of Huawei, and Liang Wenfeng of DeepSeek. It was also a rehabilitation for Jack Ma, who had a public fallout with the party leadership in late 2020 that led to the abandonment of Ant Financial’s IPO.^[22]

Xi also coined a new phrase, xian fu cu gong fu (“allow some to get rich first and then promote shared prosperity”), to win back the confidence of private players. It is worth noting that, while Xi spent years avoiding the political vocabulary of Deng Xiaoping, in this case, he borrowed from Deng’s policy of allowing some to get rich first (xian fu). However, it remains to be seen whether these developments will revive the morale of private tech players and translate into new policies.

Xi’s response after abandoning Ma’s proposed IPO had a dampening effect on the private sector. According to investment website Crunchbase, there was a 32-percent year-on-year drop in VC investments in China to US$33 billion in 2024.^[23] This resulted in a decrease in China’s inward-bound capital to one-fifth the size of the US$178 billion secured by US technology companies.^[24] There has also been a decline in the emergence of unicorns. In 2024, China had two new unicorns a month, twice that of Europe, but only 40 percent of that of the US.^[25]

This can be attributed to a series of measures that Beijing undertook in 2020 against private tech players that led to them lying flat^[l] (tang ping). What began with Chinese regulators abandoning Alibaba’s internet finance giant, Ant Financial’s US$34 billion stock debut^[26] in Shanghai and Hong Kong^[27] was followed by a multi-year crackdown on tech firms, and the imposition of fines of over US$1 billion on leading tech giants like Ant Group Co. and Tencent Holdings Ltd. Nevertheless, the leadership continued to politically signal that it was willing to engage private players.^[28] For instance, in 2023, the Communist Party and the Cabinet developed new guidelines acknowledging that “the private sector is a new force to promote Chinese-style modernisation, an important foundation for high-quality development and a key force to promote China's comprehensive construction of a socialist modern power.”^[29] The new guidelines hinted that party leadership would initiate measures like the protection of the property rights of private firms and entrepreneurs and steps to ensure fair market competition by breaking down entry barriers. However, these announcements were not followed by concrete measures.

In this year’s NPC sessions, a spokesperson said that they would work to promote China’s private economy protection law early.^[30] According to the Xinhua news agency, the proposed legislation is set to become China’s first fundamental law dedicated to developing the private economy and defining the private sector as a pillar of China’s socialist market economy. If the leadership does not take concrete actions to signal a fundamental shift regarding its policy towards the private sector, events like the 17 February symposium will be considered merely political optics.

China’s Big Technology Push

One of the highlights of the GWR was China’s determination to make large investments in developing the “new quality productive forces” (xin zhi shengchan li) and a modernised industrial system. Premier Li stressed the urgency of pursuing integrated advancements in technology and innovation, and pressing ahead through new industrialisation, expanding and strengthening advanced manufacturing, and developing modern services. Li announced that China’s policy would focus on advancing the integrated and clustered development of strategic emerging industries and implementing large-scale applications of modern technologies like the low-altitude economy. Notably, X-Peng, a Chinese private business aspiring to be a leader in the low-altitude economy, has already announced that it will introduce flying cars for passengers and goods by 2026.^[31]

The success of DeepSeek has bolstered China’s confidence in the Artificial Intelligence (AI) domain, and it was expected that the Chinese leadership would make a big push to achieve technological self-reliance. The 15^th five-year plan would see a push to bolster the AI Plus initiative. For the first time, the Chinese premier used the terms ‘6G technology’ and ‘embodied AI’ in a GWR. Elaborating on China’s tech ambitions, he said that China would focus on increasing funding for future industries, such as quantum technology, embodied AI, and 6G technology. He also stated that China would seek advanced trials for the integrated development of advanced manufacturing and modern services. The Chinese government would also support the development of unicorns and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) that specialise in sophisticated technology to produce novel products.^[32]

The premier also announced China’s plans to accelerate the development of key industrial chains in the manufacturing sector and step up efforts to advance industrial foundation re-engineering, and technology and equipment research. As part of the AI Plus initiative, China seeks to combine digital technology with its manufacturing and market strengths. Further, as part of the AI Plus initiative, China will support extensive applications of large-scale AI models and develop new-generation intelligent terminals.

Two initiatives deserve mention. In 2024, confronted by the tightening US clampdown, China launched the third phase of its China Integrated Circuit Industry to expand its chip industry, including in the materials and equipment segments.^[m] This initiative promises to be a gamechanger. Chinese firms like Guangzhou Summit Crystal Semiconductor and Tanke Blue are already expanding older semiconductors and niche substrates,^[n] driving down prices. The emergence of these players and their increasing share in the supply of silicon carbide (SiC)^[o] wafers at low prices are threatening global players like Wolf Speed. For instance, only two years ago, the cost of SiC wafers^[p] was US$1,500, but some local Chinese players are currently charging as low as US$500.

Owing to its growing appetite and high possibilities of further disruptions in technological value chains, Chinese policymakers are keen to build a robust domestic supply chain in areas not yet targeted by US export controls. These areas have various applications—e.g., compound semiconductors like SiC and other legacy chips. Although these initiatives have raised concerns about overcapacity, companies such as China FAW Group, Guangzhou Automobile Group, and Meituan hold stakes in emerging domestic chipmakers backed by local governments, especially in regions like Chongqing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Qingdao, and Ningbo, where chip manufacturing clusters have begun to emerge. Some less known chipmakers, like XLMEC and Shanghai Dingtai Jiangxin Tech, have received strong backing from local governments.

Another noteworthy initiative is the setting up of a national venture capital guidance fund. The announcement for this initiative was made during this year’s NPC sessions. The day after the presentation of the GWR, Zheng Shanjie—the head of China’s state planner, the National Development Reforms Commission (NDRC)—shared that China plans to set up the “national venture capital guidance fund”, an investment vehicle established as a public-private partnership focusing on ‘hard technology’, referring to areas such as semiconductors and renewable energy. The fund will maintain long-term investment cycles and invest in technology enterprises through market-based approaches. China maintains that setting up such a fund would boost support for AI model applications and VC investment to foster more technology breakthroughs and become self-reliant. The fund would focus on cutting-edge fields such as AI and quantum technology, and invest in seed-stage and start-up firms through market-based approaches. It is worth pointing out that influential policymakers close to the party’s leadership are already cautioning that China should not get carried away by this moment of tech triumphalism and become complacent.

The Chinese leadership led by Xi is aware of the dangers of falling into the trap of a ‘winning big’ mindset and seeking quick victories in the form of the latest AI breakthrough, inspired by DeepSeek. These concerns have been echoed by specialists working in the AI domain. For instance, some Chinese AI researchers are sceptical of China’s future AI progress due to US export bans on high-end chips, which limit China’s access to advanced chip process technology. Further, it is believed that DeepSeek’s success is a by-product of the “distillation”^[q] of some US AI models like Chat GPT, thereby failing to tilt the AI advantage in China’s favour. Moreover, China’s AI progress is conditional on the extent to which it can engage in IPR violations and reverse-engineer advanced US AI models.^[33] Although DeepSeek’s AI push is driven by algorithmic innovation—challenging the long-held belief that only high computing power and innovation can enhance AI—further breakthroughs may prove to be challenging due to China’s limitations in achieving large-scale computing power. For instance, critics have pointed out that DeepSeek’s success stems from advanced NVIDIA chip clusters, and that the global AI landscape is far from witnessing a fundamental transformation.

The Chinese leadership is well aware of the shortfalls in its AI ecosystem and  has been determined to address them through a series of policy measures.^[34] Some of these measures include establishing a financial mechanism dominated by the market, constructing an AI innovation base, investing in the coordination of international and domestic innovation resources, and establishing AI tech standards and IP systems.^[35] In this context, it is worth noting that the provincial leadership is fast-tracking the implementation of policies to invest in advanced robotics.^[36]

This month, Guangdong province unveiled a plan that includes 12 measures to spur innovation, including up to RMB 50 million in funding for national-level manufacturing innovation centres, and 10 million yuan for provincial centres.^[37] The initiative aims to strengthen AI and robotics by supporting research collaborations between enterprises, universities, and research institutions while improving the open-source innovation ecosystem and developing industry standards. Similarly, various provinces are studying the Hangzhou phenomenon^[r] and its relevance to China’s tech ambitions. During the NPC sessions, Xi Jinping also met the Jiangsu delegation and called on the officials present to pioneer the integration of technology and industrial revolution, and fully implement the spirit of the 17 February symposium on private enterprises by treating all types of ownership enterprises equally. This messaging is bound to unleash a new wave of competition among provincial leadership to boost advanced technology, and ensure that they harness support from the private tech players to achieve China’s tech ambitions. Much of these ambitions depend on the measures that the Trump administration may take to restrict the supply of advanced high-end chips from US-based players like NVIDIA.

Beijing’s Response to External Developments

This year’s NPC made references to the current international climate. On the sidelines of the NPC, Wang Yi, China’s foreign minister and politburo member of the CPC Central Committee, addressed a press meeting where he articulated Beijing’s views on various issues of China’s foreign policy. These issues range from growing ties between the US and Russia, the current international order, and China’s ties with its neighbouring countries. The high point of the interaction was China’s response to what many are terming the “Reverse Nixon”^[s] policy pursued by the Trump administration. In late February 2025, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio admitted that the US might never be “successful at peeling (Russia) completely off a relationship with China.” Still, it was important for the US to maintain ties with Russia because allowing the latter to be a “permanent junior partner” to Beijing would mean having “two nuclear powers aligned against the US.”^[38]

Wang further stated that China values the ‘sovereign equality’ of all states irrespective of their size and that “those with stronger arms and bigger fists should not be allowed to call the shots.”^[41] He warned that the US leadership’s pursuit of its national interests would likely inspire a race to the bottom, with other countries following suit. Wang asserted that “we will provide certainty to this uncertain world,”^[42] referring to recent announcements from the Trump administration that he would take back Panama and Greenland. He also highlighted the relevance of the Global South and the continued relevance of multilateralism in facilitating consultations among members of the international community.

Regarding the latest developments in transatlantic ties, China has indicated that it is willing to work with Europe.^[43] Even before the NPC began, the spokesperson of this year’s meeting, Lou Qinjian, said, “Over the past 50 years, facts have repeatedly shown that there are no fundamental clashes of interest or geopolitical conflicts between China and Europe; rather, they are partners that contribute to each other's success.”³⁴ He further stated that China and Europe jointly support multilateralism and oppose unilateralism. Later, during the press briefings on the sidelines of the NPC, Wang highlighted that the year marks the 50^th anniversary of China-Europe diplomatic ties, which bear strategic value and have a global impact. Wang characterised Sino-EU ties as being based on “mutual respect”, with both being “cooperative partners” to each other and joining forces to promote the cause of multilateralism. Further, he stressed that bilateral trade between the two sides has increased, reinforcing the role of the China-Europe Railway Express as a crucial link between Asia and Europe.

Conclusion

This year’s two sessions revealed that Xi Jinping enjoys unquestionable authority in China’s political landscape and is looking to extend his reign beyond the next party congress in 2027. Therefore, ‘regime security’ is being accorded the highest priority. Xi’s authority has emboldened him to chart a course that he believes would provide China the best opportunity to realise the ‘China dream’ and emerge as the winner in the 100-year marathon.

According to Xi, realising China’s ambitions necessitates a strategy underlined by ‘politics in command’. Adopting a whole-of-society approach, Xi believes that China can only become the top player by achieving self-reliance in technology. Consequently, Xi is committed to mobilising all available resources to obtain the most advanced technologies, including AI and robotics, and power China’s military modernisation. For Xi, achieving the China dream is as much an ideological battle as it is a pursuit of economic and technological self-reliance.

Endnotes

^[a] This term was coined by the author, alluding to the growing centralisation of the party-state’s decision-making under the current General Secretary and President, Xi Jinping.

^[b] The Politburo, which currently has 24 members, holds a meeting and a group study session once a month.

^[c] National political security indicates realising political stability by preventing the state, led by the Communist Party, from being politically divided, and stopping ideologies different from that of the ruling party from penetrating the country. See: https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/China-up-close/Analysis-Xi-Jinping-prioritizes-regime-security-over-fighting-economic-turmoil.

^[d] Neijuan points to excessive competition with businesses engaging in price undercutting at the cost of profit-making, leading to decreasing returns and reinvestment in R&D.

^[e] In recent years, involution has been identified as a hurdle in China’s economic development. The word neijuan was officially mentioned for the first time in one of the Politburo meetings in 2024 and later identified by the Chinese leadership as one of the hurdles to economic development in the annual Central Economy Work Conference held in December 2024.

^[f] ‘De-real-estatisation’ refers to the time around the previous decade when the real-estate sector led the Chinese economy. After the Evergrande crisis and the disruption of tech value chains by the US administration, China’s economic policymaking is now motivated by the ambition to achieve tech self-reliance. The Evergrande crisis refers to the debt crisis of the Chinese real estate giant Evergrande, which caused a near collapse and wider crisis in China’s property sector.

^[g] Local government revenues from land sales to real-estate developers plunged by 16 percent in 2024 from the previous year.

^[h] For instance, the press conference on 4 March 2025 revealed that the CPPCC organised special studies on 42 major issues, held 85 consultation and political discussion activities, handled over 5,000 proposals, and submitted more than 10,000 reports. Most of these documents contain recommendations from the grassroots across various sectors that have been translated into services.

^[i] The highlights of the wider fiscal package are as follows: Extra CNY 1.6 trillion in deficit spending that constitutes 1.2 percent of the GDP; CNY 1.8 trillion in special treasury bonds (up from CNY 1 trillion in 2024); recapitalising state banks with CNY 500 billion; CNY 300 billion for the consumer trade-in programmes against CNY 150 billion in 2024; and CNY 4.4 trillion that can be raised by local governments as debt instruments in the form of Special Purpose Bonds.

^[j] Xi Jinping’s meeting with the Jiangsu delegation during one of the breakout sessions, in this year’s two sessions gives an idea of central leadership’s expectations. Some of the tasks that Xi laid down are as follows: a) strategically identify key areas where it can play a leading role in pioneering the integration of technology and industrial innovation, taking the lead in advancing deep-level reforms and high-level openness, b) spearhead the implementation of national economic development strategies, c) serve as a model in promoting common prosperity for all people, d) fully implement the spirit of the 17 February symposium on private enterprises, e) treat all types of ownership enterprises equally, and f) continuously improve the business environment.

^[k] DeepSeek is a Chinese AI company owned by High-Flyer, a quantitative hedge fund. Deep Seek focuses on large language models (LLM) and has attracted attention in recent times due to its cost-effective approach to training and references.

^[l] Tang Ping, translated as ‘lying flat’ gained currency in the Chinese society beginning in 2021. It refers to a growing tendency on the part of the Chinese youth, including young entrepreneurs who are disillusioned with the prospect of working extremely hard to achieve higher social and economic status.

^[m] The first and second phases of this initiative were rolled out in 2014 and 2019, respectively.

^[n] A substrate is a supporting component on which the elements of a semiconductor device are fabricated or attached. This component provides a stable foundation and high integration ensuring proper functioning of the semiconductor device.

^[o] Silicon carbide wafers are thin, specialised semiconductor materials made from silicon carbide.

^[p] SiC wafers play a critical role in industries like aerospace, EVs, turbines, and data-centre infrastructure.

^[q] ‘Distillation’ is a Machine Learning (ML) technique developed with the purpose of maintaining high-end performance with reduced computational requirements.

^[r] The ‘Hangzhou phenomenon’ refers to the province’s success in harbouring tech startups and how, in a brief period, it became a tech hub, with the emergence of the ‘six little dragons’. The ‘six little dragons’ refers to major tech players: United Robotics, DeepSeek, Game Sciences, Brain Co, Manycore Tech, and Deep Robotics. The founders of these companies have inspired a new wave of Chinese innovators reshaping emerging industries through pathbreaking technologies.

^[s] The ‘Reverse Nixon’ policy refers to recent diplomatic initiatives by the Trump administration to woo Russia and drive a wedge between China and Russia. During the Cold War era, the US administration pursued a similar policy of befriending China to further corner its ideological rival, the USSR.

^[t] In Chinese foreign policy discourse, sanjiao guanxi has an additional layer of contingent strategic value in contrast to a regular triangular relationship and can affect China’s national interests, like border stability and territorial integrity. Further, sanjiao guanxi refers to triangular ties that influence the stability and structure of the international system. See: Korolev and Wu, Is There a US–China–India Triangle?

^[1] Katsuji Nakazawa, “Analysis: Xi Jinping Prioritizes Regime Security over Fighting Economic Turmoil,” Nikkei Asia, March 6, 2025, https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/China-up-close/Analysis-Xi-Jinping-prioritizes-regime-security-over-fighting-economic-turmoil.

^[2] National Political Security, “The State Council of the People’s Republic of China,” March 12, 2025, https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202503/12/content_WS67d17f57c6d0868f4e8f0c0d.html.

^[3] “China’s Policy Guide,” Bloomberg, June 25, 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/features/china-policy-guide/.

^[4] “China’s Two Sessions: More Control, Less Networking,” The Diplomat, March 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/03/chinas-two-sessions-more-control-less-networking/.

^[6] Chris Buckley, “China, Xi, and Trump,” The New York Times, March 11, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/11/world/asia/china-xi-trump.html.

^[8] Lionel Lim, “China’s ‘Reluctant’ Stimulus Could Pick Up in the Event of a New Trade War with Trump, Predicts Goldman Sachs,” Fortune Asia, October 22, 2024, https://fortune.com/asia/2024/10/22/china-stimulus-trade-war-tariffs-trump-us-presidential-election-goldman-sachs/.

^[9] Huileng Tan, “China May Be Holding Back on Economic Stimulus in Case of a Trump Win,” Business Insider, September 13, 2024, https://www.businessinsider.com/china-economy-stimulus-intervention-delay-donald-trump-presidential-eleciton-tariffs-2024-9

^[10] “China Prioritizes Consumer Spending Ahead of Technology as Economic Worries Weigh,” Reuters, March 5, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/markets/asia/china-prioritises-consumer-spending-ahead-technology-economic-worries-weigh-2025-03-05/.

^[11] Mark Williams, “5% Growth at a Cost: China's Struggles with Domestic Stability,” IndraStra, January 2025.

^[12] Amy Hawkins, “China Sets GDP Target of 5% for 2025 amid Tariff War with Trump,” The Guardian, March 5, 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/mar/05/china-donald-trump-tariffs-gdp-target.

^[13] Yue Wang, “China Sets 2025 GDP Growth Target At ‘Around 5%’ Amid Major Challenges,” Forbes, March 4, 2025, https://www.forbes.com/sites/ywang/2025/03/04/china-sets-2025-gdp-growth-target-at-around-5-amid-major-challenges/

^[14] Qian Zhou, “China’s Two Sessions 2025: Key Takeaways from the Government Work Report,” China Briefing, March 5, 2025, https://www.china-briefing.com/news/chinas-two-sessions-2025-takeaways-government-work-report/

^[16] “Xi Voices Support for Jack Ma, China Private Sector Chiefs”

^[17] “I Have Always Supported Private Enterprises: A Record of Comrade Xi Jinping’s Concern and Promotion of Development of the Private Economy,” People’s Daily, March 5, 2025, https://www.people.com.cn/2025/03/05/c_1211234567.htm

^[18] Yu Evelyn, “China Vows to Dismantle Local Barriers to Build National Market,” Bloomberg, February 26, 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-02-26/china-vows-to-dismantle-local-barriers-to-build-national-market.

^[19] “Tech Crackdown Rationale from Party Leadership,” Xinhua News, March 3, 2025, http://www.xinhuanet.com/mrdx/20250303/0b05c2ae25754afb99f905dbe948f88b/c.html.

^[20] “I Have Always Supported Private Enterprises: A Record of Comrade Xi Jinping’s Concern and Promotion of Development of the Private Economy”

^[21] “China’s Talk of ‘Two Unwaverings’ Reveals Private Sector Fears,” Bloomberg, October 25, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-25/china-s-talk-of-two-unwaverings-reveals-private-sector-fears

^[22] “Xi Promises Jack Ma and China’s Private Tech Bigwigs Unwavering Support,” Nikkei Asia, February 17, 2025, https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/China-tech/Xi-promises-Jack-Ma-and-China-s-private-tech-bigwigs-unwavering-support.

^[23] Chris Metinko, “China Leads Asia’s Venture Downturn — But Other Countries Didn’t Help,” Crunchbase News, January 27, 2025, https://news.crunchbase.com/venture/china-leads-asia-downturn-ai-ev-data-centers/#:~:text=China's%20venture%20market%20was%20brutal%20in%202024,2023%2C%20hitting%20only%20$33.2%20billion%20last%20year

^[25] Metinko, “China Leads Asia’s Venture Downturn—But Other Countries Didn’t Help”

^[26] Lulu Yilun Chen and Richard Frost, “Ant Group Says Hong Kong IPO Also Suspended,” Bloomberg, November 3, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-11-03/ant-group-says-hong-kong-ipo-also-suspended

^[27] Raymond Zhong and Paul Mozur, “China’s Regulators Halt Ant Group’s Blockbuster IPO,” The New York Times, November 6, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/06/technology/china-ant-group-ipo.html.

^[28] “China Vows to Boost Private Economy, Protect Businesses,” Bloomberg, July 19, 2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-07-19/china-vows-to-boost-private-economy-protect-businesses-lk9n3grq.

^[29] “China to Increase Support for Private Companies to Bolster Economy,” Reuters, July 19, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/markets/asia/china-increase-support-private-companies-bolster-economy-2023-07-19/.

^[30] “China's National People's Congress Is Working for Early Promulgation of Private Economy Promotion Law: Spokesperson,” Global Times, March 2025, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202503/1329458.shtml.

^[31] Cheng Yu, “XPeng to Mass-Produce Flying Cars by 2026,” China Daily, March 8, 2025, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202503/08/WS67cb9cc0a310c240449d988c.html.

^[34] General Office of the State Council, New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan, The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, July 20, 2017, https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2017-07/20/content_5211996.htm.

^[36] Allen, “DeepSeek, Huawei, Export Controls, and the Future of the U.S.-China AI Race”

^[37] “China’s Regions Power up AI and Robotics Innovation with Financial Incentives,” Caixin Global, March 12, 2025, https://www.caixinglobal.com/2025-03-12/chinas-regions-power-up-ai-and-robotics-innovation-with-financial-incentives-102297178.html.

^[38] “Bloomberg: Rubio Says US Can’t Let Russia Become China’s Junior Partner,” Euromaidan Press, February 27, 2025, https://euromaidanpress.com/2025/02/27/bloomberg-rubio-says-us-cant-let-russia-become-chinas-junior-partner/.

^[39] “China Foreign Minister’s Press Conference,” Bloomberg, March 7, 2025, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/live-blog/2025-03-07/china-foreign-minister-s-press-conference.

^[40] Alexander Korolev and Fengshi Wu, “Is there a U.S.–China–India triangle? – Beijing’s official views,” October 22, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1080/14736489.2019.1662187.

^[41] “China Will Resolutely Counter U.S. Pressure on Fentanyl,” Reuters, March 7, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-will-resolutely-counter-us-pressure-fentanyl-foreign-minister-says-2025-03-07/.

^[42] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Wang Yi on China-EU Relations: Lifting up Both Sides and Making for a Brighter World,” March 7, 2025, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjbzhd/202503/t20250307_11570249.html.

^[43] “NPC Spokesperson: Positive Trend of China-EU Ties Remains Unchanged,” CGTN, March 4, 2025, https://news.cgtn.com/news/2025-03-04/NPC-spokesperson-Positive-trend-of-China-EU-ties-remain-unchanged-1BsQnO7BvkA/p.html.

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