21@20
NAVIGATING THE ALPHA CENTURY
2020 Conference Report
26 Embracing a Gig World: Paychecks, Protections, Purpose and Skills
28 Right to Breathe: The Battle for Clean Air
32 Unstable Regimes: Fake News, New Media and Our Political Futures
34 A Rock and a Hard Place: New Rules For India and The EU In a Multipolar World
36 Hacking Democracy: Defending Pluralism in the Digital Age
39 In Conversation: With H.E. Sergey Lavrov
41 The India Way: Preparing for a Century of Growth and Contest
44 Competing Nationalisms, Universal Norms: Street Power In 21st Century Diplomacy
46 In Conversation: With H.E. Mohammad Javad Zarif
48 New Arc of Cooperation in Rising Rimland: From Vladivostok to Chennai
50 Cracks on the Roof of the World: Growth, Stability and Assault Rifles in the Heart of Asia
52 Regime Meltdown: New Powers and the Arms Control Failure
54 Content Sub-Continent: Catalysing Our Digital Futures
56 Greenbacks For Green-Tech: Paying for Innovation so that Innovation Pays
58 iSheLeads in the Alpha Century: The New Narratives of Transformations and Change
60 Geopolitics and God: Identity and Religion in the Digital Age
62 Fluid Fleets: Navigating Tides of Revision in the Indo-Pacific
65 A New Eastern Trade Route: Integrating the Bay of Bengal
68 Scorched Earth: Communities, Conflicts and Migrants
70 The Bias Bug: Responding to Automated Patriarchy

72 iRadical: Countering Online Hate and Violence
74 Ministerial Addresses
78 Poachers as Gamekeepers: Can Terror Incubators Counter Terror?
80 Between Atlantic and Pacific: The Future of Europe
82 In Conversation: With H.E. Hamid Karzai
84 Junction India: Towards an East Indian Ocean Community for Growth
86 The Art of the Plan: Deciphering Key Trends @ 20
88 Digital Binaries: 5G and the New Tech Wars
90 Just like US: Exclusive Trade in the Trump Age
92 Digital Crossroads: New Norms for a New Society
94 Plural Waters: Strengthening Democracy in the Indo-Pacific
96 Coalitions and Consensus: In Defence of Values that Matter
98 Coded to Kill: Proxy Wars and Autonomous Systems
100 E-mobility and the City: Innovation on the Move
103 Connecting Waters: Sustainable Infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific
105 Valedictory Address by H.E. Josep Borrell
109 Raisina EdiT
110 Author’s Corner
112 Raisina Hosts, Rapporteurs and Team Raisina
114 Raisina 2020 Sponsors
The fifth edition of the Raisina Dialogue, India’s flagship conference on geo-economics and geopolitics hosted by the Ministry of External Affairs and the Observer Research Foundation, was held from 14-16th January 2020. The theme of the conference was “21@20: Navigating the Alpha Century,” highlighting the emergence of an ‘Alpha’ moment where popular leaders across communities, business and states are defining the new century. It also explored India’s role in the emerging world order and key challenges of the current age. The Raisina Dialogue 2020 brought together over 600 speakers and delegates from 103 countries, representing heads of state, cabinet ministers, diplomats, CEOs, and leaders from academia, civil society and media. Over 1,500 participants joined from India and abroad, who discussed and debated ideas that will serve the emergence of this new world order.
The inaugural session of the Raisina Dialogue 2020 brought together seven former heads of state to offer their perspectives on the interlocking and interrelated drivers of change in the world order. The discussion covered five broad themes.

The Future of the Transatlantic Relationship
Acknowledging the rifts in this unique and valuable relationship, Prime Minister Harper remarked that the end of the Cold War marked the breakdown of a “common sense of mission” amongst Western Allies. However, he argued, the partnership remains resilient, since both sides of the Atlantic “fundamentally share [the same] values, economic structures and macro-security interests.” According to Harper, the real challenge is internal and not external. The emergence of “political protests” across Western countries have largely been precipitated by the rise of nationalist leaders and compounded by the “uneven distribution of the impacts of globalisation.” However, although Western soci-

Multilateralism
While PM Tobgay highlighted the failures of the multilateral governance system, both PM Rasmussen and President Han expressed a shared optimism. Illustrating the success of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Rasmussen remarked that the alliance is “stronger [now] since any point after the end of the Cold War,” and has been the “most successful peace movement in history;” particularly in the West. However, he also stressed the importance of soft power in international governance and called for “a global alliance of democracies to raise their voice against advancing autocracies.” President Han spoke in support of both multilateralism
Raisina Dialogue 2020 Conference Report

and globalisation, noting its success in South Korea and its neighbouring countries in bringing “economic prosperity, which guaranteed peace and security, more than any alliance.” East Asia, he remarked, is at an inflexion point, with the emergence of certain “worrying trends” that harken to the shift from multilateralism to unilateralism and from free trade to protectionism. Echoing the point made by the panellists before him, Han stressed the importance of regional and global leadership in reversing current trends that have the potential “to make our lives difficult in the future.”

Peace and Security in Asia
President Karzai discussed peace and security across Asia, stating that East and West Asia are intrinsically linked, with developments in the Middle East having a direct impact on countries such as Afghanistan. Similarly, both East and West Asia are threatened by deteriorating security relations amongst geographies beyond this region. Great power competition and the undermining of international institutions have only exacerbated the challenge.

Emerging Technologies
An overarching theme of the next century will likely be the intersection of technology with societies. As President Bildt observed, this interaction will be dictated by those that have “mastered the technology.” Over the past decade, assumptions about digital technologies have changed dramatically. Once seen as an instrument of democracy, emerging technologies are increasingly polarising open societies and undermining international security. Bildt cautions that “digital conflict” is starkly different from traditional conflicts, and its outcomes can completely alter systems. Therefore, there is an urgent need for new international norms, rules and institutions to govern these technologies.

In their concluding remarks, participants underscored the need for democracy, multilateralism, climate and technology, which should be at the centre of not only high politics but also all dialogues, from the local to the global.

—Aastha Kaul
As the world enters the third decade of the 21st-century, it faces no reprieve from the tides of disruption. Changing climate and weather patterns are devastating entire countries, regional and global tensions are intensifying, mass mobilisations are multiplying, established relationships are fraying, technological disruptions are accelerating, and international institutions are struggling to keep pace with our quicksilver times. The international community finds itself entering a new decade that is, paradoxically, being animated by old insecurities and anxieties.

The Raisina Dialogue 2020 is designed to engage with the zeitgeist. The popular leaders across communities, business and states who shape this ‘Alpha’ moment are one strain of inquiry for us this year. Their rise has been a defining feature of the past decade. The marginalised range from individuals to societies to countries to regions. The ‘ism’ that truly requires scrutiny today is not nativism but the project of globalism. Technology was thought to be a messiah—correcting all wrongs as it seeped into our societies. But even as technology platforms connected the world at unprecedently fast pace, they inadvertently aggravated old tensions and inequities. Information communication technologies have created a new ‘mega’ public sphere while also enabling their manipulation at scale. Discourse and dialogue—essential for open and plural societies—have become commodified and weaponised. In the digital marketplace of ideas, misinformation is easier to manufacture and sell. The clash of identities, old and new, is being exacerbated and mediated on these platforms. Meanwhile, those who control technology and these platforms continue to materially benefit from flows of data and information, creating a new divide, even as old grievances remain unresolved.

Even as ‘tech’ promises to become a new frontier for contested governance, new strategic geographies—from the Indo-Pacific to Afro-Eurasia—remain under managed. In a world driven by parochialism and self-interest, the political incentive to invest in these domains and regions is missing. Regimes around trade, technology and international security have all become opportunities for the application of zero-sum statecraft. Most damagingly, perhaps, this stasis has inhibited our capacity to tackle the single most important existential crisis we are currently facing: climate change. From Shatapatha Brahmana, which warned of deluge and destruction, to Biblical imagery of fire and brimstone, ancient wisdom has long cautioned us of a planet-induced civilisational collapse. The image of hapless koalas, seeking shelter from raging fires, are contemporary visuals of the incipient but real threat to humankind. We ignore it at our own peril.

Wealth and power in the past have gravitated towards a cosmopolitan global elite. This is neither accidental nor divinely ordained. Those who were excluded have found refuge in old identities. The marginalised range from individuals to societies to countries to regions. The ‘ism’ that truly requires scrutiny today is not nativism but the project of globalism.

We must repurpose post-Westphalian systems of governance in an era of big tech, popular leaders and strong states. We require a new social contract for the digital age that respects individual identity, supports coherent collectives and responds to the needs of all aspirants.”

“The incumbents of the old order, meanwhile, have found an easy scapegoat in these popular leaders and frequently dismiss them with contempt and derision. This is a fatal mistake, as it confuses the symptom for the cause. The deeper malaise of broken political and economic models around the world remains largely ignored.

The Raisina Dialogue 2020 is designed to engage with this zeitgeist. The popular leaders across communities, business and states who shape this ‘Alpha’ moment are one strain of inquiry for us this year. Their rise has been a defining feature of the past decade. Some of these leaders have intuitively understood that old insecurities are now manifesting themselves in the tribalisation of politics, with individuals reinforcing their relationship with religion, ethnicity and cultural identities. The international community finds itself entering a new decade that is, paradoxically, being animated by old insecurities and anxieties.

The international community finds itself entering a new decade that is, paradoxically, being animated by old insecurities and anxieties.
Finance must start "seeking alpha" if the planet is to be saved. It is also certain that the methods, tools and, indeed, the ethic of globalisation will have to change. The world urgently needs a new architecture to better distribute the gains of global flows amongst nations and within local communities—especially at a time when data has become the primary driver of integration. We must acknowledge the new risks inherent in this process, and catalyse trade and technology arrangements that create secure and resilient interdependence. Otherwise, we are consigned to enter a new age of technology wars.

And as the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) continues to alter our societies, it is time to rethink the relationships between the individual, businesses and the state. We must repurpose post-Westphalian systems of governance in an era of big tech, popular leaders and strong states. We require a new social contract for the digital age that respects individual identity, supports coherent collectives and responds to the needs of all aspirants.

But the solutions to these global challenges may not come from established powers and actors, who are often hobbled by old ideas and vested interests. Instead, global governance requires new champions. Fluid coalitions must sustain and advance multilateral solutions. Indeed, navigating the Alpha Century requires bold and innovative leadership. We are already investing in this process with the Asian Forum on Global Governance, which will bring together 54 young leaders from 28 countries to debate these issues. From within this cohort will emerge future leaders who may yet discover the solutions we urgently need.

The Raisina Dialogue 2020 brought together over 600 speakers and delegates from 103 countries, representing heads of state, cabinet ministers, diplomats, CEOs, and leaders from academia, civil society and media. Over 1,500 participants joined them from India and abroad to discuss, debate and discover the ideas that will serve the emergence of a new world order. On behalf of team Raisina, I thank you for joining us at this "ideas arena" and hope that we as we conclude the fifth edition of the Dialogue, we bring with us a new sense of purpose and direction.
Jayant Sinha, 
Moderator – 
Chairperson, Standing Committee on Finance and Member of Parliament, India

Tshering Tobgay, 
Helen Clark,  
Former Prime Minister, New Zealand and Member of the WLA-Club de Madrid

Deputy CEO, LuxSE and Founder, Luxembourg Green Exchange, Luxembourg

Julie Becker, 

Shashi Tharoor,  
Chairman, Finance Commission, India

Keynote address: viz. K. Singh, 
made stakeholders in this battle? What regulatory nudges can incentivise environmentally friendly state policies?

In cities around the world, air pollution has reached a crisis point. As a ‘wicked’ public policy challenge, with complex drivers, addressing it requires an all-of-the-government approach. What are the international best practices that may inform government efforts around the world? How should states invest in a new skills and education framework for the digital age? This panel will ask how states should realign their economic social protection policies to accurately reflect the evolving relationship between capital and labour.

Shrayana Bhattacharya, Senior Economist, Social Protection and Jobs, World Bank

Moderator – 
Jawaharlal Nehru University, India

Professor and Jean Monnet Chair, Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, India

Director, Center for Asian Studies, Institut Français des Relations Internationales, France

Director, Center for International Relations and Sustainable Development; Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Serbia

President, Center for International Relations and Sustainable Development; Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Serbia

Andreas Schaal, Director of Global Relations, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

Moderator – 
Harsh V. Pant, 
Director, Studies and Head, Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation, India

Kabir Taneja, 
Pallavi Raghuvar, 
Animosity at Bay: An Alternative History of the India-Pakistan Relationship, 1947-1952

Moderator – 
Vikram Sampath, Savarkar: Echoes from a Forgotten Past

Savarkar: Echoes from a Forgotten Past

Vikram Sampath, 

A growing wave of discontent has stalled—perhaps even reversed—globalisation, as the ordinary citizen turns their ire towards the ‘elites’ claiming to be honest interpreters of policy. Think tanks are not immune from this scrutiny but have yet to reflect on their role in an era where the trust in experts is waning. Are think tanks merely victims of a script normative propositions for new geographies and domains such as trade and security in the Indo-Pacific or responsible state behaviour in cyberspace? This panel will ask whether both actors can shed old hesitancies to embrace a partnership capable of serving the needs of the 21st century.

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Vuk Jeremic, 
President, Center for International Relations and Sustainable Development; Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Serbia

Ondrej Ditrych, 
President, Center for International Relations and Sustainable Development; Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Serbia

Solomon Passy, 
President, The Atlantic Club of Bulgaria; Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bulgaria

Alina Klavzková, Senior Researcher, Institute of International Relations, Czech Republic

Chunhao Lou, 
Director, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, China

Ummu Salma Bava, 
Professor and Jean Monnet Chair, Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, India

Moderator – 
Francoise Nicolas, 
Director, Center for Asian Studies, Institut Français des Relations Internationales, France

Rani Bagh Roundtables: Author’s Corner: India, Then and Now (I)

Pallavi Raghavan, 
Anonymity at Bay: An Alternative History of the India-Pakistan Relationship, 1947-1952

Kabir Taneja, 
The World’s Most Fearsome Terror Group and its Shadow on South Asia

Moderator – 
Harsh V. Pant, 
Director, Studies and Head, Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation, India

Mumtaz: 
A Rock and a Hard Place: New Rules for India and the EU in a Multipolar World

With China and the US loudly proposing zero-sum models for globalisation, is it time for India, the EU and others to reject these binaries? Can India and the EU partner effectively at multilateral institutions to present a rules-based order? Can they script normative propositions for new geographies and domains such as trade and security in the Indo-Pacific or responsible state behaviour in cyberspace? This panel will ask whether both actors can shed old hesitancies to embrace a partnership capable of serving the needs of the 21st century.

Tara Varma, 
Director of the Paris office, European Council on Foreign Relations, France

Solomon Passy, 
President, The Atlantic Club of Bulgaria; Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bulgaria

Alina Klavzková, Senior Researcher, Institute of International Relations, Czech Republic

Chunhao Lou, 
Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia

Moderator – 
Robin Niblett, 
Director, Chatham House, United Kingdom

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Moderator – 
Harsh V. Pant, 
Director, Studies and Head, Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation, India
DAY TWO Wednesday, 15 January 2020

0900-1000 Panel Discussion
Durban: Hacking Democracy: Defending Pluralism in the Digital Age
Influence operations are undermining democratic processes in plural societies. Such operations often take place at the intersection of social, economic and security domains, requiring a comprehensive response across these multiple arenas. Can international norms to disseminate information operations evolve? What is the role of individuals and large enterprises? How should states respond to influence operations? Are kinetic responses inevitable?
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Former Prime Minister, Denmark; Founder, Alliance of Democracies
Marijke Schalka, President, Cyberpeace Institute, Netherlands
Jane Holl Lute, President and CEO, SICPA, United States
Mag. Gen. (Retd) Amos Gilad, Executive Director, Institute for Policy and Strategy, IDC Herzliya, Israel
Stephan Marcop, Former Prime Minister, Canada
Moderator – Ashok Malik, Policy Adviser, Ministry of External Affairs, India

1000-1100 Durban: In Conversation
Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Russia with Sunjoy Joshi, Chairman, Observer Research Foundation, India

1100-1200 Durban: Competing Nationalisms, Universal Norms: Street Power in 21st-Century Diplomacy
Identity, inequality and the consequent rise of nationalism have drastically altered global politics. Diplomacy—once abstracted from the agitations of the masses—is now often shaped by it. From Washington D.C. to Hong Kong, the “will of the people” is expressed dramatically, but its repercussions are being felt in talk circles around the world. How willstreet power implicate efforts to build consensus? Will relationships between states and within them be held hostage to hashtag convergences. How can powers with a common interest in growth and stability find ways to work together? Which will be the stability. Yet, this era is also marked by a shift away from containment and stable alliances to one marked by issue-based:

1200-1300 Durban: In Conversation
Mohammed Javad Zarif, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Iran with Sanjoy Joshi, Chairman, Observer Research Foundation, India

1300-1400 Lunch Conversations (By invitation only)

Shanghai: New Arc of Cooperation in Rising Rimland: from Vladivostok to Chennai
The future of the global order is being written where Eurasia meets the Indo-Pacific. For sustained growth, this area will need stabiology. Yet, this area is also marked by a shift away from containment and stable alliances to one marked by issue-based convergences. How can powers with a common interest in growth and stability find ways to work together? Which will be the spaces of contestation and which of cooperation? How can these realms be further integrated to their mutual benefit?

Vladimir Norov, Secretary General, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Uzbekistan
Manish Tewari, Member of Parliament, India
Chenchen Chen, Deputy Director of Research, Institute of China’s Economic Reform and Development, Renmin University, China
Vance Serchuk, Executive Director, HRF Global Institute, United States
Sergey Afonin, Deputy Director of Research and Head of Economic Theory Department, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russia
Moderator – Timofei Bondarchuk, Academic Supervisor, Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Russia

Mumbai: Cracks on the Roof of the World: Growth, Stability and Assault Rifles in the Heart of Asia
Central Asia is the location, once again, of a Great Game between great powers. How will this region be impacted by Belt-and-Road geo-economic statements and its efforts to integrate its far west? Will the US continued efforts to get Afghanistan provide an additional source of uncertainty? Can Russia, the traditional security provider in the region, balance its historical interests and contemporary developments? What alternatives must the world provide to Central Asian countries seeking markets and investment on their own terms?
C. Raja Mohan, Director, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, India
Elidor Aripov, Director, Institute of Strategic and Regional Studies, Uzbekistan
Rosshan Muradov, Secretary General, Nazariy Ganjavi International Center, Azerbaijan
Suhainsi Matia, Diplomatic Editor, The Hindu, India
Dirk Wiesel, Member of Parliament and Coordinator, Intersocietal Cooperation with Russia, Central Asia and the Eastern Partnership Countries, Germany
Moderator – Ali Aslan, Anchor, Germany

Johannesburg: Deeperening Delivery: How Healthcare is Changing the Politics of Development
Over the past decade, the world has made significant progress towards achieving universal health coverage (UHC) through improved political and policy commitments, led by countries like China and India. While many transition health systems try to leapfrog binding constraints by leveraging technology, issues like access to quality medicines remain challenges for large populations. Can healthcare in the emerging world shift away from a high-volume business model to a low-margin, high-volume model? Can technological, financial and social disruptions accelerate this shift? Are new alliances of unlikely partners emerging? With global political attention and commitments towards health increasing manifold, how is the now-mainstreamed narrative of UHC acting as a catalyst of change?

Chinny Ogune, Director of Health Research, Centre for the Study of the Economies of Africa, Nigeria
Sandyha Venkatasureshwar, Deputy Director, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, India
Siddharth Venkataparam, Associate Professor, King’s Global Health Institute, King’s College London, United Kingdom
Willem Muneke, Head, Integrated Healthcare Services, Merck KGaA, Germany
Sree Khang Khor, Senior Fellow, Health Systems and Policies, Universiti of Malaya, Malaysia
Moderator – Anjaal Nayyar, Executive Vice President, Global Health Strategies, India

Posnan: Rign Memeltdown: New Powers and the Arms Control Failure
The architecture of peace and security was primarily constructed by the great powers of the 20th century. In a world characterised by multipolarity and unilateralism, many of those arrangements are crumbling, if they have not already fallen apart. Will the undermined earlier arms control regimes continue to shape state behaviour, or should the world prepare for an era of escalatory military developments? Do existing international instruments possess the political will or capacity to facilitate new negotiations about these arrangements? How will the interests of new powers from Asia and Africa affect future regimes? This panel will interrogate the root causes for the failure of extant arms control agreements and discuss possible scenarios for the future of these regimes.

S. Paul Kapur, Policy Planning Staff, State Department and Professor, Naval Postgraduate School, United States
Dingli Shen, Professor, Fudan University, China
Sang Hyun Lee, Senior Research Fellow, Department of Security Strategy Studies, Sejong Institute, Republic of Korea
Manish Seth, Distinguished Fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies, India
Rory Medcalf, Head, National Security College of the Australian National University, Australia
Moderator – Rahul Rizwa, Adjunct Fellow, Center for a New American Security, United States

Rani Bagh: Lunch with the Lawmakers: Content Sub-Continent: Catalysing Our Digital Futures
While new industries are rapidly emerging from India, in sectors ranging from artificial intelligence, cloud computing and visual effects and digital entertainment, India’s policy and regulatory architecture retains many of the rules first developed in the early 2000s. Who are the new economic actors and what is their impact on the market and society? What is the role of creative industries in fuelling this new economy? What are the priority areas for governance reforms and how can they serve India’s development needs?
Baijayant Panda, National Vice President and Spokesperson, Bharatiya Janata Party, India
Shashi Tharoor, Member of Parliament, India
Vincent Tarzia, Speaker, South Australian House of Assembly, Australia
Marina Kaljurand, Member of European Parliament, Estonia
Tejasvi Surya, Member of Parliament, India
Roopa Ganguly, Member of Parliament, India
Moderator – Vivek Shanmugam, Partner, Koan Advisory Group

15 January 2020
DAY TWO Wednesday, 15 January 2020

1430-1450  Keynote Address at Durbar:
Hamidullah Mohib, National Security Advisor, Afghanistan

1450-1500  Panel Discussion

Durbar: Greenbacks for Green Tech: Paying for Innovation so that Innovation Pays

The battle against climate change is at an infection point. The failure of the latest COP and related efforts indicates that the world is struggling to respond to climate change. The onset of the Fourth Industrial Revolution presents a tremendous opportunity for states to discover a new relationship between their economic and environmental policies. How will these pathways to growth be financed? Is global finance making the right choices at a crucial time for the fight against climate change—and for global growth? How can the emerging world transform its development model, and what can the global community do to assist the green transformation?

Han Seung-soo, Former Prime Minister, Republic of Korea; Member of the WLA-Club de Madrid
Robert Scharf, CEO, Luxembourg Stock Exchange, Luxembourg
Eleni Kounalakis, Lieutenant Governor of California, United States
Claire Perry O’Neill, President, COP26, United Kingdom
Moderator – Jayant Sinha, Chairperson, Standing Committee on Finance and Member of Parliament, India

1550-1610  Ministerial Address at Durbar:
Tomas Petricek, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Czech Republic

1630-1650  Ministerial Address at Durbar:
Abdulla Shahid, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Maldives

1650-1750  Ministerial Address at Durbar:
Abdulaziz Khafizovich Kamilov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Uzbekistan

1750-1810  Panel Discussion

Durbar #SheLeads in the Alpha Century: The New Narratives of Transformations and Change

Often ignored in discussions about strongman politics is how women are strategically cementing their place in the halls of power. How are women leaders affecting political outcomes around the world? How have countries and cities benefited from women leadership? How can corporations practice strong women efforts at promoting women leadership? This panel will discuss how women leaders are scripting stories of change around the world.

Snehit Irani, Minister of Women and Child Development, Minister of Textiles, India
Esther Brimmer, Executive Director and CEO, NAFSA: Association of International Educators, United States
Eleni Kounalakis, Lieutenant Governor of California, United States
Helen Clark, Former Prime Minister, New Zealand; Member, WLA-Club de Madrid
Patricia Scotland, Secretary General, Commonwealth Secretariat
Moderator – Joanna Roper, Special Envoy for Gender Equality, Foreign and Commonwealth Offices, United Kingdom

1830-1850  Break

1850-1915  Ministerial Address at Durbar:
Nathaniel Echauze, Minister of Finance, Nigeria

1915-2015  Panel Discussion

Durbar: Fluid Fleets: Navigating Tides of Revolution in the Indo-Pacific

Is the “Indo-Pacific” an organic expression of connectivity, a community of nations, or a strategic construct? The answers to these questions will define national security postures in the region over the next decade. As things stand now, the Indo-Pacific is caught between two conflicting realities: as a region for geopolitical competition and one where Asia’s development futures will be decided. This panel will respond to the big questions about the Indo-Pacific: Who defines it? Who will bear the costs of this strategic orientation? What purpose does it serve? And how will it be managed?

Adm. Karambir Singh, Chief of Naval Staff, India
Gen. Gen. Yosuke Ninomiya, Chief of Staff, Joint Staff of the Japan Self-Defense Forces, Japan
Victor Astudillo, Minister of National Defense, Peru
Christine Cipolla, Special Envoy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Slovenia
Moderator – Richard Verma, Vice Chairman and Partner, The Asia Group, United States

2015-2145  Dinner Conversations (By invitation only)

Sharyl Jain: A New Eastern Trade Route: Integrating the Bay of Bengal

Long divided by artificial regional constructs, the communities and markets of South and South East Asia are organically tying the region together. Dynamic economies in the region centering on Bengal are driving this trend. Can this region provide solutions for emerging disruptions such as the Fourth Industrial Revolution and climate change? How can the region become a hub for the process of Asian integration? Can communities in the Bay of Bengal script the new norms and frameworks for the Indo-Pacific? What are the implications and interests for the rest of the world in a rising Bay of Bengal?

Stephen Smith, Professor of Law, University of Western Australia; Former Defence and Foreign Affairs Ministr, Australia
Anuradha K. Herath, Director, Media and International Relations, Prime Minister Office of Sri Lanka, Sri Lanka
Dino Patti Djalal, Former Ambassador of Indonesia to the United States, Indonesia
Moderator – Richard Verma, Vice Chairman and Partner, The Asia Group, United States

Mumtaz: Scorched Earth: Communities, Conflicts and Migrants

Despite the well-established causal connection between climate change and migration, global and regional responses to climate refugees have been slow to evolve. Part of the reason is political: the global mood has turned hostile to immigration. Technical challenges persist as well. Can the world develop an international legal framework to address climate refugees? Is there an evolving consensus on how to define environmental refugees? This panel will explore how best to accelerate policy solutions that respond to this new global challenge.

Kanchan Gupta, Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, India
István Miklósi, Special Envoy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Slovakia
Renata Lok-Dessaliën, UN Resident Coordinator in India
Christine Cipolla, Regional Director for Asia Pacific, Operations, International Committee of the Red Cross, Switzerland
Moderator – Asle Toje, Member, Norwegian Nobel Committee, Norway

15 January 2020
Midnight’s Machines: A Political History of Technology of India

Tanvi Madan, Anita Mukherjee, Rani Bagh Roundtables: Author's Corner: India, then and now (II)

Executive Director, Global Partners Digital, Croatia

Moderator –

Lea Kaspar,
President, Cyberpeace Institute, Netherlands

Gulshan Rai,
Head of Policy Planning, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Italy

Benedetta Beri, Head of Policy Planning, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Italy

Elizabeth Laren, Global Gender Adviser, International Alert, United Kingdom

Ravi Bagh Roundtables: Author’s Corner: India, Then and Now (II)

Anir Mukherjee, The Absent Dialogues: Politicians, Bureaucrats, and the Military in India

Amis Modi, Fatal Triangle: How China Shaped US-India Relations During the Cold War

Arun Mohan Sukumar, Midnight's Machines: A Political History of Technology of India

Moderator – Ritika Passi, Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, India

Pandemic: Politics and Economics of Contest in the 21st-Century

Roshanara

(Invitation only)

Nizwan:
Ministerial Dinner

(Invitation only)

1030-1050 Ministerial Address at Durban:
Urmas Reinsalu, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Estonia

1050-1110 Break

1110-1130 Ministerial Address at Durban:
Jappe Kofoid, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Denmark

1130-1230 Panel Discussion

Between Atlantic and Pacific: The Future of Europe

Pioter Szajgoertos, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hungary

Theresa Fallon, Founder and Director, Center for Russia Europe Asia Studies, Ireland

Marina Kaljurand, Member of the European Parliament, Estonia

Gen. Claudio Graziano, Chairman, European Union Military Committee

Hans-Thomas Paulsen, Member of the Executive Board, Körber-Stiftung, Germany

Moderator – Ali Aslan, Anchor, Germany

1230-1300 Panel Discussion

Durban: Poachers as Gamekeepers: Can Terror Incubators Counter Terror?

A crisis of identity has gripped the EU’s foreign policy. The continent is caught between its Atlantic moorings and its growing equity in Asia. As the EU invests more resources and energy in Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific, will it find that its interests in these regions do not fully converge with those of its principal partner, the US? Will the EU engage with China and Russia to secure its political future? Will such new priority strain its partnership with the US and use a stronger relationship with India provide the EU more room to manoeuvre? This panel will ask whether there exists a European consensus on these issues and will explore how the continent is responding to shifts in the global balance of power.

Pioter Szajgoertos, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hungary

Theresa Fallon, Founder and Director, Center for Russia Europe Asia Studies, Ireland

Marina Kaljurand, Member of the European Parliament, Estonia

Gen. Claudio Graziano, Chairman, European Union Military Committee

Hans-Thomas Paulsen, Member of the Executive Board, Körber-Stiftung, Germany

Moderator – Ali Aslan, Anchor, Germany

1230-1300 Panel Discussion

Durban: In conversation

Hamid Karzai, Former President, Afghanistan

with Robin Niblett, Director, Chatham House, United Kingdom

1300-1430 Lunch Conversations (By invitation only)

Shahshah: Junction India: Towards an East Indian Ocean Community for Growth

Home to one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes, the eastern Indian Ocean has so far been relegated in the popular imagination to just this: a transit route. This panel will explore pathways for deeper integration between the states that inhabit these waters. Do states share a common vision for managing sea lanes? What common infrastructure investment and technology interests do states in the region share? Is there a consensus around the region’s security architecture? This panel will ask whether states that operate in the Arabian Sea, the East Indian Ocean and East Africa possess the appetite for integration and explore the region’s potential as a new hub for development and growth.

Navdeep Biri, Director, Centre for New Economic Diplomacy, Observer Research Foundation, India

Ahmad Al Saidy, Minister of State and Chairman of Qatar Free Zone Authority, Qatar

Lt. Gen. David Gwadi, Former Minister of Defense, Madagascar

Elsbeams Al Kfr, President, Emirates Policy Center, United Arab Emirates

Kwame Osei, CEO, Institute of Economic Affairs, Ghana

Moderator – Dhruva Jaishankar, Director, US Initiative, Observer Research Foundation, India
This panel will ask the custodians of policy planning to investigate the key trends that will shape the world order in the coming decade. What cleavages and alliances continue to define foreign policy planning? Which coalitions and partnerships are best suited to respond to 21st-century challenges? What emerging domains and sectors will emerge as strategic priorities for states?

Nagna M. Mutlick, Additional Secretary, Policy Planning and Research Division, Ministry of External Affairs, India

Peter Berkowitz, Director, State Department Policy Planning Staff, United States

Manuel Lafont-Rapnouli, Director, Center for Analysis, Planning and Strategy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France

Hans Christian Hagman, Chief Analyst and Senior Advisor to the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden

Moderator – Daniel Twining, President, International Republican Institute, United States

Jehangir: Ministerial Interaction with Young Fellows

Grace Naledi Pandor, Minister of Foreign Affairs, South Africa

Urmas Reinsalu, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Estonia

In conversation with Shashi Tharoor, Member of Parliament, India

Roshanara: Digital Binaries: 5G and the New Tech Wars

Emerging technologies are fast becoming the principal source of friction in the international system, with a digital cold war seemingly inevitable. 5G communications technologies are perhaps the first victim of this rising tide of technonationalism. With ‘decoupling’ best describing global technology systems, will states be forced to choose between incompatible propositions? How will this implicate development pathways for emerging economies? This panel will investigate the geopolitical implications of emerging technologies and offer potential future scenarios for the global digital economy.

Shiv Sahai, Additional Secretary, National Security Council Secretariat, India

Elina Noor, Associate Professor, Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Malaysia

Lesley Margaret Seebeck, CEO, Cyber Institute, Australian National University, Australia

Chris Painter, President, GFCE Foundation Board, United States

Gilles Babinet, Vice President, CHINUM and Digital Adviser for France, France

Moderator – François Godein, Senior Advisor for Asia, Institut Montaigne, France

Hani Bagh Roundtables: Author’s Corner: Leaders and Leadership

Karthik Nachiappan, Does India Negotiate?

Rachel Saltzman, Russia, BMES, and the Disruption of Global Order

Carl Bildt, The Age of the New Disorder

Moderator – David Malone, Rector - United Nations University, Canada

1430-1530 Panel Discussion

Durbar: Just like Us: Exclusive Trade in the Trump Age

With the processes of globalisation under scrutiny around the world, the appetite for multilateral trade has waned considerably. And with its principal architect—the US—determined to repudiate long-held economic consensuses, the future is uncertain. Will exclusive economics continue to define national policy in this decade? Will flows of technology be the first casualty of today’s economic nationalism? Do other states possess the appetite or economic means to fill this gap? Can emerging economies incubate new arrangements?

Psyrigu Goyal, Minister of Railways and Commerce & Industry, Government of India

Jeffrey Philip Bielas, Partner Everharths Sutherland LLP, United States

Veda Poorn, Director International Finance, HM Treasury, United Kingdom

Alexander Kutitz, Member of Parliament, Germany

Amy Searight, Senior Advisor and Director, Southeast Asia Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, United States

1530-1610 Break

Durbar: Digital Crossroads: New Norms for a New Society

Digital technologies operate at great velocities with little concern for borders—and national and international systems have struggled to address rule-setting, market forces, and conflict resolution. The schism between real and virtual has undermined trust in digital technologies and fuelled domestic polarisation and zero-sum international behaviour. Can the norms of the analogous age be adapted to digital societies? What institutional changes can ease this transformation? This panel will ask what norms and architectures public, civic, and private leaders can coalesce around to maintain the stability, safety and security of our increasingly interconnected world.

Sandip Malhotra, Executive Vice-President (Products and Innovation), MasterCard, Singapore

Marina Kaljurand, Member of European Parliament, Estonia

Carl Bildt, Former Prime Minister, Sweden, Co-Chair, European Council on Foreign Relations

Christopher Painter, President, GFCE Foundation Board, United States

Henri Verdier, Ambassador for Digital Affairs, France

Moderator – Latha Reddy, Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, Co-Chair, Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace, India

1710-1730 Ministerial Address at Durbar: Grace Naledi Pandor, Minister of Foreign Affairs, South Africa

1730-1830 Panel Discussion

Durbar: Plural Waters: Strengthening Democracy in the Indo-Pacific

The common interests that bound the transatlantic community underpinned the international liberal order. With the global balance of power fast shifting to Asia, the Indo-Pacific will define the architecture of the 21st century. Do leaders in the region share an overarching and common vision for the region and its role in the world? Will divided and fault lines limit the Indo-Pacific’s potential? Are pluralism and democratic arrangements an essential feature of this region? How can states and communities in the region collaborate to script and defend democratic norms for this region in this century?

Ram Madhav, National General Secretary, Bharatiya Janata Party, India

Faria Maamoon, Executive Council Member, Maldives Reform Movement, Maldives

Cdr. Melissa Ross, Deputy Chief, Royal New Zealand Navy, New Zealand

Peter Berkowitz, Director, State Department Policy Planning Staff, United States

Mona Dave, Senior Program Officer, Asia, National Endowment for Democracy, United States

Moderator – Melissa Conley Tyler, Director of Diplomacy, Asialink, University of Melbourne, Australia

1830-1850 Break

1850-1910 Valedictory Address

Josep Borrell, Vice-President, European Commission, High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

1910-1955 Panel Discussion

Showstopper at Durbar: Coalitions and Consensus: In Defense of Values that Matter

As the century turns 20, what values are under threat in a world increasingly defined by diverging interests? Can states coalesce around shared values, and what are values worth defending? Can states with dissimilar political regimes come to a consensus around value frameworks? Which coalitions and partnerships can support this process? This panel will ask if states can transcend today’s polarised political moment to defend the values that matter.

Vijay Gokhale, Foreign Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, India

Jukka Juusti, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Finland

Marina Payne, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Australia

Matthew Pottinger, Deputy National Security Advisor, U.S. National Security Council, United States

Moderator – Ram Madhav, President, Observer Research Foundation, India

1955-2000 Vote of Thanks

2000-2130 Dinner Conversations (By invitation only)
## Shahjehan: Coded to Kill: Proxy Wars and Autonomous Systems

The implications of autonomous weapons on strategic postures and humanitarian law is uncertain. With international institutions unable to arrive at a consensus on these issues, it is almost certain that LAWS will be deployed before regimes are incubated to manage them. Which regions will first see the deployment of LAWS? How are states integrating these systems into their weapons arsenals? How can the creation of international rules be accelerated?

**Giacomo Persi Paoli**, Head, Security and Technology Programme, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research  
**Lindsey Sheppard**, Fellow, International Security Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, United States  
**Arvind Gupta**, Founder Member, iSPIRIT, India  
**William J. Parker III**, President and CEO, EastWest Institute, United States  
**Lt. Gen. Rajesh Pant**, National Cyber Security Coordinator, India  
**Moderator – Kaja Ciglic**, Senior Director, Digital Diplomacy, Microsoft, Slovenia

## Mumtaz: E-mobility and the City: Innovation on the Move

The e-mobility revolution is being accelerated by three interrelated trends: the onset of the 4IR and falling costs of production; political action against climate change; and shifting attitudes to urbanisation and car ownership. Burdensome investment rules, inefficient infrastructure for power distribution, and high consumer costs continue to hinder EV adoption. How can states, businesses and city leaders overcome these barriers? How can these stakeholders facilitate flows of innovation, finance and governance solutions between each other?

**Keynote Address:**  
**Anil Srivastava**, Mission Director, NITI Aayog, India  
**Siddharthan Balasubramania**, Senior Adviser, Strategy, ClimateWorks Foundation, India  
**Catherine Bremner**, Director, International Climate and Energy, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, HM Government, United Kingdom  
**Mahesh Babu**, CEO, Mahindra Electric, India  
**Sheryl Foo**, Director, Vertech Capital, Singapore  
**Harj Dhaliwal**, Managing director, Middle East and India, Hyperloop One, India  
**Moderator – Arnab Kumar**, Programme Director, Frontier Technologies, NITI Aayog, India

## Jehangir: Special Interaction with Young Fellows

Countries in the emerging world require trillions of dollars in infrastructure investment to meet the needs of their rapidly maturing economies. A host of ‘mega-infrastructure’ initiatives have been launched in recent years to respond to these initiatives. However, bad standards for governance and finance have often placed recipient economies under crippling debt. How can states with shared interests in a free and open global economy create infrastructure investment standards that serve the interests of emerging economies? What role must environmental and political concerns play in the norms underpinning the emerging world’s big infrastructure build-out? How must global finance deal with its failure to address the infrastructure gap in the emerging world?

**Lynn Kuok**, Shangri-La Dialogue Senior Fellow for Asia-Pacific Security, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Singapore  
**Kurihara Toshihiko**, Chief Representative in New Delhi, Japan Bank for International Cooperation, Japan  
**Annie Norfolk Beadle**, Policy Analyst, South and Southeast Asia Regional Programme, OECD, United Kingdom  
**Ila Patnaik**, Professor, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, India  
**Rafiq Dossani**, Director, RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy, United States  
**Bharat Gopalaswamy**, Senior Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, India  
**Moderator – Claire Alembik**, Investment Specialist, Asian Development Bank, Private Sector Operations Department, Thailand Office

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### Day 3 – Thursday, 16 January 2020

#### Durbar: Young Fellows @ 10 – Communities Forever

**Cocktails, Conversations and Celebrations**

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2200 onwards
three core principles that should govern policy. Face these challenges along a spectrum, speakers agreed on stemming the outflow of workers to the United States (US). While the origin of the welfare state is attributed to German Chancellor of this contract and are necessarily political. Indeed, the or- work would affect the social contract between the citizen and their government. Social protections are an integral part of this. Speaker continued to hold traditional jobs and turn to gig work long hours for meagre compensation. Consequently, peo- ple continue to hold traditional jobs and turn to gig work only to supplement their income. In this context, the panel discussed how the evolution of work would affect the social contract between the citizen and their government. Social protections are an integral part of this contract and are necessarily political. Indeed, the origin of the welfare state is attributed to German Chancellor Otto Von Bismarck, who instituted welfare programmes to stem the outflow of workers to the United States (US). While countries at different stages of growth and development will face these challenges along a spectrum, speakers agreed on three core principles that should govern policy.

1. Securing the dignity of people
The relatively low barriers to entry to the gig economy create a systematic self-selection bias, with the workers often coming from the most vulnerable sections of society. For instance, India’s data-labeling industry is an attractive option for women from low-income families. These segments of the populations, Daisy Amdany noted, are also most in need of protection from shocks—economic, environmental or otherwise—that could push entire families into poverty.

2. Social nets for sustainable growth
The protection of gig workers is not only an economic imperative but also a social one. The productivity of a country’s workforce is indelibly linked with their quality of life. Amitabh Kant highlighted the importance of access to terr- itory services, such as education and healthcare, particular- ly for countries hoping to reap their demographic dividend. For several decades, benefits such as insurance and pen- sions have been linked to employers. However, gig-econo- my workforce faces two sets of challenges. First, as Stavros Yannouka noted, traditional workplaces are phasing out pensions and “jobs for life” are now increasingly rare. Sec- ond, emerging forms of employment do not offer long-term benefits and require one to constantly evolve their skill sets, observed Andreas Schaal and Shrayana Bhattacharya. With these principles at the forefront, panelists laid out possible pathways for a future-ready system of social pro- tection. One key feature that emerged was the targeted de- livery of benefits. New technologies can play an enabling role, as is the case with India’s Unique Identification system (Aadhaar), which enables citizens to access hundreds of government schemes, including health insurance. A sec- ond feature is improved access to financial services. In many developing nations, where access to formal banking services is limited but mobile penetration is high, mobile payments services such as Mpesa allow regular individu- als, small businesses and entrepreneurs access to loans and merchant payments services. The third important fea- ture is the free flow of data, which enables efficiency in the targeting, delivery and improvement of social protection.

The panel was broadly in agreement regarding the need for government initiatives. However, some panelists were of the view that the government cannot provide efficient solutions for the full range of issues linked to the future of work. Junaid Ahmad summarised this position thus: “Capital is mobile, people are semi-mobile, but government is local and limited.” “Government programmes,” added Shrayana Bhattacharya, “are not nimble enough to meet ever-changing demands.” To the future generations with the skills required to survive and thrive in future economies, interventions must begin in early childhood. For instance, schooling must incul- cate qualities such as emotional and social aptitude, which cannot be easily replicated through automation or artificial intelligence. Universities, too, must change their course offer- ings to adapt to changing socioeconomic realities.

With a prominent presidential candidate for the 2020 US Elections advocating for “Universal Basic Income,” it has become evident that social protection in a digital world is an issue that resonates with groups of all ages, origins and socioeconomic status. Therefore, social pro- tection must be forged in an inclusive and equitable man- ner. The future, after all, belongs to those who design it. — Trisha Ray
In cities around the world, air pollution has reached a crisis point. As a ‘wicked’ public policy challenge, with complex drivers, addressing it requires an all-of-the-government approach. What are the international best practices that may inform government policy? What is the role of local businesses, communities, and municipalities? How can financial and consumption markets be made stakeholders in this battle? What regulatory nudges can incentivise environment-friendly state policies?

In recent years, the growing crisis of air pollution has transcended the boundaries of a health crisis and entered the all-consuming sphere of developmental issues. Air pollution has been held responsible for 12.5 percent of the deaths in the country. In 2018, the World Health Organization estimated that approximately 8.5 out of every 10,000 children in India, under the age of five, died due to illnesses related to air pollution. With 18 percent of the share of global population, India accounted for 26 percent of the global disability adjusted life years. Out of the 1.24 million deaths in India attributed to air pollution, Lancet estimated that 0.67 million were accredited to ambient particulate matter pollution and 0.48 million to household air pollution. The colossal damage air pollution entails to human health and development has sparked public outrage, but the matter has yet to receive optimum attention. This has sparked debates about whether the ‘right to breathe clean air’ should be a fundamental right. Furthermore, dealing with the pollution crisis requires building and re-building a greener India for a clean future, which has prompted another key question: who will pay for it?

These questions have provoked a series of conversations, focusing on what cost-effective, equitable, and efficient solutions would look like.

The progress with respect to building a credible set of measures to combat air pollution and global warming has been limited, continuing to elude success. A dialogue can only commence by equating the right to clean air with the right to breathe and by extension, the right to life. The rapidly rising greenhouse gas emissions infringe upon the right to life, while an increase in the concentration of particulate matter curtails individuals’ right to breathe. The failure to respect this right is inflicting a terrible toll, not just on individuals but also on the entire ecosystem. There is an urgent need to address the challenges associated with growing air pollution.

A significant challenge in the air pollution debate has been the lack of political commitment. Air pollution requires not only a commitment at an international and national level but also a convergence of these interests at the sub-national level. India continues to witness a scarcity of policies and initiatives aimed at reducing pollution.
In 2017, 77 percent of India’s population was exposed to a mean PM2.5 of more than 40 μg/m3, which is the recommended limit by the National Ambient Air Quality Standard of India. The National Clean Air Programme (NCAP), launched in 2019, is a long-term national strategy to reduce the PM10 and PM2.5 levels by 10-20 percent from 2017 to 2024, respectively. The NCAP has proposed the implementation of comprehensive action plans in 122 non-attainment cities. While the NCAP has been well received, it lacks the necessary motivation and fund allocation to have a successful impact; the targets set by the NCAP have been inert due to the unambitious goals, which are well below the recommended national standards. Indian policies and initiatives have also seen a shortage of legislative support, necessary to create a strong compliance mechanism: the Air Act of 1981 provides the jurisdiction for prevention, control and abatement of air pollution but has not been updated to meet the crisis at hand, whereas the NCAP lacks statutory backing.

India’s per capita emissions are about 40 percent of the global average and contribute seven percent to the global carbon dioxide burden. This comes as a challenge as well as an opportunity—efforts targeted at addressing air pollution also have a positive impact on human health and therefore, on the quality of human capital. As the country moves along on its development trajectory, policymakers must exploit the linkages between poverty reduction and climate change mitigation. There is an urgent need to examine the air pollution crisis through an economic lens: the health burden and economic costs of air pollution are so high that solutions effectively pay for themselves.

Another challenge associated with climate change is the lack of a financing module to adequately deal with a crisis of this scale and magnitude—designing and implementing solutions entail large investments. Crafting innovative financial instruments that encapsulate the stick-and-carrot approach of incentivising climate-friendly action and penalising practices that have a potentially detrimental impact on the environment is a strategy that has the potential to show encouraging results. Modern-day investors are increasingly concerned about where their money is going and what impact it is creating, which has led to an upsurge in the demand for green and sustainable finance products. Redirecting capital flows to sustainable development projects (for instance, projects that enhance air quality) can play a vital role in unlocking sustainable capital and creating adequate financing capacity to address air pollution.

Policy certainty and regulatory stability are two of the most significant correlates for creating financing capacity. This in turn is linked with the issue of getting enough political buy-in. Air quality should be right at the top of the developmental agenda; it should be the issue over which regimes are chosen. However, in the context of the air pollution debate, India has witnessed a startlingly low political buy-in at the domestic level. Similarly, international commitment and cooperation to address this challenge collectively are crucial. Low-cost transfer of green technologies across countries and cross-sharing of mitigation measures and best practices are extremely important for moving the needle on the issue of air pollution.

The next big civilisation clash is projected to be on account of environmental issues. Air pollution is a global challenge that affects all and thus requires concerted, collective action. The previous decade has witnessed an upsurge in public and political interest in climate change and air pollution. The time is ripe to harness this interest to make sure that the world we leave behind is not unliveable. The only way to win the battle for clean air is by ensuring that the right to breathe is firmly embedded at the heart of the global development agenda.

—Kriti Kapur
Although technology is neutral, its users are not. Social media is being manipulated by both foreign and domestic actors. An Oxford research project studied 70 different governments and their use of Big Data and computational propaganda in shaping public opinion. The project found a 150-percent increase in governments’ use of social media for manipulation campaigns, from 2017 to 2019.

According to Alexander Klimburg (Hague Centre for Strategic Studies), the 2016 United States Election was the clearest example of some of these strategies. The news cycle was influenced by targeted leaking, which diverted public attention from President Trump at key moments during the campaign. Approximately 80,000 inexpensive social media posts were able to interact with and mobilise 126 million Americans. Social institutions such as the press and thinktanks were attacked, calling into question their legitimacy in identifying and drawing attention to disinformation. The 2020 US Presidential Election will be the next battleground, but with more new and unfamiliar tactics.

Liberal democracies have limited experience in this new type of warfare, unlike systems that have a history of prioritising information as a tool of conflict. These nations must readjust to these tactics without compromising the freedom of speech, which is fundamental to a democracy. In response to the influx of fake news online, many governments have taken to censorship. However, this is only a stopgap solution. Liberal democracies must focus instead on education to create discerning consumers of information. This will prove more resilient than censorship or detection.

With the scale of the challenge constantly on the rise, private actors are also stepping in. Facebook removed 2.2 billion fake accounts in the first quarter of 2019. Transparency in political advertising was devised as an important strategy to combat the misuse of social media platforms. However, while technology companies are committed to combatting fake news, there is no silver bullet, noted Natasha Jog, Facebook’s Election Integrity Lead in South Asia. In this scenario, third-party fact-checkers and election integrity initiatives play an important role. Recent studies from Stanford and Michigan found that the amount of fake news on Facebook had decreased over the last three years.

Additionally, some countries have sanctioned military responses to disinformation campaigns. In 2018, the US Cyber Command engaged in a military cyber attack against a Russian troll factory. However, it is unclear if such an attack complies with the international law, and such practice can potentially pave the way for other countries to authorise pre-emptive acts of war without the threat of the use of force. That such a precedent is set by the US—the security guarantor of so many nations in the Indo-Pacific—makes it even more dangerous.

In combating fake news, censorship, deterrence and resilience play equally important roles. However, there are risks of overestimating the ability of political campaigns to manipulate citizens, on one hand, and on the other, underestimating the ability of citizens to form their own opinions. Despite this, governments err on the side of caution, driven by concerns about losing the public’s trust, which is an important aspect of democracy.

In the non-governmental space, civil society plays an important role in the trust equation by supporting education and literacy programmes, putting pressure on technological companies, and narrowing the divide between policymakers and the public. While civil society has always been independent, but there is now an increased need for transparency and detachment from ideology. Governments that overreach should be called out, while at the same time credit must be given to governments that rectify or respond appropriately.

Rachel Rizzo from CNAS remarked that there is a dire need for more democratic governments, at a time when Turkey, for instance, is jailing journalists and Bahrain is tracking dissenters. While combatting fake news and disinformation should be a high priority, liberal democracies must ensure freedom of expression and continue to protect dissidents and truth tellers.

—— Natasha Kassam
A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE: NEW RULES FOR INDIA AND THE EU IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD

Panelists
Tara Varma, Director of the Paris office, European Council on Foreign Relations, France
Solomon Passy, President, The Atlantic Club of Bulgaria; Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bulgaria
Alica Kizeková, Senior Researcher, Institute of International Relations, Czech Republic
Chunhao Lou, Deputy Director, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, China
Ummu Salma Bava, Professor and Jean Monnet Chair, Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, India
Françoise Nicolas, Director, Centre for Asian Studies, Institut Français des Relations Internationales, France

Panel Moderator
Françoise Nicolas, Director, Centre for Asian Studies, Institut Français des Relations Internationales, France

THE US under the Trump administration has repeatedly stressed that it cares more for sovereignty than it does international norms and multilateral institutions. China has repeatedly stressed that it interprets a “rules-based order” somewhat differently than western countries do—that it has a different understanding of what those rules should be, and of what the values that underpin the rules, if they exist at all, are.

On the first night of the Raisina Dialogue, panellists and discussants gathered to mull over whether the European Union and India could, in this new context, uphold a multipolar order.

Tara Varma, providing a European perspective, stressed that the EU should not necessarily limit itself by picking a side. Ummu Salma Bava, giving an Indian view, noted that India, too, wanted opportunities, offering, “You get trade, and we get lectures.”

What these panelists—indeed, what all panelists—neglected to mention is that the choices one makes trading are not separate from the future of the multipolar order. On the contrary, trade has been one of the chief weapons through which the multipolar—or rules-based, or multilateral, or however one chooses to describe it—order has been weakened.

Look at, for example, the steps that the Trump administration has taken to weaken the multipolar order. Many, though by no means all of them, have related to trade. President Trump withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a trade deal; demanded the negotiation of NAFTA, a trade deal; imposed and threatened tariffs on those countries that he deemed to have taken advantage of the US, the richest and most powerful country in the world; and threatened to sanction those businesses that continued to do business with Iran so as to undermine the Iran nuclear deal. Trade with the US is not separate from the multipolar order; it is a key chapter in the story of how that multipolar order was weakened.

But perhaps the more obvious case is that of trade with China. Various social media companies have had to self-censor to do business with China or have had to take down videos that the Chinese government deems offensive. The NBA famously found itself in hot water when the general manager of the Houston Rockets spoke out about protests in Hong Kong: the league and various high profile players then tripped over themselves to say that this was not the view of the NBA, and they did so because China is a large market. Because of trade, China was able to dictate the stance that corporations based in countries that ostensibly believe in freedom of speech and freedom of assembly took on both of those issues.

Trade, to put it another way, is not an added bonus of the new iteration of the multipolar order. It is, at the present moment, one of the chief ways in which that order is being eroded.

Chunhao Lou, offering the Chinese response, said that China doesn’t see the world in terms of zero-sum or rivalries. However, he stressed, the rules-based order should be inclusive. It can’t, he said, be ideological. But this is not a rules-based order. The rules are based on something—a common understanding, a shared set of principles. They don’t need to be put in American terms, as they have been for the past 70 years, but they do need to exist. Otherwise, it isn’t a rules-based order. If the rules are not understood by everyone in the same way, they do not exist.

Perhaps the EU and India can tell themselves that they can ignore values, or the terms attached to trade, and that they can pursue opportunities and the multipolar order will continue, simply because there are more than two players in the game. But, if the multipolar order is only based on transaction, and not anything more, than to the larger, more powerful party, will always go the spoils. In other words, a multipolar order that does not deal with what is demanded along with trade will be one in which the poles are lopsided. All one needs to do to see that is true is look around the world today.

It was all well and good, in other words, to hear panellists talk about how the EU and India might increase cooperation, or might recognise that they are geopolitical actors, or might negotiate going forward. But until someone starts talking about the costs that will be incurred by trying to hold the multipolar, rules-based order together, we aren’t really talking about that at all.

— Emily Tamkin
This panel discussed how influence operations are undermining democratic processes in plural societies. Such operations often take place at the intersection of social, economic and security domains, requiring a comprehensive response across these multiple arenas. Can international norms evolve to dissuade information operations? What is the role of individuals and large enterprises? How should states respond to influence operations? Are kinetic responses inevitable?

The panel focused on how technology has disrupted democracy, broadly and elections, specifically—presenting not only challenges but also new possibilities. There was divergence amongst panellists on how these challenges and possibilities should be responded to and the net benefit such developments present for democracy.

Mr. Rasmussen stated that the biggest changes are in the speed and distance that disinformation could travel and the growing difficulty in identifying which sources are accurate or not. However, he believes the internet and social media have enhanced democracy by giving more people a voice than previously.

Mr. Harper agreed, saying that the biggest break between old and new technology is that the general population can now broadcast back—they no longer only receive messaging, like in the eras of radio and television. Mr. Harper said the ability for greater dialogue from the general population shows that the long-held ‘global liberal elite’ consensus on markets, free-trade and individualism may not be as widespread as once believed. Identities based on faith and nationalist perspectives are more pervasive than first thought, and it will take political practitioners some time to catch up to these divergent public views.

Marietje Schaake pointed out that it is not possible to currently know how widespread such views are because technology companies are not transparent with data and may exacerbate problems by micro-targeting people susceptible to anti-pluralistic messaging.

Discussing elections specifically, Jane Lute noted that while tampering with elections has been a phenomenon for a long time, election integrity had been taken for granted in many liberal democracies in the West. This, however, is no longer the case following the discoveries of foreign meddling in many recent Western elections.

Mr. Rasmussen was of the belief that a more united front amongst democracies and a sharing of lessons would help in guarding against any future foreign interference in elections. Mr. Gilead made the point that treaties are not valuable without the capability to enforce them. The panel discussed that technology alone is neither inherently more secure nor insecure when used in elections; it is the integrity of the systems in place that matters most. Technology cannot stand in for a lack of trust in processes.

Marietje Schaake argued that there needs to be greater regulation of large technology companies and more transparency in how data is used. She said it is unclear if social media displays a true representation of views or is skewed to sensationalist and polarising views, based on
“...democracies are not only under immense pressure from outside forces, but much disinformation as well as the undermining of trust in liberal democracies is increasingly being perpetrated by domestic actors. How democratic states respond to these challenges is important for democratic resilience. However, many states that claim to be democratic engage in internet shutdowns and surveillance of journalists and critics.”

profit-driven algorithms: tech companies were not built to spread democracy or human rights—although their platforms may be used for this—they were built to make profits. Legislators need to close the information asymmetry that large tech companies enjoy.

Marietje Schaake pointed out that democracies are not only under immense pressure from outside forces, but much disinformation as well as the undermining of trust in liberal democracies is increasingly being perpetrated by domestic actors. How democratic states respond to these challenges is important for democratic resilience. However, many states that claim to be democratic engage in internet shutdowns and surveillance of journalists and critics. For Marietje, it is important to not only consider the integrity of elections but also the quality of democracy, which is under threat from actions of states against their own citizens.

Rasmussen argued that while foreign meddling needs to be prevented, citizens’ rights to free speech must be protected, even the more extreme ones. Instead of more regulation being placed on speech and social media platforms, such views should be countered with factual arguments. Marietje Schaake believed that responses to terror threats need to provide for a more robust liberal democracy, arguing that many fundamental rights have been eroded in the name of national security. She pondered, “Are we not playing into the hands of those that seek to undermine us?”

Jane Lute closed the panel with a conclusion that largely summed up the discussion: She noted that information is a valuable commodity. Governments have lost control of legitimising information, and there is now a ‘market-place’ for legitimising information. This greater contestation over legitimising information comes with dangers, such as those the panel discussed, but it also comes with possibilities that have enlightened the world in ways that governments could not have.

— Rebecca Strating
of “rule-based world order.” According to him, countries such as the US oppose the creation of a “global multipolar democracy,” championing a rule-based order instead, because it helps them circumvent obligations under international law. Lavrov advocated for the UN Charter to be the “anchor” for creating consensus on such issues of global relevance, and the subsequent participation of India, Brazil and an African candidate as permanent members of a reformed UN Security Council (UNSC).

Noting the dangers of subscribing to a myopic definition of the “Indo-Pacific,” Lavrov spoke in favour of widening its scope and influence to include the African continent and the Persian Gulf. In his view, moving towards an “Indo-Pacific” strategy would be an attempt to reconfigure the region’s geopolitical reality and diverge from the consensus of the ASEAN nations. Russia supports formats that are not “divisive, but which unite,” he stated, offering the SCO and the BRICS regional blocs as examples of a “unifying format.”

In his concluding remarks, the foreign minister commended the strong India–Russia relationship, citing Russia’s status as an “especially privileged” partner to India, as indicative of their deepening ties. Expressing a desire for international politics to be purged of colonial and neo-colonial influence, he called for a renewed focus on diplomatic means of engagement that utilise the benefits of multilateralism.

Akhil Deo
As India and China attempt to find “equilibrium” with the world and each other simultaneously, they must work out the terms of this relationship. This, he argued, is a “work in progress, because both powers are very dynamic in terms of where they stand.”

Dr. Jaishankar commended the “extraordinarily steady” nature of India’s relationship with Russia, attributing it to “sentiment,” amongst the other usual suspects. He recounted his mother’s memory of welcoming Khruschev in 1955, highlighting the importance of the “contribution of the street to shaping foreign policy attitudes.” Indian sentiment has been similar towards the US over the last few years. Building on this, Dr. Jaishankar argued that “today, there is virtually no area of activity where India and the US don’t work with each other,” and the relationship is likely to remain promising in the years ahead.

In the concluding segment, Dr. Saran brought the focus back to India and the internal developments the country is currently going through. Dr. Jaishankar stated that the challenges that India is facing, such as terrorism and naturalisation, are common challenges of state-building. India is undergoing a period of rebalancing as it tries to define itself, and it should not let others define it first.

— Aastha Kaul

“India is transitioning from being ‘talent’ supplier to an ‘innovation’ supplier. While it is not yet at the forefront, he argued that the ‘theory of the late-comer having an advantage’ will prove true if India maintains this momentum. Furthermore, technology is quite strategic, and India is not only cognisant of this fact but is also responding to it by developing competencies of both technology and personnel.”

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In response to the questions on “great power politics,” Dr. Jaishankar discussed the India–China relationship. He noted that while neighbouring countries are bound to encounter challenges, “very rarely in history have two powers who are neighbours have actually gone up in the international order in approximately the same timeframe.”

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ARTING with the Arab Spring in 2011, the last de-
cade was characterised by street protests sweep-
ing across the world, challenging the definitions of
nationalism. As Indrani Bagchi observed, these protests
spread from Hong Kong to Chile and dealt with issues rang-
ing from climate crisis in the US to citizenship laws in In-
dia. The changing landscape of civil-society outrage, both
in terms of their frequency and intensity, has brought to the
fore how street power is becoming a normative behaviour in
several nations. In the 21st century, street power has become
a force that can not only dictate domestic policies but also
shape foreign policy. The panel discussion essentially broke
this phenomenon into a framework of how street power
functions, the catalysts to such occurrences, and the role of
technology in altering patterns of mass mobilisation.

To put this into perspective, panellists Jane Holl Lute
and Seyed Kazem Sajjadpour highlighted the importance of
understanding the theory of street power and its in-
fluence on diplomacy. There was broad agreement that
street protests are caused due to the globalisation of frus-
tation, anger and emotions, and are fuelled by technolog-
ical advancements in the framework of global politics. To
break this down, Sajjadpour discussed the roles of:
• “Angry actors,” whose expectations are raised by the
digital world but are not met;
• “Identity politics” or “blame games,” which are defin-
ing a new sense of nationalism; and
• “Crowded actorship” that pushes national institu-
tion systems to fast-track their actions, which is not in
tandem with foreign policy being intrinsically slow and
gradual.

According to Lute, the anger of the masses is driven by
anxiety, caused in turn by the complete collapse of trust
in government institutions. Thus, more than real politics,
a “political psychological approach” is required to nor-
malise the balance of power within and across states.

Werner Fasslabend noted that rapid digitalisation has
turned a semblance of bonding within communities. Equally,
however, they can also fracture communal harmony. Gov-
ernments must engage with people and their problems
more closely, viewing globalisation, urbanisation and dig-
talisation as political problems instead of mere economic
phenomena. The failure to understand the interlinkages
between public fear, government actions and diplomacy
is one of the major reasons that societal peace is being
increasingly disrupted. For example, in the case of coun-
tries which are dealing with migration disputes in con-
temporary times, while foreign policy attempts to address
human rights and developmental concerns in tackling the
immigration problem, the domestic system is seeing an
increase in economic and security issues.

Technology induced people-to-people connectivity is
extremely empowering in modern times, and social media
has gained enough momentum to coerce societies and gov-
ernments to revise diplomatic ties. Street power has always
been a prominent force, but the advent of social media has
changed the methods of mass mobilisation. Contemporary
policymakers must reflect upon this. According to John Lee,
this drastic change mandates that tackling mechanisms also
need to adapt to understanding public viewpoints instead of
blatantly repressing them. One has to be smart about using
social media, noted Edgars Rinkēvics, by devising ways in
which it can be used to gain positive outcomes. For exam-
ple, in Latvia, there are numerous “online petitions” regard-
ing developmental issues. If these petitions are supported
by a significant number of people, the Parliament has to take
cognisance and incorporate the public opinion in their do-
nestic and foreign policies.

On the one hand, open societies and democratic pro-
cesses are better equipped to deal with public outrage,
but on the other hand, such societies find it difficult to
curb biased information and fake news. The panellists
agreed that street power can end up taking a wrong turn
as a result of the unnecessary mobilisation of hatred us-
ing historically successful tools, often fuelled by interest
groups within and outside the borders of a nation. This is
made possible by organised funding and dissemination of
disinformation and misinformation using the digital space.
Policymakers must propose an antidote for such hatred,
which can cut across political boundaries.

To maintain state order, there must be coherence be-
tween public opinion and political machinery. Reform pro-
cesses have to start early to assuage fear-driven anger
in people. For example, India needs to protect its potential
to become a major economy by properly handling and re-
viewing its politics of religion. Any extreme regime must
be resisted, whether it is the universalisation of political
norms or the prevalence of the street anger. However, a
consensus has to be reached to strike the right balance.
The governing elites must find a way to deal with discon-
tent to make institutions sustainable.

— Soumya Bhowmick
With the collapse of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, more popular as the INF Treaty, the world is observing a trend towards the failure of major arms control arrangements. In such times, certain concerns need to be addressed—such as the root causes of the failure of such arrangements; their likely future; the role of emerging powers in answering said concerns; and the role of international institutions in the future of international arms-control agreements.

US media reports after the killing of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds commander Qasem Soleimani made it clear that the current US administration, and in particular President Donald Trump and his Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, regarded the event as a great victory for the US, one that was celebrated the world over. The killing was at first presented as preventing American deaths, but was later said to have re-established deterrence, even those in the US who came out against the act were careful to note that Soleimani was a bad man who had done bad things in the world.

But the response to Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, when he spoke at Raisina Dialogue 2020 made it clear that the American narrative on Iran and Soleimani was no longer believed by the international audience, or at least that section of it that was present at Raisina. The audience cheered Zarif enthusiastically.

Zarif was in discussion with Sunjoy Joshi, Chairman, Observer Research Foundation. Joshi’s view was that the current round of US-Iran tensions began when the US withdrew from the nuclear deal. The US, in the past year and a half since it withdraw from the deal, had failed to convince the world, including India, that Iran was in the wrong and the US was right, that it had withdrawn from the deal because of Iranian actions. It was clear to the audience that the US, not Iran, was to blame for the deterioration of Iran-US relations, and the fears and tensions that had arisen since. The US might be able to pressure European companies into not doing business with Iran. Zarif said that the US had “bullied” them into doing just that. But the US could not pressure everyone, and certainly not India, into thinking that this is anyone but the US’ fault.

Zarif noted, too, that there had been many protests in India against the killing of Soleimani. “They say we have proxies,” he said, “but could Iran really have so many proxies in Indian cities?”

Zarif declared that the only people who were cheered by Soleimani’s demise were Trump, Pompeo, and the Islamic State. He asked what the US had brought to Iraq, to Afghanistan, to the entire West Asian region. He said that when the deal with the US had been broken by the US, why would he want another deal with Donald Trump? Iran had kept to its commitments; the US had not. “If I make a deal with Trump, how long will it last?” he asked. He did a Trump imitation. The Raisina audience laughed and applauded.

Asked to respond to Pompeo’s suggestion that Iranians needed to follow international law if they wanted to eat, Zarif said, “I think he should get a good lawyer.” He also said that there should be a new international coalition to fight terror, and that the US should demonstrate that it really wanted to fight the Islamic State (which, he reiterated, cheered the death of Soleimani). There was much laughter when Zarif joked that he would be out of a job if there were no room for diplomacy—but he also added that he was not interested in negotiations with the US.

— Emily Tamkin
The reimagining of political geographies in the post-Cold war period, driven by the rise of two of the most populous countries of the world—India and China—has brought new opportunities for geo-political and geo-economic cooperation. This redefinition of regions has also found resonance with developing countries, which have led the call for building a democratic and fair architecture of international relations.

From connectivity projects to economic cooperation to security and economic cooperation. In this context, the Indo-Pacific is also being seen as a step towards building a more inclusive region, especially through transport corridors like the Chennai-Vladivostok route, which will help reduce economic distances and energise trade relations. Given that the regional states are all striving towards further national economic development to uplift the living standards of millions of their people, the initiative is expected to bring more opportunities to the stakeholders.

The Indo-Pacific can be used to bring together the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions as a common space of security and economic cooperation. In this context, the Russian pivot to the East can be merged with ideas of the Indo-Pacific in Russia’s international economic policy. Already, in Eurasia, Russia is extending its cooperation with regional states through the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). The region has seen efforts to build multilateral cooperation, even as the global trend has veered away from it in recent years.

This has been evident in their steady pursuit of connectivity projects, whether through initiatives like the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) or the Chennai-Vladivostok sea link. One major focus of both EAEU and China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been a focus on improving transportation connectivity. Through the BRI, apart from strategic aims, China has also sought to achieve a position as an intermediate market between developed and developing economies, and transform itself into a major consumer goods market for the region’s exports.

But the promise of these ideas has been tempered by geopolitical realities. Concerns about the strategic impact of China’s rise have had to be balanced against the economic benefits of engaging with the rising power. The ambitious connectivity projects have also had to deal with the real-world challenge of proving their economic viability and sustainability.

The general discontent with multilateral trading regimes has been another challenge, with the bilateral dimension gaining ground in the pursuit of national interests. This was seen in the case of the US pulling out of Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and India not agreeing to join the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), arguing that it does not benefit its citizens at this point in time. This conflict has been more pronounced in the case of the US and China, with both trying to keep their dominance over global value chains.

Given the stakes involved, relations of the US with regional powers, the equilibrium reached between India, Russia and China, as well as the role of regional multilateral organisations, will all influence the maintenance of peace and stability in the region. It has been argued that given the political and security threats before regional regimes, it is important to preserve the cooperation mechanisms in existence.

For this, the role of organisations like SCO, BRICS, and ASEAN will have to evolve to deal with the challenges of the ongoing churn in the world order. The countries involved will also have to work towards preserving agreements that promote liberal trading regimes in a manner that takes into account the national interest of different countries. This needs to be done not only to save the trade regime as it exists today but also for the economic benefits that accrue from it. It will also be necessary to build trust amongst states and strengthen their economic fundamentals for peace and stability.

The region remains too big, diverse and dynamic for any one country to dominate it. To maximise growth potential and prevent conflict, the key challenge for regional states will be to find the right concepts that will enable co-existence in a manner that benefits all stakeholders.

— Nivedita Kapoor
Looking at the puzzle of Central Asia’s future, where does India fit in? This was the subject tackled in “Cracks on the Roof of the World: Growth, Stability and Assault Rifles in the Heart of Asia,” a panel discussion held at Raisina 2020.

The answer, at least according to the panellists, was that India’s piece of the puzzle was a small one. In part, that was because the present India-Russia relationship was not the old India-Soviet relationship. So long as India was dealing with the Soviet Union, it necessarily had a relationship with Central Asia. Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan were all Soviet republics then. A close partnership with the Soviet Union meant that India, despite its non-aligned stance, was tied to Central Asia.

But in 2020, as panellist Rovshan Muradov, Secretary-General, Nizami Ganjavi International Center, Azerbaijan, noted, while Central Asia may be, linguistically and culturally still influenced by Russia, it does not mean that, by extension, it is influenced by India too. Added panellist Suhasini Haidar: “India is lagging behind Russia in terms of soft power in Central Asia.”

Haidar maintained that India is also lagging behind China in Central Asia. China and Russia, once arch-enemies, have, in recent years, developed a geopolitical bond. Muradov noted that the cooperation between these two countries was an important global development. However, it would be misleading to say that China has put down roots in Central Asia simply because it has come closer to Russia. In fact, it could be argued that Chinese culture—and, more to the point, Chinese investment—has become competition for Russia in Central Asia. Through its One Belt One Road initiative, China has poured enormous amounts of money into Central Asia.

But it is not just Chinese money that has bolstered Chinese influence over Central Asia. It is also the absence of the similar level of investment by any other country. Muradov added that if Europe and the US did not help Central Asia, the countries would have to look elsewhere to take care of their economies.

So too did panellist Eldor Aripov, Director, Uzbekistan’s Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies, make the point that China’s growing influence in Central Asia was not only because of its proactive approach, but also due to the passive stance of other countries. Muradov maintained that since Central Asian countries were far away from the European nations and the US, they should be primarily engaged with their three large neighbours: Russia, China, and India. They implied that Chinese influence in Central Asia was growing in part because of the lack of an Indian presence, or even an attempt at one.

But India is unlikely to follow China’s example. India is not going to pour the same amount of money into Central Asia as China has. Further, to a certain extent, as panellist C. Raja Mohan, Director, Institute of South Asian Studies in Singapore, pointed out, India is blocked from fully engaging in Central Asia because of its own difficult relationship with Pakistan. “Whatever India says, at this point, its role is bound to be moderate,” he said. “We are not involved in any Great Game in Central Asia.”

On Afghanistan, the Central Asians on the panel acknowledged they had previously tried to relegate it to South Asia, or at least regard it as a bridge between South and Central Asia. If Afghanistan were to move more completely into Central Asia’s orbit, it would further diminish Indian influence in the region.

That is not to say that Central Asia is not, or will not be, important. It is not to say that India is not, or will not be, an increasingly influential world power. They noted, however, that the past is not the present, and the present may not continue in the future. India’s relationship with Central Asia is no longer what it was in the past; in the future, it may not even be what it is at present.

— Emily Tamkin
With the collapse of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, more popular as the INF Treaty, the world is observing a trend towards the failure of major arms control arrangements. In such times, certain concerns need to be addressed—such as the root causes of the failure of such arrangements; their likely future; the role of emerging powers in answering said concerns; and the role of international institutions in the future of international arms-control agreements.

S. Paul Kapur, Planning Staff, US State Department, and professor, Department of National Security Affairs, US Naval Postgraduate School focused on the reasons for the withdrawal of the US from the INF Treaty and what implications this might have for the future of the New START (Strategic Arms Reduction) Treaty. In assessing the value of arms control failures, Kapur observed that the treaty only covered strategic systems and excluded sub-strategic systems that were also a threat to international stability. Such systems were attractive to states because they were less destructive than strategic systems, the decision to employ them was often less momentous, and they were more likely to generate deterrence in a way that strategic systems would not.

On the other hand, US removing its own strategic weapons (removing South Korea and Japan) would undermine the NPT. For North Korea, denuclearisation meant complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantling of North Korea’s weapons, delivery systems and nuclear infrastructure as the first step before sanctions would be removed. For North Korea, denuclearisation involved the US removing its own strategic weapons (removing South Korea’s nuclear umbrella) and an end to joint military exercises by the US and South Korea. This would leave a step-by-step fashion to demonstrate that the US no longer viewed North Korea as a hostile actor. Lee argued that it was a mistake for the US to contemplate withdrawing its nuclear umbrella over South Korea and Japan, allowing each of them to acquire their own nuclear weapons as this would undermine the NPT.

For India’s approach to arms-control, and impediments to the creation of new arms-control agreements, Manpreet Sethi, Centre for Power Studies, suggested that India was more receptive to the idea of nuclear arms-control agreements after historically focusing on nuclear disarmament. However, for future arms-control agreements to emerge, Lee argued, states must have a better understanding of each other’s nuclear doctrines and threat perceptions. After all, one of the biggest impediments to arms control in South Asia has been the huge trust deficit between India and Pakistan and China.”

“For future arms-control agreements to emerge, states must have a better understanding of each other’s nuclear doctrines and threat perceptions. One of the biggest impediments to arms control in South Asia has been the huge trust deficit between India, Pakistan and China.”

— Lavina Lee
VEN as India sees the emergence of new information technology industries, the policy architecture retains many of the rules first developed in the early 2000s, primarily the IT Act of 2000. Fintech is slated to be one of the most disruptive technologies poised to change the way the world banks, insures, transacts and trades.

In this evolving domain, “when you have global on-demand content creators rising, Indian creators have a legitimate grouse that they have differential regulatory standards,” observed Baijayant Panda, National Vice President and Spokesperson, Bharatiya Janata Party. In India, broadcast regulation comes under the telecommunications regulator; instead of duplicating regulatory bodies, one body has been given an expanded and overlapping role. “Innovation and regulation must not be seen as opposites in this space, and there should not be limits to creativity,” notes Tejasvi Surya, Member of Parliament, India; therefore, while the creative industry must think to creativity, “new ideas are being given a platform here, and there is an environment to invest in local production from global players,” said Roopa Ganguly, Member of Parliament, India. Thus, healthy cooperation between local and global players can lead to a content-rich and accessible future for consumers.

Digital innovation needs to be nurtured by engaging stakeholders, so that new technologies can overcome the hurdles of the uneven pace of technology and policy-making. “Local needs must be heard and addressed by elected officials,” asserted Vincent Tarzia, Speaker, South Australian House of Assembly. For example, secure digital banking can help bridge the financial inclusion gap in developing economies. More than a billion people in Asia still do not have access to formal financial services; they do not have a bank account and no means to engage in commerce, whether offline or online. While a large portion of the population is unbanked or under-banked, a larger population has access to mobile connectivity. According to World Bank data for 2018, mobile cellular subscriptions for India is 87 per 100 people. Therefore, a digital banking infrastructure that uses the immense processing power of the mobile phones in use, must be designed to engage such a large population through a transparent, secure, and efficient banking system. There is widespread use of transnational payment services already in the emerging digital economies. According to the Reserve Bank of India’s annual report for 2017-2018, mobile banking services witnessed a growth of 92 percent and 13 percent in volume and value terms, respectively, with the number of registered users growing to 250 million.

Which such widespread digitisation already underway, the imperative is to ensure that the data of the burgeoning population, now online and connected, is safe and secure. “A digital-friendly economy and an open internet require a robust data protection bill, with safeguards against arbitrary interventions in the name of security,” stressed Shashi Tharoor, Member of Parliament, India. In this regard, Marina Kaljurand, Member of the European Parliament from Estonia, advocated for integrating the private sector to combat the vulnerabilities in cyber security today. “Without the private sector, governments will not survive in the digital world, as the majority of online services and digital infrastructure is owned by the private sector. Civil society must be the watchdog of the internet. The applicability of international law to cybersecurity is confusing, and where academia can provide its expertise,” said Kaljurand. There needs to be a collaboration between the government, private sector, civil society, as well as academia to ensure the success of a wholesome digital regime.

— Aditi Ratho
The battle against climate change is at an inflection point. The failure of the latest Conference of the Parties (CoP) and related efforts indicate that the world is struggling to respond to climate change. The onset of the Fourth Industrial Revolution presents a tremendous opportunity for states to discover a new relationship between their economic and environmental policies. Is global finance making the right choices at a crucial time for the fight against climate change—and for global growth? How can the emerging world transform its development model, and what can the global community do to assist the green transformation?

The World Economic Forum’s Global Risk Assessment determines the failure of climate change mitigation and adaptation as the number one risk by likelihood over the next 10 years. Global temperatures have seen a rise of more than one percent since pre-industrial times, primarily driven by fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes. The continuous rise in global carbon dioxide emissions has resulted in the need to shift the paradigm from a quantitative growth model to utilise scarce resources effectively. These twin transformations require shifting from an agriculturally-dependent to a resource-efficient development model. India’s insufficient natural resources coupled with the global requirement to reduce its carbon emissions necessitate innovation—in green technologies, finance and development models. India’s development model must take the economy from the farm-to-green frontier.

The discussion further established that the four pillars of the battle against climate change are: mitigation, adaptation, finance and technology. Climate change mitigation requires leveraging the linkages between technological innovation and green growth to get ahead of the climate change crisis. To move away from fossil fuels India needs innovations such as a battery-amplifying technology for wind or solar plants and zero-emission vehicles. This can be accomplished by focusing on the twin policy pillars of market creation and mobilisation of green finance—which fundamentally must be a market-driven process. It is, therefore, important for policymakers to unleash market forces to incentivise investments for building a low-carbon economy.

A global challenge like climate change implicates everyone and requires coordinated multi-stakeholder action. Since the shift towards green development is in its initial stages, one challenge in building a sustainable future is the unforeseeable risk associated with loss of employment, specifically in the higher polluting industries. “Sustainability is the single biggest job opportunity since the industrial revolution.” Deep public support in terms of outcomes is necessary to adapt towards changing policies and initiatives. Exterminating the climate crisis requires a top-down approach. Building a regulatory environment that is conducive for green innovation is necessary to catalyse the economy’s green transformation. Stable and precise policy goals laying out greenhouse gas emission targets, regular monitoring and evaluation of green efforts, and willingness to take global leadership on climate change is imperative. A crucial policy lever to achieve green transformation is the creation of an effective institutional architecture to support green growth. The key supports for such an architectural would include legislative bodies, independent monitoring organisations, dedicated funding agencies, academic institutions with major climate change research programmes, and inter-sectoral expert groups.

India’s green growth will require an average investment of US$85 billion to US$125 billion per year for climate mitigation—approximately US$1.6 trillion between 2020 and 2033. Sufficient financing capacity will need to be developed (including establishment of dedicated financial institutions) through both public and private sources. Due to fiscal constraints in the public sector, private-sector capital will play a significant role in green climate finance. Combined efforts in policy, regulation and capacity-building will, therefore, be needed.

With India’s heavy dependence on high emission sectors—such as power, construction, and agriculture—it is imperative for the country to transition towards a green and sustainable development path. Besides reducing its carbon intensity, India aims to increase the contribution of renewable energy to 40 percent of the power supply and restore degraded land by 2030. As the third-largest source of carbon emissions in the world, India’s progress will also play a crucial role in determining the planet’s success in moving towards a low-carbon trajectory. How effectively governments, businesses, civil society, and communities work together to meet their commitments will be a key determinant of global growth in the years to come.

—Kriti Kapur
The past decade saw transformative changes in the strides women have taken in the political, social, and economic spaces. In 2019 alone, Zuzana Caputova, for instance, became the first female president of Slovakia, Gita Gopinath became the first female chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, Cardi B became the first solo female artist to win the Best Rap Album at the Grammy Awards, and Tongku Maimun Tuan Mat became the first female Chief Justice of Malaysia. The new decade began with Finland having elected the world’s youngest female Prime Minister, Sanna Marin. Leading a political coalition headed by female leaders, “50 percent of the cabinet being female as well, and they are one of the fastest-growing democracies, which shows the influence of women in policy,” observed Patricia Scotland, Secretary-General, Commonwealth Secretariat. Along with Rwanda, two other countries have more women than men in parliament: Cuba at 53.2 percent and Bolivia at 53.1 percent. Even in the US, which lags well behind much of the world when it comes to female representation and does not even reach the global average of 24.1 percent of lower house seats won by women, “2018 was the year for women in politics; women stood up, shared ideas, and people were motivated to find women on the ballot and vote for them,” said Eleni Kounalakis, Lieutenant Governor of California. A record number of 102 women were elected to the House of Representatives in the 2018 midterms, accounting for 23.5 percent of the 435 seats.

Has the increasing political representation of women in the upper echelons of policymaking resulted in tangible changes on the ground, or are these growing numbers merely a gender wash? In Rwanda, the 2003 constitutional mandate to provide quotas for women in parliament, had a clear and dramatic effect. However, in parliament, women have been unable to weigh in on legislative changes in topics like parental leave, which is still a low 12 weeks. India, which has been making progress in political representation but has yet to establish a quota system, has several laws that ostensibly help women succeed in the workplace, but actually have the opposite effect of impeding growth. For example, in order to ensure women’s safety, Section 66(1)(b) of the Factories Act, 1948 states that “no woman shall be required or allowed to work in any factory...” which night-shift for women will only be allowed if adequate safety measures are in place, can have a negative effect of filtering employees based on hiring cost. The possibility of the proliferation of this trend was noticed in the reaction to the Maternity Benefit (Amendment) Act 2017, which discentivised employers from hiring women due to increased and cumbersome compliances.

While these corrective policies are necessary in the short term, their role in the long-term empowerment of women needs to be examined critically. Providing special provisions do not engender social respect nor do they automatically lead to egalitarian gender relations. As stated by Smriti Irani, Union Cabinet Minister for Textiles and Women and Child Development, India, “Women are now looked at as vote banks, which can be a good thing; they now say ‘if your policies match my needs, you have my vote,’ which brings a measure of power in the hand of the female voter.” This power of affecting leadership needs to be combined with creating leadership organically, from homes and schooling systems, which would result in leadership positions in various domains without it being provided in the form of quotas. As elaborated by Esther Brimmer, CEO of NAFSA, Association of International Educators, “The majority of people in universities over the world are women, which means there is a pipeline of talent that is receiving the skills to be leaders.” The alpha century needs to tap into this potential early on, lest women face the regressive consequences of a shadowed empowerment.

—Aditi Ratho
NEW digital technologies can have a profound impact on the role of religion in political life. It is fairly easy for different religions to peacefully coexist—since religious tolerance forms the crux of them all.

Venerable Banagala Upatissa Thero, Chairman, Mahabodhi Society, Sri Lanka spoke about the challenges in Sri Lanka of the peaceful coexistence amongst the majority Buddhist population and the minority Christian, Hindu and Muslim communities. Sri Lanka has introduced a monthly Congress of Religions, where representatives of each faith meet, to find ways to promote religious tolerance. He also emphasised the importance of education, which was key to developing religious tolerance in society, and state-supported multi-religious schools instead of separate schools for each religious group.

On how cyberspace has penetrated and influenced culture and the state, Swapan Dasgupta, Member of Parliament, India spoke about how every generation sees its own problems as being more formidable and insurmountable than those of their forebears. In history, there have been two major technological advances that challenged or threatened existing religions—the printing press and the translation of religious texts, thus making them more accessible to the masses. He argued how the internet has erased the belief that the next stage of progress was the end of religion and its replacement with secular cosmopolitanism. On whether the Indian Constitution was threatened by religious mobilisation in the community, in his view the Constitution should be viewed as a living document that does not define the culture of a society and does not override pre-existing religious beliefs. Dasgupta argued that while it had been expected that information technology would lead to greater understanding and democratisation, the creation of alternative and often exclusive communities could create social harm. He also said that religion, with its varied senses of the ‘good life’, should play a much greater role in combatting extremist views.

Ali Rashid Al Nuaimi spoke on the interaction between religion, technology and the state. His focus was on the spread of religious extremism and the use of technology, particularly social media, to spread divisive religious ideologies. He argued that technology is simply a tool used to spread narratives to young people. It was up to religious leaders to provide a counternarrative to convince the new generation to accept coexistence amongst religious groups, and to harness social media. He gave the example of ISIS generating 90,000 tweets a day in 2015 to show how pervasively social media was used by extremist groups. Al Nuaimi observed that it was impossible to block out extremist messages on the internet. Thus, the task of religious leaders was to develop a counternarrative that emphasised our common humanity.

—Lavina Lee
FLUID FLEETS: NAVIGATING TIDES OF REVISION IN THE INDO-PACIFIC

S is the “Indo-Pacific” an organic expression of connectivity, a community of nations, or a strategic construct? The answers to these questions will help define national security postures in the region over the next decade. As things stand now, the Indo-Pacific is caught between two conflicting realities: geopolitical competition and Asia’s future development. The panel tackled some of the crucial questions about the Indo-Pacific: Who defines it? Who will bear the costs of this strategic orientation? What purpose does it serve? How will it be managed?

This panel was primarily concerned with how the challenges of great power rivalry are being played out in the Indo-Pacific region’s oceans. There was broad agreement that the Indo-Pacific concept/strategy is not aimed at one state, which became the central theme of the panel, along with the importance of upholding rules, particularly in the maritime domain.

The session began with a discussion about the military balance of power, with a focus on China’s growing might in naval capacities. Adm. Singh raised the issue of the increasing number of Chinese naval ships in the Indian Ocean, calling it a concern for India. India is watching and observing what is happening with defence exports, and Adm. Singh stated that if anything impinges on the nation’s sovereignty, it will have to act. Deviations of norms are linked to regional instability in the maritime space, and Adm. Singh noted examples of China coming into India’s exclusive economic zones (EEZs). As per the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, China’s actions are an infringement on Indian sovereignty. China, however, has not backed off. In response, India has its deployed ships in the Indian Ocean.

Vice Adm. Johnson discussed the Quad (US, Japan, Australia and India) as a counter to China, suggesting the need to reframe it as a relationship between democracies that have shared interests and is not “anti-anything.” The four countries are ‘like-minded’ and share core democratic interests. As a mechanism for cooperation, the Quad allows for broad-ranging discussions—the foreign ministers have met—with a range of themes of collective interests (of which China is one). Have the meetings translated into activities? What’s changed? Vice Adm. Johnson remarked that the high-level foreign-minister meetings are important, i.e. dialogue is important. While nations must work together in multiple ways, for example through training exercises, dialogue remains the most important aspect. The Quad is still evolving and must develop further to exploit all available opportunities. Johnson reiterated that Australia also has an important relationship with China, especially through trade. Thus, China is part of the framework, and it is important not to be exclusive and to recognise the world as it is.

Gen. Koji Yamazaki emphasised that Japan is closely monitoring the situation vis-à-vis any conflict with China. The military expansion was unprecedented, Yamazaki noted, calling the South and East China Seas “theatres of expansion.” Has Japan stepped up? The emphasis was placed on the Japan and US alliance, which exists to ensure peace and security in the Japanese view. The country is also building a self-defence force to deal with
Combating piracy off the coast of Africa requires many nations in supporting the rules-based system in the Indo-Pacific, where maritime constructs are relatively fluid. The UK is sticking to principles about rules-based order and consolidating its traditional place in the region. Defence has been prioritised despite Britain’s “budget crisis,” and the country has doubled down on defence. Brexit will allow the UK to think more broadly and ambitiously about its role in the Indo-Pacific. As a member of the UN Security Council with a large economy, Britain has shared interests with other states, e.g. Diego Garcia and the Persian Gulf. The Royal Navy is set to increased connectivity to India’s eastern coast and beyond has been a longstanding desired goal of close observers of the region. The region, which had been historically open to trade, has somewhat artificially been closed since the post-Partition era. Recently, however, a consensus has emerged in India and its neighbouring nations to the east, regarding the benefits of a more closely integrated BoB region, perhaps most importantly as a way to boost economic growth in the region. However, despite wide-scale agreement over the last several years, the region remains very poorly integrated. As incremental progress at integration will almost certainly continue, several outstanding issues and questions must be addressed before robust integration can take place.

First, stakeholder nations must recognise that sustained integration will not take place without leadership. For integration to continue and excel, India must continue to spearhead integration efforts both publicly and privately, and through a variety of bilateral and multilateral fora. Second, regional institutions must be strengthened and utilised effectively for improved communication, cooperation and the implementation of key connectivity projects in the region. The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) is the most promising regional multilateral institution and is best positioned to integrate the BoB, considering its total population of over 1.5 billion. While BIMSTEC has been utilised more effectively than its regional counterpart, SAARC, its long-term effectiveness can only be ensured through sustained Indian leadership.

Nevertheless, while there is a great deal of enthusiasm related to the use of BIMSTEC to coordinate regional integration, one must realise that regional multilateral institutions do not become strong overnight. They are most effective
Stakeholder nations must recognise that sustained integration will not take place without leadership in the region. While integration of the Bay of Bengal region has often been talked about as a laudable goal, tangible efforts have not been seen due a lack of sustained leadership. As the biggest player in the region, India is the obvious choice.

when there is sustained commitment to the institution over a number of years and decades. Policymakers leading the integration of the BoB must look to ASEAN in Southeast Asia as an example of slow but sustained growth because of continuous political leadership and buy-in from the countries involved. A lesson to be learnt from the ASEAN experience is that buy-in at the ground level will need to be sustained in all member countries for integration to succeed. Integration in the Bay of Bengal region has often been held up because of political backlash to projects aimed at increasing integration in the region, with the local population in question often worried that connectivity projects ignore sovereignty and exploit local resources. Integration eastward of India is likely to be a decades-long affair. Local and national governments’ ability to win over key constituencies early on in the process and address their concerns is essential in accelerating the pace of integration.

Third, the countries that take the lead in integrating the BoB region must assess whether they should roll out entirely new structures or complement existing projects by outside actors that are already underway. For example, China is an outside actor that has increased its development activities in the region in recent years. With resources always at a premium and certain economies in the region having slowed down, it might be more prudent to complement ongoing connectivity initiatives, instead of recreating the work that has already been done.

Fourth, in integrating the Bay of Bengal region, the stakeholder nations must reflect on the wisdom of involving only BIMSTEC countries. Non-BIMSTEC nations such as Australia and those within Southeast Asia may be looking for opportunities to increasingly get involved in South Asia. While countries beyond the BoB region are unlikely to reduce or limit ties with their other major partners, they could benefit from increased integration with India and its eastern neighbours. This will, in turn, lead to increased economic integration and trade in the region as a potential hedge against stronger powers elsewhere. Thus, India, as the leader of economic integration in the BoB, should attempt to engage non-neighbouring countries in its efforts at local integration.

Finally, as economic integration slowly increases, the concerned countries should take care to address challenges, such as including environmental degradation and trafficking, that may be exacerbated by increased connectivity in the region. The stakeholder countries should address these issues collectively.

After a long period of stagnation, a consensus is emerging on the benefits of integration in the BoB and the creation of a new eastern trade route. To this end, a new eastern trade route can be created with sustained political leadership and a willingness to address existing issues.

— Nimit Dhir
CLIMATE-induced displacement is already under way; natural disasters, the majority of which were climate-related, displaced up to 184.4 million people between 2008 and 2014, with 19.3 million displaced in 2014 alone. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) projects that by 2100, hundreds of millions of people will be displaced due to land loss in low-lying areas, and the majority of those affected will be from East, Southeast and South Asia. These IPCC predictions are based on countries considerably mitigating their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions; if they do not, climate migrants, which the IPCC predicts would rise to 150 million people between 2008 and 2014 alone. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) projects that by 2100, hundreds of millions of people will be displaced due to land loss in low-lying areas. Therefore, there needs to be a global consensus on how to respond to climate-induced displacement, which must be tied to a concerted effort towards mitigation of emissions.

As stated by Asle Toje, Member of the Norwegian Nobel Committee, "In 2010, there were 50 million climate migrants, which the IPCC predicts would rise to 150 million by 2050." The UN Refugee Agency, UNHCR, which has the mandate to legally define "refugees", acknowledges the influence of environmental and climatic factors on patterns of forced migration, but does not recognize "environmental refugees" as a legal category—and legally, rights are necessary for remedies. "We need to protect environment migrants by law" emphasized Madina Mwagale Guloba, Senior Research Fellow, Economic Policy Research Center. Unlike those fleeing traditional persecution and conflict, climatically displaced people currently have no protection in international refugee law, only general human rights protection. This is unfortunate, as in a lot of cases, "climate induced scarcity of resources may be the reason for conflict, which leads to migration," noted Ambassador Iztok Mirošič, Special Envoy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Slovenia.

Christine Cipolla, Regional Director for Asia-Pacific, International Committee of the Red Cross called for "a focus on those who have the double vulnerability of conflict and climate-related displacement, where we must prepare for the displaced person’s return to a stable country of origin." However, if the country of origin is not environmentally sound, there needs to be a mechanism where the host country is provided with the infrastructure and tools to absorb the migrants. Therefore, legal definitions are necessary to determine who will be a short-term versus long-term migrant. Even if legal refugee rights are not defined, international responsibility and assistance under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) pertain to all people suffering harm from climate change, including burden-sharing principles such as common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR). States have nearly universally agreed to the extensive principles and obligations in the UNFCCC. Other international agreements, such as the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, which gave birth to the UNFCCC, and those concluded under the UNFCCC framework, e.g., Paris Agreement, call for creating a task force on displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change.

Climate change involves transboundary harm in the form of historically accumulated GHG emissions, which makes govern ance necessary on a global scale, and international panels provide a forum for cooperation which is crucial. "There is a need for concerted global effort to address basic concerns of climate change in vulnerable, underdeveloped and developing countries, which would bring medium-term solutions and force local governments to deliver better," said Kanchan Gupta, Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation. Furthermore, the delocalised effect between emission source and victim of climate change effects creates an international chain of causality and responsibility. "In the EU, there is deep division in how to tackle the problem of burden-sharing, between countries of first line of migrants like Italy and Greece, and those of final destination, which has become a global division too. However, the EU commission has also adopted a principle to be carbon-free by 2050, which should be a global phenomenon as well," observed Mirošič.

When it comes to financing the mitigation of climate change, as well as the responses to climate-induced disasters, the UNFCCC creates a general obligation to assist developing countries. The Paris Agreement affirms this in the clause whereby states shall provide financial resources to aid developing countries. UNFCCC Article 11 entitles the UNFCCC’s Financial Mechanism to the Global Environment Facility, the Special Climate Change Fund, Least Developed Countries Fund, the Adaptation Fund and the Green Climate Fund. These international bodies’ committees must widen financing to integrate “clear relocation plans, strategic direction and guidance,” according to Guloba. Planned relocation and legal migration, as opposed to merely emergency displacement that exposes a vulnerable population to further risk, must be included in the strategy.

"UNFCCC member states have trouble doing what has to be done because we are stuck on the north-south perspective—we need an enlightened north and enlightened south to come together and political will is the key to this," said Renata Lok-Dessallien, UN Resident Coordinator in India. Defining climate refugees legally is tricky, because law relating to climate-induced migration transcends not only national boundaries, but also various disciplines of law. Such migration is capable of triggering international, environmental, human rights, criminal and refugee law—as well as tort, land and property law. Therefore, a globally governed response necessary to address this phenomenon requires development, adaptation and coordination of international law, which must then be enacted on an urgent basis.

—Aditi R atho
“The future is now.” This oft-used phrase to describe innovation perfectly encapsulates technology’s gender dilemma. Once heralded for its potential to bridge the gender divide, digital technology has instead become a tool to reinforce masculine biases and patriarchal norms. With STEM industries still dominated by men, the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) remains a man’s world. It is within this context that on the fifth edition of the Raisina Dialogue, an all-female panel convened to ask why women are still invisible in these spaces, despite accounting for half of the world’s population.

Silvana Lopez offers an anthropological reason: “Women are carrying the burden of three industrial revolutions.” Our societies have been built upon centuries of a gendered division of labour, which relegates women to private spaces, restricting them from competing in the labour force. This significantly narrows down the pool of talent from the classroom to the boardroom. The dichotomy is particularly visible within STEM fields, which face higher gender pay gaps. According to Aditi Kumar, this “gender conditioning,” has led to women undervaluing themselves and thus earning significantly less than men do. Paula Kift points out that professions associated with prestige and “big money,” such as finance and technology, value masculine traits and tend to have a “diversity and privilege problem.”

In the virtual world, the biases perpetuated in physical spaces get amplified. As Lopez highlighted, despite constituting half of humanity, women are virtually absent from datasets. This has led to systemic biases, wherein issues that affect all humans have defaulted to the male bias. For example, for vehicle safety, all testing parameters use male dummies, thereby inherently focusing on the male anatomy. Moreover, as Kumar argues, research surrounding issues where women bear the burden are less likely to receive funding and, therefore, less likely to have innovation.

Indeed, the “bias bug” is not limited to the digital but is entrenched in all forms of our interaction. Technology does not create value, but it reflects human values. Therefore, a holistic solution must tackle inequalities within our existing as well as future systems. Governments are central to this endeavour. Ana Maria Paraschiv describes the Romanian experience to highlight the importance of governments in ensuring the digital skilling of women right from early education, to create an equal labour force. Roy echoes this argument and calls for the increase of women-led platforms that will not only encourage women participation but also increase access, which is key to ensuring equal participation. Furthermore, better public–private cooperation in regulating emerging technologies and artificial intelligence systems will be critical to creating an equitable digital framework.

While the panellists agreed that the 4IR creates an exciting and unique opportunity, they concluded by calling for sustained efforts from governments, the private sector and the civil society to create just and equitable societies in the digital future.

—Aastha Kaul

Panelists:
- Silvana Lopez, CEO, The Blockchain Challenge, Colombia
- Aditi Kumar, Executive Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, US
- Anna Roy, Senior Advisor, NITI Aayog, India
- Ana Maria Paraschiv, CEO, Ubuntu World, Romania
- Paula Kift, Civil Liberties Engineer, Palantir Technologies, Germany

Panel Moderator:
- Mariam Maz Hakim, Presenter, Virgin Radio, United Arab Emirates
N 15 March 2019, a terrorist attack on the Muslim community of Christchurch became a tragic and horrific example of the challenges in countering online hate and violence. The perpetrator used Facebook Live to broadcast the attacks, which was viewed live by nearly 200 people. However, within 24 hours, more than 1.5 million versions of the gruesome content were uploaded to Facebook. This was not an isolated incident of a brutal crime being livestreamed, and the case was only a potent reminder of the exploitation of social media for radicalisation, recruitment, and the dissemination of terrorist propaganda.

With countries rushing to legislate and regulate these types of crimes, they often clash with fundamental human rights principles and their commitments to a free and open internet. At what point does countering online hate and violence become an infringement of freedom of speech? The starting point has always been this: what was illegal in the physical space was also illegal in the cyberspace. However, it is one thing to say that basic human rights laws should apply online just as they do offline, and another, much more difficult, issue to implement these principles. There is a significant grey zone, since any decision to de-platform speakers or take down content can be seen as an act of infringement on the right to free speech. The recruiters and extremists understand this challenge well and have managed to exploit it to suit their needs. Consequently, groups with an agenda often walk a fine line, ensuring that the content they put out is rousing but within the limits of the law. Countering online hate and violence requires an understanding of such tactics.

In some parts of the US, efforts to de-platform disinformation have been met by concerns that the right to speech should be protected. However, there is a difference between the right to express a view and the right to having that view amplified illegitimately, micro-targeting vulnerable people via messages for maximum effect. While concerns about limitations on speech are legitimate, amplified disinformation has a profound negative impact, as evident in the links between anti-vaccination theories trending online and the recent measles outbreaks. The goals of the illegal actors in this space must also be questioned. It is not simply to convince vulnerable people of one theory or another, but to broadly erode trust in institutions and the media. Participation is a key ingredient in a democracy, noted Mariette Schaaake from the Cyberpeace Institute. If people can be convinced to refrain from voting in the elections or to disengage from the media, this would be one version of success for those who want to erode a liberal democracy.

The panel agreed that private companies have a large role to play in combating online hate and violence. However, most of them formulated the “terms of use” in their country of origin, which do not take into account their operations across jurisdictions. Despite admitting that offline laws should apply to the online environment, most governments have not been using the existing laws and legislation to hold perpetrators or platforms accountable. Often, nations outsource this responsibility to technology companies, allowing platforms to decide what is acceptable and what is not. Rather than decisions being made by government and leading with the law, technology companies were able to make decisions without accountability or transparency. While this is a daunting challenge for some technology companies, most find it preferable to complying to new regulations.

New challenges are emerging in this space every day. However, there is still no universally accepted definition of what constitutes terrorism, noted India’s former National Cyber Security Coordinator Gulshan Rai. Moreover, there is no consensus on how to deal with content related to radicalisation. The challenge is exacerbated by the additional impact of big data and artificial intelligence. It will be more helpful to separate issues of hate speech, which are contested, from online terrorism and radicalisation, to formulate new challenges in turn.

There is significant pessimism about the successful regulation of online hate speech in the future. According to the Moby Group’s Saad Mohseni, in future, the online market is only going to become more fragmented, with user-generated content continuing to attract millions of viewers. As a result, traditional media companies will command increasingly less hold over audiences. At the same time, extreme views will become more mainstream. Right-wing parties are unlikely to regulate platforms that they have been, and continue to be, the beneficiaries of. Such parties can potentially dominate European parliaments within the next 10 years.

Despite the largely bleak outlook, there is scope for positive change. The Atlantic Council’s Emerson Brooking noted that after the Christchurch massacre, New Zealand’s period of reflection inspired the Christchurch Call, asking companies and governments to collectively tackle issues of radicalisation. It provided new communication mechanisms between the government and tech companies to be activated in the event of a terrorist attack. While such a mechanism is currently functioning without democratic accountability, it could be considered the first step in the right direction.

— Natasha Kassam
MINISTERIAL ADDRESSES

“Today, Central Asia is a commendable example of the development of positive process—of strengthening regional cooperation, political trust, and tackling problems through mutual consolidation of interests and reasonable compromise.”

H.E. ABDULAZIZ KAMILOV, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Uzbekistan

“Small states remind member states of their obligations, reaffirm normative commitments to compliance, and advocate for a recommitment to a multilateral rules-based international order. The nuclear weapon of small states is international law.”

H.E. URMAS REINSALU, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Estonia

“Sustainability is a social issue, an economic issue and a democratic issue. If we fail—protest, civil unrest and instability will be the cost. If we succeed —prosperity, social mobility and cohesion will be the reward.”

H.E. JEPPE KOFOOD, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Denmark
“The global community needs to recognise and recommit to the principles of de-escalation, peaceful resolution of conflict, neighbourliness and responsive statehood. We can grow stronger from the current disorder by adhering to these tried and true principles.”

H.E. HAMOULLAH MOHIB, National Security Adviser, Afghanistan

“We in Africa, have planned to vigorously pursue an agenda for peace on our continent, because we believe that there is a strong link between peace, development and prosperity. We can only implement our grand ambition of Agenda 2063 if we achieve the objective of silencing the guns.”

H.E. GRACE NALEDI PANDOR, Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, South Africa

“We often hear climate change defined as an environmental challenge, while others describe it as an economic challenge. Most importantly for the Maldives, climate change can be best described as a human rights challenge.”

H.E. ABDULLA SHID, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Maldives

“Europe will not run the 21st century—I hope no single country or collation of countries will. I hope the world will be firmly governed by mutually agreed rules, enshrined in international law, respected by all players in the spirit of peaceful cooperation—a part of our European DNA.”

H.E. TOMÁŠ PETRÍČEK, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Czech Republic
The challenge in fighting terrorism is not only the resilience of terrorist groups, but also the difficulty in eradicating or changing terrorist ideology. This is especially true in cases where terrorist groups have state support. For example, countries such as Afghanistan and India would likely have major powers to begin diplomatically isolating Islamabad to teach them a lesson. There are many, however, who believe that this might be a counterproductive strategy. Successive governments in the US and UK have failed to successfully pressure Pakistan, given their belief in long-term diplomacy. While certain channels must remain open to allow countries to communicate and engage, the fact that terrorism in Pakistan is an intergenerational problem, needs to be addressed in a manner that forces the terror incubator to introspect and change its course. One may question the US’ rationale in not tackling Pakistan’s terrorist problem, by asking why they can target Qasem Soleimani, the Iranian general and not a general in Rawalpindi. It is the double standard in dealing with terror incubators, that allows militant groups and terrorists to flourish in certain environments.

The spread of smartphone technology and rise in use of social media platforms has helped militant and terrorist groups spread their message to a larger number of people without requiring massive financial resources. Groups such as the Islamic State have mastered the use of social media, providing easy ‘solutions’ and tools for those wanting to commit jihadi, without them having to travel to the caliphate in West Asia. Given how different platforms serve different purposes for terrorist groups to propagate their narrative, the onus falls on technology companies to ensure that their platform is not misused by such groups. This involves continuous engagement with local governments and authentic, local voices on the ground that flag extremist content. Today, technology companies are increasing their use of artificial intelligence in detecting vulnerable and/or radicalised individuals online to defeat digital propaganda from militant groups. While progress has been made in developing counter-narratives that help reverse the process of online radicalisation and recruitment, much more work remains to be done.

— Kriti M. Shah
IN the third decade of the 21st-century, it has become clear that this is an “Asian Century.” The inexorable shift of power to the East has been accompanied by the steady decline of American hegemony. For Europe, the seminal question is where it situates itself within these geopolitical developments, characterised by new great power rivalries.

Over the years, the European Union (EU) has lost much of its power and leverage within the global commons. It now finds itself in a power struggle between the United States (US) and China. Characterising the relationship as “an uncomfortable throuple,” Theresa Fallon argued that the EU is struggling to respond to this challenge, as it is unable to move away from a purely economic bloc and focus its policy towards achieving geopolitical goals.

The situation is exacerbated by the vacuum of leadership within the Union. Marina Kaljurand argues that internal politics has led to a “breakdown of common sense and respect between the member states.” According to Hans-Thomas Paulsen, this vacuum cannot be filled by one country alone. Nations such as Germany and France—the two biggest powers following Brexit—must work together to achieve concrete goals. Currently, however, there is a divergence of approaches, with Germany attempting to ensure that all of Europe remains united and France looking inwards at “core Europe.” The two must resolve this incongruence; should the proposal to integrate the EU become too ambitious, there is a risk of losing some countries.

Despite struggling with internal divisions, the EU has attempted to adapt to the geopolitical churn that is currently underway. The panelists agreed that the US and EU are natural partners. Furthermore, the Trans-Atlantic Partnership (TPP) remains the cornerstone of European security, defence, foreign policy and trade. However, given the recent shift in narrative from across the pond, the EU has pivoted to other allies. So far, the nature of these new relationships remains elusive.

Kaljurand noted that while the EU engages in regular dialogue with Russia based on five guiding principles, the EU–Russia relationship has seen a decline in recent years. The latter’s actions in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, and its recent constitutional amendment, are worrisome. However, both EU and Russia seem inclined to mend fences.

China, on the other hand, presents a different challenge. The EU–China relationship is a dichotomous one and often contradicts itself. As H.E. Mr. Péter Szijjártó observed, the EU has been guilty of criticising China, yet openly doing business with them. Previously, EU’s relations with Beijing worked as a counterbalance to the US. However, China’s investments in the Mediterranean region, the Arctic and emerging technologies necessitate a re-examination of this relationship. As Europe transitions to a post-modern world, it must ensure that it does not create a post-values world.

Discussing the need to create an ethos, Gen. Claudio Graziano underscored the importance of incorporating strategic autonomy at the core of the EU’s response to challenges. The emergence of new threats (such as terrorism, illegal migration, failing states and organised crime) requires Europe to not only act autonomously but also speak with a single voice at the institutional level. Through crisis management, capacity-building, and economic and political support, the EU can become a global provider and partner.

The panel agreed that Europe continues to be a significant player in trade, investment and climate change. However, its ambition must be strengthened, and EU must show greater willingness to be a united and active player in the international arena, whilst simultaneously building new strategic alliances. The EU can only remain strong if its member states are equally strong.

—Aarshi Tirkey
There is a strain of current foreign policy thought in the United States that can be found on both the political right and the political left: that the core foreign policy tenet of the country should be to end seemingly endless wars.

But when Hamid Karzai, former president of Afghanistan, spoke at Raisina Dialogue 2020, it was a reminder that for the people of Afghanistan, "end endless war" is not only a foreign policy platform, or a trend, or the subject of a policy paper; it is also a reality that is lived with and over which people have died.

The sole focus in Afghanistan, Karzai stated, should be on the peace process. It is his belief that the country should have focused on this before elections were held so that there could be no claim of disenfranchisement. While this was not, in the end, what happened, Karzai’s message that peace should be Afghanistan’s focus was not limited to the electoral process. He added that the inflow of American money, the tens of billions of it, is not helping.

The reason, according to Karzai, that he famously refused America’s bilateral security amendment in 2013 was that he wanted peace first. The overwhelming majority of the Afghan people, he said, essentially feel the same way—the problem is not the United States, but the extent to which US presence and ambitions undermine the opportunity for Afghanistan’s people to live with dignity, non-interference, and sovereignty. The red line in negotiations over the future of Afghanistan, Karzai said, is that the Afghan people regain control of their own destinies. That cannot happen without peace.

Karzai is, admittedly, an imperfect messenger. His own presidency was marked by charges of electoral fraud, which the United Nations described as “widespread” in 2009. And if Karzai feels US money has been useless, he is himself partially to blame—though he has made claims since leaving office that American money has fuelled corruption, cables released via WikiLeaks have described Karzai himself as corrupt. US frustrations with Karzai, in other words, may not only have been because he did not accept US policy wholesale.

Nevertheless, Karzai was believable for his overall message—that the people of Afghanistan are tired of war, and they have been for some time. If Americans are tired of war in Afghanistan; if US politicians can campaign on the basis of ending this endless war; if think tanks can pop up around the idea that the US has been at war for too long; if anti-war hashtags can trend on Twitter in the United States; if all of this is true—then, that the people of Afghanistan are also tired of war, and they have been for some time is a wholly believable message.

— Emily Tamkin
JUNCTION INDIA: TOWARDS AN EAST INDIAN OCEAN COMMUNITY FOR GROWTH

PANELISTS
Naudjeep Suri, Director, Centre for New Economic Diplomacy, Observer Research Foundation, India
Ahmad Al Sayed, Minister of State and Chairman of Qatar Free Zone Authority, Qatar
Lt. Gen. Dominique Rakotozafy, Former Minister of Defence, Madagascar
Ebtesam Al Ketbi, President, Emirates Policy Centre, United Arab Emirates
Kwame Owino, CEO, Institute of Economic Affairs, Kenya
Dhruva Jaishankar, President, Emirates Policy Centre, United Arab Emirates

PANEL MODERATOR
Nimit Dhir, Director, UFI Initiative, Observer Research Foundation, India

T is only natural that India—through both its historical and current connections to the Indo-Pacific region—would prioritise having a policy towards the region that would make it stable, vibrant and conducive to growth. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government has, in fact, done just that over the last several years, emphasising that the Indo-Pacific should be open for all, and underpinned by international norms and values.

India, in particular, has powerful incentives to have a coordinated and well-thought-out approach to the Indo-Pacific since a great deal of its economic interests depend on the region having open lanes of navigation, but more importantly, because a significant number of its citizens live in countries that touch the Indo-Pacific, and are vital for stable management of the vast region.

Nevertheless, despite India’s recent emphasis on the Indo-Pacific, less public discussion and thought has been given to different subsets of this region; namely, how India and its partners will manage the western Indo-Pacific, which includes the Gulf. Most recently, the rise in tensions between Iran and the United States is the latest data point in a long-term trend of instability in the region. Before a fully integrated western Indo-Pacific can take root, relative calm will need to prevail and become a defining characteristic.

There’s an immediate need for stability in the region. As the panel underscored, enduring this stability has often been hard to come by in the western Indo-Pacific, which includes the Gulf. Most recently, the rise in tensions between Iran and the United States is the latest data point in a long-term trend of instability in the region. Before a fully integrated western Indo-Pacific can take root, relative calm will need to prevail and become a defining characteristic.

Second, with so many sovereign countries in the region, each with their own set of enduring national interests, one or two nations will have to emerge as a leader to help coordinate vision, strategy, and capacity. As the panel emphasised, India has already begun to assert itself further in the western Indo-Pacific and will likely continue to take the lead given its diplomatic clout, ambition and resources to coordinate such a disparate number of actors.

Given that the maritime capacity of several countries throughout the western Indo-Pacific is low, the recent trend of building capacity will have to be prioritised. For example, in recent years, India has attempted to build up local capacity across the expansive region—negotiating capacity building agreements with Seychelles and Mauritius, and providing patrol vessels to Sri Lanka and the Maldives.

In addition, given the number of countries involved and complex issues that require coordinated action, the countries of the western Indo-Pacific will need to further enhance their real-time communication. Here too, India has taken the initiative by establishing an information centre in Gurugram, Haryana, but it will need to ensure that communication is seamless with other established information centres in Singapore and Madagascar.

Third, the nations of the western Indo-Pacific will need to evaluate whether they will work within current multilateral institutions or if there is a need for a new multilateral institution devoted exclusively to the integration of the western Indo-Pacific. The Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) stands out as the organisation most suited to handle governance in the concerned region, already dealing with issues such as maritime security and governance. Leaders of the region should reflect deep on the need for a completely new architecture for discussion. New multilateral institutions can require a long runway to get to an effective point as well as a leading nation that is committed to ensuring the new organisation’s success. It is likely the case that concerned countries can work through IORA and adapt it to the western Indo-Pacific’s evolving needs, including, for example, working with other sub-regional multilateral institutions such as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC).

Finally, to create a fully vibrant and economically integrated western Indo-Pacific, India—as a leader in the region—will need to focus on areas where beneficial investment can be provided. With an increasing Chinese presence in the region unlikely to shift anytime soon—in part because of the receptivity of Western Indo-Pacific nations to Chinese investment—Indian policymakers will have to articulate what they are comfortable with in the region and ways in which India’s presence can complement ongoing economic initiatives. For example, with India’s development focus centering on building capacity and knowledge transfers to local communities, New Delhi can help nurture a more integrated region without being perceived as exploiting other nations or using a heavy hand in its leadership.

While challenges are likely to arise as a number of countries with varying interests seek to create an integrated western Indo-Pacific region, the good news is that an emerging consensus is forming about the willingness to sort through strategic and more micro issues in a constructive manner.

— Nimit Dhir
THE ART OF THE PLAN: DECRYPTING KEY TRENDS @ 20

PANELISTS

Nagma M. Mallick, Additional Secretary, Policy Planning and Research Division, Ministry of External Affairs, India

Peter Berkowitz, Director, State Department Policy Planning Staff, United States

Manuel Lafont-Rapinoe, Director, Center for Analysis, Planning and Strategy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France

Hans Christian Hagman, Chief Analyst and Senior Adviser to the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden

PANEL MODERATOR

Daniel Twining, President, International Republican Institute, United States

The decade to come will be shaped by disruption: through demography, technology, trade flows, global pandemics, and of course, climate. Many of these challenges will be shared by the international community. But while most policy planners in liberal democracies are united on this diagnosis, there is limited consensus on solutions.

Fundamentally important to any democracy’s ability to navigate a world of dynamic change and uncertainty is strength and resilience at home. Many democracies, however—from the United Kingdom to Brazil, from the United States to India—are experiencing a resurgence of nationalism. In some cases, this is a backlash to globalisation. As publics and their governments appear to rediscover sovereignty, it is unclear whether this newfound focus will continue to have a significant impact on the rest of the world.

Today, the G2—the United States and China—are shaping up to be the most important players geopolitically. The relationship between the United States and China will continue to have a significant impact on the rest of the world. According to the State Department’s Peter Berkowitz, for the United States, China’s growth is the leading international challenge. The trade war with the United States demonstrates that China’s rise will not be without contestation. US officials accept that the rules-based order can only be preserved in cooperation with friends and partners.

While Europeans appear to agree with the US’ criticism of China’s economic policies, they are not aligned on the US’ responses. Europeans are unsupportive of the bilateral approach taken between China and the US, and are concerned about the “death” of multilateralism. The identity of the European Union (EU) is founded on the idea of interdependence as a source of stability and embraces the belief that regional and global cooperation is needed to handle future challenges. The trade war between the US and China, on the other hand, appears to weaponise interdependence and market power, and focus on decoupling. For the EU, the World Trade Organization’s dispute settlement body requires reform but should not be sidelined. The issues identified in China’s economic behaviour are equally applicable to Europe, Africa and the Middle East. There is thus major debate within the EU about the extraterritorial dimensions of US sanctions on China.

While accepting that Asia would be the centre of the world in the 21st century, Europe will retain a seat at the table. Europe accepts that it cannot alone be shielded from climate change, terrorism, pandemics and other global challenges; it is best served by a functioning multilateral system. Once the United Kingdom exits the EU, Europe will be more dominated by France and Germany.

Democracies will come into sharper conflict with the rising tide of authoritarianism. The world will be mostly middle class, a shift that would not necessarily herald democratic changes. However, the growing middle class will also bring with it increased expectations and aspirations; democracies would be better placed to respond to changing public opinion.

Despite arguments, authoritarian governments have also not proven more successful at coping with climate change. Though electoral cycles make tackling such issues an onerous task, authoritarian regimes that are paranoid about legitimacy are even less likely to make such difficult decisions. Market forces are unlikely to solve the climate crisis, although the free market may see innovation that helps the world live with a reduced carbon footprint. Governments will be required to prioritise climate change and make the case to publics that the cost of mitigation today is worth the cost of adaptation in five or ten years’ time. New technology will be needed to solve the climate crisis. China’s technological prowess will play a significant role in this regard; other governments are increasingly irrelevant because of their failure to keep up with and invest in technological developments. Space and artificial intelligence will be increasingly dominated by China and the United States.

The interaction of technology and democracy is another trend to think about. Social media will continue to have an outsized effect on electoral politics, public opinion, and policy; political decision-making and public opinion will be exposed to its interference. The potential export of China’s surveillance state will be a game-changer—and the decisions that countries make about using Chinese technology in their 5G networks is the beginning of this contest.

History has been characterised by disruptive revolutions. This, however, is the first time in history that humans have had the capacity to end it all with nuclear and biological weapons or send society back to the 18th century through cyber attacks. As we look ahead, the experience of being human itself could be shifted through artificial intelligence.
DIGITAL BINARIES:
5G AND THE NEW TECH WARS

PANELISTS

Shiv Sahai, Additional Secretary, National Security Council Secretariat, India

Elina Noor, Associate Professor, Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Malaysia

Lesley Margaret Seebeck, CEO, Cyber Institute, Australian National University, Australia

Chris Painter, President, GFCE Foundation Board, United States

Gilles Babinet, Vice President, CNNum and Digital Adviser for France, France

François Godement, Senior Adviser for Asia, Institut Montaigne, France

PANEL MODERATOR

Akhil Deo

The roll-out of 5G communications infrastructure has animated several new questions about the risks of economic interdependence, the trade-offs between economic growth and security, and the nature of great-power politics in the world order. It comes amidst a rising wave of techno-nationalism around the world—a political posture that sees the development of emerging technologies as a zero-sum game. It is unsurprising that 5G would have fallen victim to this trend early on, observed Gilles Babinet, Vice President of CNNum notes. 5G technologies, he pointed out, will not only exponentially increase the technical capabilities of existing communications infrastructure but also underpin several new industrial processes in the years ahead.

It is for this reason that intelligence communities around the world are concerned by China’s dominance in this market. Some nations have made early decisions to prevent the entry of Chinese actors into their markets—especially the US and some of its partners in East Asia. Lesley Seebeck, CEO of the Cyber Institute at the Australian National University, defended such policy choices by arguing that all technologies are inherently political. The vulnerabilities stem less from the infrastructure alone, and more from the domestic institutions and political norms that inform its design and operations. China’s vague data protection and national security laws make it nearly impossible to accurately assess the risks of its 5G infrastructure propositions.

Not everyone is convinced, however. Both Shiv Sahai, of the Indian National Cyber Security Secretariat and Elina Noor, Professor at the Daniel Inouye Asia Pacific Centre for Security Studies cautioned against compelling emerging economies to “make choices.” Indeed, they give voice to a rising chorus of actors who are hesitant to make binary choices in a complex, interconnected world. Many point out that technological “de-coupling” is not a practical policy proposition. The European continent—perhaps the most important fence-sitter in this debate—is not convinced either. Many states, including the UK, will likely allow Chinese 5G companies to operate in the market. The larger question, of course, is what will choices around 5G today mean for the future of globalisation and the free flow of ideas and technology. This will depend on a range of factors. To begin with, are governments, especially emerging economies, well-positioned to make long-term decisions around economic and security trade-offs? In the absence of alternative and inexpensive technological alternatives, cost and efficiency are likely to define policy choices in much of the emerging world.

A second, related question is how China and the US approach nations that have chosen to ignore their diplomatic positions. The US has already cautioned allies that deploying Huawei 5G might implicate intelligence-sharing efforts in the future. China, on the other hand, has often hinted to those that will listen that a decision on Huawei could be tied to other forms of economic support. For now, it remains clear that neither actor is willing to disengage from what is obviously a downward spiral in the management of technology flows.

This leads to the final question of how questions around 5G will spill over into other emerging technologies—including IoT and AI. If they follow a similar trajectory, is it inevitable that the global technology system will split into competing spheres of influence? Will digital sovereignty—an increasingly catch-all phrase—effectively undo the gains of the past five decades of global integration? The prevailing view amongst the panelists was that until these questions are resolved, a period of “strained interdependence” is inevitable—with states competing over the security of supply chains and products even as they attempt to operate in global markets. For the foreseeable future, some digital binaries are certainly here to stay.

—Akhil Deo
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AS the era of globalisation come to an end? Amy Searight, senior adviser and director, Southeast Asia Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, United States, drew attention to the decline in the percentage of world GDP represented by trade since 2009, US tariffs and counter-tariffs under the Trump administration, and creeping protectionism around the world. What was the role of the US as defender of free trade internationally? Domestically, free trade had become associated with the decline in US manufacturing jobs, and there was growing bipartisan consensus that other states were not playing by the same trade rules. The Trump administration had been unfairly targeted for criticism even as it was simply highlighting existing tensions and unwelcome developments within the free trade system. This included increasing barriers to trade and unfair trade amongst many countries around the world. He argued that in the long run, addressing concerns about large trade deficits, reciprocal and fair market access would make the system of free trade fairer. India itself had faced discrimination and unfair trade practices from its trade partners. India’s industry for India to join RCEP.

On India’s RCEP decision, Goyal explained that the agreement was not amongst equals in terms of economy size, population size, political systems of participants, and level of prosperity. A key impediment to India’s participation in the RCEP were Chinese trade practices, wherein the Chinese ‘ecosystem’ locked out fair trade with other countries. India also had a large trade deficit with RCEP countries, with that deficit growing 10 times in the period between 2003-04 and 2013-14. This was due to a lack of fair market access for Indian producers and services providers and the circumvention of product-of-origin rules. Until these issues were resolved, the Minister stated that it would be detrimental to the country’s industry for India to join RCEP.

Jeffrey Philip Bialos, partner, Eversheds Sutherland LLP, USA, addressed the decoupling of the US-Chinese economies in critical infrastructure and strategic technology sectors, and particularly how far this could go in terms of blocking Chinese access to US technology and critical infrastructure. He noted that China had conducted an extended campaign to absorb US technology, by both legal and illegal means, from classified US companies, and acquisitions of new technology companies before their technology could become classified. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) had recently put in place strict rules on foreign acquisitions to block Chinese investment in a range of emerging dual-use technologies. Companion export control laws have also been created to add dual-use technologies to export control lists to ensure that the US can maintain its military edge over China. Going forward, the US government is focusing on developing supply chain resilience in the defence and aerospace sectors. Bialos was of the view that it was difficult to envision that the rest of the world will follow the US on these issues, given the lack of support for banning Huawei from 5G participation. He argued that such controls would need to focus on high-end technologies, given how many technologies had become underdeveloped. Jeffrey Philip Bialos was of the view that it was difficult to envision that the rest of the world will follow the US on these issues, given the lack of support for banning Huawei from 5G participation. He argued that such controls would need to focus on high-end technologies, given how many technologies had become underdeveloped.

Three lines of action—the UK support an independent and binding dispute settlement mechanism and collective action to defend agreed trade rules; the focus should be on liberalisation in services that had become the real driver of trade growth through data and related digital services; and the nexus between sustainable growth and climate change was underexplored. Trade agreements need to address sustainability and climate change. Alexander Kulitz, Member of Parliament, Germany, spoke about the EU’s problems in reaching a trade agreement with the Mercosur countries over a 20-year period because of disagreements on these issues. He argued for reform of the current trade system, particularly the development of new rules for the digital age, instead of the ‘maximum pressure’ approach of the US government. Veda Poon, director, International Finance, HM Treasury, United Kingdom, advocated for the setting of a more inclusive trade system providing for the development of new rules for the digital age, instead of the ‘maximum pressure’ approach of the US government.
DIGITAL CROSSROADS: NEW NORMS FOR A NEW SOCIETY

PANELISTS

Sandeep Malhotra, Executive Vice-President (Products and Innovation), MasterCard, Singapore
Marina Kaljurand, Member of European Parliament, Estonia
Carl Bildt, Former Prime Minister, Sweden; Co-Chair, European Council on Foreign Relations
Chris Painter, President, GCFE Foundation Board, United States
Henri Verdier, Ambassador for Digital Affairs, France

Latha Reddy, Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation; Co-Chair, Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace, India

DIGITAL technology is advancing at an unprecedented speed. The imminent development of 5G networks—regardless of the provider—will only accelerate this pace. With its lack of respect for borders or nationality, digital technology brings a new set of challenges to global governance. Policymakers, in turn, are struggling to create rules, resolve conflicts, and preserve the open, innovative, and secure nature of cyberspace.

The backlash against globalisation, where many publics have become polarised, has been heightened by social media. In some countries, public trust in institutions has been undermined, and the social contract between users, manufacturers, and policymakers has become polarised, heightened by so-called “naming and shaming.”

As well as improving accountability, other efforts are needed in developing norms for cyberspace. Little work has been done on defining what damage is caused by a cyberattack. More inclusivity is needed in the conversation, with representation from more countries, including ASEAN and Africa, as well as stakeholders from the private sector and civil society. Coordinated capacity-building in developing countries is another important step; the private sector needs to have avenues to understand consumer privacy and data regulation worldwide: fraud prevention, for example, doesn’t have borders.

Officials and researchers in this space need to think ahead—each day will bring a new challenge. States assume that central banks will retain control of currency: will this still be the case in five years or will payment systems become interconnected. As a result, there will be a cyber-based dimension to every geopolitical or geo-economic issue in the future.

The new economy will be defined by digitisation. As businesses, consumers, and governments change the way they interact, the world is becoming even more interconnected. As a result, there will be a cyber-based dimension to every geopolitical or geo-economic issue in the future.

Digital technology will transform the lives of almost every citizen. The negotiation and acceptance of norms will need to catch up with this reality sooner rather than later.

—Natasha Kassam

Digital technology allows for unacceptable levels of hate speech and disinformation. At the same time, the free and open internet is an unrestricted internet is a security risk, an avenue for cyberattacks. The idea of an open and free internet is seen as an opportunity to foster innovation and to provide a release valve for discontent, or even as a policy tool to respond to public opinion and concern.

This difference in perspective is not only true for the internet but for many of the concepts within cyberspace governance. Encryption is a key example of an issue that is complicated, controversial, and critical to the security and privacy of states and individuals; privacy is considered differently by governments from China to the European Union, from the United States to Russia. The necessity and legality of state surveillance is another point of contention. The security of infrastructure for cyberspace has also prompted a vigorous debate about 5G; states cannot agree on which providers should be allowed to build 5G infrastructure in particular countries, let alone on how to set 5G standards so that systems can communicate.

The question remains whether existing norms and regulations can be applied to the internet. Many countries agree that the digital and physical space should be governed by the same sets of laws and norms—human rights, for example, apply equally in both arenas. It could be dangerous to have different sets of norms for online and offline environments.

There is some division about the ability of existing norms and laws to apply to the internet. Carl Bildt from the European Council on Foreign Relations noted that governing cyberspace will see issues emerge that are not adequately covered by existing regulation. However, Marina Kaljurand, Member for European Parliament, explained that in Estonia, existing laws have been amended to reflect such scenarios rather than introducing new legislation altogether. She noted that ideological division between countries means that the United Nations will never be able to negotiate a treaty on governing cyberspace, while the UN could provide a useful forum for education and awareness-raising, it will be fundamentally unable to reach consensus on new norms for cyberspace.

Some norms have been agreed on for the ways in which countries deal with each other in cyberspace: for example, the norm of restraint, where countries agree not to attack each other’s critical infrastructure; and the norm of cooperation. Yet there has not been enough attention paid to the way in which international law applies to cyberspace. The resulting ambiguity and grey areas can be taken advantage of by rogue actors, as seen in Ukraine.

Even if existing regulations were sufficient, implementation is another issue. Breaking agreed-upon norms in cyberspace is met with limited or no consequences as accountability is lacking. More focus is needed on appliability, attribution, responsibility, and state practice. The European Union’s cybersecurity toolbox, an instrument of attribution, is an important contribution to this space. It takes significant courage or political will to attribute, but this is a more compelling proposition as a collective response. The time has come to insist on identifying which actors are violating international norms for cyberspace. At the same time, even in the few cases where states choose to attribute, further action is needed, such as sanctions; some actors, such as Russia and North Korea, are not concerned about so-called “naming and shaming.”

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Officials and researchers in this space need to think ahead—each day will bring a new challenge. States assume that central banks will retain control of currency: will this still be the case in five years or will payment systems become interconnected. As a result, there will be a cyber-based dimension to every geopolitical or geo-economic issue in the future.

The new economy will be defined by digitisation. As businesses, consumers, and governments change the way they interact, the world is becoming even more interconnected. As a result, there will be a cyber-based dimension to every geopolitical or geo-economic issue in the future.

Digital technology will transform the lives of almost every citizen. The negotiation and acceptance of norms will need to catch up with this reality sooner rather than later.

—Natasha Kassam
PLURAL WATERS: STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC

FREEDOM House’s latest report on the global state of democracy recorded 2018 as the 13th consecutive year of decline in global freedom, leading to the conclusion that democracy is in retreat. It is not just the strengthening of authoritarian regimes in China and Russia that has political observers concerned, but regression found in newer and long-standing democracies in the Indo-Pacific. Periodically, there are media reports about an illiberal turn in countries like Indonesia, India and the Philippines regarding restrictions on religious pluralism or increasing authoritarian measures to deal with social issues. Against a global backdrop of decline, what are the future prospects for democracy in the Indo-Pacific? What can regional states do to strengthen democracies?

For all its ills, democracy remains the best available form of accountable government in the Indo-Pacific, yet can vary in practice in terms of its level of representation or liberal nature. In several newer democracies in this region, one challenge has been to provide representation for the disenfranchised and marginalised. For instance, women’s participation in political processes has been known to raise disenfranchised and marginalised. For instance, women’s one challenge has been to provide representation for the shared democracy systems serve them best and who feel nostalgia for a time when things seemed to be used to strengthen democratic systems. There is scope for the political class to use nationalism to remind citizens of a shared destiny as well as common values, traditions and habits, rather than foster divisiveness and hatred. This must be buttressed by faith in the belief of the protection of dignity for all, not just some citizens.

That said, the health of a democracy depends on more than just its political classes. Ethical leadership is buttressed by a strong education system and freedom of information. Democracy can appear messy, particularly to citizens who have been used to an authoritarian system and who feel nostalgia for a time when things seemed to get done. National education systems can untangle the complexities of democracies for children so they understand how and why democratic systems serve best by the time they are eligible to vote.

Similarly, the media must continue to provide independent reporting and analysis of policy decisions to help nurture a culture of accountability between leaders and citizens. One instance is countering misinformation campaigns. Media literacy helps citizens differentiate between what is real and not real, giving them the right questions to ask about bias and authenticity, particularly on social media. This remains challenging as trust in the media is low. According to a 2019 Gallup poll, only 41 percent of Americans trust mass media to report the news “fully, accurately and fairly.” Elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific, journalists can be dissuaded from criticizing political leaders and holding them accountable when they are threatened with arrest or legal action. Last September, protests held in several major Indonesian cities opposed numerous law revisions including a proposal to criminalise criticism of the president. Human rights groups decried the move as an erosion of freedom of speech and a step backwards for Indonesia’s democracy.

Think tanks also play an important role by providing new ideas to governments, sharing information with citizens and shaping public discourse. Think tanks can work on the issue of decreasing the inflow of foreign money while informing public discussion about the nature and extent of Chinese government-linked interference in domestic political processes.

Despite the gloomy forecast for the future of democracy in the Indo-Pacific, there is a glimmer of hope. During 2019, two of the region’s largest democracies, India and Indonesia, held successful federal elections, with several others due to follow suit. Protesters in Hong Kong have fought for over six months against the introduction of mainland measures seen to erode civil liberties. The year 2018 was also a victory for democracy in the Maldives and Malaysia where voters registered their gross dissatisfaction with corrupt leaders by voting them out. That said, the tide can turn against democracy in the region not just through the efforts of some, but by the complacency of others.

— Nathalie Sambhi
THe Indo-Pacific faces the challenge of forming co-alitions and finding consensus on shared interests and common values. While realpolitik continues to drive cooperation based on material interests, it is often the case that shared values create a sense of collective identity and affinity. Governments are not the sole actors in international affairs. It is important to have greater points of contact and cooperation across communities and civil societies to better solve vexatious issues. How do Indo-Pacific states work best multilaterally? How do they do so with nascent “rules of the road”? How do the concerned states react to common challenges posed by rapid technological change?

This question might be easier to answer for democratic states. While there are myriad forms of democracy, there is a shared sense of adherence to laws and respect for norms and institutions. As such, democracies like Australia have democratic values built into their foreign policy. Amongst its policies, Australia is committed to upholding an Indo-Pacific system that protects human rights and encourages open and strong markets. The United States’ Deputy National Security Adviser Matt Pottinger espoused a similar view. Defining the Indo-Pacific “from California to Kilimanjaro,” he said the American vision for the region emphasised respect for the rule of law, freedom of navigation, the promotion of open commerce, the defence of each sanctity of sovereignty and support for citizen-centric (not regime-centric) governments. In the spirit of such cooperation, Australia, New Zealand, the United States and Japan will work together with PNG to increase electrification in the country from 13 percent to 70 percent coverage. Similarly, the Blue Dot Network is a cooperative arrangement between Japan, Australia and the US, which promotes private sector-led infrastructure investment, evaluates and certifies projects that meet basic standards and are transparent, sustainable and environmentally sound.

Another important theme in the Indo-Pacific is a sense of ownership and belonging. Vijay Gokhale, India’s Foreign Secretary noted that the Indo-Pacific concept comes from the region and is thus relevant to the region in economic and security terms. In contrast, the term “Asia-Pacific” is a colonial concept and vestige of a bygone era. As subtle a shift as it may seem, states’ adoption of the Indo-Pacific label also marks a sense of ownership by the region over its identity, rather than one imposed on it.

To foster a sense of inclusiveness and belonging, states must act responsibly—not as disruptors but as stabilisers. This nascent normative culture might appear idealistic, but in the absence of Indo-Pacific architecture or mechanisms to restrain states, it is a necessary starting point.

The complexity of building trust and cooperation within the Indo-Pacific is exemplified by the challenges posed by fifth-generation (5G) technology. The more complex such technological systems become, the more reliant states are on them, the more they worry about potential vulnerabilities to information and sovereignty. States should start to see 5G as critical national infrastructure. In the past, the EU has played a significant role in building norms around cyber and information security issues. However, as Jukka Juusti, Finland’s Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence observed, Europe has been busy trying to solve its own issues, including Brexit, so the EU has not been thinking as much about international norms. Norms around technology concerning the Indo-Pacific will have to be driven from within. While states will endeavour to minimise risks, they have to act based on trust between governments and citizens, and between governments. Gokhale warned against going with the lowest bid. The spread of fake news can be met with a combination of education and legislation. Behavioral sciences have played a significant role in building norms around cyber and information security. States should start to take technological systems seriously, as they become more complex and states are more reliant on them.

The Indo-Pacific is exemplified by the challenges posed by 5G technology. While states will endeavor to minimize risks, they have to act based on trust between governments and citizens, and between governments. Gokhale warned against going with the cheapest option of data protection, since data can be collected for economic or national security. 5G technology demonstrates the interconnectedness of Indo-Pacific players, even as competitors. Western countries no longer dominate technology. As China becomes a strong competitor, the dynamics between the party and state-owned enterprises adds another layer of complexity to the technological field. As Pottinger noted, Chinese-owned Huawei has had state subsidies allowing them to undercut the market, driving competitors out of business. In his view, Huawei’s behaviour in the Indo-Pacific must foster trust and foster citizen-centric regimes which obey the rule of law.

Martse Payne, Australia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs noted that while social media allows for direct communication with people, polarisation can be harmful to democracy and the option of anonymity can lead to vile behaviour, harassing and trolling. The spread of fake news can be met with a certain degree of media literacy, but governments can be restricted in terms of resources. On the other hand, the fast spread of news can mean it is difficult to prepare, according to Juusti.

“Matthew Pottinger on the Tech Wars and Huawei: Can you imagine Reagan and Thatcher having a conversation in the 1980’s saying ‘I think we should have the KGB build all of our telecommunications and computer network systems, because they’re offering a great discount?’ That’s really the proposition before us.”

— Nathalie Sambhi
Rapid increases in computing power and the rise of “smart” weapons systems have long posed ethical and legal dilemmas for militaries and states. Despite conflict and war in the fourth industrial revolution likely being defined by autonomous weapons systems, the international community has struggled to arrive at a consensus on how these technologies will be developed and deployed. The failure of successive UN processes, alongside massive increases in spending and testing of such technologies, have led many to believe that “coded conflict” is a near inevitability. As Lindsey Shepherd of Chatham House observed, lawmakers and diplomats often use terms like ‘artificial intelligence’, ‘autonomy’ and ‘machine learning’, interchangeably—even though the implications of these terms vary significantly. It is for these reasons, said Arvind Gupta, CEO of MyGov.in that the norms of ethics and governance must develop before such systems are deployed. But the large challenge almost certainly pertains to how they will inevitably be used in the battlefield well before the international community may arrive at a consensus. This is exacerbated by the fact that great-power competition is increasingly defining the state of the world today, creating perverse incentives to investing in intelligence machines and learning how to vest decision-making authority in them. It is not impossible to imagine that such weapons will be fielded in war before their abilities and limitations have become apparent—adding uncertainty into escalation dynamics and liability and accountability for unintended fatalities. Today, very few fully autonomous weapons systems are in active combat—but the pace of development is growing exponentially. So too is the pressure on military strategists and lawmakers to accelerate such efforts to outpace would-be competitors. It is not clear yet if diplomatic officials will be able to put in place international norms or conventions that will govern their use. It is more likely that the international community will have to learn from experience—or from a wartime tragedy that will compel political action.

—Akhil Deo
IKE most developing countries in the world, India is going through a phase of rapid urbanisation. This has led to higher mobility in the urban areas, thereby increasing the demand for transport services. As public transport remains largely inefficient, however, there has been a surge in the number of private vehicles on Indian roads. Not only has this resulted in an increase in air and noise pollution, but has also made these roads less secure. The increasing motorisation has further depleted energy resources running on fossil fuels, underwriting high greenhouse gas emissions.

In 2017, the Global Burden of Disease study predicted that more than 1.2 million people in India die prematurely per year due to illnesses related to air pollution. Indeed, air pollution has become the fifth leading cause of deaths in the country, contributing to 12.5 percent of all deaths in 2017. At present, vehicles account for nearly one-third of the particulate matter pollution in India, in addition to being a high contributor of nitrogen oxide; both compounds are extremely harmful to human health. Moreover, the vehicle fleet in India is projected to reach 200 million by 2030, owing to the rapidly growing economy and population.

One way of mitigating pollution from vehicles in India is the electrification of transportation in the country. With the current expansion of the transport sector, vehicles with internal combustion will have a negative impact on both the people's health and the economy. The volatile crude oil prices only add to this by multiplying the import bill and requiring heavy investments. E-mobility for India, therefore, represents an opportunity for enhancing air quality, while gaining economically as well.

According to the government think tank, NITI Aayog, an electric fleet has the potential to cumulatively save 5.4 Mtoe of oil demand over its lifetime. This will lead to a reduction in energy consumption and, in turn, the emissions of carbon dioxide. Moreover, although most Indian cities have implemented highly functioning public transport systems, there are smaller areas that remain dependent on autos and rickshaws. The transformation to electric transportation provides an opportunity for the early conversion of the last-mile connectivity in rural areas to electric vehicles.

India was one of the first countries to pledge phasing out non-electric vehicles and become a 100-percent electric vehicle nation by 2030. Research suggests that up to 90 percent of car owners in India would choose an electric vehicle, if the optimum infrastructure and support system is provided to the users. However, the country has only achieved a penetration of 0.28 million vehicles as of May 2019. The achievement of electrification of vehicles in India depends on the development of an innovative ecosystem, which is hinged in turn on three key factors: policy and regulation; infrastructure; and performance and innovation.

Studies advocate that policy measures have a positive influence on the percentage of EVs. In order to adopt a new technology, government regulations must push for the same. In 2019, the Government of India launched the second phase of the Faster Adoption and Manufacturing of Electric Vehicles (FAME) scheme to promote a more affordable and environment-friendly public transport system. While the scheme is expected to augment the demand for electric vehicles, there is a requirement of regulation of foreign manufacturers and incentivisation for private electric vehicle buyers, to reach the designated targets. There is an underlying need for an in-depth strategy to penetrate the market. Additionally, such an ambitious goal requires a proper monitoring and evaluation mechanism to function at an optimum level.

The second factor influencing the shift to electric vehicles is the required charging infrastructure. Since electric vehicles have limited range, it is necessary to build charging stations within the cities and throughout the country to support their long-term use. There is also the issue of higher costs associated with electric vehicles. The high cost, in addition to the low trav-
el range and performance of these vehicles, compared to conventional ones, serve as barriers to adoption. Since most EVs are imported, higher costs and taxes levied are unavoidable. However, local manufacturing provides a desirable solution by lowering costs and promoting acceptance through economies of scale.

A transition to a green transportation system represents an enormous opportunity for technological innovation and investment, through adaption, research and development. Electric vehicles (EV) require a range of appropriate systems—from electric car manufacturing to the creation of support infrastructure. Such systems are certain to have a positive impact on employment. Innovative solutions through emerging technology can help in lowering costs, promoting local manufacturing, and enhancing current infrastructure to meet future needs.

—Kriti Kapur

In recent years, countries in Asia and beyond have begun to prioritise the Indo-Pacific. While motivations may vary—from the rise of China to wanting a more open and rules-based order to seeking greater economic growth to combating transnational threats—the growing importance of the region is evident. However, before countries can begin to accomplish these goals, Indo-Pacific infrastructure will need to be upgraded and/or built, given how general connectivity in the region is particularly poor. The Asian Development Bank has estimated that these needs could exceed well beyond US$1.5 trillion. While financing this will be an issue, numerous questions will have to be answered while building sustainable infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific.

As the panel discussion highlighted, there is a great deal of discussion and preoccupation with China’s investment in the region, namely through its now widely known Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). As the discussion and Q&A highlighted, there are a lot of questions and concerns about the BRI and an almost singular focus on it. While the Indo-Pacific is understandably concerned about a wide-ranging and enormous development programme led by a country that is often opaque in its methods, the singular focus on the BRI can become counterproductive. Countries of the Indo-Pacific—led by India, one of the few countries active in the Indo-Pacific that can rival China’s size and influence—would be wise to develop their own long-term, wide-ranging development program as another option.

As the Indo-Pacific proceeds with its own development programmes, it should keep in mind certain aspects of the BRI highlighted by the panellists. First, the BRI is of unprecedented scope and scale, making other development initiatives of the past look small in comparison. Given the wide-ranging nature of the initiative, no singular country is likely to be able to counter the BRI on its own. At a time when certain countries are struggling with their economic growth—most prominently India—it will likely take a group of countries across a variety of development initiatives to

I recently took my first flight using an electric vehicle (EV). Though the performance on paper was impressive, I was surprised by the steep learning curve. The picking up of a suitcase is much easier with EVs, and the range and performance of these vehicles, compared to conventional ones, serve as barriers to adoption. Since most EVs are imported, higher costs and taxes levied are unavoidable. However, local manufacturing provides a desirable solution by lowering costs and promoting acceptance through economies of scale.

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—Kriti Kapur
provide an alternative to the BRI.

Second, as the panellists argued, there seems to be a great deal of misunderstanding about the “debt traps” of the BRI. According to the panellists, even while the financing of specific projects may carry too much debt, overall, few countries face onerous overall financial circumstances. Therefore, if leading countries of the Indo-Pacific are placing bets on the idea that countries will look elsewhere for development assistance as their financial situations deteriorate, this is not likely to happen with China playing the long-game. Countries will have to come up with a compelling alternative to the BRI instead of waiting for it to self-destruct.

Third, and closely related, China is using the BRI to build influence. However, as the panellists noted, all countries use development initiatives as a matter of foreign policy to build influence. Instead of bemoaning China’s influence, countries of the Indo-Pacific should develop not only their own development initiatives, but also a possibility that builds upon their particular strengths. For instance, only their own development initiatives, but also a possibility that countries of the Indo-Pacific should develop not necessarily mean matching the BRI project for project. This is unlikely to make much economic sense, and more importantly, may not make much progress on the ultimate goal of developing sustainable infrastructure in the region.

Leaders and practitioners should understand the intricacies of development initiatives in the Indo-Pacific as they currently stand. By taking on board relevant expertise, it is clear that current development programmes—most prominently the BRI—are unlikely to fade from the scene in the near term because the focus is both on sustainability and local partners’ desire for funding. As the panel made clear, countries throughout the Indo-Pacific are looking to diversify their development partners. By understanding the reality of current development initiatives, leading countries of the Indo-Pacific can only provide another path to development, but also provide an equally impactful, complementary resource that will lead to sustainable infrastructure in the region.

Fourth, despite misgivings that countries may have in the Indo-Pacific’s participation in the BRI, they will continue to do so because they both desperately need the funding. If leading countries of the Indo-Pacific do not show up to provide development assistance, they cannot fault those taking development assistance where they may receive it. Nevertheless, showing up as a development partner does not necessarily mean matching the BRI project for project. This is unlikely to make much economic sense, and more importantly, may not make much progress on the ultimate goal of developing sustainable infrastructure in the region.

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. It is a pleasure for me to be back to Raisina Dialogue. In Europe, everybody rushes to Davos, but for me, being here, you I think is much more important. Last year I came as the Spanish Foreign Minister, and this year, I have the pleasure to participate in my new capacity of Head Representative for the European Union for Foreign and Security Policy. That is precisely what I would like to talk about today, the common Foreign Policy and Defence and Security Policy that 28 (well, now 27) European Union Member States have decided to build. Common doesn’t mean unique. A common policy means that each one can have its own policy and share a common understanding. But a common understanding of a foreign policy is difficult to build because a country’s foreign policy is a way to project its own identity to the outside world. This difficulty for the Europeans puts us in a difficult situation because we are still a player in search of identity. We still don’t know exactly what kind of role we want to play. Let me elaborate a little bit more about that.

We Europeans should be proud of what we have achieved. From the ashes of the World War II, we built a system that combines political freedom, economic prosperity and social cohesion—one of the best in the world. We suppressed borders among us, borders that wear the scars that history had left in the skin of our continent. We are together in a union because we agree that what unites us is much more important than what divides us. But, however, I also have to recognise that today we are facing a nationalist and populist comeback that can put into question these achievements.

Ladies and gentlemen, after three wars between Germany and France in the short period of 70 years, the same number of years that India became independent, the European Union was created to prevent us from using the power, the idea of power, against each other. The European Union was built on the basis that not to use power. But today, this logic is no longer valid and instead of curtailed our power we should use our Union to enhance it. A historical project does not, as it often is being believed or presented, aim at abolishing the sovereignty of European States in favour of a kind and sober European State. It has an objective, very precise, to enable European States to participate in my new capacity of Head Representative for the European Union for Foreign and Security Policy.
Europe is all about. Doing together what we can no longer do each one of us in our parts. It means to share sovereignty. But sometimes, to have less formal sovereignty brings you the capacity for being more autonomous or have more real sovereignty in order to be able to take your own decisions. Let me put an example. In 2004, Spain sent troops to Iraq. But after the elections and the change of a government, the new Prime Minister decided to withdraw the Spanish troops. We did it, and nothing happened. Nothing happened because we had the Euro as a currency. If we had had our all currency, the Peseta, this Peseta would have suffered devaluations after devaluations suffering speculative attacks in the financial markets, and we should have forgotten about the idea of withdrawing our troops. So having less formal sovereignty at the end it brings you more real sovereignty. This teaches us that pooling our monetary policies gives us more capacity to have more power, more autonomy in the world.

Trade is one of the best examples of how sharing a common European policy where the Commission negotiates on behalf of all member states gives us much more power in the world stage. Individually, most European states have relatively little ways in the world stage but collectively we are one of the world’s largest trading blocs together with the United States and China. I repeat, that is what Europe is all about, pooling sovereignties to regain influence in the world stage. Our unity is our strength.

But today we have to do it because we are living in a new bipolar system, and if we don’t do anything we will repeat the same way where we were living after the World War, in a kind of bipolarity of two big powers confronting each other. Today, power politics means that international law is under-mined, that there are fewer agreements and more vetoes, that the territorial integrity of a sovereign state is being violated, the non-proliferation and disarmament systems are threatened. How can we prevent power politics from becoming the organising principle of international relations? The answer is clear: through multilateral rules. The multilateral rules that have been built with difficulty should not only be protected but multiplied in order to guarantee the security of the international orders. In the current world, if we want to be able to take our destiny in our hands, Europeans are beginning to realise that we have to learn to talk the language of power because being a soft power is not enough. Our values and our interests reflect what we are, our history, our preferences, our strategic, political and economic choices. Europe needs to be more assertive to defend all of them. Otherwise, the law of the jungle will prevail, and we do not want that ‘might’ replaces ‘right’.

Multilateralism is on the siege; all of us know it. But we must hold tight and actively promote it. Let us defend international law. Be it in United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, Humanitarian International Law or the Non-Proliferations. Europeans want to prevent a race towards nuclear proliferation in the MENA region, thanks to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Everybody is talking about it these days. Thanks to this agreement today, Iran is not a nuclear power. Just imagine the situation if Iran would be today a nuclear power. Those who want to kill this agreement claiming that they can negotiate a better one (better for whom?) should bear in mind that it took 12 years to negotiate it, and that this nuclear deal succeeded in making the world a safer place. In this context, I have to regret once again the US decision to withdraw unilaterally from the nuclear deal with Iran. This Thursday, three European Member States participated in JCPOA France, Germany and United Kingdom have invoked a few days ago the dispute resolution mechanism concerning implementation of Iran’s commitment under this deal. However, let me underline (that) as recently as at our meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers last week the Europeans (all of us) reaffirmed the need to maintain alive this deal knowing very well how difficult it would be to build another one.

Today, the world’s great powers tend more and more to use the tools of the everyday life, trade for example. In order to convert in a weapon, everything is being converted in a weapon—trade agreements, technology, currency devaluations—all of them at the service of the quest for power. They become political tools. They have always been political tools, but today they are becoming more and more weapons on the soft meaning of the word but really something that you use in order to enhance your power.

Technology is the big word that is going to be decisive on shaping the new global order. It has always been like this. Technology ruled the world. As the Watt steam engine resulted in Europeans leading the first Industrial Revolution in the 19th century, the country today that controls 5G and artificial intelligence or the Internet of the Things and sets the world digital standards will lead the world. Some big powers like China and the US have clearly understood that. This is the reason they are in a race to be the masters of the new wave of technologies. We Europeans cannot accept the idea that the world should organise around a new Chino-American bipolarity, which would come to replace after 30 years of transition period the Soviet-American bipolarity that literally divided Europe. On this point, I believe that there is a real political conversion between Europe and many countries of this region. Call it In-
do Pacific or Asia Pacific—doesn’t matter everybody knows what I am referring to—many of the countries of this region including for sure India but Japan, Australia, Vietnam among others share this feeling. That is one of the reasons why it is so important that I am here today to talk about how can we work together, how can Europe and India work together for multilateralism. Once again, let me give you some examples.

Both Europe and India have a major interest in guaranteeing the survival of the World Trade Organization, which is strongly being jeopardized today. The blockage of the settlement dispute mechanism is extremely worrisome for us, for India, for many of the countries in the Southeast Asia and for Europe. We have made proposals to break this deadlock, and knowing India’s strong attachment to the WTO, I know that we can work together on this issue in practical and effective ways. A second area in which we could strengthen our cooperation is maritime security. For more than 10 years now, European Navy, European Opera—could strengthen our cooperation is maritime security. For us it is the fact that actions offshore are coupled with actions on shore, of justice reform, alternative livelihoods to address the root causes of piracy. If we do not work in an integrated way, we are just treating symptoms but not facing the illness. Operation Atlanta was a good example of cooperation among many countries, among them India.

The relationship between India and Europe must become more strategic in view of the importance of the call whatever you want Asia or Indo-Pacific region. That is why it is essential that we develop a new roadmap for our strategic partnership in the 2025 horizon, covering cooperation in areas of security to digital or climate change. Negotiations for this roadmap started just yesterday, and I hope they will be ready to be approved in the next summit of India-Europe on the 13th of March. Among them the defence and implementation of the Paris Climate Agreement is of particular importance, given India’s great ambitions in terms of renewable energy but also of the big needs that you have to satisfy on energy supply to your growing population. We are facing a true climate crisis; everybody knows. We literally have no time to lose. We have recently stated the strong commitment for Europe to become carbon neutral by 2050—what we call the Green Deal but maybe more than a deal, is a will. Let us call it a Green Will, and this will have to be shared by the rest of humankind because we Europeans represent only nine percent of the world emissions of green gases. Even if tomorrow we were able to cancel absolutely all our emissions, the problem would not be solved because there is still 91 percent produced by the rest of the world. So either we are able to engage all of us in this process sharing different responsibilities, but acting together all our effort would be a good example of willing of transformation but not being enough. The example of the conference in Madrid shows how much more remain to be done. In 2016, Prime Minister Modi and European leaders agreed on a European Union-India Clean Energy and Climate Partnership. Today, we are working together on an International Solar Alliance headquartered here in India.

Lastly, another example of European Union-Indian cooperation is counterterrorism. I had the pleasure of having a meeting some hours ago with the National Security Adviser of India and talk about it. Last month, we organised here in Delhi a European Union-India Counterterrorism Workshop on investigating the ISIS Networks. This two-day workshop brought together Indian and European experts and focused on capacity-building of the Indian state police services to deal with the growing threat emanating from terrorism networks trying to infiltrate here in Southeast Asia countries. All of that is part of a new system of global governance. I believe it is important to listen to all the voices of countries like India, which will soon become the most populated country in the world. [The year] 2022 will be an important year for India. You will celebrate the 75th anniversary of your Independence and hold at the same time the Presidency of the G20. Let us use this time in the run up to 2022 to listen to your views in how the world would like to be in this century—and that can be done together.

In a world full of challenges that travel without passports and know no borders, our cooperation with defence and rules-based multilateral order is more necessary than ever because no country is isolated, big, strong enough to be apart from these challenges—challenges to our peace, our freedom, and our prosperity. That is our common endeavour, that is our common purpose, that is our common work together. Thank you.
Raisina Dialogue 2020 hosted a series of conversations with authors on recently published books that engage with contemporary themes in a world in transition. This year’s Author’s Corner focused on two themes:

**India: Then and Now**
Can India’s past guide its present? What histories are important for India to remember and re-engage with? What challenges persist, and what choices does India face, as the country remains poised to play an increasing role in its region and on the international stage?

**Leaders and Leadership**
How, and to what extent, is the global re-ordering taking effect? Which countries, blocs and institutions will script and sustain the rules of this century? How are key stakeholders behaving in this period of uncertainty and flux?
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