

**THE ORF  
FOREIGN POLICY  
SURVEY 2022**

**INDIA @75  
and the  
WORLD**

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INDIA @75 and the WORLD



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# Preface



**INDIA ENTERS ITS** 76<sup>th</sup> year as an independent nation amidst a far more volatile external environment, starkly different from what was envisioned by our forebears. But while the challenges abound, the year ahead also brings with it opportunities for India to show the world that it can lead, and stand true to its reputation as a responsible global power.

With the war in Ukraine continuing unabated and compounding the devastation caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, countries across the globe are struggling to keep their economies stable. For India, its recent achievement of overtaking the United Kingdom to become the fifth largest economy in the world is no small feat, but the precarious economic situation in the world and our neighbourhood warrants us to not lose sight of the challenges ahead.

Meanwhile, the Taliban have been in power in Afghanistan for over a year, and the continuing uncertainty in the country's future poses a threat to the region and beyond. India's southern neighbour, Sri Lanka, has defaulted on its debt repayments and is facing its worst economic crisis yet, rendering many of its people hungry and insecure.

When the pandemic first broke out there was a rise in protectionist sentiments and countries scrambled to protect their citizens and close off their borders. The current situation, however, shows the importance of engaging with the international community to address our shared crisis.

As India prepares to assume the G20 presidency in December this year, it has the opportunity to re-focus attention on adapting to the realities of a post-pandemic world and facilitate conversations on policy responses towards sustainable growth. It is in an effort to understand how the youth of the country view this dynamic world that we inhabit, and India's role in shaping it, that ORF releases this second iteration of India's foreign policy survey, 'The ORF Foreign Policy Survey 2022: India @75 and the World'.

The survey found that India's urban youth have an overall positive assessment of the country's foreign policy, with 77 percent of respondents expressing confidence in New Delhi's conduct of its external relations. Awareness and understanding about the non-traditional security threats facing India, particularly climate change and cybersecurity issues, was also evident in the responses. While the economic disruption caused by the pandemic was still a cause of distress for many, border conflicts with China and Pakistan also topped the list of concerns. The sentiment shows, in turn, in a heightened negative view of China and a lack of inclination to engage with Pakistan.

The low awareness regarding India's impending G20 presidency necessitates concerted efforts by policymakers to explain the potential of the grouping as a multilateral platform where India can share its global objectives and goals. Such engagement with the G20 will be appreciated, given the high degree of support for multilateralism as the mode of India's engagement with the world.

As India lives its next 25 years, the role of the youth will become increasingly more pertinent in its growth and advancement. For policymaking to be most effective, it is imperative to create an understanding of how the younger generations perceive New Delhi's responses to global events. This is a gap that this survey intends to fill. Following the first foreign policy survey released in 2021, this present one aims to gauge the shift, if any, in how the youth view India's foreign relations and their aspirations about the role India should play in the future.

**- Dr Samir Saran  
President, ORF  
November 2022**

# Executive Summary





Rated India's foreign policy positively.

77%

The economic disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic is India's biggest security challenge.

90%

Multilateralism should be India's preferred mode of engagement with the world.

34%

India's foreign policy has adequately defined what constitutes the country's neighbourhood'.

79%

The US will most likely be the country's leading partner in the next 10 years.

85%

US support is important for India to rise as a global power in the 21st century.

83%

71%

Russia is India's most reliable partner since Independence.

43%

Climate change is the biggest non-traditional security threat to India.

84%

India's bid for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council is an important foreign policy goal.

91%

Expressed strong support for India's Afghanistan policy.

28%

India should remain neutral if US-China tensions escalate.

49%

China poses a challenge to India's rise.

71%

1

Urban Indian youth rated the country's foreign policy positively: 25 percent graded it *very good*, and 52 percent, *good*. This is an increase from the 2021 survey report where 32 percent said it was very good, and 40 percent rated it good.

2

The respondents named Russia as India's most reliable partner since Independence (43 percent); the United States followed with 27 percent.

3

Of India's most pressing security challenges, 90 percent of respondents were concerned about the economic disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Other challenges were terrorism (named by 86 percent of respondents); border conflicts with China (84 percent); and territorial disputes with Pakistan (82 percent). In the 2021 survey, the top concerns were similar: pandemics like COVID-19; terrorism; border conflicts with China; and Pakistan.

# 4

Non-traditional security threats are of great concern to India's youth: 84 percent named climate change as the challenge of most concern; and 83 percent were concerned about cybersecurity issues. The 2021 survey results were similar: climate change (83 percent) and cybersecurity (82 percent).

# 5

One-third of respondents (34 percent) chose multilateralism as their preferred mode for India's engagement with other countries, over unilateralism and bilateralism.

# 6

Ninety-one percent of respondents said India's bid for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council was an important foreign policy goal. In 2021 too, the same share of respondents agreed with the notion.

# 7

Twenty-six percent ranked the grouping of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, China, South Africa) as the most beneficial forum for India's global goals. Of other forums listed in the survey (i.e., Quad, BIMSTEC, G20, and SCO), the SCO got the lowest rank at 6 percent.

# 8

The respondents said India's priorities at the G20 and other multilateral forums should include climate finance and adaptation; healthcare preparedness; and global food security.

# 9

Nearly 80 percent agreed that Indian foreign policy has adequately defined what constitutes the country's 'neighbourhood'. The respondents expressed trust for the country's immediate neighbours, except for Pakistan and Afghanistan. In 2021, respondents said they trusted the country's immediate neighbours except for Pakistan.

12

# 10

India's urban youth believed that the country's bilateral relationships with its neighbours have strengthened, except with Pakistan and Afghanistan. In the 2021 survey, Pakistan was the only South Asian country that the respondents perceived negatively.

# 11

More than one-fourth of respondents (28 percent) expressed strong support for India's diplomatic efforts following the August 2021 US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Taliban's return to power.

# 12

India's youth are of the view that it is the United States (US) that will most likely be the country's leading partner in the next 10 years (more than 85 percent of the respondents); 76 percent said it will be Russia. In 2021, 78 percent named the US; and 57 percent, Russia.

# 13

When asked about India's position should US-China tensions escalate, 49 percent believed India should be neutral. In the 2021 survey, 62 percent said India should side with the US.

# 14

Eighty-three percent of respondents agreed that US support is *extremely important* for India to rise as a global power in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. A little more than seven of every 10 respondents (71 percent) agreed that China poses a challenge to India's rise.

# Introduction

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India at 75 is keen to show the world that it has the capacity for global leadership. Meanwhile, the international order that it inhabits is changing rapidly and the challenges are compounding for New Delhi, making it clear that the road to the global centre-stage will not be easy.

For one, the prolonged COVID-19 pandemic continues to stall the full reopening of economies. China's harsh COVID-19 lockdowns have disrupted supply chains and slowed production even as new variants of the virus continue to delay prospects for recovery. At the same time, other events have required the attention of the international community. The defeat of the US-backed government in Afghanistan in August 2021 and the

return of the Taliban raised searching questions about the failures of liberal internationalism and provoked concerns about the prospect of a rise in terrorism in South Asia.

In February 2022 the Russia-Ukraine conflict erupted, disturbing long-held norms of territorial integrity and sovereignty, and paving the way for a new form of total war: the weaponisation of *everything*. Ukraine's supporters in the West have leveraged their dominance in the global financial system to inflict economic costs on Russia, while Moscow has weaponised food and energy exports to protect itself. New Delhi has had to skilfully navigate its relationship with Moscow while strengthening its ties with the United States and Europe. Providing

a backdrop to these watershed events is the China challenge, which continues to occupy policymakers in the global capitals as Beijing remains on the offensive: intimidating Taiwan, expanding its diplomatic and security footprint in the Pacific, and pursuing its ambitions of military dominance in Asia.

For India at 75, the strained international situation has complicated its strategic calculus. The world order that ushered in India's rise following the end of the Cold War is dissipating, and a new one is struggling to take its place.

Closer to home, India's neighbours are beset by political and economic instability and the ripple effects are threatening to reverberate across the region. Pakistan and Sri Lanka, for example, face a grim economic future and the public are growing increasingly dissatisfied with their governments. In Afghanistan it is a different challenge that awaits India: Almost a year after the US withdrawal and the collapse of the government, New Delhi and the Taliban have cautiously

re-established contact in an effort to establish stability, security, and normalcy in the region.

The question for India is what role it will play as the world struggles to find its feet. And how will its ambitions for leadership evolve in a new order? New Delhi has the opportunity to answer these questions when it takes over the presidency of the G20 before the close of 2022. From that pulpit, India will work to set the agenda as the world navigates its realities of recessions and rogue states.

Yet, no nation can hope to bear the burden of international leadership without the support of its citizens. It is in this context that this report, *The ORF Foreign Policy Survey 2022: India @75 and the World*, becomes relevant. As India forges its path in global affairs, the views of its youth could light a torch for the country's conduct as an emerging power. This survey—which builds on, and challenges the findings of ORF's 2021 Foreign Policy Survey,<sup>a</sup> could hold a key to decoding India at 75.

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a Harsh V Pant, et al., *The ORF Foreign Policy Survey 2021: Young India and the World*, August 2021, Observer Research Foundation.

# Context and Rationale for the Poll

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**E**arlier surveys have sought out the Indian public's views of foreign policy and world affairs. The Indian Institute of Public Opinion, for example, has been conducting annual and bi-annual surveys since 1959 that ask respondents their views of India's foreign engagements.<sup>b</sup> In the years since, various targeted polls have solicited the Indian public's view of epochal events such as the Pokhran nuclear tests, the Kargil War, and the signing of the Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal.<sup>c</sup>

Other polls have attempted more expansive research aims and demographic samples. In 2005-06, researchers at the Centre for the Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania, conducted what could be the largest pan-Indian poll on world affairs so far. The survey covered 212,563 interviewees and gathered insights into how Indians belonging to diverse socio-economic and regional groups saw the country's place in the world.

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b Aidan Milliff, Paul Staniland, and Vipin Narang, "Uneven Accountability? Public Attitudes on Indian Foreign Policy since the 1960s," MIT Political Science Department Research Paper No. 2019-21, 2019, 1–66.

c Shivaji Kumar, "India's Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: A View from New Delhi," *India Review* 17, no. 4 (August 8, 2018): 353–71.



Media organisations and academics have done similar surveys of their own. These polls have also attempted to assess the Indian citizenry's views on the country's foreign, defence, and security policies, and their attitudes towards countries that India engages with. In 2019, a research paper built on the findings of a survey on the implications of counter-insurgency measures on public opinion in Kashmir.<sup>d</sup> In March 2021, an article collated evidence from various surveys to assess public opinion towards China since the 1960s;<sup>e</sup> and in August 2022, the Stimson Center released findings of a telephonic survey of 7,000 Indians that assessed public attitudes to India's national and international conflict scenarios.<sup>f</sup>

While these efforts have been notable, the early surveys such as the IIOPO polls are yet to be analysed. The latter polls are also often limited to a single event or use a population sample that is limited to rarefied policymaking circles.

The annual *ORF Foreign Policy Survey*, of which this is the second iteration, is designed to fill this gap in Indian discourse on world affairs. The first poll, released in August 2021, surveyed a subset of Indian

youth with 2,037 respondents from 14 cities. It sought to gather the views of India's urban youth demographic about the world and the various facets of India's engagement with it.

Unlike other surveys that have focused on responses to specific events or issues, *ORF's Foreign Policy Survey* attempts a more encompassing review of India's foreign policy. This second edition of *ORF's* flagship poll tracks how India's urban youth perceive the structural changes underway in the world order even as the Indian Republic, which marked its 75<sup>th</sup> independence day in August 2022, begins its ascent as a global power. Covering 5,000 respondents in 19 cities, this year's survey questions invited young people between 18 and 35 to share their views of India's world. This demographic cohort makes up 27 percent of India's urban population, and around 26 percent of the country's overall population.<sup>g</sup>

The findings presented in this report can have profound implications for India's conduct on the global stage. For example, the respondents' views on the turning points in India's foreign policy, its

d Gautam Nair and Nicholas Sambanis, "Violence Exposure and Ethnic Identification: Evidence from Kashmir," *International Organization* 73, no. 2 (2019): 329–63.

e Aidan Milliff and Paul Staniland, "Public Opinion Toward Foreign Policy in a Developing World Democracy: Evidence from Indian Views of China," *SocArXiv*, March 2021.

f Christopher Clary, Sameer Lalwani, Niloufer Siddiqui, and Neelanjan Sircar, "Confidence and Nationalism in Modi's India," Stimson Center, August 2022.

g In the rural districts, this age group comprises 25 percent of the population.

traditional foreign policy partners, and its preferred modes of engagement, would reveal the level of support, if at all, enjoyed by the key pillars of India's diplomatic strategy over the last 75 years. The survey also has an eye on the future. Questions on India's neighbourhood policy, its emerging geopolitical alignments, and its engagements with forums such as the G20 and UN Security Council interrogate the kind of leadership role that India could play in the next 25 years.

The responses were analysed according to various parameters such as age, employment, gender, occupation, geography, and income. The research team conducted a thorough calculation and assessment of the data before attempting to draw patterns and offer insights.

# Methodology and Sample Design



In collaboration with Impetus Research, ORF conducted this national survey of India's urban youth covering a sample of 5,000 in the age group 18-35. Covering 19 cities across India, the survey aimed to gather views about important aspects of the country's foreign policy goals.

The primary field work was conducted from June to July 2022. The questionnaire was administered in 10 languages—i.e., Assamese, Bangla, Gujarati, Kannada, Marathi, Odia, Punjabi, Tamil, Telugu,


and English. The sample was drawn using a stratified multi-stage cluster sampling approach. Impetus Research used the 2011 Census figures provided by the office of the Registrar General and Census Commissioner, Ministry of Home Affairs, as a sampling frame.

# Survey Findings and Analysis



## 1. Indian Foreign Policy Since Independence

### 1.1 Overall, how would you rate India's foreign policy? (% of all responses)



#### **India's urban youth are upbeat about the country's foreign policy.**

India's youth strongly support the country's foreign policy, echoing the main finding of the first iteration of *The ORF Foreign Policy Survey*, in 2021.

Seventy-seven percent of respondents rated India's foreign policy positively (25 percent said it was *very good*, and 52 percent, *good*). This proportion is up by five percentage points<sup>h</sup> from the 2021 survey.


<sup>h</sup> While making the comparative study with the 2021 survey, a change has been regarded statistically significant if the associated p-value is lower than 5 percent level of significance.

The positive response can be attributed to factors like India's Neighbourhood First policy and, more recently, its COVID-19 vaccine diplomacy. Another factor can be India's stronger approach towards China.

Broken down by income group, the findings show that no respondent in

the highest income bracket identified in this survey (more than INR 80,000 per month) rated India's foreign policy *very poor*. Meanwhile, other parameters—age, geography, gender, education, and occupation—appear to have had no impact on the responses.

## 1.2 Which country has been Independent India's most trusted partner? (% of all responses)




***Amidst the Russia-Ukraine conflict, India's youth choose Russia as India's most enduring partner.***

A little more than four of every 10 respondents (43 percent) were of the view that Russia was India's top partner; 27 percent chose the United States. Support for Russia increased with higher education: from 23 percent among those with primary education to 53 percent of post-graduate respondents. Disaggregated by income, the positive view of Russia increased from 37 percent among those earning less than INR 10,000 per month to 64 percent in those earning more than INR 80,000. Broken

down by gender, a higher proportion of male respondents (54 percent) than female respondents (23 percent) said Russia was India's most trusted partner; more female respondents (30 percent) than male respondents (23 percent) considered the United States as India's most trusted partner,

Support for Russia was highly significant among government servants: 66 percent of them said Russia was India's most trusted partner. Respondents from cities in India's eastern states reported stronger support for Russia (53 percent) than their counterparts in the South (36 percent).

**1.3 What has been the biggest turning point in India's foreign policy? (% of all responses)**



***The Pokhran nuclear tests are the most important watershed in India's history, even as China has been the thread since independence.***

Sixteen percent of the respondents ranked the 1998 Pokhran nuclear tests—with which India announced itself as a nuclear power—as the most significant turning point in the country's history. Thirteen percent of respondents pointed to the 1962 India-China War as most important; while 12 percent said it was the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War.


Amidst India's border disputes with China, 9 percent of the respondents said the Galwan clashes were most important. This could explain the vote for Russia as India's most trusted partner (see Question 1.2). After all, the country's defence relationship with Russia can aid India in checking the growing Chinese threat. Indeed, it appears that the

respondents view Russia in the context of its contemporary relationship with India, rather than the Cold War history—only 6 percent of respondents said the end of the Cold War was a turning point in Indian history.

Broken down by education, the lowest proportion of respondents who chose the Pokhran tests as Indian foreign policy's biggest turning point was among those who finished only up to primary education (5 percent). The choice of Pokhran increased with income level, with a range of between 10 and 28 percent.

India's economic liberalisation in the 1990s had the most votes from among the government servants (18 percent). Respondents from the western cities (17 percent) and those in the South (16 percent) ranked the Indo-China war high among all the events listed in the questionnaire.

## 1.4 How concerned are you about the following foreign policy challenges of India? (% of all responses)



**Two years since the outbreak of COVID-19, there are lingering concerns about the uncertainties caused by the pandemic.**

When given a list of foreign policy challenges facing India, nine of every 10 respondents (90 percent) said they were concerned by the economic disruption caused by COVID-19. Eighty-nine percent were worried about the possibility of similar global pandemics.

Eighty-six percent were either very concerned or somewhat concerned about terrorism, 84 percent found border conflicts with China to be a key challenge, and 82 percent felt similarly about territorial disputes with Pakistan. Anxieties over border issues and memories of previous wars with China and Pakistan (see Question 1.3) have likely influenced these responses. The proportion of respondents who were concerned over India's issues with




Pakistan increased by 7 percentage points from the 2021 survey.

Non-traditional security threats were also among the concerns of India’s youth: 84 percent were either *very concerned* or *somewhat concerned* about climate change, and 83 percent were worried about cybersecurity. A higher proportion of female respondents expressed concern for cybersecurity issues compared to those surveyed in 2021 (i.e., there was an increase of 8 percentage points).

On climate change and terrorism, a larger proportion of respondents in north India reported being *very concerned* about these issues, compared to their counterparts in the cities in the south. Sixty-one percent of respondents from the North were *very concerned* about climate change compared to 34 percent from the southern states. The gap was equally remarkable on the issue of terrorism: 71 percent in the northern states were *very concerned*, against 44 percent of those in Southern India.

### 1.5 What should be India’s preferred mode of engagement with other countries? (% of all responses)



***India should engage with the world through multilateral platforms.***

Despite the crisis of confidence that besets existing multilateral platforms, 34 percent of respondents—a plural majority—said they should be India’s preferred mode of engagement with the world. Minilateral platforms received the

least favourable response (21 percent). Perhaps because minilateralism is a fairly recent development, it could take some years for such platforms to win popular support. Indeed, in Question 1.3, only 3 percent said the 2021 Quad Leaders’ summit was a turning point in India’s contemporary foreign policy history. It is also remarkable that although India has


partnership arrangements with countries like Australia, Japan, and the US, the proportion of respondents who said India should prioritise bilateral forums is less than what might be expected (24 percent).

Disaggregated by income, respondents in the above-INR 80,000 monthly bracket preferred minilateral platforms (31 percent) over bilaterals (21 percent). Broken down by occupation, unskilled

workers preferred minilateral as much as multilateral forums (26 percent) and more than bilaterals (21 percent).

Among the respondents in Western India, 31 percent felt minilateral engagements were the best for India compared to multilateral platforms, chosen by 27 percent. Respondents from the southern states reported the least support for minilaterals (11 percent).

### 1.6 Is it an important goal for India to have a permanent seat at the UN Security Council? (% of all responses)




#### ***India must pursue its bid for a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council.***

Ninety-one percent of respondents said obtaining a permanent UNSC seat was an important foreign policy goal for India. This kind of support shows that India's urban youth view the UNSC bid as a "prestige project" for the country, even

as multilateralism *per se* does not have overwhelming support as seen in the preceding question.

The number of *Don't know* responses decreased, from 19 percent to 1 percent, as the education level went up from primary to post-graduate. Age, gender, geography, and occupation have had no impact on the responses to this question.

## 1.7 Which of these global forums are beneficial for India's foreign policy goals? (% of all responses)



### ***BRICS is the most promising forum for India's foreign policy goals.***

India's urban youth chose the grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) as the most beneficial for India's pursuit of its global goals (26 percent). This support largely held across a number of variables like gender, geography, and income.


The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) trailed a distant second with 12 percent of respondents choosing it over the other platforms. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)—which counts Russia, China and a number of Central Asian states among its members—was chosen by only 6 percent of the respondents. And even as India prepares to take over the presidency of the G20 in December 2022, only 9 percent

of those surveyed chose it as the most beneficial forum for India's interests.

BRICS and Quad were the top two choices of most of the respondents. Broken down by region, respondents from the eastern cities (13 percent) and South (12 percent) reported preference for the G20. Higher-

income groups chose the G20 as well (32 percent). The G20 was also the forum of choice for government servants (32 percent), followed by BRICS (20 percent). Respondents from the private sector preferred the G20 (14 percent) over either Quad or BIMSTEC.

### 1.8 Are you aware of the G20? (% of all responses)




***Even as India is poised to take over the G20 presidency in December 2022, India's urban youth are not aware of the forum.***

Awareness of the G20 is low, and only 26 percent of respondents had heard of the forum at the time of the survey. Government servants broke from the overall trend: 64 percent of them had heard of the G20. Disaggregated by income, the highest awareness of the G20 was among the respondents who

earned more than INR 80,000 a month (58 percent). Awareness of the grouping also increased from 5 to 45 percent as the educational qualification of the respondents went up. Geographically, respondents in the eastern cities tended to be more aware of the grouping (32 percent). Age had no visible impact on the responses to this question. With India set to take over the presidency of G20 before the end of 2022, will knowledge about G20 increase in the coming days?

## 1.9 Which issue should India prioritise at the G20? (% of all responses)



**Climate action, healthcare preparedness, and food security should be high in India's G20 agenda.**

When given a list of issues that India should prioritise when it takes the helm at the G20, the respondents chose the following top three: climate finance and adaptation; healthcare preparedness; and global food security. A cumulative

77 percent of respondents placed *climate finance and adaptation* among their top three priorities. Seventy-two percent ranked healthcare preparedness and global food security their second and third priorities. Anxieties related to climate change and pandemics such as COVID-19 (see Question 1.4) could have influenced these preferences.

At 58 percent of all respondents, *terrorism and terrorism finance* was ranked as another crucial priority for India's G20 presidency. This would be related to the youth's view that terrorism and border conflicts with Pakistan were among India's most significant challenges (see Question 1.4).

A counterintuitive result appears to be that India's youth do not think that pushing for multilateral reform is a top-line priority. This, despite the finding that there is still more support for India's engagement with other countries through multilateral platforms as compared to unilateral and bilateral engagements (see Question 1.5), as well as for the country's bid for a permanent seat at the UNSC (see Question 1.6). A low 38 percent of respondents ranked *multilateralism reforms* as among their top three priorities for India's G20 leadership. Other issues like *tech governance*, *women's empowerment*, and *sustainable consumption* also ranked low among the issues listed in the questionnaire.

Respondents who finished up to primary education (50 percent) chose *climate finance* as a second preference. This


was followed by respondents who finished school till class 8 who chose the issue as their second (25 percent) and third priority (31 percent). Those who completed class 8 (39 percent) and 10 (30 percent), however, ranked *healthcare preparedness* first. Diploma holders (24 percent) chose *global food security*. This was followed by those who finished up to class 8 (43 percent) and those with post-graduate degrees (27 percent).

Geographically, the respondents from the southern cities ranked *climate finance* second (39 percent), and *healthcare preparedness* first (33 percent). Respondents from the East preferred *global food security* first (27 percent).

Broken down by income group, respondents who earned less than INR 10,000 a month listed *climate finance* as the second priority (37 percent) and *healthcare preparedness*, first (31 percent). Those earning INR 40,000-60,000 a month prioritised *healthcare preparedness* first (30 percent). Respondents in the income brackets of INR 20,000-40,000 (28 percent), 40,000-60,000 (32 percent), and above 80,000 (30 percent) ranked *food security* as second priority.

## 2. India's Neighbourhood Policies

### 2.1 Which of the following regions are strategically vital to India, in terms of its neighbourhood? (% of all responses)



***For India's urban youth, South Asia is at the core of the country's strategic imagination.***


Overall, 36 percent of participants in this survey deemed South Asia as the region of greatest strategic importance

to India. This proportion is significantly higher than those who chose other regions such as Central Asia (13 percent of all respondents), Southeast Asia (12 percent), Indo-Pacific (11 percent), and West Asia (6 percent).

The choice of Indo-Pacific increased with higher education (from 5 percent among those with the lowest education level, to 18 percent of those who finished post-graduate degrees), as well as higher incomes (from 7 percent among those with the lowest monthly income to 24 percent of those in the highest income range).

Disaggregated by occupation, government employees had the highest proportion (23 percent) of those who considered the Indo-Pacific as their second most strategically important region. Gender-wise, only 7 percent of female respondents said the Indo-Pacific is an important region, while 15 percent of males deemed the region as strategic. Geographically, the highest priorities to the Indo-Pacific came from respondents in the eastern cities (15 percent).

## 2.2 To what extent do you agree that Indian foreign policy adequately defines its neighbourhood? (% of all responses)




### ***India's 'Neighbourhood First' policy adequately defines its neighbourhood.***

A significant majority of respondents (79 percent) were of the view that Indian foreign policy, officially known as 'Neighbourhood First', has succeeded in terms of adequately defining its neighbourhood. As seen in Question 2.1, India's youth assign great significance to South Asia.

Broken down by income, no one among the respondents earning more than INR 80,000 a month strongly disagreed with Indian foreign policy defining its neighbourhood. Age, occupation, education, and geography appear to have had no impact on the responses to this survey question.



### 2.3 Has Indian foreign policy towards its neighbourhood been adequate enough in the following sectors? (% of all responses)




**India should ramp up its political engagements in South Asia, as well as its undertakings in infrastructure and connectivity.**

Over 86 percent ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ that India’s *trade* with its neighbours is adequate. Sixty-eight percent were of the view that *political engagement* in the neighbourhood has been adequate. Another area where respondents felt that India has not given

adequate attention was *infrastructure and connectivity* (71 percent of respondents). This, despite the government’s significant attempts to boost the sector.

Income-wise, no respondent in the INR 80,000 income bracket strongly disagreed with the notion that India was adequate in its cultural ties with the neighbours. The variables of age, occupation, education, geography, and gender have had no impact on the responses.

## 2.4 Is India's foreign policy of not engaging with Pakistan beneficial or detrimental to regional peace and stability? (% of all responses)




### ***India's policy of not engaging with Pakistan is beneficial for regional peace and stability.***

More than half (58 percent) of respondents agreed that not engaging with Pakistan is beneficial to regional peace and stability, and a far lower 24 percent of respondents responded to the contrary. Challenges such as border conflicts with Pakistan (see Question 1.4)

and terrorism (Questions 1.4 and 1.9) would have influenced these responses.

The lowest proportion of respondents who said India's policy vis-à-vis Pakistan is beneficial (39 percent) was seen among those who finished up to primary education. Age, income, gender, and geography have had no obvious impact on the responses to this survey question.

## 2.5 How much do you trust these South Asian nations? (% of all responses)



***Nepal and Sri Lanka are the most trustworthy among India's South Asian neighbours.***

India's urban youth trust the country's neighbours, specifically those that are part of BIMSTEC: Nepal (named by 70 percent of respondents), Sri Lanka (65 percent), Bhutan (63 percent), and Bangladesh (57 percent).

More than seven of every 10 respondents (71 percent) said they *completely distrust* Pakistan, and 6 percent said they *somewhat distrust* it. For Afghanistan, the proportion of respondents who reported distrust is 43 percent. The lack of trust in both countries would be related to the respondents' concerns over terror threats to India likely emanating from Pakistan and Afghanistan (see Questions 1.4 and

1.9). The concern over India's border conflict with Pakistan (82 percent, as seen in Question 1.4) could also be a factor in the distrust.

Broken down by education, the highest proportion of respondents who reported having *complete distrust* on Nepal (21 percent) was recorded among those who finished up to primary education. In the case of Pakistan, the least distrust came from the same education category (63 percent). In terms of occupation, government employees reported the highest trust for Nepal (82 percent) and Mauritius (68 percent). No one among the government employees reported *complete trust* for Pakistan.

Disaggregated according to income, no respondent earning more than INR 80,000 a month—the highest income bracket identified in the survey—reported having *complete trust* on Pakistan. Geographically, respondents from the southern cities reported the least distrust for Pakistan (62 percent), while the East had the greatest distrust (86 percent). The eastern states also expressed the highest trust for Bhutan (71 percent) and Nepal (77 percent). Trust for Sri Lanka is relatively low in the South (54 percent).


Overall, trust for India's South Asian neighbours has increased when

compared to the findings of the first ORF Foreign Policy Survey of 2021. Nepal, for instance, has seen an overall increase in trust by 15 percentage points. Meanwhile, Afghanistan has seen a drop of nearly 9 percentage points. Sri Lanka too, has witnessed a slight dip in trust of 3 percentage points, moving the country from the rank of 'most trusted' to the second most trusted neighbour. There was a notable increase in trust levels for Maldives, Bhutan, and Bangladesh.

Compared to 2021, the change in trust for South Asian countries has increased statistically. This is 6 percent in Bangladesh, 7 percent in the Maldives, 8 percent in Bhutan, and 15 percent in Nepal.

India's increasing role as a net-security provider, its perceptibly adequate neighbourhood policy (see Question 2.3), COVID-19 diplomacy, along with media coverage, has likely attributed to this more positive outcome. (As noted earlier too, this present survey covered a bigger sample size than the first one.) In the case of Afghanistan, the change of regime has contributed to reduction of trust by (-)8 percent. Although distrust for the country was 4-percent higher (45 percent) among male respondents, the change shows that the proportion of male respondents expressing trust increased by 14 percent.

## 2.6 How do you assess India's bilateral relations with these South Asian countries? (% of all responses)



**India's bilateral relations with immediate neighbours, barring Pakistan and Afghanistan, are on the upswing.**

Indian youth's trust for South Asian neighbours (see Question 2.5) likely influences their perception of India's bilateral relations with these countries. Only a small number of respondents

expressed optimism about India's relations with Afghanistan (29 percent) and Pakistan (9 percent). Meanwhile, 31 percent of the respondents considered India's relations with Afghanistan to be *poor* or *very poor*, and 74 percent of respondents believed the same with Pakistan. The negative perception for both countries may also be linked to responses to Questions 1.4 and 1.9,

where a large number of respondents reported being concerned of terrorism and India's border conflict with Pakistan.

Other responses on India's neighbourhood engagements were mostly positive. Sixty-seven percent were of the view that India and Nepal enjoy *good* or *very good* relations. Not far behind, over 61 percent of respondents had a positive view of India and Sri Lanka's relationship. India's urban youth also noted that India enjoys good bilateral relations with South Asian countries that are part of BIMSTEC. This is despite the organisation's lack of popularity as a platform for India's foreign policy goals (see Question 1.7).

Reactions to this question were also non-binary, with an increase in *Neutral* and *Don't know* responses, particularly concerning countries that are the subject of less media coverage. In the case of Mauritius, for example, over 18 percent of respondents were neutral, and nearly 24 percent said they *Don't know/Can't say*. The *Don't know/Can't say* responses were also sizeable in the case of the Maldives (19 percent) and Bhutan (15 percent). When it comes to bilateral relations with Afghanistan, 24 percent of the respondents were neutral and 15 percent said they *Don't know/Can't say*.


Respondents who finished up to primary education had the highest proportion

of responses (29 percent) that rated India's relations with Mauritius as *poor* or *very poor*. A majority of those with post-graduate and higher education (63 percent) thought India-Mauritius relations were *good* or *very good*.

Disaggregated by income, the results show that none of the respondents earning more than INR 80,000 a month believed that India's relations with the Maldives, Bhutan, and, Nepal are *very bad*. However, when it comes to Pakistan, none of the respondents in this category believed that relations are *very good*. Geographically, respondents from the southern regions were least positive of India-Sri Lanka relations (51 percent). Respondents from the West recorded the least proportion of those who believed in increased positive relations with the Maldives (49 percent); and those from the eastern states said India had *good* or *very good* relations with Nepal (84 percent), Bhutan (72 percent), and Bangladesh (62 percent).

Compared to 2021, there was an increase in the positive response to this question. India's increasing role as a net-security provider, its neighbourhood policy (see Question 2.3), COVID-19 diplomacy, media coverage, and increase in the sample size, have all likely attributed to this positive outcome.

## 2.7 How do you assess India's interactions with these South Asian countries in the last five years? (% of all responses)



**India's engagements with its neighbours, except with Pakistan, have continued to grow in the past five years.**

A large number of respondents were of the view that India's interactions have increased with all of its neighbours, except for Pakistan. More than half (55

percent) thought India's engagements with Nepal increased, and 52 percent felt the same with Sri Lanka.

With Pakistan, 50 percent of the respondents believed that India's interactions have decreased. Referring to Question 2.4, a large number of respondents found this lack of

engagement to be beneficial to regional peace and stability. While substantial, the 50 percent is 6 percentage points lower than the result of the 2021 survey.

Responses to this poll question were dispersed and non-binary: a significant number of respondents were of the view that the interactions remain unchanged, and many of them also replied with *Don't know*. Similar proportions of respondents (between 22 and 24 percent) believed that the relations *Remained unchanged* with Bangladesh, Bhutan, Mauritius, Afghanistan, Maldives, and Sri Lanka. Lower proportions of respondents said relations with Pakistan *Remained unchanged* (19 percent) as did with Nepal (20 percent). Just as in the preceding question, the highest numbers of 'Don't know' responses were on Mauritius (29 percent), Maldives (25 percent), Bhutan (21 percent), and Afghanistan (20 percent). The higher number of *Remained unchanged* or *Don't know* responses could reflect that foreign policy developments can be short-lived in public memory.

Broken down by income range, respondents earning less than INR 10,000 a month were the least to believe


that India-Pakistan interactions have decreased over the past five years (44 percent).

It is notable that in this and the preceding question, the numbers of 'Don't know' responses are significantly lower than in the 2021 survey, except when referring to Pakistan. The number of *Remained unchanged* responses has come down, too. Again, the exceptions are Pakistan and Afghanistan when it comes to the overall rating of the bilateral relationship, and Nepal, Maldives, and Pakistan in the question about interactions in the past five years. This could indicate an increasing degree of awareness of developments in the neighbourhood among India's youth.

Compared to 2021, the proportion of respondents who thought India was increasing its diplomatic relations in the past five years has risen. There is a 7-percent increase for Sri Lanka, 12 percent for the Maldives, 16 percent for Bhutan, and 21 percent for Nepal. India's increasing role as a net-security provider, adequate neighbourhood policy (see Question 2.3), media coverage, and increase in the sample size, have likely attributed to this more positive outcome.



## 2.8 Which of the following could become India's most important partner in the coming years in the Indo-Pacific? (% of all responses)



### ***Japan and Australia could emerge as India's most important partners in the Indo-Pacific.***

When asked to rank the Indo-Pacific countries according to which ones they think will be India's most important partner in the coming years, the respondents' first two choices were Japan and Australia. Among the first preferences, Japan took the top place with 31 percent of respondents ranking it first; followed by Australia (30 percent), and Singapore (19

percent). The preference for Japan and Australia shows the respondents' bilateral support and trust for QUAD countries, despite having little enthusiasm for the QUAD itself (see Question 1.7).

Respondents who have had schooling up to class 5 (39 percent) and class 8 (34 percent) ranked Australia as first partner for India. For Japan, the votes came most from post-graduates/professionals (42 percent) and diploma holders or those who finished a technical course


(34 percent). Government employees (48 percent) and students (34 percent) preferred Japan as India's most important partner.

Responses in favour of Singapore are scattered throughout all these indicators.

Private-sector employees (24 percent) and skilled workers (26 percent) preferred Singapore as first partner, and those from the southern cities (34 percent) did so as well.

### 3. India's positions and responses to significant events in the neighbourhood

#### 3.1 Following the US withdrawal, do you support India's Afghanistan policy? (% of all responses)




#### **India's urban youth gave a strong nod to India's Afghanistan policy.**

India's youth are largely concerned with terrorism and terror-financing, as seen in Questions 1.4 and 1.9. At the same

time, 68 percent of the respondents said they support India's diplomatic efforts in Afghanistan following the US's withdrawal in August 2021. Only 5 percent of respondents were *strongly opposed* to India's Afghanistan policy.

### 3.2 Can India protect its interests better in Afghanistan by improving relations with the Taliban? (% of all responses)




#### ***India must engage with the Taliban.***

When asked if India's interests in Afghanistan would be better safeguarded by improving relations with the Taliban, a plurality of the respondents (37 percent) agreed, while 32 percent disagreed and 23 percent answered 'Maybe'. As India's urban youth have less trust for Afghanistan compared to its other neighbours (see Question 2.5), they would like India to improve its relationship with the Taliban.

A majority of respondents across different educational qualifications, occupations, and income levels were of the view that India can protect its

interests in Afghanistan if it engages with the Taliban. This can be attributed to the following factors: the US's withdrawal from Afghanistan could accelerate current trends in India's relations with the United States, China, and Russia: greater cooperation with Washington, deeper conflicts with Beijing, and wider fissures in the traditional strategic partnership with Moscow. New Delhi's distancing from the Taliban can also cause a gap in the relationship between Russia and India. This will not bode well for India. As discussed in Question 1.2, India's urban youth consider Russia a highly trustworthy partner for India and thereby also safeguarding India-Russia relations is in India's interest.

### 3.3 Should India continue its political ties with the military government in Myanmar? (% of all responses)




#### ***India should continue to engage with the military government in Myanmar.***

When asked if India should continue its political ties with the military government in Myanmar, most respondents (74 percent) agreed with the proposition. Only 8 percent responded with 'neither agree nor disagree', 6 percent 'disagreed', and 3 percent 'strongly disagreed'. Broken down by occupation, 47 percent of self-employed professionals, 45 percent of government employees, and 43 percent of students agreed with India's current approach of seeking out talks with the military government of Myanmar.

The responses remained largely the same across education: across all categories, the responses were largely within the bracket of 30 to 37 percent. The support for India maintaining political engagement with the junta was recorded across geographical regions, too.

This can be attributed to the fact that Myanmar is among India's close neighbours and developments in that country can have a bearing on Indian foreign policy. Given that China is supporting the Myanmarese junta—which came to power through a coup in 2021—and is looking to have a more substantial role in the country, India too, is upping its game and balancing its relations with both the junta and the opposition.

### 3.4 Should India be concerned about the inflow of migrants from the neighbouring countries? (% of all responses)




***The inflow of migrants is a significant challenge for India.***

Another challenge facing India is the inflow of migrants from neighbouring countries. Eighty-four percent of the respondents agreed that it was a

concern; 5 percent said they 'neither agree or disagree', and nearly 7 percent either 'disagreed' or 'strongly disagreed'. The responses have been largely similar across the variables of geography, age, income, occupation, education, and employment.

### 3.5 Should India revive the SAARC? (% of all responses)




#### **SAARC is still relevant.**

India's urban youth (72 percent of respondents) strongly favoured the idea of reviving the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). The result is hardly unexpected, as respondents reported preference for multilateralism as India's platform for its global engagements (see Question 1.5). India is widely regarded in South Asia

as an influential state, and the revival of SAARC is perhaps seen as a mark of prestige for the country (see Question 1.6).

Broken down by region, there was greater support for the idea of reviving regional forums from among the respondents in the northern cities (43 percent) compared to the East (23 percent) and South (26 percent).

### 3.6 Do you support India's Vaccine Maitri? (% of all responses)




**India's Vaccine Maitri initiative was laudable.**

As COVID-19 first surged, India worked to fulfil its role as first responder and extended assistance to South Asian countries in the form of vaccines. Nine of every 10 respondents (90 percent) backed India's *Vaccine Maitri* initiative

for the country's South Asian neighbours. This result would be highly related to their concern about global pandemics (see Question 1.4) and healthcare preparedness (Question 1.9). Recall that the respondents also rated India's interactions and people-to-people contacts with its South Asian neighbours positively (see Question 2.3).

## 4. Perceptions on the US, China, Russia, and the European Union

### 4.1 How likely are each of the following powers to become India's leading partners? (% of all responses)



***The US and other Quad members are most likely to become India's leading partners in the future.***

While India's urban youth are of the view that Russia is India's most trusted partner (see Question 1.2), 85 percent of the respondents said the US is likely to become the country's leading partner over the next 10 years.

Other choices were Indo-Pacific partners, Australia (78 percent) and Japan (73 percent). The preference for Quad countries is similar to responses observed in Question 2.8. This response becomes more notable when viewed against the responses in Questions 1.3 and 1.7—where the youth expressed little enthusiasm for the Quad.

In the maiden survey of 2021, 78 percent of the respondents chose the US as India's leading partner in the coming decade, while 62 percent chose Australia; Russia and Japan scored evenly at 57 percent. In this present survey, the support for Russia has increased substantially, possibly due to more awareness amidst the Russia-Ukraine war and the difficult choices the conflict has brought for India.

The degree of support for Russia and the US hovers around similar proportions in the northern and southern parts of India. Support for Russia is distinctly high in

the eastern cities, while that for the US is higher in the western parts. In the northern cities, 47 percent of the respondents felt that Russia will most likely be India's leading partner in the future. In the South, support for Russia was at 46 percent of all respondents. In the eastern cities, 49 percent ranked Russia highest; and in the West, 32 percent ranked Russia highest.

A notable pattern is that with higher age, education level, and income level, the support for countries like Russia and Japan also increases; while for the United States, the support either remains the same or drops, with increase in these parameters.

In the lower age group of 18-25 where respondents were highly educated with postgraduate degrees, 24 percent (the plural majority) were of the view that Russia will most likely be India's leading partner in the future. In the age group of 26-35, among respondents who are postgraduates, 26 percent said Russia will most likely be India's leading partner in the future.


In terms of employment, Russia appeared to be favoured by respondents across all categories, followed by the United States. Similarly, in the 18-25 age group where respondents are self-employed, 18 percent chose Russia as India's most likely leading partner in the future.



Compared to 2021, the increase in respondents who see the US as India's leading partner in the next ten years is 7 percent. The increase in overall respondents perceiving Japan as India's

leading partner in the next ten years is 16 percent. The increase in overall respondents perceiving Russia as India's leading partner in the next ten years is 19 percent.

#### 4.2 What should India's position be if US-China tensions continue? (% of all responses)



***India should remain neutral in the event that US-China tensions escalate.***

More than 40 percent of the respondents said India should cooperate with the US and only 5 percent were of the view that India should cooperate with China. A substantial 49 percent said India should remain neutral, despite their concerns for China (as seen in Questions 1.3 and 1.4).

In the age group of 18-25, substantial proportions of respondents across occupation supported cooperation with the US: self-employed professionals (17 percent), business people (15 percent), government employees (21 percent), and private-sector employees (18 percent). Meanwhile, in the age group of 26-35,

the proportions of respondents who said India should support the US also hovered around the same rates: self-employed professionals (16 percent), business people (15 percent), government employees (10 percent), and private-sector employees (16 percent).

It appears that the higher the education level, the greater is the interest in India staying neutral. In the age group of 18-25, only 11 percent of respondents with postgraduate degrees favoured cooperation with the US, while 29 percent preferred staying neutral. In the age group of 26-37, about 13 percent respondents with postgraduate degrees favoured cooperation with the US, while a far higher 28 percent chose staying neutral.


From a regional perspective, 48 percent from the North, 32 percent from the West, 42 percent from the East, and 40 percent from the South preferred cooperation with the US. While 45 percent from the North, 58 percent from the West, 42 percent from the East, and 48 percent from the South preferred that India stay neutral.

In ORF's first survey in 2021, when asked what India's position should be if US-China tensions continue to escalate, a majority 62 percent had preferred cooperation with the US, and 32 percent

favoured a neutral stance. The Russian-Ukraine war could be a factor that is influencing preference for the country to stay neutral.

Compared to 2021 too, there is a decrease in overall respondents voting to cooperate with the US if US-China tensions continue to rise, by (-)21 percent, decrease in male respondents is (-)23 percent, decrease in female respondents is (-)18 percent. The increase in overall respondents, both male and female, voting to cooperate with China if US-China tension continue to rise, is less than 5 percent.

### 4.3 To what extent do you agree with these statements on India-US relations? (% of all responses)




***The United States is crucial to India's rise as a global power.***

Around 83 percent of respondents agreed that the support of the US is crucial to India's rise as a global power in the 21st century while about 70 percent agreed that the US-China trade war provides India with an opportunity to rise in the global markets. More than seven of every 10 respondents (74 percent) supported strong US-India cooperation under the

Quad banner to achieve the vision of a rules-based, free and open Indo-Pacific.

At 66 percent, a significant majority agreed that India's neutral stance on the Ukraine war will not impact India-US ties. This optimism is likely from the fact that India's urban youth see the US as India's most trustworthy partner in the future (see Question 4.1). The variation in age, gender, education, employment, and income had no notable impact on the responses.

**4.4 To what extent do you agree with these statements on India-Russia relations? (% of all responses)**



***Defence ties between India and Russia remain robust but there are concerns over strengthening Russia-China ties.***


Half of the respondents (50 percent) *strongly agreed* that defence relations with Russia are important to India but overall, 73 percent also agreed that India and Russia have very limited economic ties, which is a challenge for the relationship. This perception has also likely had an impact on their view of Russia as India's future most reliable partner (see Question 4.1) The higher the age and income level, the greater is the support for India-Russia defence ties and concern over limited Russia-India economic ties.

For example, in the age group of 18-25, among respondents earning above INR 80,000 per month, 29 percent supported Russia-India defence ties, while in the age group of 26-35, 40 percent of respondents

from the same income bracket supported Russia-India defence ties. Similarly, in the age group of 18-25, among respondents earning above INR 80,000 per month, only 4 percent are concerned about limited Russia-India economic ties, while in the age group of 26-35, more than 10 percent respondents from the same income bracket worry about limited Russia-India economic ties.

Some 47 percent of the respondents were of the view that India and Russia are drifting away from each other. About 68 percent agreed that stronger Russia-China relations is a cause of concern for India. Respondents from the northern cities (45 percent), and the West (30 percent) are most bothered by growing China-Russia ties, while respondents from the eastern states (18 percent) and southern states (15 percent) are least concerned. Sixty-eight percent are of the opinion that India's neutral stance on the Ukraine war serves India-Russia ties well.

#### 4.5 To what extent do you agree with these statements on India-China relations? (% of all responses)



#### ***China poses a challenge to India's rise as a global power.***

More than seven of every 10 respondents (71 percent) were of the view that China poses a global challenge to India's rise, and specifically, 47 percent *strongly agreed* that China is a threat to India's land borders. Respondents from the northern cities (65 percent) and the West (45 percent) feel more strongly on the China challenge than those from the eastern states (37 percent) and the South (35 percent).

About 38 percent of the respondents *strongly agreed* that India has responded effectively to China after the Galwan Valley clash. Slightly over 33 percent *strongly agreed* that India should expand its ties with the US in order to balance China's rise, while 54 percent believed India should also improve its economic ties with China. These responses would be related to the respondents having a memory of the Indo-China war, and also pointing to the Galwan clashes as an important turning point in India's history (Question 1.3). Moreover, 82 percent of


the respondents view the border conflicts with China as a significant continuing challenge to India (see Question 1.4).

Recall that respondents preferred that India stay neutral on China when approached through the prism of US-China great-power competition, (see Question 4.2). However, when it comes to China posing direct threats to India's border, the respondents preferred aligning with the US to counter China. In other words, it can be argued that choosing neutrality does not necessarily mean that India's youth is shy of preferences between China and the US, but rather they could be more keen to utilise the

opportunity created by the worsening US-China competition to maximise India's room for manoeuvre, to independently pursue its national interests.

Also a trend that might be counterintuitive is that although India's youth see China as the biggest challenge to India's rise, they voted (around 26 percent) for BRICS as the most promising multilateral forum for India's foreign policy goals (Question 1.7). They chose BRICS over other forums like Quad, BIMSTEC, and G20. It will be interesting to see how this apparent contradiction will impact the future course of BRICS.

#### 4.6 To what extent do you agree from these statements on India-EU relations? (% of all responses)



***India views the EU as a favourable partner.***

India's urban youth have a limited perception of the EU being the country's most trusted partner at present (see Question 1.2). EU was also the second-least preferred partner for India in the future (see Question 4.1). But 72 percent of respondents agreed that the EU views India as a reliable partner in the Indo-Pacific even as 61 percent said the EU is too geographically distant to play a role in the Indo-Pacific. About 67 percent of the respondents were of the view that the EU's close economic and political ties with China are a concern for India.

More than one-third of the respondents (37 percent) strongly believe that India should develop deeper trade ties with the EU. Around 69 percent agreed that India can also learn from the EU about the critical elements in building a regional organisation in South Asia. This response indicates Indian youth's preference for multilateralism (Question 1.5) and the revival of SAARC (Question 3.5)

The variation in age, gender, education, employment, and income had no notable impact on the responses.

# Scope for Future Research



**T**his poll has attempted to provide important insights into how India's youth are perceiving and engaging with the country's foreign policy. The poll covered a wide range of topics that dominated India's foreign policy in the past year.

The poll was comprehensive as it captured the youth's awareness of historical events that have characterised the conduct of Indian foreign policy, their present concerns such as the COVID-19 pandemic, terrorism, and non-traditional security threats like climate

change, as well as their rising interest in multilateralism as a platform for India's national ambitions. The survey gave particular attention to the latest developments in India's neighbourhood that impact India's interests, as well as the youth's assessment of the country's recent strategic engagements in its neighbourhood. It captured their positive and negative perceptions of India's different neighbours, and the factors influencing either their trust or distrust of these countries. This survey also contributes to the foreign-policy literature of India by describing the youth's perceptions of the country's relations with global powers, and how cooperation with



them could assist India's development trajectory.

Scholars and policymakers alike, both in India and overseas who are studying and tracking Indian foreign policymaking, will benefit from this survey. The poll and the accompanying analysis of its results gauge public sentiment in India, particularly among the youth who will reap the benefits or else bear the consequences of the country's policymaking.

This survey can serve as an important reference point for carrying out future research on both the theoretical aspects of Indian foreign policy, and its practice. ORF offers this annual survey as a pilot project whose scale and scope can be enhanced in the coming years to cover wider sections of the Indian polity. It is in expanding this survey—to include different demographic cohorts, tier-2 cities, rural districts, and different socioeconomic groups as well—that the exercise can provide a more representative view of Indian thinking on contemporary global geopolitics and the country's rightful place in it.

# Appendices



## A. The Probability of Responses Which Rate Foreign Policy Positively: A Statistical Model

The following probit model was employed to assess the impact of factors such as age, gender, education, employment, income, and geography, on the probability of responses which rate foreign policy positively:

Probability (Positive rating of foreign policy/Age, Gender, Education, Employment, Income, Geographical zone)

$$= \beta_0 + \beta_1 * \text{Age} + \beta_2 * \text{Gender} + \beta_3 * \text{Education} + \beta_4 * \text{Employment} + \beta_5 * \text{South} + \beta_6 * \text{East} + \beta_7 * \text{West} + \beta_8 * \text{Lower Middle Income} + \beta_9 * \text{Middle Income} + \beta_{10} * \text{Upper Middle Income} + \beta_{11} * \text{Higher Income} + \text{error term}$$

(1)

Where:

Education = 1, if education of the respondent is more than Class 12

= 0, if education of the respondent is lower or equal to Class 12

Employment = 1, if the respondent is employed

= 0, if the respondent is unemployed

Gender = 1, if the respondent is a male

= 0, if the respondent is a female

Lower Middle Income = 1, if respondent's income is in the lower middle-income category

= 0, otherwise

Middle Income = 1, if respondent's income is in the middle-income category

= 0, otherwise

Upper Middle Income = 1, if respondent's income is in the upper middle-income category

= 0, otherwise

High Income = 1, if respondent's income is in the higher income category

= 0, otherwise

South = 1, if the respondent is from South India

= 0, otherwise

East =1, if the respondent is from East India

= 0, otherwise

West =1, if the respondent is from West India

= 0, otherwise

The above probit regression model has been estimated using R software.[1] The result of the estimation procedure of this model have been tabulated below:

**Table 1: Output of probit regression model in (1)**

Regression coefficient	Estimate	Std. Error	z value	Pr> z
$\beta_0$	1.84434	0.19097	9.658	<2e-16 ***
$\beta_1$	-0.01027	0.00659	-1.558	0.1191
$\beta_2$	-0.20041	0.08169	-2.453	0.0142*
$\beta_3$	0.04595	0.07119	0.646	0.5186
$\beta_4$	0.01081	0.08468	0.128	0.8984
$\beta_5$	-0.22862	0.09499	-2.407	0.0161*
$\beta_6$	-0.17529	0.08664	-2.023	0.0430*
$\beta_7$	0.03581	0.10323	0.347	0.7287
$\beta_8$	0.20174	0.09003	2.241	0.0250*
$\beta_9$	0.17530	0.09499	1.846	0.0650
$\beta_{10}$	0.08567	0.19605	0.437	0.6621
$\beta_{11}$	0.66837	0.39932	1.674	0.0942

Signif. codes: 0 '\*\*\*' 0.001 '\*\*' 0.01 '\*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

From Table 1, it is clear that the variation in age, education and employment have no statistically significant impact on the probability of responses which rate foreign policy positively. The variation in gender, income, and geography of the respondent influences this probability. Therefore, the variables of age, education, and employment are removed from the model and the following resultant model is estimated:

$$\text{Probability (Positive rating of foreign policy/ Gender, Income, Geographical zone)} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * \text{Gender} + \beta_2 * \text{South} + \beta_3 * \text{East} + \beta_4 * \text{West} + \beta_5 * \text{Lower Middle Income} + \beta_6 * \text{Middle Income} + \beta_7 * \text{Upper Middle Income} + \beta_8 * \text{Higher Income} + \text{error term} \quad (2)$$

**Table 2: Output of probit regression model in (2)**

Regression coefficient	Estimate	Std. Error	z value	Pr> z
$\beta_0$	1.58709	0.09028	17.580	<2e-16 ***
$\beta_1$	-0.17646	0.06929	-2.547	0.0109 *
$\beta_2$	-0.23760	0.09429	-2.520	0.0117 *
$\beta_3$	-0.17924	0.08642	-2.074	0.0381 *
$\beta_4$	0.03696	0.10285	0.359	0.7193
$\beta_5$	0.20342	0.08937	2.276	0.0228 *
$\beta_6$	0.17889	0.09118	1.962	0.0498 *
$\beta_7$	0.08701	0.19329	0.450	0.6526
$\beta_8$	0.70835	0.40076	1.768	0.0771

Signif. codes: 0 '\*\*\*' 0.001 '\*\*' 0.01 '\*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

In the context of gender, the probability of rating foreign policy positively is greater among females than males. In the context of geographical region, the probability of rating foreign policy positively is lower among respondents belonging to South India and East India when compared with the respondents from North India. However, this probability is the same for the respondents in the West and North

India. As regards income, the probability is lower among respondents belonging to the lower income group when compared with those belonging to lower middle- and middle-income groups. This probability is the same for respondents in the lower, upper middle- and higher-income groups. Based on the above regression estimates, the probabilities of rating foreign policy positively are calculated below:

**Table 3: Probability of rating foreign policy positively for demographic group**

Demographic group	Probability of rating foreign policy positively in the interval [0,1]
Female respondents from North and West India belonging to the lower, upper middle- and higher-income groups	0.94
Male respondents from North and West India belonging to the lower, upper middle- and higher-income groups	0.92
Female respondents from South India belonging to the lower, upper middle- and higher-income groups	0.91
Male respondents from South India belonging to the lower, upper middle- and higher-income groups	0.88
Female respondents from East India belonging to the lower, upper middle- and higher-income groups	0.92
Male respondents from East India belonging to the lower, upper middle- and higher-income groups	0.89
Female respondents from North and West India belonging to the lower middle-income group	0.96

Demographic group	Probability of rating foreign policy positively in the interval [0,1]
Female respondents from North and West India belonging to the middle-income group	0.96
Male respondents from North and West India belonging to the lower-middle income group	0.95
Male respondents from North and West India belonging to the middle-income group	0.94
Female respondents from South India belonging to the lower middle-income group	0.94
Female respondents from South India belonging to the middle-income group	0.94
Male respondents from South India belonging to the lower-middle income group	0.91
Male respondents from South India belonging to the middle-income group	0.91
Female respondents from East India belonging to the lower middle-income group	0.95
Female respondents from East India belonging to the middle-income group	0.94
Male respondents from East India belonging to the lower-middle income group	0.92
Male respondents from East India belonging to the middle-income group	0.92

[1] The estimation does not include responses of neutral and don't know/can't say

## B. Tables of Survey Results

### 1. Indian Foreign Policy

#### Q1. How would you rate India for its foreign policy on an overall basis?

Very good	25.02 %
Good	51.68 %
Neutral	15.2 %
Poor	3.3 %
Very poor	1.7 %
Don't know/can't say	3.1 %

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#### Q2. According to you, which country has been India's most trusted partner since its Independence?

Russia	42.54%
The United States of America	26.7%
The United Kingdom	4.12%
France	5.44%
European Union	2.74%
Israel	4.62%
None of the above	2.3%
Don't know/Can't say	11.54%



**Q3. What has been the biggest turning point in Indian Foreign Policy in the last 75 years?**

India China War (1962)	13.42%
The Liberation War of Bangladesh in 1971 / Indo-Pakistan war 1971	11.62%
The Cold War	6.26%
End of the Cold War and Collapse of the Soviet Union (1989-91)	3.46%
Liberalization of the Indian economy and the Strategic Pivot (1991-91)	8.7%
Pokhran Nuclear test (1998)	16.12%
Indo - US civil nuclear deal 2008	6.88%
The Quad Leaders' Summit 2021	3.2%
Galwan Valley clash between Indian and Chinese forces in 2020	9.38%
Don't know/Can't say	20.96%

**Q4. How concerned are you about the following major foreign policy challenges facing India?**

	Very Concerned	Somewhat Concerned	Neither concerned nor unconcerned	Somewhat unconcerned	Not concerned at all	Don't know/ Can't say
Border Conflicts with China	50.9%	33.42%	4.5%	2.26%	4.46%	4.46%
Border Conflicts with Pakistan	51.62%	30.08%	4.76%	2.78%	6.74%	4.02%
Global pandemics (like COVID-19)	62.2%	26.58%	3.64%	1.88%	3.76%	1.94%
Climate Change	49.62%	34.32%	5.42%	2.44%	4.48%	3.72%
Terrorism	60.7%	25.08%	3.48%	2.66%	4.44%	3.64%
Cyber Security	50.28%	32.64%	5.04%	2.72%	3.96%	5.36%
Economic disruption post COVID-19	64.3%	25.54%	3.4%	2%	2.7%	2.06%

**Q5. In your opinion, what should be India's preferred mode of engagement with other countries?**

Global cooperation through multilateral platforms	34.02%
Cooperation with like-minded countries through mini-lateral platforms	21.5%
Bilateral engagement	24.48%
No engagement at all	6.78%
Don't Know/Can't Say	13.22%

**Q6. India seeks to secure a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council. Do you personally think that this is an important goal for India?**

Very Important	70.38 %
Somewhat Important	20.66%
Neither important nor unimportant	2.24%
Somewhat Unimportant	0.84%
Very Unimportant	1.08%
Don't know/can't say	4.8%

**Q7. Which of the following new forms of global collaboration is the most beneficial forum for achieving India's foreign policy goals?**

SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Operation)	6.48%
Quad (The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue)	11.84%
BIMSTEC (The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation)	9.8%
BRICS (Group of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa)	25.72%
G20 (Group of Twenty is an intergovernmental forum)	9.48%
None of these	8.22%
Don't know/Can't say	28.46%

**Q8. Are you aware of G20?**

Yes	25.82%
No	74.18%

**Q9. India will assume the G20 Presidency on 1 December 2022 from Indonesia and will convene the G20 Leaders' Summit for the first time in India in 2023. Which of the following issues should be India's major policy priorities for discussion and action at the G20? Please rank the top 5 in order of importance**

	1	2	3	4	5
Climate finance and climate adaptation	35.74%	23.8%	17.69%	11.94%	10.46%
Health preparedness	25.07%	29.97%	17.28%	16.38%	10.79%
Global food security	18.45%	24.64%	29.28%	18.45%	8.76%
Measures against terror and terror financing	18.12%	18.43%	21.22%	25.26%	16.15%
Data and Tech governance to make it reliable, consistent, and trustworthy	13.94%	14.16%	19.18%	23.41%	28.32%
Ensuring availability and equality of opportunities to access financial services for all	11.37%	14.93%	18.72%	22.75%	30.33%
Reform of Multilateralism to ensure that only the few powerful nations don't have all the say	7.41%	10.77%	20.2%	24.92%	33.67%
Creating funds for SMEs and Start-Up financing	9.25%	14.38%	13.36%	25.68%	32.88%
Promoting Sustainable Consumption	12.15%	6.08%	20.99%	22.1%	33.15%
Gender Empowerment	12.9%	10.14%	12.44%	18.89%	44.47%

## 2. India's Neighbourhood Policies

**Q.10. For each of the following neighbouring countries, please indicate how much you trust each of these nations to overall act responsibly in the neighbourhood.**

	Trust Completely	Trust Somewhat	Neither Trust nor Distrust	Distrust Somewhat	Distrust Completely	Don't know / Can't Say
Sri Lanka	14.62%	49.62%	9.76%	6.24%	11.18%	8.58%
Maldives	13.06%	47.48%	8.42%	4.56%	7.94%	18.54%
Bhutan	17.02%	45.82%	8.38%	5%	9.92%	13.86%
Nepal	20.12%	49.7%	7.08%	5.22%	9.58%	8.3%
Afghanistan	4.44%	28.96%	11.2%	10.74%	32.16%	12.5%
Bangladesh	10.36%	46.6%	10.88%	7.38%	15.24%	9.54%
Pakistan	1.9%	8.52%	5.16%	5.74%	71.2%	7.48%
Mauritius	9.48%	42.24%	11.34%	5.14%	9.62%	22.18%

**Q.11. How do you assess the status of India's bilateral relationship with each of the following neighbouring countries?**

	Very Good	Good	Neutral	Poor	Very Poor	Don't Know / Can't Say
Sri Lanka	10.06%	51.4%	19.08%	6.68%	3.2%	9.56%
Maldives	9.58%	46.1%	17.06%	5.56%	2.46%	19.24%
Bhutan	11.58%	46.02%	17.94%	5.98%	3.06%	15.42%
Nepal	13.06%	53.82%	15.42%	5.06%	2.96%	9.68%
Afghanistan	3.4%	26.08%	24.34%	17.02%	14.16%	15%
Bangladesh	8.18%	45%	21.46%	9.38%	4.98%	11%
Pakistan	1.64%	6.72%	9.88%	19.04%	55.24%	7.48%
Mauritius	7.74%	41.58%	18.28%	5.72%	2.82%	23.86%

**Q12. What do you think about the levels of interaction between India and each of the following neighbouring countries in the last 5 years?**

	Increased Significantly	Increased Somewhat	Remained unchanged	Decreased Somewhat	Decreased Significantly	Don't Know / can't say
Sri Lanka	11.92%	39.7%	21.84%	7.92%	3.34%	15.28%
Maldives	8.9%	34.32%	22.64%	6.22%	3.18%	24.74%
Bhutan	10.32%	35.66%	23.78%	6.06%	2.9%	21.28%
Nepal	13.44%	41.6%	20.22%	7.16%	2.84%	14.74%
Afghanistan	5.36%	25.42%	22.74%	14.9%	11.44%	20.14%
Bangladesh	9.2%	37.18%	24.22%	8.26%	4.66%	16.48%
Pakistan	4.84%	11.28%	19.5%	13.12%	36.76%	14.5%
Mauritius	7.7%	31.08%	22.76%	6.34%	2.94%	29.18%

**Q.13. To what extent do you agree that Indian foreign policy adequately defines its neighbourhood?**

Strongly Agree	37.18%
Agree	42.22%
Neither agree nor disagree	7.62%
Disagree	3.78%
Strongly Disagree	2.68%
Don't know/Can't say	6.52%

**Q.14. Has Indian foreign policy towards its neighbourhood been adequate enough in terms of the following:**

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Dis-agree	Strongly Disagree	Don't know/ Can't say
Trade	33.7%	51.64%	5.26%	3.3%	1.54%	4.56%
Security	30.34%	50.66%	7.52%	5.58%	2.16%	3.74%
Political engagement	20.5%	47.52%	11.68%	8.7%	3.94%	7.66%
Cultural ties	22.44%	52.66%	9.42%	5.52%	2.54%	7.42%
People to people contacts	25.08%	53.52%	8.42%	5.26%	2.08%	5.64%
Infrastructure and connectivity	21.88%	48.72%	8.66%	5.22%	3.14%	12.38%

**Q.15. In the context of India's neighbourhood, which of the following regions is of most strategic importance to India?**

South Asia	35.86%
Southeast Asia	12.28%
Indo-Pacific	11.06%
West Asia	6%
Central Asia	12.52%
Don't know/Can't say	22.28%



**Q.16. With recent developments in the Indo-Pacific, which of the following could become India's most important partner in the coming years? Please rank in order of preference:**

	1 <sup>st</sup> preference	2 <sup>nd</sup> preference	3 <sup>rd</sup> preference	4 <sup>th</sup> preference	5 <sup>th</sup> preference	6 <sup>th</sup> preference
Australia	29.6%	30.22%	18.64%	10.8%	6.12%	4.62%
Japan	30.64%	25.3%	19.64%	12.48%	7.06%	4.88%
Indonesia	7.58%	12.98%	24.48%	27.04%	16.84%	11.08%
Taiwan	4.58%	7.22%	10.58%	18.5%	28.6%	30.52%
Singapore	19.28%	16.98%	17.8%	15.92%	18.22%	11.8%
Vietnam	8.34%	7.34%	8.86%	15.24%	23.14%	37.08%

**Q.17. Do you think, India's current policy of not engaging extensively with Pakistan is beneficial or detrimental for regional peace and stability?**

Mostly Beneficial	28.32%
Somewhat Beneficial	30.02%
Neither beneficial nor detrimental	11.06%
Somewhat Detrimental	12.28%
Mostly Detrimental	11.94%
Don't know/Can't say	6.38%

### 3. India's stand and response to significant events in the Neighbourhood

#### Q. 18. How much do you support India's foreign policy towards Afghanistan following US withdrawal from the country?

Strongly support	28.5%
Somewhat support	40.04%
Neither support not oppose	12.5%
Somewhat oppose	5.32%
Strongly oppose	4.96%
Don't Know/Can't Say	8.68%

#### Q.19. Do you think, India can protect its interests better in Afghanistan by improving relations with the Taliban?

Yes	37.46%
No	32.12%
Maybe	22.9%
Don't Know/Can't Say	7.52%

#### Q.20. Do you think, India should be concerned about the inflow of migrants from the neighbouring countries?

Strongly Agree	52.54%
Agree	30.86%
Neither agree nor disagree	5.12%
Disagree	4.88%
Strongly Disagree	2.72%
Don't know/Can't say	3.88%

**Q.21. Do you think, India should continue its political ties with the military government in Myanmar?**

Strongly Agree	33.96%
Agree	39.68%
Neither agree nor disagree	7.88%
Disagree	5.76%
Strongly Disagree	3.44%
Don't know/Can't say	9.28%

**Q.22. Do you think India should revive the SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation)?**

Strongly Agree	34.32%
Agree	37.64%
Neither agree nor disagree	7.08%
Disagree	4.7%
Strongly Disagree	3.16%
Don't know/Can't say	13.1%

**Q.23. How much do you support India's decision to export vaccines under Vaccine Maitri (Vaccine Diplomacy)?**

Strongly support	66.58%
Somewhat support	22.8%
Neither support nor oppose	4.12%
Somewhat oppose	2.02%
Strongly oppose	2.02%
Don't know/Can't say	2.46%

#### 4. Perceptions on US, China, Russia and EU

24. In the next 10 years, how likely are each of the following powers to become India's leading partners?

	Very Likely (%)	Somewhat likely (%)	Neither likely nor unlikely (%)	Somewhat Unlikely (%)	Very Unlikely (%)	Don't know/ can't say (%)
US	41.22	44.10	5.26	2.08	1.80	5.54
Australia	24.34	54.14	8.00	2.86	2.78	7.88
Japan	29.94	42.94	9.06	4.32	5.36	8.38
Russia	44.28	32.52	6.84	4.00	4.58	7.78
UK	21.86	45.92	11.34	4.52	4.58	11.78
France	21.54	48.22	9.90	4.76	4.50	11.08
European Union	16.08	47.08	11.96	4.36	6.32	14.20
China	5.58	18.44	11.12	8.60	44.60	11.66

25. What should be India's position if US-China tensions continue to rise? India should ....

	Single Choice (%)
Cooperate with the US	40.76
Cooperate with China	4.96
Remain neutral	48.68
Don't know/Can't say	5.60

**26. The following are some statements on India's relations with the United States. Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the statements?**

	Strongly Agree (%)	Agree (%)	Neither agree nor disagree (%)	Disagree (%)	Strongly disagree (%)	Don't know/ can't say (%)
Support of US is extremely important for India to rise as a global power in the 21st century	37.26	45.70	5.40	3.58	2.68	5.38
The Kargil War was a major event that elevated India – US Relationship	28.06	46.60	7.54	5.56	3.46	8.78
The Indian diaspora in the US plays an important role in improving India-US ties.	39.66	39.98	7.04	4.20	1.80	7.32
The US – China trade war provides India with an opportunity to rise in the global markets	26.08	44.22	8.26	7.68	4.38	9.38
India and the US should strengthen the Quad to achieve a rules-based, free and open Indo - Pacific	31.98	41.92	6.62	3.90	2.68	12.90
India's neutral stand on the Ukraine war will not impact India-US ties.	24.34	42.02	8.94	8.58	5.10	11.02

**27. The following are some statements on India's relations with China. Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the statements?**

	Strongly Agree (%)	Agree (%)	Neither agree nor disagree (%)	Disagree (%)	Strongly disagree (%)	Don't know/can't say (%)
China poses a global challenge to India's rise	29.50	42.42	7.84	6.40	5.02	8.80
China is a threat to India's land borders	46.84	35.24	4.74	4.64	2.98	5.56
India should further develop its economic ties with China	17.70	35.76	10.00	13.24	16.58	6.72
India should expand its ties with the US in order to balance against China's rise	33.40	40.40	7.30	6.78	5.08	7.04
India has responded effectively to China after the Galwan Valley clash	37.56	35.06	6.06	5.02	3.82	12.48

**28. The following are some statements on India's relations with Russia. Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the statements?**

	Strongly Agree (%)	Agree (%)	Neither agree nor disagree (%)	Disagree (%)	Strong disagree (%)	Don't know/ can't say (%)
Defence relations with Russia are important to India	49.58	36.96	3.24	2.38	1.64	6.20
India and Russia have very limited economic ties	24.18	48.62	7.00	6.88	4.40	8.92
Strengthening of Russia-China relations is a cause for worry	28.68	38.88	9.48	9.22	5.74	8.00
India and Russia have been drifting away from each other	13.78	32.78	10.46	17.20	15.16	10.62
India's neutral stand on the Ukraine war serves India-Russia ties well.	25.88	42.36	8.50	6.70	4.68	11.88

**29. The following are some statements on India's relations with the European Union (EU). Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the statements?**

	Strongly Agree (%)	Agree (%)	Neither agree nor disagree (%)	Disagree (%)	Strongly disagree (%)	Don't know/ can't say (%)
India should develop deeper trade ties with the EU	37.20	46.00	4.36	2.80	1.70	7.94
The EU views India as a reliable partner in the Indo-Pacific	24.38	48.18	8.56	4.56	2.08	12.24
The EU's close economic and political ties with China are a concern for India	25.24	42.06	9.10	8.44	4.48	10.68
The EU is too geographically distant to play a role in the Indo-Pacific	17.98	42.54	10.22	8.38	3.82	17.06
India can learn from the EU about the critical elements in building a regional organisation in South Asia	24.32	44.94	7.84	5.28	3.20	14.42



## C. A Note on Quality Control

Throughout the fieldwork, multi-level back checks were completed to ensure interview quality. The following types of field checks were conducted:

- Accompaniments, spot-checks, and in-person back-checks by Field Supervisors
- Project Manager's personal spot-checks and call-backs
- Telephonic and face-to-face back-checks by an Independent QC team from the central office of Impetus Research.

The internal QC team performed telephonic back-checks and after-data QC. The field supervisors and team leaders conducted physical and telephonic back-checks by reaching out to the respondents and re-checking a few randomly selected questions to match their responses with the responses recorded by the interviewers in the survey.

In total, 5,000 interviews were conducted and included in the final dataset delivered

to ORF. 2,096 out of 5,000 interviews in the final dataset were back-checked, which means a back-check rate of 42 percent.

## D. Statement of Survey Limitations

Efforts were taken at the survey conceptualisation and implementation stages to ensure that the methodology guiding our poll survey was robust. The ORF and Impetus Research teams, however, admit to certain limitations.

1. The target population of 18-35 years were mostly accessible only during the evening, after work hours. This meant that the survey team had less hours per day to administer the questionnaire.
2. The survey administrators met with less cooperation from certain communities in cities like Hyderabad and Bengaluru.
3. Rains and floods adversely affected fieldwork in Guwahati, Mumbai, Hyderabad, Bangalore, Jaipur and Vijaywada.

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