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India-Pakistan Relations after Mumbai Attacks

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Abstract

This Paper makes a critical appraisal of India-Pakistan relations and explores their future trajectory in the aftermath of the Mumbai terrorist attack of November 2008. The rising tide of terrorism within Pakistan after 9/11 and the importance of South Asia to the United States made Pakistan selectively withdraw support to terrorist groups. This, in turn, helped India's efforts to initiate the Composite Dialogue in 2004. The Dialogue led to a ceasefire along the Line of Control, encouraged possibilities of bilateral trade, inspired greater people-to-people contact and helped create conditions conducive for mature negotiations. The Mumbai attack pushed the peace process close to the brink of failure but was not completely scuttled, due to the tenacity and composure of the top leadership in both the countries. The Paper's central thesis is that the peace process cannot be held hostage to acts of terrorism and India and Pakistan, must keep the communication channels open even during the worst of crises, and not let non-State actors and their State sponsors derail or dictate foreign policy objectives of sovereign nations.

Introduction

There is perhaps no other bilateral relationship which has attracted such intense global scrutiny for over six decades as the India-Pakistan relationship. The reasons for such an interest, which often encouraged direct and indirect interference by various powers, are not difficult to identify. The relationship, for one, has been acrimonious, and also viciously violent, causing death and destruction of several thousand people in four military conflicts, and has the potential of bringing the world to perhaps its first nuclear confrontation.

A more recent concern has been the growth and expansion of terrorist and extremist groups, and tendencies, in Pakistan which pose a threat not only to the region, but also to the world. An unstable Asia can unsettle the present geo-political and economic order. The key to a stable Asia lies in how India and Pakistan,

with the baggage of a bitter history and an arsenal of nuclear weapons, learn to live together, peacefully, as neighbours.

This paper is an assessment of how far both India and Pakistan have reached in keeping hopes of such a rapprochement alive, particularly the Composite Dialogue, despite grave provocations to withdraw from such a process of negotiations. The Paper, in particular, analyses relations between the two countries following the deadly terror attack in Mumbai on November 26, 2008.

The Paper is broadly divided into three sections—the first section deals with the historical provocations which have bedeviled the relationship for more than half a century; the second section looks at the India-Pakistan Peace Process which began, in all earnest, in

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January 2004 when former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, on a visit to Srinagar, against conventional wisdom and advice of his colleagues and officials, declared a unilateral ceasefire and extended the idea of a peace process. The third part will assess the outcome of the process, and attempt to study the possible trajectory of the dialogue given the changed domestic political and military situation in Pakistan, and the threat of terrorism looming large over post-Mumbai South Asia.

Uneasy history

The relationship has been hostage to two predominantly historical factors, notably Partition and the Kashmir dispute, which in turn provoked four border conflicts and almost a two-decade long proxy war in Kashmir and other parts of India. This long and acrimonious relationship has stoked, and sustained, mutual demonisation which, even today, continues to reflect majority opinion in both countries. This process of demonisation, amply reflected in the popular media, books and films, has been fanned by religious differences, and military-political compulsions in both the countries, more so in Pakistan where the military has come to dominate the decision making process, even during civilian reign.

The Indian policy towards Pakistan (many experts doubt the existence of an articulated policy), for better part of the last 60 years and more, has been unambiguous in its suspicion and distrust, particularly after attempts to strike a cordial note in the relationship were met, squarely, by wars and proxy wars. Besides the four wars in the first 25 years of Independence, the brutal proxy war in Kashmir, the persistent and loud anti-India rhetoric by every Pakistani Prime Minister and President and the heavy presence of ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence directorate) sleeper cells in big and small towns across India to provoke communal violence and divide the society only added to the existing distrust about Pakistan. Even those among the political leadership in India who viewed the relationship in a different perspective (Prime Minister I.K. Gujral, for instance) remained circumspect about talking peace with the 'enemy' Pakistan.

In Pakistan, such ambiguities about India had no place in the public discourse. The majority of Pakistanis believed in the 'unfinished agenda of Partition', supported the 'cause' of Kashmir, and jihad to free Muslim areas from a Hindu India. The military exploited such deep-rooted sentiments to promote a virulent anti-India stance to justify its overarching

authority over the country, and its economic and political interests. New Delhi's forceful actions post-1947 in Hyderabad, Junagarh and Jammu and Kashmir, and the 1971 division of Pakistan with the creation of Bangladesh only heightened fear and hatred towards India. The vulnerability of military assets and bases from a possible Indian land, air and sea assault went a considerable way in shaping Pakistan's offensive strategy against India. This strategy included the sponsorship of a low-cost proxy war in Kashmir, a factor which derailed any hopes of a working relationship between the two neighbours.

Peace process

Though the peace process followed a tumultuous period—Kargil conflict, a coup in Pakistan and a military build-up on the border following a terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament and hence an intense global pressure to cool off—it had its origins in the Gujral Doctrine¹. The doctrine, which drew its premise from Jawahar Lal Nehru's Panchsheel principles, marked the beginning of a more liberal, broad-approach to foreign policy issues. Such a stance eschewed aggressive intent and adopted economic, political and social aspects of a bilateral relationship as cornerstones of India's foreign policy. In many ways, the new policy was a turnabout from the military-centric posturing and policies which had become counter-productive in times of sweeping geo-political changes in the post-Cold War age.

Gujral, free of the compulsions of party politics and the traditional aggressive rhetoric, took courage to break the ice and decided to talk to the 'enemy' face to face. The first of a series of meetings took place on March 28-31, 1997, followed in quick succession by Gujral's meeting with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, and between the two Foreign Secretaries, all of which culminated in a comprehensive agreement. Both the countries agreed to stop the futile rhetoric against each other, liberalise visa procedures, release prisoners, and put Tulbul navigation project, Sir Creek and Siachen disputes on the table, increase people-to-people contact and work towards a better bilateral trade and commerce.

Ironically, it was Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, whose 'Hindutva' party been advocating an aggressive anti-Pakistan stance, who picked up from where Gujral left, and against all odds and advice, decided to take the path of peace and negotiations. Vajpayee, himself a more liberally inclined politician than most of his senior colleagues in Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and

his National Security Advisor, Brajesh Mishra, considered India's relations with Pakistan a 'negative factor' in India's foreign policy² and was quite keen to correct the anomaly.

Though Vajpayee's initial attempts (the Lahore Declaration³) to establish a framework for peace were met with obstacles, first by the Kargil conflict, and subsequently the failure of the Agra Summit, the Indian Premier's persistence, and some analysts argue the involvement of Washington, brought tangible results in 2004. On January 6, 2004 Vajpayee and Musharraf met on the sidelines of the SAARC Summit in Islamabad and decided to open negotiations with a significant commitment on part of Pakistan that it would not allow terrorist groups targeting India to operate from its soil⁴. The statement was followed by a three-day official level 'talk on talks' in Islamabad on February 18, 2004 which laid the groundwork of the Composite Dialogue.

The Composite Dialogue

To create a formal structure of the dialogue on issues, the India-Pakistan Joint Commission, which last met in 1989, was revived. The commission met under the co-chairmanship of the two Foreign Ministers in Islamabad on October 4, 2005 and decided to establish Technical Level Working Groups on Agriculture, Health, Science & Technology, Information, Education, I.T. & Telecommunications, Environment and Tourism.

The outcome of these discussions led to the creation of a formal structure of the Composite Dialogue. On its agenda were eight issues:

1. Siachen
2. Sir Creek
3. Tulbal Navigation Project
4. Terrorism & Drug Trafficking
5. Economic & Commercial Cooperation
6. Promotion of Friendly Exchanges
7. Peace & Security, including CBMs
8. Jammu & Kashmir

Till date, five rounds of discussion on the Composite Dialogue have taken place. The fifth round of the Dialogue was initiated on July 20, 2008 but remains incomplete after the process was put on pause following the Mumbai attacks⁵.

The singular achievement of the Dialogue, till now, has been the ceasefire on the International Border, Line of Control and Actual Ground Position Line (Siachen),

which came into effect in November 2003.

There have been, undoubtedly, other gains from the process, notably increased people-to-people contact through trade and transit facilities, and an entire slew of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), both civilian and military, which contributed considerably in creating an atmosphere of cordiality.

Some tangible outcomes⁶ are listed below:

- ◆ Judicial Committee on Prisoners. There are over 300 Indian fishermen, 342 boats and 199 (estimated) prisoners in Pakistan's custody. Of these, 73 are Indian Missing Defence Personnel, including 53 from the 1971 war. Pakistan has consistently denied their presence. There are no Pakistani Prisoners of War (POW) in India. The Judicial Committee on Prisoners, set up after External Affairs Minister's visit to Islamabad in January 2007, comprises retired judges from both the countries and it held its first meeting on February 26, 2008.
- ◆ Joint Anti-Terrorism Mechanism (JATM). The mechanism was established after the meeting between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Musharraf on September 16, 2006 in Havana. The first meeting was held on March 6, 2007 and discussed ways and means to cooperate in counter-terrorism measures and investigations. At the meeting, which was held seven months after the July 2006 bombings in Mumbai, the two sides agreed that specific information would be exchanged for (i) helping investigations on either side related to terrorist acts and (ii) prevention of violence and terrorist acts in the two countries. The most recent meeting was held on June 24, 2008.
- ◆ Trade and Commerce: Total bilateral trade stood at US\$ 1.66 billion in the Financial Year (FY) 2006-07 as compared to US\$ 859.33 million of FY 2005-06, \$ 616 million for 2004-05 and US\$ 344.29 million in 2003-04. In FY 2006-07 India's exports to Pakistan were valued at US\$ 1.34 billion and India's imports at US\$ 0.32 billion. In FY 2007-08 (April-Dec 2007) total bilateral trade stood at US \$ 1.53 billion. This is 34% more than the corresponding period in previous year. The trade is expected to cross the mark of US \$ 2 billion during 2007-08. Unofficial trade through third countries is also of significant value. From October 1, 2007 trucks from both the countries were allowed to cross at Wagah/Attari borders upto designated points on either side.

Following Manmohan Singh's meeting with Asif Ali Zardari in September 2008, the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad and the Poonch-Rawalakot roads were also opened to trade from October 21, 2008. In the shipping sector, India and Pakistan signed a revised shipping protocol in December 2006 that removed restrictions in place since 1975. The protocol allows lifting of third country cargo by Indian and Pakistani vessels from each other's ports and it also lifted the restriction that the cargo destined for the other country could be carried only by an Indian or Pakistani vessel. In July 2008, Pakistan has allowed the import of compressed natural gas (CNG) buses from India under its trade policy for 2008-09. The import of CNG buses has been allowed along with that of 135 other items that have been added to the positive list for imports from India. With this, the number of items that the government permits for import from India goes up to nearly 2,000. Pakistan reportedly has plans to import 8,000 CNG buses for public transport in Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad.

- ◆ **Transport Links: Road**—The Delhi-Lahore bus service that was started on February 20, 1999 was stopped on January 1, 2002 after the attack on Parliament. The service resumed from July 11, 2003 and its frequency was increased from two to three trips per week in the meeting of India-Pakistan Standing Committee on Bus Services held on Feb 21, 2008. Subsequently, other routes were also opened⁷. **Railway**—bi-weekly Delhi-Attari-Wagah-Lahore Samjhauta rail resumed service on January 14, 2004. The Thar Express from Munabao to Khokrapar began on Feb. 18, 2006. **Air**—Air Services Agreement between India and Pakistan was signed on Feb. 15, 2008. The frequency of the flights from four points of call—Delhi, Mumbai, Karachi and Lahore was increased from 12 to 28 and the number of designated airlines from 1 to 3.
- ◆ **Energy sector cooperation:** On Feb. 9, 2005, India agreed to discuss the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline between Iran, Pakistan and India with Pakistan in the framework of security and assured supplies. On April 24, 2008 India signed a framework agreement with Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan on a \$7.6 billion gas pipeline project. The line will be 1,680-km long. Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI), supply 3.2 billion cubic feet per day (90 MMSCMD) and gas flows are expected from 2015.

- ◆ **Security-related CBMs:** On January 1, 2004 both countries exchanged the list of their nuclear installations and facilities. A month later, on February 20, First flag meeting between Indian and Pakistani army units in three years took place in Chorbat La sector in India. In June, narcotic officials from both countries met in Islamabad to discuss cooperation in sharing information and coordinate strategy to tackle drug trafficking. In October, Border Security Force officials met their counterparts in Pakistani Rangers at Chandigarh and agreed on nine points of cooperation. In December, expert level talks were held on Nuclear CBMs. In May 2005, an expert group met in Rawalpindi to establish a communication link between Pakistan Maritime Security Agency and Indian Coast Guard. In October, an agreement on advance notification of ballistic missile tests was signed. Same month, both sides also agreed to establish a hot line between their maritime security agencies to facilitate early exchange of information regarding apprehended fishermen who inadvertently stray into the other side's territorial waters. On February 21, 2007 both the countries agree on "Reducing the Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons".
- ◆ **Kashmir specific CBMs:** In May 2008, India and Pakistan agreed on a set of specific Kashmir-specific CBMs. These include triple-entry permit for cross-LoC, simplification of the procedures for getting the permit which at present takes at least two years, and an increase in the frequency of two cross-LoC bus services, Srinagar-Muzaffarabad and Poonch-Rawalakot, from fortnightly to a weekly service. The formal talks were complemented by secret negotiations between India and Pakistan that over a period of three years came close to finding a mutually acceptable solution to Kashmir.

Such notable gains notwithstanding, the Composite Dialogue had had its share of disappointments and failures⁸. For instance, the most notable of the achievements, the Ceasefire, has since been violated several times in the past without any provocation. Soon after Musharraf's exit, the period between May-September 2008 (the traditional season for cross border infiltration) witnessed more than 30 ceasefire violations committed by Pakistan. According to an August 2009 government assessment⁹ there are 42 training camps still operational inside Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) and almost half of the

militants present inside Kashmir are of 'foreign origin'. The violations and renewed attempts to keep the LoC 'hot' by Pakistan now threaten to undo this gain and point to the vulnerability of such positive outcomes of the Dialogue with the military-political compulsions within Pakistan. The violations of the Ceasefire have raised serious concerns about the continuity of the Composite Dialogue itself.

In fact, persisting ceasefire violations have only added to India's concerns about Pakistan's strategy to maintain irregular warfare capabilities to revive militancy in Kashmir and elsewhere in the future. The increasing number of terrorist attacks in Kashmir and in other parts of the country, with linkages in Pakistan, has had a negative impact on public expectations from such a dialogue.

Despite the setbacks and disappointments at the inevitably slow process of reconciliation, broad contours of a new way of approaching the contentious bilateral relationship, with marked departures from the past, could be identified. The three visible lines were: a) Bringing to end all violence, including terror acts, b) Reasonable resolution towards all issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, and c) Encouragement to putting in place a superstructure of cooperation in different fields¹⁰. It is against such an evolving paradigm that the India-Pakistan relationship would be tested after the Mumbai attacks.

Engaging Pakistan after Mumbai

Given the tenuous nature of the relationship, and the persistent threat of terrorism from Pakistan-based groups, the Mumbai attack of November 2008 undoubtedly posed the most serious challenge to the peace process.

The attack triggered a frenzy of political statements and diplomatic moves in India to build pressure on Pakistan to act against Lashkar-e-Tayyeba (LeT). India made it quite clear that any revival of the process would depend on Pakistan's commitment to contain terrorist groups targeting India. The Indian leadership insisted that Pakistan must produce tangible results in arresting and punishing those who carried out the Mumbai attacks as a precondition for the resumption of the Composite Dialogue¹¹.

Yet, seven months after the attacks, India and Pakistan issued a joint statement about their intention to talk which, as expected, kicked up an unholy row, more

visceral in India than in Pakistan. It would be therefore instructive to study how, and why, both the countries persisted with finding, amidst threats and counter-threats, a common ground to shake hands at Sharm-el Shaikh.

There were a few 'acts of omission' which characterised India's post-Mumbai response and offered a tentative insight into how events would develop in the immediate future. The most significant was the troop deployment which did not take place. The government spoke of "keeping all options open"¹² but made no visible move to launch a possible war. Unlike in 2002, after the December 13, 2001 attack on Indian Parliament, when hundreds and thousand of men were moved to the borders to position for a conflict, the armed forces this time were merely put on 'war alert'¹³. Within weeks, if not days, the war rhetoric too was tempered down¹⁴.

The second missing dot was the telling absence of any formal statement from the government about severing diplomatic and other ties with Pakistan. Neither was the Delhi-Lahore bus service terminated nor the Samjhauta Express; the air-link also remained intact¹⁵. In short, the attack had not completely disrupted the engagement between the two neighbours as was widely perceived. This 'continuity' was also amply reflected in the Indian government's official stance—it wanted Pakistan to act against terrorist groups and not launch an attack on Pakistan.

The communication channels between the two countries too remained open and, in fact, became the sole vehicle for keeping up with the engagement. In just over a month from the attack, the first formal exchange began on January 5, 2009¹⁶. Pakistan's reaction was unprecedented—it admitted on February 12 that the Mumbai attack was indeed planned in Pakistan and arrested LeT Operational Commander Zaki-ur Rehman Lakhvi¹⁷. It also handed to India a list of 32 questions to assist in the investigations¹⁸.

Interactions at Track II level resumed within months of the attacks¹⁹ and helped pave the way for the first series of meetings between the top leadership. The first such interaction was on June 17, 2009, when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh met with President Zardari on the sidelines of the summit of Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Russia on June 17, 2009. Later, Prime Minister Yousaf Gilani on the sidelines of the 15th Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Summit in

Sharm-el-Sheikh, Egypt²⁰ where the controversial Joint Statement was issued. What kicked off the intense debate in India were two references in the statement. The first one read 'action on terrorism should not be linked to the Composite Dialogue process and these should not be bracketed'. The second one mentioned Pakistan possessing 'some information on threats in Balochistan and other areas', for all purposes, an euphemism for Indian role in facilitating the insurgency in Balochistan²¹.

Given that the next few months will determine the tone and tenor of future dialogue, it would be useful to probe the Indian inclinations to reach out to Pakistan. It could be fairly argued that India's Pakistan policy has rarely polarised the polity and the strategic community as the Sharm-el-Sheikh²² statement. Many in the Opposition and the elite intelligentsia have accused Manmohan Singh of jeopardising India's security, compromising its traditional stand on Pakistan and unabashedly bowing to the US pressure. It is crucial to note that President Zardari also received a similar reception when he attempted to alter Pakistan's traditionalist views on India and pledged his desire for a no-first-use policy (regarding nuclear weapons against India), called hitherto termed Kashmiri 'freedom fighters' as 'terrorists'. In a much-publicised interview, he recently admitted that Pakistan "created and nurtured terrorist elements as a policy to achieve some short-term tactical objectives"²³.

The Sharm-el-Sheikh stand can be explained by acknowledging some of the variables in the India-Pakistan equation which have been witnessing visible elements of change. For instance, there has been a consistent attempt on the part of the Indian government, since the inception of the Composite Dialogue in 2004, to not freeze negotiations in the event of terrorist strikes emanating from Pakistan. Such a stand, contrary to conventional wisdom, betrayed three important realisations on the part of India; one, that Pakistan was no longer in control of all the terrorist and extremist groups operating from its territory²⁴ and second, that the army could not be considered a willing partner in the peace process indefinitely. The third, which flowed naturally from the above considerations, that the traditional military-centric stand would only benefit the terrorist groups and sections of the Army, both harbouring, and surviving on, deep animosity towards India.

The urge to persist with the dialogue-mode is also rooted in a growing belief that only a stable civilian

government in Pakistan can offer a more stable and useful engagement. The dire state of Pakistan's economy has increased the need for sustained international aid which serves as an important incentive for the incumbent civilian government to make policy recourse under the constraints of the system under which it operates. By persisting with the traditional argument that talking peace with the civilian government was irrelevant since in Pakistan it is the army which determines the India policy, India will unwittingly strengthen the grip of elements which have all along been outright cynical, and inimical, towards India²⁵. But, by showing its earnestness in making meaningful talks, whose agenda includes issues relevant to both India and Pakistan, India will incidentally strengthen the civilian establishment and help untangle, even by a micro-millimetre, Pakistan from the 'mullah-military' alliance. By agreeing to hold talks with Pakistan in Sharm-el-Sheikh, and denying non-state actors and elements inside Pakistan's security establishment the power to dictate the course of India's foreign policy, Manmohan Singh has shown the foresight and statesmanship to resume dialogue despite strong opposition back home.

Long-term prospects

The prospect of an enduring bilateral relationship built on mutual trust post-Mumbai attack seems remote, if not impossible. The terrorist attack has damaged the fragile sense of cooperation between the two countries and exposed the peace process being hostage to the Pakistani state as well as non-state actors engaged in terrorist activities. Thus it is clear that without the Pakistan Army giving up its support for anti-India terrorist groups, all efforts to build bridges between the two countries will remain doomed.

Notwithstanding the absolute need of resolving all issues through the process of dialogue and therefore fostering the democratic progression in Pakistan, India must still build a variety of military capabilities in order to retain a full spectrum of policy options, keeping in mind future contingencies in Pakistan. Some of the options suggested by experts include enhancing India's Special Operations Forces to carry out cross border raids against terrorist infrastructure and increasing the Air Force's precision strike capability, giving the political leadership the option of carrying out quick reprisals in the event of another terrorist attack.

But India, in the larger interest of peace and stability, must find ways and means to undo the stranglehold of the military-militant nexus on the people of the region

and this cannot be achieved by pursuing the traditional military-centric solution. India must therefore pursue an active policy of creating and expanding a constituency for peace in Pakistan, which, in the longer run, could probably undo the stranglehold of those state as well as non-state entities which are pushing the country towards a failed State syndrome. India can pursue the following policy options towards achieving such long-term objectives:

1. **Encourage democratic forces in Pakistan.** One of the effective means to neutralise the military-militant nexus is to encourage democratic institutions and forces in Pakistan. This can be achieved by much more robust and extensive interactions at the government and public level with institutions like judiciary, election commission, legislature, universities, research organisations, industry associations and media. Social interactions between the people should be encouraged by relaxed visa norms, university and educational institutional admissions, easier access to medical facilities, cultural exchange programmes and intense tourism promotion.
2. **Engage with the young leadership.** India must engage with the young leadership in politics, business, media, academia and social sector with greater focus. Exchange visits between the young communities on both sides of the borders should be frequent and widely publicised. This will help expand the community of stakeholders in peace and stability in the region.
3. **Vigorously pursue the anti-terror agenda.** India must vigorously pursue the objective of dismantling terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan. All future official-level talks must rest on the precondition of Pakistan keeping its January 2004 commitment of not allowing its soil to be used by terrorist groups targeting India. There must not be any laxity on this front. A comprehensive counter-terrorism policy should envelop measures to strengthen internal security and prevent external actors from carrying out terrorist activities in India. This could also mean the development of specialised commando units which can be deployed for pre-emptive as well as surgical military missions.
4. **Peace must be projected as peoples' option.** India must project peace as a viable option before the people of Pakistan, and the international

community. The rhetoric of war must be kept low and preferably abjured. India must initiate measures to keep the status quo on its western borders and state unequivocally that it was not in favour of an armed conflict with Pakistan.

5. **Persuade the international community to direct aid to civilian institutions.** India must persuade the international community, especially the United States, to direct aid and other assistance to civilian institutions in Pakistan rather than the military. A substantial part of the aid is usurped by the military establishment to strengthen its hold over the country and its people. This can be achieved in a large measure by closely monitoring the usage of the aid and its impact on the people's lives.
6. **Restructure the Composite Dialogue:** It is clear that issues like Kashmir and Siachen defy an easy and early solution. Such complex issues have to be dealt with on a longer term and hence need distinct redressal systems than the present structure of the Composite Dialogue. These issues therefore should be divested from the present process and given a separate delivery mechanism in the form of a Joint Commission institutionalised by both the Parliaments with a longer but firm deadline of submitting its findings and recommendations. Such a step would free the present process from the overhanging threat of discontinuity.
7. **New Agenda:** The Composite Dialogue must therefore include a far more diverse economic, political and social agenda, thus freeing the process from the political-bureaucratic hierarchies and giving it a popular momentum. This would mean, as argued by many scholars, a more generous commitment on trade and commerce, social and cultural interactions, cooperation in education and health matters, and an exchange of ideas in governance issues.

Such a modification of the Composite Dialogue framework would be a natural progression, built on the lessons learnt from the past five years, and would infuse it with a greater popular involvement and therefore a better chance of survival in times of dramatic political changes in Asia. Only then can both the countries find a way out of the vortex of violence which has severely undermined peace and stability in the region.

ANNEXURE I

Joint Statement of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the Prime Minister of Pakistan Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani Sharm-el-Sheikh, July 16, 2009
 The Prime Minister of India Dr. Manmohan Singh and the Prime Minister of Pakistan Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani met in Sharm-el-Sheikh on July 16, 2009.
 The two Prime Ministers had a cordial and constructive meeting. They considered the entire gamut of bilateral relations with a view to charting the way forward in India - Pakistan relations.
 Both leaders agreed that terrorism is the main threat to both countries. Both leaders affirmed their resolve to fight terrorism and to cooperate with each other to this end.
 Prime Minister Singh reiterated the need to bring the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks to justice. Prime Minister Gilani assured that Pakistan will do everything in its power in this regard. He said that Pakistan has provided an updated status dossier on the investigations of the Mumbai attacks and had sought additional information/evidence. Prime Minister Singh said that the dossier is being reviewed.
 Both leaders agreed that the two countries will share real time, credible and actionable information on any future terrorist threats.
 Prime Minister Gilani mentioned that Pakistan has some information on threats in Balochistan and other areas.
 Both Prime Ministers recognized that dialogue is the only way forward. Action on terrorism should not be linked to the Composite Dialogue process and these should not be bracketed. Prime Minister Singh said that India was ready to discuss all issues with Pakistan, including all outstanding issues.
 Prime Minister Singh reiterated India's interest in a stable, democratic, Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
 Both leaders agreed that the real challenge is development and the elimination of poverty. Both leaders are resolved to eliminate those factors which prevent our countries from realizing their full potential. Both agreed to work to create an atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence.
 Both leaders reaffirmed their intention to promote regional cooperation.
 Both Foreign Secretaries should meet as often as necessary and report to the two Foreign Ministers who will be meeting on the sidelines of the forthcoming UN General Assembly.
 Available at: "Joint Statement of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the Prime Minister of Pakistan Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani", *The Hindu*, July 16, 2009
<http://www.hindu.com/nic/indopak.htm>

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Ends Note:

1. Read "Aspects of India's Foreign Policy," a speech by I.K. Gujral at the Bandaranaike Center For International Studies in Colombo, Sri Lanka on January 20, 1997, visit <http://www.stimson.org/southasia/?sn=sa20020116302>
2. Brajesh Mishra enunciated the goals of the Vajpayee-led National Democratic Alliance government during a talk at Observer Research Foundation in July 2003.
3. http://www.indianembassy.org/South_Asia/Pakistan/lahoredeclaration.html
4. http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/document/papers/indo_pak-6jan04.htm
5. "Joint Press Conference by External Affairs Minister of India and Foreign Minister of Pakistan (November 26, 2008)", Press Briefings, *Ministry of External Affairs*, Government of India, November 26, 2008 <http://meaindia.nic.in/secframe.php?sec=pb>
6. An overview on India-Pakistan relations, *Ministry of External Affairs* (PIA Division), India.
7. The Amritsar-Lahore weekly bus service commenced on January 24 2006. The Amritsar-Nankana Sahib bus service on March 24, 2006 The Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service started on April 7, 2005. The Poonch-Rawalakot bus service commenced on June 20, 2006. On March 7, 2006, the Indo-Pak night bus service from Ferozepur and Fazilka to Ludhiana-Chandigarh resumes.
8. One of the failures has been the slow death of IPI pipeline. With Pakistan refusing to offer counter-guarantees for the uninterrupted supply of gas and safety of the pipeline running through the troubled Balochistan, while charging a hefty transit fees of \$750 million per annum, there is hardly any enthusiasm in the government as well as private circles about the commercial viability of the project.
9. "Pak following 'dichotomous policy' on terror: Army chief", *The Times of India*, 11 August 2009
10. Harish Khare, "Forces trying to derail peace process", *The Hindu*, September 26, 2008
11. The Composite Dialogue was put on pause on December 1, 2008. 'EAM's Suo Motu statement in Parliament on Follow Up to Mumbai Terrorist Attack', *Ministry of External Affairs*, February 13, 2009.
12. India says all options open to dismantle terror groups, *Reuters*, January 7, 2009.
13. Josy Joseph, Armed forces are put on war alert, *Daily News and Analysis*, December 10, 2008.
14. India says all options open to dismantle terror groups', *Reuters*, January 7, 2009; "India says war was never an option", *NDTV.com*, February 18, 2009.
15. "Bookings on bus to Lahore continue", *The Economic Times*, December 28, 2008
16. India formally handed over evidence linking the Mumbai attack to Lashkar-e-Tayceba, which included transcripts of intercepted communication between the terrorists and their handlers in Pakistan and those of Kasab's interrogation; recovered weapons, and other equipment. This, in fact, was the fourth official communication between the two countries after the attack. Earlier, on November 28, Mukherjee spoke with his counterpart, Shah Mehmood Qureshi over the telephone and followed it with a written account. On December 1, India made a formal demarche to Pakistan. Later on December 22 2008, a letter from Kasab was forwarded to Pakistan. On January 15, Pakistan began a formal investigation headed by the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), banned Jamat-ud-Dawa and placed its leader, Hafiz Saeed under house arrest after the organisation was declared as a terrorist group by the United Nations.
17. Pakistan also claimed that the attackers had links to a "network of Islamists" United States, Austria, Spain, Italy, Russia; a move Indian analysts argue was an attempt to divert attention from complicity of state actors. Other arrested were Hamad Amin Sadiq and Zazar Shah, Mohammad Kaif, Mohammad Ashfaq and Javed Iqbal.
18. Facilitated by the United States ('CIA Helped India, Pakistan Share Secrets in Probe of Mumbai Siege' *The Washington Post*, February 16 2009), the exchange of information led a softening of positions by both sides. On March 13, India responded to Pakistan's query and further investigations continued. However the slow pace of legal proceeding (a norm in South Asia) raised doubts in New Delhi over Pakistan's sincerity in bringing the case to its logical conclusion.
19. After promise of talks, track-II diplomacy restarts, *The Indian Express*, May 18, 2009.
20. While the first meeting led to Dr. Singh snubbing Zardari (In a surprising departure from his otherwise polite demeanor, Manmohan Singh, in front of the media greeted Zardari by saying, "I am happy to meet you, but my mandate is to tell you that the territory of Pakistan must not be used for terrorism". 'Indian and Pakistani leaders meet', *BBC*, June 16 2009) and pressing for tangible action against Lashkar and other groups, the second meeting culminated in a joint statement whose conciliatory tone has since been criticized by most experts in India.
21. For the entire text of the Joint Statement, see Annexure I
22. Speaking on the floor of the Parliament, former foreign minister Yashwant Sinha said "waters of the seven seas will not be able to wash the shame" brought on the country through this flawed initiative.
 "Seven seas will not wash shame at Sharm el-Sheikh: BJP", *The Hindustan Times*, July 29, 2009
<http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/StoryPage.aspx?sectionName=HomePage&id=72717842-40ec-4edf-a17e-b4b929857835&ParentID=b1ad8417-06dc-4650-9f87-4836f1fa61f1&Headline=Seven-seas-will-not-wash-shame-at-Sharm-el-Sheikh-BJP>
23. "Pakistani president Asif Zardari admits creating terrorist groups", *The Telegraph*, July 8, 2009
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/5779916/Pakistani-president-Asif-Zardari-admits-creating-terrorist-groups.html>
24. P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Stephen Cohen, *Four Crisis and a Peace Process*, (Noida: Harper Collins, 2008), p.181
25. This argument is made, among others, by Lt. Gen. Talat Masood, a foremost defence analyst in Pakistan. "analysis: In our own interest", *The Daily Times*, December 18, 2008



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