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US Policies Towards Africa In Search of a New Paradigm

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Introduction

Africa, as a continent, has always been marginal to overall US grand strategy. During the Cold War and immediately thereafter, Africa was largely neglected. It was only after 9/11 that interest in Africa picked up because of the challenge from terrorists in Africa and the entry of new powers in the continent. Hillary Clinton, as Secretary of State, made two trips to Africa in 2009 and 2012. These did not go down well with most Africans because she warned them against cooperating with countries which would exploit Africa's natural resources. This was perceived in Africa as being patronising. In 2013, President Obama visited four Sub-Saharan African countries and this year in August, he is all set to host the first US-Africa Leaders' Summit for promoting better relations with the continent. There thus seems to be a revival of American interest in the continent. What are the reasons for this? What are the past and current US policies towards the region? Are these interests and policies different from those it had during the Cold War? How do Africans perceive the US? What are the implications of a renewed US interest in Africa for India? These are some of the questions that this Issue Brief attempts to answer.

American Interests during the Cold War

US foreign policy during the Cold War was largely targeted at containing Communism and the Soviet Union. Africa, which was under colonial rule and with its active liberation movements, was seen as a volatile region which was susceptible to the spread of Communism. In fact, in 1960, Presidential candidate Richard Nixon argued that “in the struggle with the Russians, Africa is the most critical

area in the world”, while a few months later President-elect Kennedy claimed that Africa was the objective “of a gigantic communist offensive”.¹ As John Foster Dulles repeatedly said, decolonization and the other problems of the new States were to be viewed through the prism of the Cold War. Thus strategic and tactical considerations moulded attitudes towards further decolonization.² It was felt that decolonization was to proceed only when the allegiance of the new States to the Western alliance could be ensured. This criterion, however, could not be met in Africa.³

So, many nationalist movements which received support from the USSR were seen as enemies by the US. The US even provided covert assistance to groups in Angola which were seeking to win pre-independence elections and to groups in Chad which wanted to overthrow a government that was seen in Washington as being radical or Moscow-led.⁴ The US also collaborated militarily and economically with White minority governments in Southern Africa, even sharing intelligence with them.⁵ It supported governments, however brutal and dictatorial, which professed to be anti-Communist, like Zaire under Mobutu. Economic and military assistance was given to countries like Kenya, Ethiopia and Liberia which provided access to military facilities and those which supported US initiatives against Soviet “surrogates”.⁶

Therefore, the US supported its allies—the colonial powers—despite its proclaimed support for self-determination and democracy. In fact, US economic and military assistance to its allies in Europe (like for instance, the Marshall Plan) helped these powers to recover and consolidate their rule in Africa despite strong nationalist movements.⁷ Thus, US policies towards Africa were Eurocentric with the interests of its allies being the determining factor in its dealings with Africa. When African demands for decolonisation and popular rule clashed with strategic interests of the European powers, American Presidents decided in favour of the Atlantic Alliance.⁸ Even geostrategic interests gained resonance only because they were important for the European powers. Thus, the trade routes through the Suez Canal, Straits of Bab el Mandeb and Cape Route became important because they carried energy to Europe.

American disinterest towards the continent was also partly because there was no domestic constituency to lobby for Africa. Nevertheless, there was a humanitarian element in its policies towards Africa. Washington was the largest donor of humanitarian assistance to the continent during the Cold War and provided scholarships to African students.

US Interests Post-Cold War

Like during the Cold War, Africa remained marginal to American foreign policy in the initial years after the Cold War. However, America slowly woke up to the continent's potential, particularly its economic potential. This resulted in the Africa Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA) which was

passed in 2000 by the Clinton administration. The AGOA transformed US-Africa relations from the donor-recipient narrative to one which also took into account trade and investment as factors in the bilateral relationship. The Clinton administration in fact engaged more closely with Africa than most American administrations in the past and the President travelled to more African countries than any American President before him. He also started the Africa Crisis Relief Initiative (ACRI) to promote indigenous African capacity for humanitarian relief.

President George W. Bush's administration continued this engagement with Africa. The emphasis was on humanitarian interests during Bush's first term. He increased aid to the continent by more than 640 per cent by the time he left office.⁹ This was mostly for tackling global health issues like AIDS/HIV and Malaria. He established the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), which spent \$15 billion over five years on prevention, treatment and research on HIV/AIDS and a \$1.2 billion initiative against Malaria. After 9/11, Africa also received attention as a region where anti-US terrorist groups were active.

US interests in the continent during this period can be divided into security and geostrategic interests, economic interests and humanitarian interests.

Security and Geostrategic Interests

Today terrorist organisations like the Boko Haram in Nigeria, Al-Shabaab in Somalia, the Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the Lord's Resistance Movement in Uganda are perceived by the US as a threat not only to Africa, but also to US citizens and businesses in African countries.

The US had experienced terrorism in Africa in 1998 when its embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were bombed. But after the attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001, fighting terrorism became one of the top priorities for the US, with Africa becoming one of the battlefronts in the war against terrorism. This was because of the spread of Islamic radicalism in some parts of the continent. The poverty, ethno-religious diversity and civilian conflicts in many countries in Africa were seen as the major reasons for the rise in terrorism. The large number of fragile/failed states, unresponsive and corrupt governments in the continent, and vast lawless spaces have also contributed to the spread of terrorism. Moreover, most of these countries do not have well equipped or well trained militaries to fight the terrorists who take full advantage of the porous borders.

The US has asked African countries for support to fight against terrorism. In many cases, it has given economic and military assistance to countries battling terrorism. It has asked African governments to ratify the twelve universal conventions against terrorism and even monitored the extent to which they have complied with these conventions.¹⁰ In 2002, Washington created a Combined Joint Task

Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in Djibouti and followed it with a \$100 million counterterrorism initiative for East Africa and the Horn in 2003. The US European Command (EUCOM) also started a series of training and military support operations in the Sahel, which developed into the Trans-Sahara Counter terrorism Initiative involving both North Africa and the Sahel.

Piracy off the coasts of the Gulf of Guinea and Somalia are also a concern for the US as it affects maritime trade. It is estimated that about half of the reported pirate attacks in the world take place off the coast of Guinea and Somalia.¹¹ The hijacking of an American ship and the kidnapping of two American crew members off the coasts of Guinea in October 2013 highlighted this problem for the US. While piracy off the coast of Somalia has declined due to international policing and patrolling efforts, there has been no movement so far on a similar initiative to counter piracy off the coast of Guinea due to lack of cooperation from weak governments in West Africa.

The creation of AFRICOM in 2007 is another sign of US interest in the region. Before AFRICOM was created, US military involvement on the continent was divided under the European Command (EUCOM), Central Command (CENTCOM) and Pacific Command (PACOM), causing problems in coordination. AFRICOM's area of responsibility covers all of Africa except Egypt. The US initially wanted to have the headquarters of AFRICOM in Africa. But almost all the African countries were reluctant to host the AFRICOM headquarters, with some even warning that it should not be stationed in any country neighbouring them.¹² None of them wanted to be seen as American lackeys or to be targeted by terrorists for being too close to the West. There was also concern that American generosity in sending military advisors could soon turn into a full-blown military intervention by the US.¹³ Some countries felt that the AFRICOM would undermine their sovereignty while others, particularly in Northern Africa, did not want to engage with the US because of its pro-Israeli stance; they were apprehensive that partnering with the US could open the door for Israeli military and intelligence presence in the region.¹⁴ Eventually, it was decided that the AFRICOM headquarters would be in Stuttgart-Moehringen, Germany.

The establishment of a command exclusively for Africa shows Africa's importance to the US. According to the Pentagon, AFRICOM's objectives are to “promote U.S. strategic objectives by working with African states and regional organizations to help strengthen regional stability and security through improved security capability and military professionalization. If directed by national command authorities, its military operations would aim to deter aggression and respond to crises”.¹⁵ AFRICOM is described as innovative because it comprises of an integrated staff of permanently assigned military and civilian Department of Defence and non-Department of Defence government personnel, as well as officers and staff from foreign military and civilian organisations.¹⁶

Figure 1: US Military Commands

Source: Geographic combatant map, Defence Procurement and Acquisition Policy. Available via: http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/pacc/cc/areas_of_responsibility.html.

AFRICOM undoubtedly offers an integrated framework for pursuing US interests in Africa. The command is now in a much better position to compete for resources, manpower, and influence over policy-making. Considering the fact that African interests were subordinate to Europe during the continent's colonial past and the Cold War years, the establishment of AFRICOM now provides American political leaders with more indepth knowledge of the region to advance US interests.¹⁷ This may also help US planners to make consistent policies on the region rather than ad hoc or multiple policies that earlier resulted from varying priorities spelt out by different commands. AFRICOM could also improve America's intelligence and contingency planning in relation to Africa and enhance military-to-military cooperation with African states. The US could get better access to oil and natural resources (like rare earth minerals), curb to some extent China's deepening military, political and diplomatic ties to Africa, and participate in joint exercises to combat piracy and terrorism.

But critics fear that since AFRICOM is a product of the Department of Defense, it may ultimately wield greater influence on US foreign policy in Africa and dictate policy and principles to African governments to suit US military interests, leading to a greater militarisation of US policies towards Africa.¹⁸

The US has set up a drone base in Niger. There are reports suggesting that drone bases have also been set up in Ethiopia, Djibouti, Burkina Faso, Kenya, Uganda and Libya.¹⁹ The US also has military

bases in Djibouti and Kenya. However, its military footprint in the region is far larger and it is involved in military operations in as many as 49 African countries (see Figure 2). It has bases in some of these other countries under other “heads” while in others it trains personnel to take on terrorists.²⁰

Figure 2: US Military Footprint in Africa



Source: Nick Turse, 'The Startling Size of US Military Operations in Africa', 6 September 2013, Mother Jones, <http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/09/us-military-bases-africa>.

Africa is also an important arms market for the US. Though the US is not the biggest arms exporter to the continent, it remains a significant player in the arms market.

Table 1: Arms Exports to Sub-Saharan Africa

Rank	1996-2000		2001-2005		2006-2010	
	Exporter	Share	Exporter	Share	Exporter	Share
1	Russia	31	Russia	51	China	25
2	Belarus	12	China	9	Ukraine	20
3	Ukraine	8	Ukraine	7	Russia	11
4	China	6	Moldova	5	Italy	6
5	Slovakia	6	Bulgaria	5	South Afr	5
6	Bulgaria	5	Belarus	4	Belarus	4
7	Canada	4	Israel	2	Moldova	4
8	United St	3	United St	2	Jordan	3
9	Italy	2	Italy	1	United St	3
10	Spain	2	Slovakia	1	Singapore	3
	Others	21	Others	13	Others	16

Source: Pieter D. Wezeman, Siemon T. Wezeman and Lucie Béraud-Sudreau, "Arms Flows to Sub-Saharan Africa", SIPRI Policy Paper 30, December 2011, p.11.


Economic Interests

Africa is home to some of the fastest-growing economies in the world at a time when growth has stagnated in the West. The continent has a large middle class of almost 350 million people and is thus a market for consumer goods from the US.

The economic resurgence of Africa in the new millennium has been discussed in detail over the past few years. According to an IMF report, Sub-Saharan Africa has been growing at an average of over 5 per cent per year in the last decade. Some states like Angola, Nigeria and Sudan have had even more dramatic growth rates. This growth has been recorded in both resource-rich and resource-poor countries. The consumer spending in Africa is reaching US\$1 trillion every year. The sovereign currency ratings of many African countries have also seen favourable revisions. Since 2000, 316 million mobile connections have been added.

Promoting neo-liberal economic policies in Africa is a priority for the US. It passed the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) to promote trade and investment between the US and Sub-Saharan African countries and to promote economic growth and development in the region. Under AGOA, the US gives unilateral trade preferences to products from countries in Sub-Saharan Africa so that they can enter the US market virtually duty free. The AGOA has increased bilateral trade. In 2000, while US imports from AGOA countries were worth \$22 billion and exports were worth \$6 billion, in 2013, imports were worth \$38 billion and exports were worth \$23 billion (See Figure 3). The trade balance is thus in favour of African countries. However, oil exports accounted for more than 80 per cent of AGOA trade in 2012.²¹ Trade has more than doubled since 2000, partly due to AGOA and partly due to resource imports.


Figure 3: Goods Trade between AGOA Countries and the US



By providing duty-free entry into the United States for almost all African products, AGOA has helped expand and diversify African exports to the US. Before AGOA, US-Africa relations had been defined largely by Cold War paradigms, donor-recipient relations, aid for poverty reduction and

emergency relief.²² The AGOA was passed to specifically eliminate barriers to trade and capital flows in Sub-Saharan Africa and privatisation of important state-owned industries on a large scale. Currently, there are 40 beneficiary countries. As part of the legislation, all beneficiaries are required to undergo an annual eligibility review process to assess whether they are conforming to AGOA's conditionalities.²³ Countries are determined to be eligible for AGOA by the US President if they are deemed to have made progress in such areas as: establishment of market-based economies; development of political pluralism and the rule of law; elimination of barriers to US trade and investment; protection of intellectual property; efforts to combat corruption; policies to reduce poverty, increase availability of health care and educational opportunities; protection of human rights and worker rights, and elimination of certain practices of child labour.²⁴ But progress in each area is not required to be eligible for the AGOA.

Figure 4: Leading AGOA exporters 2013 / 2014 (Jan - Jan)



Source: <http://agoa.info/data.html>

The US can thus put pressure on individual states to maintain or accelerate the pace of economic reform. Another criticism about AGOA is that a very small amount of the eligible product lines have been utilised and that only a few countries have benefited from the Act.²⁵ There is also criticism that Africa had little say in formulating AGOA and that the legislation is dominated by raw materials and oil exports. Nevertheless, AGOA has enabled limited exports of new products to the US like footwear, horticultural products, fruits and nuts, automobiles, automobile parts and steel. The AGOA is set to expire in 2015, much to the consternation of African countries who have been lobbying for its renewal. The fact that African countries have been lobbying for AGOA to be renewed indicates that they feel it has benefitted their economies.

Africa is seen as a source of raw materials for the US. Africa accounts for about 75 per cent of the world's platinum supply; 50 per cent of the world's diamonds and chromium, including high-grade ferrochromium ore; and 20 per cent of all gold and uranium supplies, as well as lesser amounts of tantalite, tin, iron ore, coal, and other minerals.²⁶ Africa produces 12.2 per cent of the world's oil, of which Sub-Saharan Africa contributes 7 per cent.

According to the IMF, in 2012, eight of the fastest growing economies in the world were in Africa. Africa's growing consumer market is seen as the last frontier for American exporters and investors. US goods exports to Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 1.5 per cent of total U.S. goods exports in 2012. US goods imports from sub-Saharan Africa totalled \$49.6 billion in 2012, a 33.2 per cent decrease (\$24.7 billion) from 2012, but up 177 per cent from 2002. US imports from sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 2.2 per cent of total goods imports in 2012. The five largest imports in 2012 were: Mineral Fuel (crude) (\$36.7 billion), Precious Stones (Platinum and diamonds) (\$3.4 billion), Vehicles (\$2.0 billion), Cocoa (\$1.0 billion), and Ores, Slag, Ash (Titanium, Chromium and Uranium) (\$937 million).²⁷

Table 2: Top Export Markets for US Goods in Sub Saharan Africa in 2012 (in US dollars)

South Africa	\$7.6 billion
Nigeria	\$5.0 billion
Angola	\$1.5 billion
Ghana	\$1.3 billion
Ethiopia	\$1.3 billion

Source: Office of the US Trade Representative. Available at <http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/africa>.

Table 3: Top Importers to US from Sub Saharan Africa

Nigeria	\$19.0 billion
Angola	\$9.8 billion
South Africa	\$8.7 billion
Chad	\$2.7 billion
Gabon	\$1.9 billion

Source: Office of the US Trade Representative. Available at <http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/africa>.

89 per cent of US imports from Africa consisted of oil.²⁸ Sub-Saharan Africa has emerged as the new frontier in oil and gas with the discovery of new oil and gas fields in Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Mozambique and Tanzania. The emergence of new oil and gas producers offers investment opportunities for US firms in exploration, production and related services, and infrastructure development.²⁹ The shale revolution in the US, which will turn the US into a net exporter of energy, could mean a decrease in US interest in the region. According to the International Energy Agency,

the US will become the world's largest producer of oil by 2015, ahead of Saudi Arabia and Russia. The shale revolution would impact economies of African countries because of lower oil exports to the US and lower oil prices. However, the US will most likely remain engaged largely because many American oil and gas companies have investments in the continent.

Humanitarian Interests

Aid to Africa has been a major component of US policy towards the continent. US aid reached a peak in 1985 at the height of competition with the USSR for influence. This declined after the Cold War. But after 1997, it has increased again and today the US is the largest donor of humanitarian aid to the African continent. This aid goes towards emergency food supplies, addressing health challenges and in poverty alleviation schemes.

US aid today serves to push a number of American strategic objectives like enhancing strategic partnerships; consolidating democratic transitions; bolstering fragile states; strengthening regional and sub-regional organisations; enhancing regional security capacity; strengthening African counter-terrorism cooperation and capacity; stimulating Africa's economic development and growth; implementing presidential initiatives; and amplifying humanitarian and development assistance programmes.³⁰

Between 2002 and 2012, US aid to Sub-Saharan Africa nearly quadrupled from \$1.9 billion to \$7.8 billion.³¹ Fifteen African countries receive funding from the Millennium Challenge Account. Under President George W. Bush, the US gave priority to fighting HIV/AIDS in the continent and committed more than \$48 billion through the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). Under the Bush administration, aid to Africa was more than tripled. The Obama administration has continued on the same path.

New Powers in Africa

Another reason for the renewal of US interest in the region can be explained in its growing concern about inroads made by new powers in the continent. The first among these is China. Though a late entrant in the continent, China is now deeply enmeshed in Africa. The US is slowly being edged out by China “politically and economically”.³²


China has also emerged as a major donor in the continent. Its no-strings attached aid, in sharp contrast to Western aid which insists on labour standards, environmental standards and respect for human rights, has helped it accumulate goodwill in the continent. It has also been giving technical and military advice to African governments and has helped in building critical infrastructure like

roads, bridges and dams. While earlier, China's objective in engaging with African nations was to make sure that they did not establish diplomatic relations with Taiwan, today its objectives have changed. China, which requires cheap raw materials for its manufacturing industry, sees Africa as a rich source of oil and mineral deposits. Africa is also a growing market for cheap Chinese consumer products. Its trade with Africa is twice that of the US' at \$200 billion, a huge increase from 10.6 billion in 2000. Chinese companies have invested in the oil and gas sectors as well as extractive industries in the continent.

China's policy of engagement with African countries on the win-win arrangement of getting raw materials in exchange for development cooperation has been welcomed in the continent. This arrangement, which has worked well, was started in Angola and is hence called the Angola model. Essentially, it is a trade-off between raw materials for provision of infrastructure projects in road and rail building and power projects. Now China is trying to replicate this model in other places like Sudan, Nigeria and Guinea.

The US is worried about China's influence in Africa for a variety of reasons.³³ It is concerned that China's influence could affect its counterterrorism operations, since countries loyal to Beijing could place new restrictions on the US. Moreover, China's increased influence would mean that it has more political support in fora like the United Nations. Finally, the US might lose to China in the economic competition between them for the continent's critical resources. This concern has been voiced several times by American officials from the Secretary of State down saying that the nature of China's trade with Africa is colonial as it imports raw materials and exports finished products to the continent. This argument sounds defensive and does not display the confidence of a Superpower.

Other countries like Brazil and India have also stepped up their engagement with Africa. Brazil, which has the second largest African population in the world after Nigeria and also a shared Portuguese colonial history, has built on its cultural links with the continent to pursue its objectives. It also sees Africa as a source of resources and a market. India, which has a large diaspora in the continent, has also built on its cultural links, shared British colonial history and ties formed during the Cold War through the G-77 and NAM to push its engagement. Both countries have also emerged as development partners to the continent. They have also worked together in poverty alleviation programmes in Africa through the IBSA Trust Fund. Their trade with Africa has also grown, with India's trade standing at \$65 billion while Brazil's trade is worth about \$28 billion. South Korea and Israel are other significant players in the continent.

Figure 5: Old and New Powers in Africa and their Trade with Africa

Source: Addisalem Zenebe, *The Impact of the African Growth And Opportunity Act (AGOA): An Empirical Analysis of Sub-Saharan African Agricultural Exports*, Thesis Presented to the Faculty of The Graduate College at the University of Nebraska, August 2013, <http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1014&context=agecondiss>, p.63.

African Perceptions

The US' emphasis on human rights and good governance and its conditions for giving aid make it a less appealing economic partner for Africa than China. Many Africans are also disillusioned with US double standards. In fact during his visit to Africa in 2013, Obama faced protests from people against his use of drones in the Middle East and his inability/refusal to shut down Guantanamo Bay.³⁴ The US' lecturing Africa about its relations with other countries like China has also not gone down well with Africans. They feel that the US needs to treat them as equal partners and not patronise them. Past experiences like when America stopped support for erstwhile friends like Zaire and Egypt have made many African countries wary of getting too close to the US.

New Initiatives

The Obama administration has rolled out new initiatives like 'Power Africa' for ensuring cleaner, sustainable electricity generation and 'Trade Africa' for boosting trade within East African Community and increasing exports to the US.

Around 589 million, or seven out of ten, Africans have no access to electricity.³⁵ Power Africa aims to double the number of people with access to electricity generation in Sub-Saharan Africa by unlocking the potential of renewable sources of energy like wind, solar, hydropower and also natural gas and geothermal resources.³⁶ The idea is to work with African governments as well as the private sector, and international organisations like World Bank and African Development Bank. There are six focus countries—Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria and Tanzania—involved in this

initiative in the first phase along with the US. The US would also partner with Uganda and Mozambique to teach efficient management of oil and gas resources. The aim is to ensure capacity for generating more than 10,000 MW of clean, efficient electricity. Power Africa would in the long term contribute to energy security, reduce poverty and promote economic growth. The US is committed to providing \$7 billion for five years starting from 2013 for this initiative.

Trade Africa aims to promote intra-African trade as well as Africa's trade with the US and other global markets. In the first phase, Trade Africa will focus on the East African Community, namely Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda, since they have “stable and pro-business regulations”.³⁷ In the first phase, Trade Africa intends to “double intra-regional trade in the EAC, increase EAC exports to the United States by 40 per cent, reduce by 15 per cent the average time needed to import or export a container from the ports of Mombasa or Dar es Salaam to land-locked Burundi and Rwanda in the EAC's interior, and decrease by 30 per cent the average time a truck takes to transit selected borders.”³⁸

Though the African countries have welcomed these initiatives, they may have come a little too late in the day to reverse the decline in US influence.

Implications of Renewed US Interest for India

India's relations with Africa are centuries old. After independence, India nurtured its ties with Africa through fora like NAM and G-77. India was in the forefront of all decolonisation and anti-apartheid efforts. Even though India was itself short of capital, it contributed to Africa's development through capacity building and human resource development. The Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme has been a huge success in Africa.

In the first decade of the new millennium, with India's own economy growing at respectable rates, the political and economic engagements have been further strengthened. The India-Africa Forum Summit (IAFS), of which two have been held so far, have proved to be effective platforms for an impressive growth in India's Development Partnership. Trade and investments have also risen significantly.

Against this background, how does a renewed US interest in Africa affect India? In broad terms, it should not. India has never seen the interests of many countries in Africa as a so-called 'New Scramble for Africa'. India feels that a healthy competition would be good for the Africans, particularly because most African countries have reached a level of stability to decide for themselves what is good for them.

Having said that, it can be conceded that there are specific areas of convergence between Indian and US interests. Anti-terrorism is one such area. Both the countries are victims of Jihadist attacks and it would be beneficial to work together to prevent the creation of new terrorist havens in Africa. Anti-piracy efforts would be another area where many countries are cooperating to ensure the safe passage of ships and cargo. In the field of development cooperation, there can be coordinated efforts to avoid duplication.

New Delhi and Washington have partnered to improve agricultural productivity and extend food security in three African countries of Malawi, Kenya and Liberia. This model can be used for cooperating in other fields of mutual interest like building infrastructure in Africa. India's proven record in capacity building can be leveraged with US resources to achieve maximum benefits.

Nevertheless, India-US cooperation in this region will be in limited sectors. India would not like to give the impression to Africans that it is following the American model in cooperating with them. Given the US' past record and India's own good standing in the region, India would like to be an independent player with its own agenda and priorities.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

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