

ORF OCCASIONAL PAPER #12
NOVEMBER 2009



The Meaning of China's 'Peaceful Development' Concept

Hayoun Jessie Ryou

OBSERVER RESEARCH FOUNDATION

The Meaning of China's 'Peaceful Development' Concept

Hayoun Jessie Ryou

Associate Fellow

**OBSERVER RESEARCH FOUNDATION
NEW DELHI**

© 2009 Observer Research Foundation. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from ORF.

The Meaning of China's 'Peaceful Development' Concept

China's leadership announced a few years ago that the concept of peaceful development would be the guiding principle of its national strategy. But its growing military strength in tandem with its economic power has given rise to controversies regarding Beijing's real motivations and has also raised doubts about its transparency—particularly among China's neighbours because of China's ever increasing investment in military modernization. This paper attempts to elucidate what this “peaceful development” concept means by exploring three main questions:

- ◆ What is the rationale and justification for the current concern and preoccupation of its neighbours with China's rise and growth? After all, every country is entitled to its aspirations and to pursue a programme for its growth and strength. Why single out China for special concern or implicit disapproval?
- ◆ How does this paradoxical dichotomy—peaceful development on the one hand and military empowerment on the other—support a political concept and process of engagement with the rest of the world on the basis of harmony?
- ◆ How can the concept of “peaceful development” be reconciled, in terms of public perception and understanding, with the reality of active military buildup?

1. Emergence of the Concept of Peaceful Development

The concept of 'peaceful development' (formerly termed 'peaceful rise') emerged in late 2003 to counter the then-prevalent apprehensions of threat from China amongst its neighbours. The term was first used by China's renowned ideologue, Zheng Bijian, who held high positions in the

propaganda department.¹ In November 2003, at the plenary session of the Boao Forum for Asia, Zheng introduced what was put forward as a new concept in international affairs and termed it China's peaceful rise.² In his presentation, he indicated that China's rise ('jueqi' (崛起)) would not follow the past great powers' aggressive and expansionist stance which had led to tensions and stresses in the international political structure, and even armed conflicts. Instead, China would take a peaceful road to development. (The term 'rise' was later amended to 'development' (發展) following intensive debates among Chinese academics and leaders). Since then, Chinese top leaders have used the term very frequently in international forums. On 22 December 2005, a White Paper entitled "China's Peaceful Development Road", declared that China would follow a path that will utilize the peaceful international environment to facilitate economic growth, and also that China would make positive contributions to world peace through her national development.

However, this proclamation was soon followed by heated debates in Beijing on the troubling question of Taiwan and related contingencies. Also, leading figures in the Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA) added another twist to the debate by expressing concern that the much vaunted commitment to peace might critically diminish domestic support for the continued allocation of greater resources to military modernization.³ Thus, the question of how China should deal with national security in this process of peaceful development evolved as a new agenda for research and debates.⁴

In a report to the 17th Congress of the Party on 15 October 2007, reflecting these internal concerns, President Hu Jintao pledged to remain committed to the peaceful development policy, but also affirmed China's intention to simultaneously foster military modernization. The report, announcing the framework of China's goals, said: "Bearing in mind the overall strategic interest of national security and development, we must take both economic

and national defense development into consideration and make our country prosperous and our armed forces powerful.” It added: “We must accelerate the revolution in military affairs with Chinese characteristics.... China must implement the military strategy for the new period, accelerate the revolution in military affairs with Chinese characteristics, ensure military preparedness, and enhance the military's capability to respond to various security threats and accomplish diverse military tasks.”

On 20 January 2009, China issued a White Paper on national defense, pledging the country's resolve to advance its military modernization. The paper revealed for the first time China's aspiration towards “basically accomplishing mechanization (of the military) and making major progress in informatization by 2020.” The former director of the Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, presently member of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference(CPPCC) and president of the Chinese Association of Asia-Pacific Studies, Zhan Wenling, was even more forceful in expressing the view that China must speed up its modernization process and be more serious about it, stating that “... its peaceful development and the overall military improvement and construction have to be accelerated.”⁵ Many observers see a contradiction between the commitment to peace and the simultaneous avowal to promote rapid military modernization.

2. Meaning of the word 'peace' in China's strategic culture

The term for 'peace' in Chinese is 'heping', which is a conjunction of two words, He(和) and Ping(平). Jiang Xiyuan, Senior Fellow in the Department of International Organization and International Law at Shanghai Institute of International Studies, says that in the context of Chinese strategic culture, 'heping' [also] implies 'expansibility'.⁶ According to him, 'He' means 'the existence of everything is a unity of opposites' and 'Ping' essentially means 'same(同)' and 'unity(一)'. “Ping (peace: 平) TianXia (whole world: 天下)” is

an old Chinese saying. The word 'Ping' can be translated or rather interpreted to mean two subtly different things. Interpreted in a straight and conservative way, it could simply mean “bringing peace to the whole world.” However, given China's age-old psyche of the 'supremacy of the Middle Kingdom' on the strength of which all its dynasties have ruled, the term appears to have taken on a more aggressive connotation and can be interpreted to mean “rule or stabilize the world.” It is what Jiang Xiyan aptly describes as the “unity of a high degree of idealism and cool-headed realism.”⁷ In this context, a professor at the Center for Strategic Studies at the Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Zhang Wenmu, while admitting the existence of the Kantian conception of real peace, contends that it needs to be premised on balance of power. “Benevolence” (仁 Ren) is the people's desire for peace, and “power” (力 Li) is a means to achieve peace.⁸

A nation's strategic culture has a tenuous influence on its foreign and security policies of the day. There are several studies on the strategic culture and the [historically recurrent] 'grand strategy' of China. The two main dominating elements are: first, the Confucian-Mencian based approach and second, the realpolitik school of thought, which is well enunciated in Sun Tzu's “The Art of War”. While the former is ethical in concept and defensive in nature, the latter is more offense oriented, favouring military solutions. Idealism and realism reflected in the word 'Heping' is a combination of these antithetical concepts. 'Peaceful development', is a unified conception of domestic and international community, social interaction and power struggle⁹—a combination of idealism and realism. Today's world is different from the past, in international norms, economic interdependence and growing mutual interest over transnational issues. Thus, both the labels—“status quo” and “revisionist”—constitute unwise over-simplifications that obscure the mix of interests and goals reflected in China's current grand strategy.¹⁰ However, history indicates how China responded to world affairs, especially in the use

of force. The long history of ancient Chinese stratagem is to some extent reflected in the current Chinese foreign and security policy making.

3. Peaceful development with military modernization: A 'Balance of idealism and realism'

Today's doctrine of 'Peaceful Development' along with military modernization can be seen (from the Chinese point of view) as a kind of balance between idealism and realism. It is effectively embedded as a guiding doctrine in China's foreign and defense policy and as an overall guiding principle of national policy. Where outsiders see a paradoxical dichotomy, the Chinese see peaceful development and military modernization working in harmony.

Li Jijun, Lieutenant General, Vice President of the Academy of Military Science Academy, and senior advisor to the China Research Society of Sun Tzu's 'Art of War', has said that the period of peace in the contemporary world is not only the time to prepare for the contingency of war, but also the time to deter war—the latter objective being of greater significance.¹¹ In order to achieve peaceful development, he suggests that China should study in depth the preparedness necessary for the contingencies of war, including the development of its armed forces, as also study the strategic choices it would have to make in this century.¹²

Deterrence of war—not war fighting itself—is the professed moral foundation for China's military modernization. Important official papers have laid emphasis on this point, as is illustrated by this quotation from the Science of Military Strategy: “War fighting is generally used only when deterrence fails and there is no alternative”. In its military White Paper in 2008¹³ China termed its military strategy's strategic deterrence, as being associated with other means. The paper says:

“China's military strategy of active defense lays stress on deterring crises and wars. It works for close coordination between military struggle and political, diplomatic, economic, cultural and legal endeavors, strives to foster a favorable security environment, and takes the initiative to prevent and defuse crises, and deter conflicts and wars. It strictly adheres to a position of self-defense, exercises prudence in the use of force, seeks to effectively control war situations, and strives to reduce the risks and costs of war. (China's strategy for active defense) calls for the building of a lean and effective deterrent force and the flexible use of different means of deterrence”.

Chinese view of deterrence is broader in the sense that it emphasizes restraint in the use of force and stresses the need to give a boost to the effectiveness of deterrence through the use of non-military, peaceful means. Factors such as economic investment and diplomatic overtures play a significant role in enhancing strategic deterrence by securing more international support for China.

The Science of Military Strategy* lists different flexible means of deterrence other than military means :¹⁴

- ◆ Displaying force or showing the determination to use force
- ◆ To compel the enemy to submit on its own will
- ◆ To refrain from taking hostile actions or escalating hostility
- ◆ Strategic deterrence also “is a major means for attaining the objective of military strategy.”
- ◆ By its very nature, deterrence seeks to change “the pattern of the opponent's psychology.”

Interestingly, in the Science of Military Strategy, as traditionally enunciated in China, only two elements are directly related to the military.

China's growing interest and substantial investments in Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia are driven by a geo-strategic approach. As Ma

Zhengang, former Chinese ambassador to the U.K, now the president of the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), said in 2006, “China-Africa forum on cooperation, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, as well as ASEAN cooperation, are all intended to create a peaceful and stable international environment for China”¹⁵ As statistics indicate, China's investment in Africa has increased since the beginning of the 21st century. Two indicators point to the underlying political motivations.¹⁶ First, government backed investments that focused on the poorest region, were in the form of aid and donations, decided at the governmental level at summit meetings or during exchange of visits by the leaders. Second, China invests in regions that western companies consider too risky to invest in.¹⁷ Without government support, it is just not in the nature of companies to make risky investments.

Men Honghua, a professor at the CCP's Central Party School, has expressed the view that one of China's strategies to deal with the US, is to give economic construction as top strategic priority, reinforce economic integration and thus establish an economic buffer zone. In the formulation of economic strategy for cooperation in the framework of regional economic integration, China should focus on long term interests and strategy to actively provide common regional security, as also set up free trade zones.¹⁸

According to Shi Yinhong, an International Affairs expert in the China People's University, and an advisor to the Chinese leadership, peaceful reunification [with Taiwan] is China's ultimate objective. To achieve this goal, China needs a vision to narrow the gap between itself and the US, and also enhance its importance to that country through a correct and firm strategy. China should make the US accept [as inevitable] Taiwan's reunification with China.¹⁹ The best war, as Sun Zi said, is a war won “without fighting”. It then follows that for China, a truly successful strategy involves manipulating the

development of a situation so effectively that the outcome is inevitably in favour of Chinese interests.²⁰

There are other factors that enhance strategic deterrence. The president and chief executive officer of the US Long Term Strategy Group, Jacqueline Newmyer, points out that China's strategic approach to arms transfers serves as a principal instrument of “Chinese-style alliance building” so as to create a disposition of forces so favourable to Beijing that China would not need to fight a war.²¹ William T. Tow, after assessing China's strategy in the new century, remarks that China “is implementing a regional diplomacy of 'anti-hegemony' designed to shape a regional security environment where the US alliance system will no longer be relevant or necessary, [and] therefore China could decide to embrace multilateralism as a long term strategy”²² According to Jing Dongyuan, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Programme at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, Beijing has actively promoted this strategy as a preferred alternative for regional security to what is regarded as a Cold War relic. China has significantly moderated its approach to territorial disputes for this purpose.²³

What if deterrence fails?

To develop effective deterrence is the main reason for seeking military power, but that does not mean that the actual use of force has been ruled out. Should national and territorial sovereignty be at threat, or if there is outside interference to its independent development, that is a clear indication China would use force.²⁴ As the Science of Military Strategy states: “War fighting is generally used only when deterrence fails and there is no alternative.” A 'just' war has to be waged in such a contingency. A 'just war' is one which is justifiable in the eye of international law, and is acknowledged as such by the international organizations like the United Nations.²⁵ Guo Shuyong, researcher in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, suggests that China's traditional strategic culture has laid emphasis on both utopian peace, as well

as the justifiability of war. In spite of China's restraint in use of force, if, in its perception, a war becomes inevitable, it will still need to seek justification both on moral grounds and in the eyes of the world. Coming to specifics, in case of any use of force or war against Taiwan's attempt to gain independence, China would need to get as much sympathy and support as possible from its neighbours, so as to strengthen the legitimacy of its action.²⁶

4. Neighbouring countries' responses

While military modernization may be an important pillar of nation building, in its peaceful modernization strategy, a major focus of China's effort is to address the concern raised by its neighbours over its military might. The effort of any state to strengthen its own security is certain to be viewed as a threat to their own security. On 5 February 2009, in an article in *Qiushi Journal* (affiliated to the Central Committee of China's Communist Party), two top generals commanding nuclear forces, Gen. Jing Zhiyan, commander of the PLA Second Artillery Corps and Gen. Peng Xiaofeng, the forces' political commissar, stated that China's strategic deterrence had been enhanced and the Second Artillery Corps had taken new steps toward the construction of information technology-dependent strategic missile forces.²⁷ This can be seen by concerned states, especially those with which China has territorial disputes, as a provocative move to upset the balance of power in the region.

- ◆ Expressing its concern in its military White Paper (2008), Japan said:

“On the military field China has been modernizing its military forces, backed by the high and constant increase in defense budget. China appears to give particular priority to the Taiwan issue. It will probably aim for the improvement of military capabilities to prevent Taiwan's independence. But in recent years China has begun to work on acquiring capabilities for missions other than the Taiwan issue.”

- ◆ Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand are in the process of acquiring capacities for surveillance, force projection, precision strike and command and control that they totally lacked just a few years ago²⁸ The defence capabilities of many Southeast Asian states have been strengthened in recent years, though for more reasons than just countering China's military modernization.
- ◆ Australia's Defense White paper (2009)²⁹ also expressed concern that China's military modernization had gone well beyond its needs to meet any Taiwan contingencies. It said:

“The pace, scope and structure of China's military modernization have the potential to give its neighbors cause for concern if [its intentions are] not carefully explained. China has begun to do so in recent years, but needs to do more. If it does not, there is likely to be serious doubts in the minds of regional states about the long-term strategic purpose of its force development plans, particularly as the modernization appears have gone beyond the scope of what would be required in case of a conflict over Taiwan.”

- ◆ India's Maritime Doctrine of 2004 referred to “attempts by China to strategically encircle India”. On 23 May 2009, Indian Air Force chief Air Chief Marshal Fali Homi Major said: “China is a totally different ballgame compared to Pakistan... We know very little about the actual capabilities of China, their combat edge or how professional their military is..... they are certainly a greater threat”.³⁰ On 10 July 2009, the Ministry of Defense, in an assessment, expressed deep concern over China's rapid military modernization.³¹ A month later, on 21 August 2009, India's Naval Chief, Admiral Suresh Mehta, said: “It is quite evident that coping with China will certainly be one of our primary challenges in the years ahead. China is in the process of 'consolidating' its comprehensive national power and creating

formidable military capabilities. Once that is done, China is likely to be more assertive on its claims”³²

While concerns about China's military threat hardly found mention in the African continent, Latin America or in the Middle East, there is growing apprehension on this subject in the countries of the Asia-Pacific.

Neighbours off the coasts of China—Japan, and South China Sea States—have territorial disputes with China, as does India. Beijing's plans to build aircraft carriers, its expansionist territorial claims and its academics' focus on South China Sea and the Indian Ocean in the new century,³³ which it claims are steps to safeguard and secure its maritime interest, are viewed by the countries of the region as upsetting the regional balance of power.

Countries off its coastal area have, for a long time in the past, been the object of China's traditional policy of imposing the imperial tributary system. Today, the policy of building Comprehensive National Power (CNP) suggests the expressions of the same old Sino-centrism. Guo Shuyong, a professor of Shanghai Jiao Tong University, explained that the Chinese tributary system was based on 'equality', and that it was a system of reciprocal exchange involving economic benefit, as well as acknowledgement of authority; the tributary countries received economic favours from the Chinese emperor, and in return, the emperor gained greater authority over them. It was 'equality' in an 'unequal system'.³⁴ This historical record is not necessarily a guide to the present. However, as pointed out by Zhao Gancheng, senior fellow and director of South Asia Studies, Shanghai Institute for International Studies, “Asian nations are likely to have their own power and capacity to control their own affairs, including containing terrorism and maintaining stability. At the strategic level, China is certainly an important player, but how important remains a question.”³⁵ In China's immediate neighborhood these are concerns and questions about the kind of role a stronger China would play in the region. Already China, as the only

Asian permanent member of the UN Security Council, has a highly privileged status among so-called equals.

The table below shows that China has actively participated in and has a high degree of influence on the regional political/strategic scenario. China has not only actively participated in, but also has a high or at least a medium degree of influence on international affairs or events occurring in its immediate neighbourhood, such as North Korea's nuclear issue and the India-Pakistan conflicts. As to affairs and events further away, China has offered only passive participation. It means there is a difference in its foreign policy for nearby areas and distant regions. Thus, it can be said that, for the same issue or event, the reaction or response of China's coastal neighbours could be very different from those of distant states.

Degree of China's participation in international system and big international affairs.³⁶

Category	Case	Degree of Stake holding	Degree of participation	Creation capability or the degree of influence
International System	UNSC	H	A	M
	WTO	H	A	L
	WHO	H	A	H
	G8	L	P	M
Regional	ASEAN+3, 10+1	H	A	H
Cooperation System	APEC	H	A	H
	SCO	H	A	H
International Affairs of great significance	ASEM	M	A	M
	China-Africa Summit	H	A	H
	Iraq War/ Afghanistan War	L	P	L
	North Korea nuclear crisis	H	A	M (influential but a third party)
	Israel-Palestine peace process	L	A	L
	India-Pakistan Confliction	M	A	M (have significant influence)
	Indian ocean tsunami	L	A	M
	Iran nuclear crisis Sudan Dafur	M M	P P	M M

H: High, M: Medium, L: Low, P: Passive, A: Active

The People's Liberation Army's role also needs to be taken into consideration. The PLA is under the Central Military Committee, the highest military leadership unit in the Chinese Communist Party. The Chairman of the committee can take final decisions on military matters. The role of the Ministry of National Defence (MND) is carried out by Central Military Commission (CMC). The four general departments of the CMC carry out MND's functions. MND merely exists on paper with no staff. It was established for dealing with foreign military and press, since China has its own distinctive military style and system. The PLA has a significant role in the policy making process. Most of the high ranking PLA leaders have high level party positions and approximately 20 percent of CCP Central Committee seats are reserved for the PLA and the People's Armed Police (PAP) officers.³⁷ Though the CMC chairman can be of civilian background, military modernization implies a growing military voice in the party, which often significantly shapes China's policies and actions on vital regional or global issues.

Foreign policy and foreign relations work interactively and this process is not amenable to unilateral decisions and declarations. The implications of China's growing military power for the regional actors and their responses could well have a strong impact on both the regional and geo-strategic balance of power. As is the rationale of US neo-realists, dominant economic resource and military capabilities give a state the power to influence its neighbors and to protect itself from outside interference.³⁸ China is the world's third largest economic power and, going by what Yao Shujie, author of a research paper published by the China Policy Institute of the University of Nottingham has said, China is likely to become the second largest economy by 2009 or by 2010.³⁹

The working language of 'peaceful development' is harmony and stability; its style of functioning is constructive diplomacy; its substance is economic

growth and—at least for now, not military—and the key goal is ascendancy.⁴⁰ All concerned states, therefore, are keenly watching China's movement forward towards total ascendancy, both economic and military.

5. 'Educating' people on peace-military linkage⁴¹

CCTV-7 (Military channel) has aired a weekend lecture series programme titled “Heping Niandai, Zhoumokaijiang”, which translates to “Peaceful period, Weekend lecture”. While the programme may not necessarily shape societal views, it clearly gives the officially sanctioned view of the likely future Chinese perception of military power. In his report to the 17th Congress in 2007, Hu Jintao had said that “we will raise the people's awareness of national defense” and that “Party organizations and governments at all levels and the general public will, as always, support efforts to strengthen national defense and the armed forces.” If Beijing decides to educate the public on military affairs, the best way would be through TV programmes.

Each of the weekend lectures deals with several questions and answers. The main questions are:

- ◆ What is the link between economic prosperity and military power?
- ◆ Why does China need a strong military in this world where no major war is likely to occur?
- ◆ Does every economically prosperous state become a militarily powerful state?
- ◆ How did the US become a military power state after such a long period of adherence to the policy of 'isolationism'?
- ◆ Was there any kingdom in Chinese history which had wealth but lacked military strength? What is the lesson we can learn from it?

A few of the conclusions drawn are as follows:

- ◆ Economic development has to go hand in hand with military modernization.
- ◆ Economic prosperity is the basis of a strong military, and a strong military is the basis of development.
- ◆ Military power is required for two purposes. The first is survival, the bottom line for maintaining any military entity. The second is the need to protect national development. This is a very important concept in the present day world where, though no major war is likely to occur, the military has the task of protecting national prosperity.
- ◆ Today, territorial boundary is no more the state's only boundary.
- ◆ National boundary goes further to wherever national interest lies.
- ◆ A strong military is necessary since sea lines of communication (SLOC), maritime rights, energy routes must kept secure, ready for any contingency.
- ◆ Economic power does not necessarily represent military prowess. There are many small countries without military strength in this world. However, these countries either benefit from super power protection or are “non-aligned,” such as Switzerland.
- ◆ Under one of the old dynasties, Song, China was economically a very prosperous state, but it failed to protect itself because it had not built up a correspondingly powerful military force.
- ◆ The United States had followed the foreign policy principle of “isolationism”, right from the days of its first President, George Washington. But it gave up the policy as soon as the nation was under attack and its national interests began to extend beyond its territory. It stands to reason, therefore, that when national interests change, shift or expand there has to be a corresponding change in that nation's stand and policies. Key word is national interest.

- ◆ Economic wealth enhances military technology. However, it does not always mean that arms procurement is possible even if a country has money. Because politics--strategic calculations in particular--is the deciding factor for the selling countries.
- ◆ Protecting national interest is a very important concept in today's world. Sending warships off to Somalia coast to protect national interest is one such example.

It is possible that the TV lecture series may not necessarily reflect the official or general Chinese opinion. All the same, it does to some extent reflect what the Chinese people think about this eco-military linkage. Safeguarding national interest has always been a driving force in China's foreign and security policies. The deployment of Chinese warships off the far-away Somalia coast is indicative of China's determination to project its power far beyond its own shores. A poll conducted on 19 and 20 November, 2008 by the Global Times, and carried in the CCP mouthpiece, the People's Daily, showed that 86 percent of the 2200 respondents supported sending warships to Somalia.⁴²

Conclusion

In a commentary, “Chinese ocean presence a must for peaceful development”, carried in the 23 April 2009 issue of CCP mouthpiece Xinhua said the Navy had taken a new step forward to shoulder greater responsibility for the nation's peaceful development.⁴³ Military buildup is not contrary to the peaceful development concept for Beijing anymore. However, how its neighbours perceive China's growing military strength is another story altogether. Despite China's “charm offensive” in Southeast Asia, anxieties persist as to how and where China intends to use its revamped military power.⁴⁴ To allay these fears, China has come out with many public statements. For example, in response to Australia's expression of concern,

the Chinese Foreign Ministry, on 6 May 2009, stated that its military growth posed no threat to others.⁴⁵ Going by open source materials available so far, no clear picture emerges on China's actual effective military strength, nor any clear indication of whether or how it will reach parity with the US or Russia. Hence, how far this military build up will go is also an open question. It is clear, however, that while developing countries, including India, consider the military budget a financial constraint on economic development, it appears that China has no such apprehensions, as its very credo allows it to emphasise on military power, on the pretext that it is indispensable for economic development.

The focus of concern for China's neighbouring countries and for other world powers is the totality of China's rapid economic growth combined with its constant military build up fuelled and motivated by Beijing's political/strategic ambition i.e., empowering China to the extent that it would possess the capability to manipulate regional and international affairs entirely to its advantage. In the meanwhile, it will probably continue with its diplomatic overtures of peace and good will, as indicated by its Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But the crucial question remains unanswered: how China intends to apply its burgeoning military power to achieve its foreign policy objectives.

History is rife with instances of nations professing commitment to peaceful development while busily building up their military prowess. In the 19th Century, Bismarck had loudly claimed that resurgent Germany had no desire to expand its borders (delineated after the 1870 war with France) and that it wanted to build a harmonious European system. But with the steady growth of Germany's economy and military power—especially its navy, which aimed to rival Britain, the dominant world power of the day—Bismarck's successors abandoned the policy of “peaceful development” resulting in the first World Wars of the 20th Century. Avery Goldstein⁴⁶ says that the situation in 21st century China cannot be analogous to Bismarck's Germany

of the 19th-20th Century, given the differences of various elements. However, while concerned states may wish to believe in China's peaceful development, there is no denying that they too may continue to follow a containment policy. It is a time of Cold Peace.

References

1. His previous positions were Vice president of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, head of its Institute for Marxism, Leninism, and Mao Zedong Thought, Executive Deputy Director of the Propaganda Department, Executive Vice president of the Central Party School, Dean of the School of Humanities and Social Sciences in the graduate school of the Chinese Academy Sciences and other honorary positions.
2. Robert L. Suettinger, "The rise and descent of "peaceful rise", China Leadership Monitor, No. 12. Fall 2004
3. Bonnie S. Glaser and Evan S. Medeiros, "The Changing Ecology of Foreign Policy-Making in China", The China Quarterly, 2007, p305
4. Yi Zhou Wang, "China's state security in a time of peaceful development: A New Issue on Research Agenda", China & World Economy, Vol 15, No. 1, 2007, pp77-86
5. Shi Yinhong, Thirty Studies on Strategy: Reflections on the External Strategies on China (Zhanlue Wenti Sanshipian-Zhongguo Duiwai Zhanlue Sikao), People's University Press: Beijing, 2008. pp174~176
6. Jiang Xiyuan, China of World or world of China, cultural principle of China's diplomacy and trends of development of international system(Zhongguode ShijieHhaishiSshijieDe Zhongguo), Shishi Publishing House: Beijing, 2009. p124
7. ibid
8. Zhang Wenmu, "National Strategic capability and world peace" (Guojiazhanlue Nengli yu Shijie Heping), PLA Daily, 08 January 2007 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqpl/2007-01/08/content_776988.htm
9. Guo Shuyong edit, Lectures on Strategy(Zhanlue Yanjianglu), Peking University Press: Beijing, 2006, p3
10. Avery Goldstein, Rising to the challenge: China's grand strategy and international security, Stanford University Press: California, 2005, p213
11. Guo Shuyong, p33
12. Ibid, p33
13. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-01/20/content_10688124_3.htm
14. Dennis J. Blasko, "Military parades demonstrate Chinese perception of deterrence", China Brief Vol. 9. Issue 8, April 16, 2009, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34869&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=25&cHash=0a8c815af3
*The Science of Military Strategy is the first English language volume on strategy by China's People's Liberation Army. It is edited by two major generals who have significant ability to form China's military strategy as advisors to China's powerful Central Military Committee and Politburo Standing Committee.
15. "The impact of US foreign policy transformation on China"(Meiguowaijiaozhuanxiangdui Zhongguode Yingxiang), South Weekend, 11 October 2007
16. Hayoun Ryou, "China's investment in Indochina: A conscious choice", 5 November 2008, http://www.ipcs.org/article_details.php?articleNo=2717
Hayoun Ryou, "A matter of give and take; China's infrastructure investment in South East Asia's poorest countries will pay back", Business Forum China, March-April 2009, Issue 2. pp72-73

17. "China firm gains Iraq, Africa oil", <http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia-pacific/2009/06/20096258127542668.html>
18. Guo Shuyong, pp287-289
19. Shi Yinhong, p145
20. Huang Ping, Chui Zhiyuan, China and Globalization: The Washington Consensus, the Beijing Consensus, or What?, Social Sciences Academic Press: Beijing, 2005, p256
21. Jacqueline Newmyer, "Oil, Arms, and influence: The indirect strategy behind Chinese military modernization", Orbis, Spring 2009, pp205-219
22. William T. Tow, Asia-Pacific Strategic Relations: Seeking Convergent Security, Green Giant Press: Singapore, 2001, p35
23. Jing Dongyuan, "China embraces multilateralism: from reluctance to activism", 50th annual convention of the International Studies Association New York City, February 15-18, 2009
24. Zhang Wenmu, Global vision of China's national security(Quanqiu Shiyezhong De Zhongguo Guojia Anquan Zhanlue), Shandong People's Publishing House: Jienan, 2008, p3
25. Guo Shuyong, "China's traditional strategic culture", China Academy of Social Sciences Articles, 2006-11-1
26. Guo Shuyong, pp253-276
27. "Top nuclear generals say: China's "strategic deterrence" enhanced now, 05 February 2009, Xinhua, <http://www.china-defense-mashup.com/?p=2576>
28. Richard A. Bitzinger, "The China syndrome: Chinese Military Modernization and the Rearming of Southeast Asia", S. Rajaratnam School of international studies, Singapore, 2 May 2007. No.126 p2
29. www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/docs/defence_white_paper_2009.pdf
30. "China now bigger threat than Pak: IAF chief", Hindustan Times, 23 May 2009, <http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/Print/413933.aspx>
31. "MoD expresses grave concern at China's rapid military modernization", July 10, 2009, The Times of India, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/msid-4759775,prtpage-1.cms>
32. "Navy Chief says China to be India's primary challenge in years ahead", August 11, 2009, News Times, <http://newstimes.in/world-news/navy-chief-says-china-to-be-indias-primary-challenge-in-years-ahead/>
33. Hayoun Ryou, "South China Sea and Indian Ocean" ORF Analysis, August 2009
34. Guo Shuyong, pp222-223
35. Zhao Gancheng, "China's rise and periphery policy", www.ssis.org.cn/sh_yj_cms//upics/2008729202355ZP3X.PDF
36. Zhang Xianwu, Huang Renwei etc. Report on China's International Status: Beijing, People's Printing House, 2005. p316
37. Willy Lam, "Power Pact: Hu's symbiotic relations with the PLA" July 27, 2007, China Brief Vol. 7, Issue 15, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4162
38. V.P. Malik & Jorg Shultz, The Rise of China: perspectives from Asian and Europe, Pentagon Press: New Delhi, 2008, p149
39. "China may top Japan as world's second-largest economy", 10 March 2009, China Daily,

The Meaning of China's 'Peaceful Development' Concept

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-03/10/content_7559222.htm

40. Ho Khai Leong and Samuel C.Y. Ku, *China and Southeast Asia*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2005. p34
41. The following is the writer's personal interpretation based on viewing the program.
42. Poll conducted between 19 to 20 November 2008 by Huanqiu Shibao(Global Times). <http://news.sina.com.cn/2/2008-11-22/065014768405s.shtml>. Accessed on 21 January 2009
43. Yan Hao, "Commentary: Chinese Ocean Presence A Must for Peaceful Development", Xinhua, 2009-04-23, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-04/23/content_11246107.htm
44. "Assessing Regional Reactions to China's Peaceful Development Doctrine", NBR analysis. Vol 18. No. 5. April 2008.
45. "China's military modernization 'no threat'", China Daily, 2009-05-06, http://www.chinadaily.net/china/2009-05/06/content_7747203.htm
46. Avery Goldstein, *Rising to the challenge: China's grand strategy and international security*, Stanford University Press, 2005

Citations from original Chinese texts have been translated by the author.

ORF PUBLICATIONS:

- India's Nuclear Diplomacy after Pokhran II, by Ajai K. Rai (ORF-Pearson Longman 2009)
- Revisiting the Sino-India-border dispute-Prospects for Resolution, by Mohan Guruswamy Zorawar Daulet Singh (ORF-Viva, 2009)
- ORF Seminar Series ; Implementation of Right to Information Act: Issues and Challenges, by Wajahat Habibullah (ORF 2009)
- Monograph: Renewable Energy Technologies, by Amitav Malik (ORF-Academic Foundation 2009)
- India and China: The Next Decade, edited by S. D. Muni and Suranjan Das (ORF-Rupa 2009)
- Food Security: Policy Options for Tamil Nadu, by Dr. A. M. Swaminathan (ORF-Academic Foundation 2009)
- Managed Chaos: The Fragility of the Chinese Miracle by Prem Shankar Jha (ORF-Sage 2009)
- Monograph: Reservation Policy and Its Implementation Across Domains in India:An Analytical Review by Niranjana Sahoo (ORF- Academic Foundation 2009)
- The New Asian Power Dynamic, edited by Maharajakrishna Rasgotra; (ORF- Sage 2007)
- Democracy in Muslim Societies : The Asian Experience (ORF-Studies in Contemporary Muslim Societies-IV), edited by Zoya Hasan (ORF-Sage 2007)
- India and Central Asia : Potential for Regional Co-operation, by Ajish P. Joy (ORF-Sanskriti 2007)
- The Naxal Challenge: Causes, Linkages and Policy Options, edited by P.V. Ramana (ORF-Pearson Longman 2007)
- Maritime Counter-Terrorism A Pan-Asian Perspective, Edited by Swati Parashar (ORF Pearson Longman 2007)
- Pakistan: Four Scenarios, by Wilson John (ORF-Pentagon Press 2007)
- ORF Policy Brief - Terrorism and Human rights, Wilson John and P.V. Ramana (2007)
- A Nation in Transition:Understanding the Indian Economy, by Jayshree Sengupta; (ORF-Academic Foundation 2007)
- The Politics of Power Sector Reform in India, by Niranjana Sahoo; (ORF-Pentagon Press 2007)
- Extremism and Opposition Movements on the Arabian Peninsula, by Joseph A. Kechichian (ORF 2006)

Observer Research Foundation is a public policy think-tank that aims to influence formulation of policies for building a strong and prosperous India. ORF pursues these goals by providing informed and productive inputs, in-depth research and stimulating discussions. The Foundation is supported in its mission by a cross-section of India's leading public figures, academics and business leaders.

Rs. 95/



Observer Research Foundation
20, Rouse Avenue, New Delhi-110 002
Email: orf@orfonline.org
Phone: +91-11-43520020 Fax: +91-11-43520003
www.orfonline.org