



OCCASIONAL PAPER

MAY 2016

92

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Wassenaar Arrangement: The Case of India's Membership

ABSTRACT

India is keen to join the world's export control regimes, all four of them including the Wassenaar Arrangement, as part of its efforts at integrating with the global non-proliferation architecture. While the Wassenaar Arrangement's predecessor, the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls, was established to control transfers of advanced dual-use technology in the North-South and East-West context, the Arrangement's objectives have moved beyond that, requiring it to be more democratic and inclusive. Meanwhile, India's own approach to these regimes has undergone a significant shift, and today India seeks to join the Wassenaar Arrangement and other export control regimes to find space that would allow it to actively contribute to global non-proliferation efforts. This paper makes an assessment of the prospects of India's inclusion in the Wassenaar Arrangement and analyses how it would benefit both India and the global non-proliferation architecture.

INTRODUCTION

Ever since the end of World War II, industrialised and developed countries have tried to control the spread of strategic goods and dual-use technologies. Following the onset of the Cold War in the 1950s, these efforts gained further traction among the developed world keen to restrict the proliferation of such goods and technologies to the Soviet Union and its allies. Export control regimes including the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and Australia Group (AG) were used as effective

mechanisms for such purpose; since then, this had gained prominence in the East-West or the North-South context as well.¹ In the recent years, there is a new determination in making the technology control regimes more inclusive and democratic, and expanding their scope by bringing in new members who can contribute to their further strengthening. The current process of bringing India into these regimes is a case in point.

For long, the international community has viewed India and its policies as being against the interests of these export control regimes. This is despite the fact that India has consistently remained an ardent anti-proliferationist. This perspective from the global non-proliferation community has made India look at these regimes as means to deny developing countries access to technology. Nevertheless, the changing nature of threats to international security and the increasing strategic convergence between India and the major global powers are beginning to create new dynamics within the non-proliferation regime. Importantly, this has led to a growing recognition of India as a “like-minded partner” with similar non-proliferation objectives. This in turn has pushed India to approach these regimes in a more positive light; New Delhi has taken significant steps to integrate with the current regimes. While this in itself is a positive development, the journey to full integration is not easy and there are a handful of countries that continue to have reservations about India's accession.

This paper gives an overview of the Wassenaar Arrangement and India's evolving approach to it. It begins by capturing the origins and objectives of the Wassenaar Arrangement. The following section describes Washington's interests and priorities which have influenced the rules of engagement within the Wassenaar Arrangement; after all, it is the US which played a major role in establishing global rules on the transfer of advanced dual-use technologies. The paper then proceeds to discuss the control lists under the Wassenaar Arrangement, an understanding of which is required in order to appreciate the scope of its export controls. The final section provides a sketch of India's evolving approach to the broader global non-proliferation architecture which provides the rationale for the country's membership to the export control regimes, including the Wassenaar Arrangement. The paper concludes by highlighting India's position with particular reference to the membership criteria of the Wassenaar Arrangement, including both political and technical

requirements, while underlining the merits of India's membership both from New Delhi's perspective as well as that of the regime.

WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT: ORIGIN AND OBJECTIVES

The Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) was one of the earliest mechanisms to be established during the Cold War years, as a critical body mandated to stem the transfer of technology from developed to developing countries. Headquartered in Paris, COCOM had 17 members and carried the primary objective of impeding the potential advancement of Soviet military competencies.² Such aims became redundant with the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, leading the COCOM members to then explore a future avatar of the committee.³ The process eventually led to the establishment of the new regime, Wassenaar Arrangement. The group, established in December 1995, has 41 member countries including former COCOM members and other cooperating countries, and Russia and Visegrad states including Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Wassenaar Arrangement has since become a broader measure to coordinate and harmonise policies on exports of conventional arms and armaments, dual-use equipment, and sensitive technologies. The Wassenaar Arrangement implements its regulations through two lists: the Munitions List that tracks conventional weapons, and the Dual-Use Goods and Technologies List.⁴ New members are accepted into the Wassenaar Arrangement based on specific criteria, including countries that: produce or export arms or associated dual-use goods and technologies; establish national policies that restrict sale of arms and sensitive technologies to countries of concern; and are adherents to the non-proliferation regimes. The Arrangement provides for periodic meetings in Vienna and the decision-making is based on consensus.

Although a successor to COCOM, the Wassenaar Arrangement is different from its predecessor in critical ways. For one, Wassenaar Arrangement is more comprehensive and inclusive, covering countries such as Russia—the target of the former control regime. It aims to be universal and open to all countries; Asian presence, however, is so far limited to Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea. Moreover, unlike COCOM, members of the Wassenaar Arrangement do not have power to veto another member's export. Every

member develops and enforces its own export control policies and consults with other members for approvals or denials. Although the US was keen to maintain certain veto powers to control the flow of goods even among the member countries, it failed to garner the support of the other members. At the same time, members have a responsibility to provide information to the others about their transactions on a semi-annual basis, through the WA Secretariat based in Vienna. This provides members, to a certain degree, with trend lines as to the major importers and exporters of high-end sensitive technology and, accordingly, helps frame the WA's focus areas for governance. The US argued that if WA is to become effective, it should have regions as well as countries of concern so that the flow of strategic goods and arms is restricted. Even as WA did not focus on specific countries, the US, for instance, had its eyes on Iran, Iraq, North Korea and Libya, whose activities were to be monitored rigorously. Thus the US tried to put in place informal arrangements that would keep a tab on certain transactions. The technological thrust that the US has retained has given it an edge in dictating the terms of engagement.

As in other control mechanisms, Wassenaar Arrangement is voluntary and does not have provisions for enforcement and compliance. It therefore is more of a transparency- and confidence-building measure. Towards that end, the member nations went about creating a set of “non-binding best practices” as a way of encouraging stricter compliance. In December 2000, for instance, the member states formulated best practices relating to implementation of national export control measures, disposal of excess military equipment, among others.⁵

THE US AND THE WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT

The United States has used a mix of domestic export control policies and global export control regimes as tools—not only in controlling the free flow of goods, but also and importantly, in furthering its foreign policy goals. Especially during the Cold War, the US objective was to deny advanced Western technologies to the Soviet Union and its partners, or even countries that were perceived to be in the non-aligned camp. The efficacy of these measures in meeting such objectives was questionable. While these

approaches restricted to some extent the access to technology of the Soviet bloc, they failed to put a complete halt to these countries' acquisition of such technologies. The denial of technologies through these regimes meant only that the Soviet Union had little recourse but to rely on less advanced ones. For instance, the Soviet Union's communication technology had become so obsolete that as late as 1987, only 16 long-distance calls could be made in and out of Soviet Union simultaneously.⁶ In an attempt to catch up with its Western rivals, the Soviet Union then made heavy investments in research and development of advanced technologies. This further crippled its economy, contributing to the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union.

In the last few decades since the inception of the Wassenaar Arrangement, the logic behind technology control and denial has undergone a big shift. Advanced technologies are no longer the exclusive domains of either the US or the Soviet Union/Russia; indeed, the diffusion of technology has not only been rapid, but it has spread across significant parts of the globe. Over the years, the impact of export controls made many countries pursue indigenous development of technologies with greater rigour. Further, the involvement of multinational corporations played a critical role in the proliferation of some of these technologies. The boom in global communication technologies is a case in point. The corporations involved in the communications sector, first, began investing in R&D of these technologies in places where costs of services, production and infrastructure were relatively lower. The rising global demand for advanced, high-end technologies further pushed the big corporations into making those investments in R&D. The contribution made by multinational corporations to the exponential growth in China's information and communication technology sector, particularly in the 1990s, illustrates this point.⁷ These efforts led to new phenomena where commercial calculations weighed as much as the military implications of the development and transfer of these technologies. These factors required the export control regimes to take into consideration the interests and concerns of the industry, and this in turn resulted in the loosening of the rules of the game.

Today, even as the US maintains an edge in dual-use technologies, its dominance has declined, albeit gradually. Indigenous technological capabilities in many developing countries have become competitive, even sophisticated, rendering the export control regimes less effective. India

serves as an example, with its own experience in indigenously developing more sophisticated rocket propulsion technology in the face of denial from the West. The US rightly understood that effective trade controls on these strategic goods cannot be maintained if it fails to establish an understanding with all potential exporters of these dual-use technologies, who otherwise could offer alternatives to the high-end technologies of the advanced countries. This—along with the larger effect of commercialisation with non-US-sourced technology—was understood by Washington, which again facilitated the loosening up of the rules and the US policies in this regard. The thin line that separated civil and military applications of a number of high-end technologies was also losing its relevance. Nevertheless, states have used export control regimes as foreign policy tools to deny certain countries access to advanced technologies.

Although these export control regimes are, technically, multilateral, the US has had an undue influence in shaping the rules of engagement. Even as there has been a gradual decline in US influence in controlling the global flow of these technologies, its technological lead gives Washington a significant edge within these regimes.

On the US side, the US Customs Service and the Department of Commerce through its Bureau of Export Administration maintained strict controls on technology transfers, especially from a commercial perspective. The Department of Defense and the Department of State, meanwhile, studied the national security-related aspects of these transfers. Simultaneously, the Departments of Commerce and State through their involvement in export control regimes influenced the framing of tougher rules for technology transfers. Thus the US—using a mix of domestic export control regulations and existing global multilateral arrangements implemented through COCOM during the Cold War and the Wassenaar Arrangement that followed—ensured the control of the flow of military and advanced dual-use technologies and products to so-called ‘countries of concern’. While there was legitimate fear that these technologies and products would end up in the hands of the Soviet Union or its allies—which was the primary concern of the COCOM—the US went beyond in using these export control regimes as effective tools in meeting its larger foreign policy goals.

WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT CONTROL LISTS

The control list of the Wassenaar Arrangement is quite expansive. There are two broad categories of control list under the Wassenaar Arrangement: lists of dual-use goods and technology, and munitions list. Items placed in the list of dual-use goods and technology, referred to as the “General Technology, General Software and General Information Security” list are placed under nine categories: Special Materials and Related Equipment; Materials Processing; Electronics; Computers; Telecommunications (Part 1 of Category 5) and Information Security (Part 2 of Category 5); Sensors and Lasers; Navigation and Avionics; Marine; and Aerospace and Propulsion. There is also the recognition of the 'sensitivity' level of these items and, based on that, some of them are placed under “Sensitive List” and some under “Very Sensitive List.”⁸

Under the category of munitions lists, there are a total of 22 lists. These lists contain items of (in)direct military utility, including and not limited to small arms and weapons, ammunitions, bombs, explosives, rockets, missiles, chemical and biological toxic agents, riot control agents, radioactive material, energetic materials and their precursors, armored and armed vehicles or carriers, vessels of war, aircrafts and UAVs.

As explained earlier, Wassenaar Arrangement was originally applicable to conventional arms and dual-use goods related to the production of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Only in 1998 did the Wassenaar Arrangement introduce controls against strong encryption software. In December 2013 the participating members of the Wassenaar Arrangement updated the control list to include certain surveillance and intelligence gathering software.⁹ These introductions were made with the intent of restricting the sale of tools that can be used by oppressive states to spy desktops and remote devices such as cellular phones. For example, tools like the DaVinci system developed by Italian firm Hacking Team and FinFisher made by the UK firm Gamma Group International, have fallen into the hands of governments which have reportedly used them against its civilians, especially human rights activists and political dissidents, in violation of their rights.¹⁰

While the intentions may have been well placed, the introduction faced a lot of criticism worldwide. The issue primarily emerged from the definition of the intrusive software being controlled. The Wassenaar Arrangement defined

intrusion software as “anything designed to 'avoid detection from monitoring tools or to defeat protective countermeasures' and which can also modify or extract data from a system or modify the system.”¹¹ This definition is too broad that there is a concern about legitimate security tools falling under the 'controlled' category. For instance, the penetration-testing software used by security professionals for the detection and resolution of vulnerabilities of systems being tested, may fall under the control list of the Wassenaar Arrangement. Thus there have been demands for changing the use of “intrusion” to “exfiltration”—such semantics will then allow the export control mechanism to distinguish between tools that test systems and ones that siphon data and intelligence.¹²

An assessment of the December 2013 updates in the WA's control list notes that the Arrangement does not restrict the intrusion software itself, but rather the command and delivery systems that install or communicate with the intrusion software. For instance, Category 4.A.5 of the dual-use list of the WA includes “Systems, equipment, and components therefor, specially designed or modified for the generation, operation or delivery of, or communication with, 'intrusion software'.” The US Department of Commerce's interpretation of the Wassenaar Arrangement's control list update to this regard was that while there will be control on the exploit codes—used to implant malicious tools including intrusion software on vulnerable systems—the exploits themselves would not be controlled. This challenge of interpreting the updates of the Wassenaar Arrangement's control list and incorporating them into the national export control system has been faced by many, if not all, members of the Arrangement. It is important for India to address these challenges as it pursues the harmonisation of its Special Chemicals, Organisms, Materials, Equipments and Technology (SCOMET) list with that of the Wassenaar Arrangement's control lists.

The following sections make an assessment of India's evolving approach to export control regimes, in general, and the Wassenaar Arrangement in particular.

INDIA AND THE GLOBAL NON-PROLIFERATION ARCHITECTURE

India's own approach to technology export control regimes has undergone a big shift in recent years. While India has remained an adherent to the

underlying non-proliferation goals over the decades, it stayed away from becoming a member of the regime for various strategic reasons. The big change in India's stance was facilitated by the new US approach that saw efforts to get India into the global non-proliferation architecture. Approaching from a geostrategic perspective, the Bush Administration understood the need to forge stronger ties with India and trade in strategic goods was identified as vital in facilitating the same. The 2005 US-India civil nuclear cooperation agreement, which enabled the India-specific waiver at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 2008, and the 2010 India-US joint statement were dynamic in changing India's approach to the global non-proliferation regime. The 2005 agreement completely turned around the basic terms of engagement between India and the US – a big shift from the previous Clinton Administration that sought to make India “roll-back” its nuclear programme. Even though this agreement is usually pitted in a US-India context, it changed the global rules of the game for India, putting to end what India called an “apartheid-like” scenario in the nuclear realm. Further, in 2010, US President Barack Obama made a strong case for including India in the four export control regimes.

India stayed outside of these regimes all these decades. However, as India's interests have since grown far and wide, New Delhi has realised the value of becoming a member of these groupings. These groups are also important in the context of a globalised world as most of the suppliers of the high-end dual-use technologies are also members of these regimes. Even the domestic export regulations of these countries are in line with the guidelines of these multilateral regimes. Accordingly, India has also begun making serious efforts at meeting the technical requirements of each of these regimes. It has already implemented the guidelines of these regimes in so far as domestic legislations are concerned, and is now in the process of harmonising its SCOMET list with the control lists of these regimes. In an effort to further streamline India's domestic export control policies with that of the Wassenaar Arrangement, New Delhi in August 2015 announced a list of 16 categories of defence equipment on which the export control regulations will be applicable. This measure clearly brings India a step closer to the requirements vis-a-vis the Wassenaar Arrangement.¹³

India's entry into these regimes will also give it greater latitude in the global governance of these technologies besides strengthening its credentials as a responsible stakeholder. India, being outside these regimes, has so far not been able to contribute effectively to the global cause of non-proliferation. For instance, India has not been effective in tackling some of the NPT-related challenges posed by states such as Iran and North Korea. These have been strong imperatives and India has been actively reaching out to states in garnering support for its accession to these global regimes.

While many of the powers have been appreciative of Indian efforts to be party to these multilateral regimes, some countries continue to harbour reservations. Such reservations come primarily from the fact that India is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) despite being an ardent adherent to its principles. Most countries agree that India has met with all the technical requirements and they also see the utility of bringing in India into these groups. Major powers such as the US, UK, Russia and France have endorsed India's candidacy, but India has to pursue a lot harder with some of the European nations such as Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands and Switzerland, which have a rather rigid posture on non-proliferation.¹⁴ China has also adopted a negative approach towards India's accession, arguing that a country-specific exemption should not be made for India. In fact, Beijing has made efforts at including Islamabad and tried to negotiate a deal. There have not been too many takers, however. If China has to play a larger role in these regimes, it has to adopt a broader strategic perspective and note India's exceptional track record in non-proliferation.

Of the four technology export control regimes, the NSG membership may prove to be more difficult than other groups. A couple of factors such as India's peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) of 1974 resulting in the establishment of the NSG and NSG's relationship with NPT, makes India's NSG membership more challenging. Some have suggested that the Australia Group and Wassenaar Arrangement are relatively easier to get into and that India should first seek membership in these two. However, it is unlikely that India will apply for membership in these two without establishing further understanding on the prospects of its entry into the MTCR and the NSG. India is increasingly approaching the membership issue as an incremental one and

the sense is that India should have reasonable assurance and sense of direction before it joins the Australia Group or the Wassenaar Arrangement.

INDIA AND THE WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT

Unlike the NSG or the MTCR, Wassenaar Arrangement has defined criteria for participation. The eligibility of a state to participate in the Wassenaar Arrangement is based on “whether it is a producer/exporter or arms or industrial equipment respectively”; “whether it has taken the WA Control lists as a reference in its national export controls”; “its non-proliferation policies and appropriate national policies, including adherence to non-proliferation policies, control lists and, where applicable, guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, (Q) the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Australia Group, and through adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and Toxicological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention and (where applicable) START I, including the Lisbon Protocol”; and “its adherence to fully effective export controls.”¹⁵

India meets three of these four criteria for participation in the Wassenaar Arrangement. It is a producer and exporter of many of the items that fall in the Control lists of the Wassenaar Arrangement. As India raises its profile as an exporter and rises up the global supply chains, its clout as an exporter is only going to increase.

As far as its non-proliferation policies are concerned, New Delhi's adherence to the principles and norms of non-proliferation has been well established. After all, it was New Delhi's exceptional track-record on non-proliferation which allowed India to get the waiver from the condition of full-scope safeguards from NSG countries and let New Delhi engage in global nuclear commerce. It has been an adherent to the guidelines of the NSG and is preparing to apply for a membership to the Group. It has also met the technical requirements of a member to the MTCR and thus adheres to its guidelines. It has signed and ratified the Biological and Toxicological Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). In terms of the NPT, India has always adhered to its principles and has fulfilled all commitments that other nuclear weapon states under the Treaty have met. It continues to stay outside the Treaty, but that does not become a stumbling

block as far as the criteria for membership to the Wassenaar Arrangement is concerned. The criterion with regard to the non-proliferation policies begins with “where applicable” before referring to the NPT. Also the reference to the NPT is regarding “adherence” to the Treaty and does not talk of “being party” to the Treaty.


India's national export control system is elaborate and incorporates necessary legislatures and mechanisms required for an effective export control system. The only remaining criterion in this regard is its SCOMET list and bringing that in complete harmony with the Control lists of the Wassenaar Arrangement. The foremost challenge would be to avoid repetitions. Many of the items included in the Control lists of the Wassenaar Arrangement are already in the control lists of, for instance, the MTCR. Another task would be to define the items from Wassenaar Arrangement's Control lists in India's SCOMET list. India could consider introducing remaining items from Wassenaar Arrangement as they are defined; however, this could lead to confusion over, for instance, what does or does not qualify as tools for surveillance and intelligence gathering and whether they should be controlled or not.

MERITS OF INDIA'S ACCESSION

The merits of India's accession to global non-proliferation regimes are significant. In essence, India is becoming a willing partner to abide by the global rules of the road and the regimes including the Wassenaar Arrangement. Bringing India into these will also go a long way in enhancing the credibility of these groupings. As India is a global rising power with an exceptional track record in non-proliferation, it is in the interest of these regimes to facilitate its accession.

At the same time, the benefits accruing India to be in the Wassenaar Arrangement are multifaceted. As far as the access to controlled items is concerned, the export of these items takes place whether or not the recipient country is a member of the Wassenaar Arrangement. For instance, items such as aircraft, sea-vessels from the munition lists of the WA's Control lists are exported from suppliers belonging to the Arrangement to countries outside of it. They definitely fall under the domestic export control systems of the

supplier countries and required licenses are issued for such transfers. However, the decision to supply items controlled under the WA to non-member states remains essentially a political call made by the supplier state. It reflects their appreciation of whether such a transfer would be stabilising to international security, or otherwise. Nonetheless, membership to the Wassenaar Arrangement would enhance the recognition of India as a responsible partner in ensuring international peace and security. Entry into the Wassenaar Arrangement would not, however, guarantee access to all the items that fall under its Control lists. What it will do is increase the probability of India receiving these items, but the transfers will continue to be subject to New Delhi's bilateral negotiations with supplier countries. Meanwhile, India as a supplier state under the Wassenaar Arrangement will also get to exercise its own discretion in determining a particular export.

A second benefit would be in terms of what and how India might be able to contribute to the regime's interests and objectives. New Delhi could take on the responsibility of identifying which items, and whether or not their exports, are potentially destabilising to international security. India is growing in its clout and capacity as a producer of many of the items that fall under the Wassenaar Arrangement's Control lists. Considering the competitive prices that it will be able to offer to the global market, India has the potential to soon emerge as a major supplier of these items. By being a member of the Wassenaar Arrangement, New Delhi will be able to not only identify items whose exports should be controlled based on their sensitivity to international security, but also define these items that would serve best the WA's objectives and potentially save it from negative spin-offs. As an advanced and responsible power, it is to the benefit of the regime to have India inside, rather than outside, the tent. India's accession into the global regimes, including the Wassenaar Arrangement, will go a long way in raising the credibility of both India as a responsible stakeholder and the regime as open and inclusive. 

ENDNOTES:

1. While these regimes took its origin with their own narrow objectives, there was the underlying attempt at denying technologies to countries from the developing world. The only exception to this was COCOM which was openly directed against the Eastern bloc.
2. Rand C Lewis, "COCOM: An International Attempt to Control Technology," *The DISAM Journal*, Fall 1990, pp. 66-73.
3. "About us: Origins," *The Wassenaar Arrangement*, available at <http://www.wassenaar.org/about-us/>, accessed 15 March 2016.
4. "List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies And Munitions List," *The Wassenaar Arrangement*, available at <http://www.wassenaar.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/WA-LIST-15-1-2015-List-of-DU-Goods-and-Technologies-and-Munitions-List.pdf>, accessed 14 March 2016.
5. "Wassenaar Arrangement," *Nuclear Threat Initiative*, available at <http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/wassenaar-arrangement/>, accessed 11 March 2016.
6. Douglas Lemke, *Regions of Peace and War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 24-25.
7. Yifei Sun, Zi Xu and Debin Du, "State, Multinational Corporations, Returnees, and Development of China's Integrated Circuit (IC) Design Industry," in Yu Zhou, William Lazonick and Yifei Sun (eds.) *China as an Innovation Nation* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 250.
8. "List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies And Munitions List," *The Wassenaar Arrangement*, available at <http://www.wassenaar.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/WA-LIST-15-1-2015-List-of-DU-Goods-and-Technologies-and-Munitions-List.pdf>, accessed 14 March 2016.
9. InnokentyPyetranker, "An Umbrella in a Hurricane: Cyber Technology and the December 2013 Amendment to the Wassenaar Arrangement," *Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property*, Vol. 13, No. 2, Fall 2015, pp.153-80.
10. Kim Zetter, "Why an Arms Control Pact has Security Experts up in Arms," *Wired*, June 24, 2015.
11. Kim Zetter, "Why an Arms Control Pact has Security Experts up in Arms," *Wired*, June 24, 2015.
12. Kim Zetter, "Why an Arms Control Pact has Security Experts up in Arms," *Wired*, June 24, 2015.
13. Manu Balachandran, "India is Finally Walking the Talk on Becoming A Global Arms Exporter," *Quartz India*, September 02, 2015, <http://qz.com/489410/india-is-finally-walking-the-talk-on-becoming-a-global-arms-exporter/>.
14. While NPT membership is not a criteria for India's accession into the export controls regimes, including the Wassenaar Arrangement, member states of these groupings have assessed the non-proliferation credentials of new applicants on the basis of their international treaty commitments and NPT has thus always featured in their assessments.
15. "Initial Elements – Appendix 4: Participation Criteria," *The Wassenaar Arrangement*, available at <http://www.wassenaar.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Initial-Elements-2015.pdf>, accessed 16 March 2016. Also see "Guidelines for Applicant Countries," *The Wassenaar Arrangement*, available at <http://www.wassenaar.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/11Guidelines-for-Applicant-Countries.pdf>, accessed 16 March 2016.

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