



# OCCASIONAL PAPER

APRIL 2016

90

## **It is Changing After All: India's Stance on 'Responsibility to Protect'**

DAN KRAUSE

# **It is Changing After All: India's Stance on 'Responsibility to Protect'**

DAN KRAUSE

## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

**Dan Krause** is research associate and doctoral candidate at the Institute for International Politics at the University of the Federal Armed Forces in Hamburg, Germany. As Lieutenant Colonel of the Army Reserve, the former Army Aviation officer gives lectures at the Armed Forces Staff College in Hamburg. He has also worked for the Federal Academy for Security Policy in Berlin. His research interests, besides issues related to Responsibility to Protect, include German and European security and defense policy, and international security policy. His PhD project deals with the R2P positions of the Southern Democracies, namely, India, Brazil and South Africa.

# **It is Changing After All: India's Stance on 'Responsibility to Protect'**

## **ABSTRACT**

Until 2009, India was regarded as one of the most stringent opponents of the 'Responsibility to Protect' (R2P) norm; it was, historically, a staunch advocate of a state-centred Westphalian system. But India's position has always been more complex and nuanced in all respects. Since 2009, the fundamental change that has taken place is also quite remarkable. This change can partly be accounted for by India's noteworthy, but still ongoing transformation from a developing country into a regional power with global clout. The fact that India has almost entirely turned its back on non-alignment, and its interests have moved increasingly further away from the developing countries, is also reflected in its foreign policy. While India has not yet made any conceptual contributions to R2P comparable to Brazil's, it has brought about important changes, in particular to its own position, since the end of its turn at the UN Security Council.

## **INTRODUCTION**

In the final declaration of the sixth BRICS Summit in Fortaleza in Brazil, Russia and China reiterated the importance they attach to the status and role of their BRICS partners Brazil, India and South Africa in international affairs, stating that they should play a greater role in United Nations (UN) structures, notably in a reformed and expanded Security Council(cf. Sixth BRICS Summit 2014a: 6). Given that the BRICS states account for 26 percent of the earth's surface, 46 percent of the world's population, and a growing share of global GDP (cf. Sixth BRICS Summit 2014b), they are becoming increasingly unwilling to accept their under-representation in matters relating to

international order and the development of global standards. Alongside China, the emergence of India, in particular, as a major pole in international politics clearly embodies the global shift in power, the re-emergence of Asia and the rise of new powers, and the fact that the world order is increasingly multipolar (cf. Staack 2013: 10f.; Fidler/Ganguly 2010). While opinions on its future role differ, India will likely become a major player in international politics if it fulfils even the most pessimistic of predictions. The further development of the global order and its underlying norms and rules will increasingly require the participation of emerging powers, with the positions of the Southern democracies of India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) being of particular interest. For even as it is true that these countries are pluralist democracies with a free press, functioning democratic institutions, and a largely liberal economy—and they share the same attributes as classical Western democracies and hold similar views on democratic principles and fundamental human rights—they have substantially different views on certain matters of global order and international politics.

This observation also pertains to the emerging political concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). India, which stands out from the Southern democracies for its being the world's largest democracy with a population of 1.2 billion—and due to its economic growth which will outperform even China's if International Monetary Fund (IMF) predictions for 2015 and 2016 come true—has expressed a great deal of scepticism about the concept of R2P. However, while this was at first perceived as undifferentiated opposition, in particular at the 2005 World Summit, it later turned out to be unrelated to the first two pillars of R2P which, in fact, are generally in line with Indian foreign policy. Yet to this day, New Delhi remains highly sceptical about pillar three, which establishes the right to intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state if such state is unwilling or unable to protect its population, and particularly rejects the use of military means in this context. Moreover, India long questioned whether a new R2P-type concept was needed in the first place, since the first two pillars were not considered to be new ideas, but rather existing and accepted norms of international law, and the third pillar was perceived as an attempt to re-introduce humanitarian intervention (HI). In the debate on the topic in India, R2P and HI are not seldom tarred with the

same brush as the selective use of military force, mainly by Western states, which claim to pursue humanitarian objectives but are in fact only after their own national and strategic interests: "One answer to the problem of internal disorder is humanitarian intervention which has most recently been enshrined in the UN as the 'responsibility to protect' or R2P" (Bajpai 2012: 54).

This paper describes the stance taken by the Indian government on the R2P concept, the focus being on the question of its causes and reasons. It is clear that the debate in India, which started rather late, revolves almost exclusively around pillar three, and in particular around the use of military intervention to prevent mass atrocities. So far, there has hardly been any normative or conceptual debate on R2P at all (cf. Mohan 2014: 3). Yet India's stance on R2P is more complex than is widely believed or visible at a glance. Thus the aim of this article is to identify and critically assess what seem to be, or actually are, the guiding principles, values and norms of India's foreign policy with regard to the (controversial aspects of) R2P. Emphasis is placed on India's own experiences with intervention and the country's stance on the Western practice of humanitarian intervention. In a second step, India's specific R2P policy is outlined and analysed in four phases. The author argues that India's basic stance has changed little in the course of these four phases, in particular on the controversial issue of military intervention envisioned under pillar three. While India's opposition was initially perceived as reflexive and fundamental, it has nevertheless given way to a clearly more nuanced image of critical and sceptical acceptance of R2P (in regard to the concept as such and with fundamental doubt about pillar three), which is the result of a more in-depth analysis of the R2P concept and a consequence of India's growing engagement with questions of international politics on the global stage. New Delhi has come quite a way along the path toward general acceptance of R2P. It was in particular India's term as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) in 2011 and 2012 and the intense debate on R2P in the wake of the war in Libya that revealed India's stance on R2P and its core elements. India's stance became substantially more open, specific and nuanced.

## INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY: GUIDING PRINCIPLES

India's stance on concrete decisions in international politics that are considered later in this article has almost always been adopted on the basis of a mix of strategic and material interests and trade-offs, domestic policy constellations and sometimes personal motives or views of important decisionmakers. Thus, the dominant factors influencing it vary and are taken into account as each situation requires. In general, however, the underlying assumption is that any state's decisions are governed by norms and rules, made in the light of subjective factors, historical-cultural experiences and institutional involvement and based on guiding principles, values and world views. It is on the basis of these principles and the way they see a particular matter that states define their specific interests and ultimately, amid consideration of the other variables mentioned above, their foreign policy.

The current state of research on India's R2P policy and an intensive study of secondary literature on the country's strategic and foreign policy allow fundamental values, norms and world views that are regarded as declaratory or actual guiding principles to be defined, and they are critically assessed in this article. They are the so-called five principles, or Panchsheel; India's perception of itself as the advocate of the Non-Aligned Movement; the principle of non-violence; and tolerance and pluralism in foreign affairs. Whenever relevant, the subcontinent's power role and development in present and especially future power politics, which are perceived as open both in India and abroad, and its meteoric rise – together with all the implications this has for its foreign policy, are considered as background information and additional explanatory variables.

### **Voice of the Non-Aligned Movement and Champion of the Westphalian Concept**

"India sees itself as an old civilisation and a new nation state; and preserving its independence and autonomy has been a constant in India's foreign policy. This led to a policy of non-alignment, emphasizing state autonomy even when it believed in engaging internationally" (Banerjee 2012: 92).

When it gained independence in 1947, India was for the first time able to

determine its own destiny again. At the same time, the circumstances in which independence was won were anything but easy and called for a consolidation of India's domestic and foreign policy. "[India was] a poor, weak post-colonial state coming into being in the midst of a dangerous bipolar international system" (Fidler/Ganguly 2010: 151). Moreover, the former crown colony had been trisected – largely along the lines of religious majorities – a development which led to considerable violence, millions of refugees, and ultimately, with India's support, the secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan. Not only do the border issues with Pakistan remain unresolved, but there have also been wars with other countries in the area, including China. Disputes are still ongoing. The difficult state in which several neighbouring states (Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan) still find themselves and the inadequately developed security architecture in the region have not necessarily made the geographical situation any easier, either (cf. Wagner 2014).

India's first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, reacted to the situation by making India's independence from the great powers his core foreign policy guideline, as well as the emphasis on and the preservation of national sovereignty, and non-interference. These guidelines would be reflected in the Non-Aligned Movement and in the so-called *Panchsheel* – the five principles of peaceful co-existence. In 1954, Panchsheel was included in the preamble of a bilateral agreement between India and the People's Republic of China for the purpose of promoting trade relations with the Tibet region of China (cf. Fidler/Ganguly 2010: 151; Hall 2013: 87f.; Virk 2013: 58, et al.). The five principles are: mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty; mutual non-aggression; mutual non-interference in internal affairs; equality and cooperation for mutual benefit; and peaceful co-existence (United Nations Treaty Series 1958: 70). It was not by coincidence that, a year later at the conference in Bandung, Indonesia, which is regarded as the birthplace of the Non-Aligned Movement, these principles were approved by the participating nations as the foundation of their relations. To this day, they continue to have a great impact in these countries and the Southeast Asian region (cf. Banerjee 2012: 92f.; Ganguly 2013: 2). The aim Nehru associated with this movement was that of creating an alliance (not in its traditional hegemonic or power-oriented sense) outside the two antagonistic blocs so as to promote India's



ambition to play a leading role in international politics and maintain its freedom of action. Nehru's foreign policy was based on high moral standards, with decolonisation, nuclear disarmament and anti-racism becoming key targets. It was accompanied by anti-colonial, anti-Western and anti-imperialistic patterns of argumentation and their associated rhetoric. This reflected the domestic situation, formative experiences in the history of the country, and the rather left-of-centre world view of the majority of the political parties and people in India (cf. Wulf 2013: 17f.; Mohan/Kurtz 2014: 5).

The break-up of Yugoslavia and the decline in importance of Egypt, the then leading power in the Non-Aligned Movement, strengthened India's position as the voice of the Movement and representative of the Global South. As a consequence, India has on more than one occasion been able to rely on considerable diplomatic backing within the United Nations, one example being its election as a non-permanent member of the Security Council in 2010 by the General Assembly with a record result of 187 out of 191 votes (UN General Assembly 2010: 2). Even though certain political movements in India continue to hold on to the idealistic aspirations of the Nehru era, the policy turned into rhetoric, rather than reality after the Sino-Indian War of 1962 and Nehru's death in 1964. Non-alignment tottered under the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of 1971, the aim of nuclear disarmament became obsolete when an Indian nuclear weapon test was conducted under Indira Gandhi in 1974, and India repeatedly demonstrated its military strength to neighbouring countries (cf. Hall 2013: 88; Wulf 2013: 19).

Today, India is still keen on pursuing a policy of cooperation with the countries of the Global South and likes to allude to the anti-colonialist country that fought Northern imperialism, for instance when referring to the climate negotiations, as "green imperialism" (cf. Wulf 2013: 19). How much longer India will be able to play this role remains to be seen. While it is true that India still displays many characteristics of a developing country, it has experienced a rapid economic rise, one that took place within the existing Western-style world order and led to an economic boom and the emergence of a middle class in which hundreds of millions of people found themselves (cf. Stuenkel 2013: 413ff.). While this has produced signs of a considerable

growth in confidence among the political elite, there is also a certain sense of uncertainty concerning India's role, its capabilities and the demands that may be placed on it and there is a marked focus on mastering the country's domestic challenges (cf. Fidler/Ganguly 2010; Hall 2013: 106; Miller 2013; Wulf 2013: 6–9).

The India-US nuclear agreement, which was initiated in 2005 and led to the *de facto* recognition of India as a major nuclear power by the United States, reinforced the political attention and recognition it was given and granted New Delhi a much greater say in international politics. This development almost inevitably means that India's interests will increasingly diverge from those of the developing countries, and this will not be without implications for India's foreign policy (cf. Virk 2013: 64; Stuenkel 2011: 192–194). "The country has largely departed from the non-alignment policy in many issues" (Debiel/Wulf 2013: 31) and pursues an interest-based foreign policy mix of global multilateralism and intensification of its involvement in forms of international club governance and expansion in its bilateral relations with neighbouring states (Look East policy), major global partners and important regional organisations (cf. *ibid*: 31f.; Gaur 2011; Mohan 2006) as well as international security cooperation (Mohan 2015).

Despite the post-Cold War realignment of India's foreign policy and a rapprochement with the United States, which backs India's ambitions for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, two post-colonial lines of Indian foreign policy continue to exist. One is that anti-colonial, anti-Western and anti-imperialistic movements are still a powerful force in Indian politics and among the people – a force that is easy to mobilise and should not be underestimated, but must be taken into account for reasons of domestic policy mainly (e.g. in the frequent coalition governments). Moreover, India is highly sceptical about the policies of interventionism pursued by the former colonial powers, and thus by the West as a whole. The other is that little has changed in the difficult geographical position India is in, with the considerable security problems there and India's own immense domestic challenges. "Modern India is a relatively new state, for which nation-building and state-making remain ongoing processes" (Virk 2013: 61). Thus India has a

strong interest in order and stability both in its own country as well as in its direct and extended neighbourhood, as this allows it to freely advance its further development. It is therefore highly sceptical about radical changes to the international order, as it expects them to create confusion, cause disorder and counter its own rise within the existing international order. Consequently, India shows a remarkable persistence in holding on to the key elements of today's world order, in particular to the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of nation states and their status as primary subjects of international politics and international law. The only aspects of the system India *does* seek to modify are related to its adequate representation within the changing power structures, its due position and influence within the international order, and to a certain extent the definition of this order's future rules and norms (cf. Mohan 2006; Fidler/Ganguly 2010; Wulf 2013: 5f.).

### **The Principle of Non-Interference and India's Interventionism**

A review of India's stance on the principles of non-interference and non-intervention from a historical viewpoint yields extremely ambivalent results. Contrary to the myth that non-interference has been one of the highest principles of New Delhi's foreign policy ever since Nehru's day and the five principles, India has violated this principle time and again on grounds of moral, strategic or national interest and adopted contradictory positions on the intervention policies pursued by other powers (cf. Hall 2013: 89f.; Mohan 2011).

From the 1940s to 1980s, India was a vociferous critic of the South African apartheid regime, calling for its international condemnation and the imposition of sanctions by the international community. It took close note of the protection South Africa was more than once given against these sanctions and condemnations in the UNSC by France, Great Britain and USA, the major Western powers (cf. Mohan 2011). Exceptionally harsh criticism was voiced against the Anglo-French Suez campaign in 1956, but little notice was taken of the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian uprising that same year. It did not take India long to condemn the US involvement in Vietnam either, whereas it supported the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia a few years later for strategic reasons (quadrilateral relations between Vietnam, Soviet Union,

India and China). And even though India took a certain domestic account of the interests of its Muslim population, it found it hard to criticise the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The strategic interest of not offending its most important global partner and weapon supplier and key protecting power in the Security Council took precedence over all concerns (cf. Mohan 2011: 3f.).

In 1961 India itself had chased the Portuguese out of Goa by resorting to the use of force with a brief, but nevertheless offensive military operation which cost some dozen casualties on both sides. Ten years later, a large number of Indian forces intervened in East Pakistan, where heavy fighting and gruesome crimes were noted between the military, dominated by West Pakistan, and the Bengali people. According to different sources, between several hundreds of thousands and three million people were killed, several hundreds of thousands were raped, and up to ten million people became refugees, most of them fleeing to India (cf. Banerjee 2012: 93). India initially stated quite understandable humanitarian reasons to justify its intervention, but they were not accepted by the international community. There was nothing like today's R2P concept that could be used as a basis for this kind of justification and even a significant number of non-aligned states refused India their allegiance in the General Assembly, while other permanent members of the Security Council protected Pakistan on grounds of their national strategic interests. As a consequence, India no longer offered humanitarian reasons, but defended its intervention by referring to the difficulty that existed in coping with the large number of refugees in the country, to various border violations, and to the bombing of Indian airfields by Pakistani troops, and citing its right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. India's commitment ended after three months and the country withdrew its troops from the newly created Bangladesh. Even though India certainly had a strategic interest in seeing Pakistan fall apart and although its motives were more than just of a moral nature, the political authorities in India learned their lesson from this international condemnation. They considered that the major powers covered up crimes against humanity (Pakistan, Cambodia, South Africa) and indisputable humanitarian grounds for an intervention were rejected for reasons of national interest (cf. Banerjee 2012: 94; Ganguly 2013: 2).

India's second formative experience with military interventions involved the dispatch of peacekeeping forces to the civil war in Sri Lanka in 1987. After having intervened in the internal affairs of the island state by airlifting supplies to the beleaguered Tamil population, India shortly afterwards deployed troops on grounds of domestic policy: out of consideration for the millions of Tamils in southern India. Even though the troops had been deployed with the consent of the Sri Lankan government to protect the Tamil minority, they soon found themselves caught between the front lines. Between 1987 and 1990, India paid for its intervention and mediation with the lives of more than a thousand soldiers and, in 1991, with a deadly suicide attack on ex-premier Rajiv Gandhi. One lesson India learned from this disaster was to accept that a conflict—where both parties, finding themselves irreconcilable and thus have resorted to the use of arms—cannot be resolved by military power alone. It also learned the hard way that interfering in violent conflicts of other states can have fatal consequences and that even substantial military means can only accomplish limited objectives.

It must be mentioned in this context that India has a long tradition of contributing to UN peacekeeping missions. These forays also give a glimpse of the country's attitude towards the use of military force in the protection of human rights. India has been one of the major contributors from the very beginning and involved in various operations (Congo, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Gaza). As these operations met all the legitimacy requirements laid down by New Delhi, continuity has been maintained in Indian policy over the years, and to this day is fully in accord with this form of interventionism. All the missions have been conducted under a UN mandate; all but one (Somalia) have had the consent of the host-state and been set up after non-military options had been exhausted; all of them have been carried out under the military command of the UN, had attainable goals and been in line with India's political goals and its Constitution, which declares that the country must contribute to global peace and security under the UN umbrella (cf. Banerjee 2012: 94–96). At the same time, the operations have also demonstrated the limits of India's consent as "Indian policymakers remain deeply adamantly opposed to transforming a peacekeeping operation into a peace enforcement without suitable UN authorization" (Ganguly 2013: 2).

This brief overview of historical events shows that India is a major regional power and insists on having its own sphere of influence in which it does not tolerate any external interference, even in controversial issues (Jammu and Kashmir), and prefers to set its own rules of the game. Interfering in the internal affairs of other states (Nepal, Maldives, Sri Lanka, and others) or conducting military interventions on the grounds of various interests thereby forms part of India's self-perception as a regional hegemon. In recent years, however, India's (not very successful) security strategy for the region has gradually changed from a policy of interference to one of bilateral cooperation (cf. Wagner 2014: 5f.). India is generally critical of interventions by powers outside South Asia, but applies double standards in its judgements, which are influenced by anti-colonial convictions, ideology, and strategic considerations. India's tradition of contributing to UN peacekeeping operations illustrates the requirements that must be met before it agrees to the use of military force to protect human rights (cf. Banerjee 2012: 94; Ganguly 2013: 2f.; Hall 2013: 90; Virk 2013: 59f.).

### **India's Response to Interventionism in the 1990s**

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, India found itself deprived of its most important ally, and became deeply uncertain about its future role in an emerging new world order. It turned sceptical, not least due to its own experiences, about military interventions by Western states in that situation – under the lead of the USA, the only remaining superpower. The economic situation was bad and India was far from enjoying the international recognition it would receive just over a decade later. Given this background, even the forceful expulsion of Iraqi troops from occupied Kuwait, backed by a UN mandate (UN Security Council 1990), was a highly controversial issue in New Delhi.

"In 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, India did not strongly condemn Baghdad. In fact, the then Indian foreign minister, Inder Kumar Gujral, visited Kuwait, which was still under Iraqi occupation, and then Baghdad, where he not only met Iraqi President Saddam Hussein but also embraced him" (Ramachandran 2002).

A year later, India, then a member of the UNSC, joined China in abstaining



from voting on Resolution 688, which authorised the imposition of a no-fly zone to protect the Kurdish population (UN Security Council 1991a). India justified this by saying that the Security Council "should at all times keep in mind the need to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states – including, in this case, of Iraq. This is a cardinal principle in international relations that deserves to be reiterated in the Council" (UN Security Council 1991b). Moreover, while this was a regrettable situation for the civil population, it did not pose a direct threat to world peace (cf. *ibid*: 62f.).

Even though the Indian government—to a large extent driven by its own weak position, without real means to shape things outside Southern Asia and its uncertainty about future developments in international politics—abided by the subparagraphs of the UN Charter in an almost orthodox manner in the 1990s and was a staunch advocate of the sovereign equality of all states and their inviolability on many occasions, national interests arose time and again. These help to explain New Delhi's stance as well.

"India's position in 1990–91 was determined significantly by concerns for the safety of the sizeable Indian population working in Kuwait and Iraq. Of course, its seeming support of Baghdad made India appear like it had taken an unprincipled position. [...] Yet, as a retired Indian diplomat explained to *Asia Times Online*, the need to protect the lives of Indians living in Iraq and Kuwait was Delhi's driving concern" (Ramachandran 2002).

Indians working in Iraq and Kuwait were of importance not least because they remitted huge sums of foreign currency to Indian banks. If these bank transfers had stopped and the prices for Indian oil imports had substantially risen because of a Gulf war, India's planned economy would have stood on the brink of collapse even sooner as the country had then hardly any foreign exchange reserves left. India was already forced to ship large amounts of its gold holdings to London in order to be granted additional loans. This was a shock and contributed substantially to the introduction of economic reforms under Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, who appointed economist Manmohan Singh as his finance minister (cf. Tharoor 2005: 199–250). Other domestic considerations that were taken into account were the millions of Muslim Indians and the strong anti-American tendencies among the people. These

tendencies were displayed when the Indian government, attempting a cautious rapprochement with the US, permitted US aircraft to refill at Indian airfields for their sorties against Iraq. Wide left-wing and anti-American sections of the population exerted intense pressure on the Indian government when this went public, forcing it to withdraw this permission (Ganguly 2013).

When formulating its position on R2P, India was also influenced by the lasting impact of the international community's failure in Rwanda in 1994 and Srebrenica in 1995. "In the face of genocide in Rwanda in 1994, the non-aligned movement was ready to authorize UN military intervention while the United States actively opposed it" (Rotmann/Kurtz/Brockmeier 2014: 2). From the Indian viewpoint – and this statement refers specifically to the case of Rwanda – the sovereignty of states that India defended was not the main reason why the mass killings were not prevented. "Rather, effective intervention is hindered by lack of political will and more importantly absence of strategic interests for great powers to commit themselves" (Mohan/Kurtz 2014: 8). The case of Bosnia and UNPROFOR is similar: in India's view, there was again a lack of political will to provide appropriate forces and a proper mandate to defend the protected zones (ibid: 9).

Finally, the NATO operation in Kosovo in 1999 provoked a particularly harsh response from India's political elite, which to a significant extent had been influenced by the fact that Yugoslavia and Belgrade had an enormous meaning for the Non-Aligned Movement. As the NATO operation was not mandated by the UNSC, it was unanimously denounced as a unilateral intervention and deliberate breach of all international norms and rules (cf. Banerjee 2012: 96f.; Hall 2013: 91f.). India's Permanent Representative to the UN in New York made the government's position clear at a meeting of the UNSC, of which India was not a member at the time:

"The attacks against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that started a few hours ago are in clear violation of Article 53 of the Charter. No country, group of countries or regional arrangement, no matter how powerful, can arrogate to itself the right to take arbitrary and unilateral military action against others. That would be a return to anarchy, where might is right. [...] Kosovo is recognized as part of the sovereign territory of the Federal Republic of



Yugoslavia. Under the application of Article 2, paragraph 7, the United Nations has no role in the settlement of the domestic political problems of the Federal Republic. [...] The attacks now taking place against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia have not been authorized by the Council, acting under Chapter VII, and are therefore completely illegal" (UN Security Council 1999: 15f.).

Particularly strong language was used by an eminent professor emeritus of Nehru University, who called the NATO operation the worst example of power politics and, referring to the selectivity of Western interventions, noted: "What is more, this outrage, now called 'ethnic cleansing', has also happened all over the world in previous centuries, before and since the establishment of the United Nations in 1945, and mostly by White nations against coloured peoples" (Rajan 2000: 31f.). He said that while it was right to argue over ways to protect human rights, this must not lead to the implementation of unipolar ideas of the USA, which wanted to take advantage of an exceptional situation in world history, and a common consensus based on the existing international system must be found. Rajan believed that, in the absence of a better alternative, this system was still based on the Westphalian system and considered worth maintaining by developing and third world countries, which made up the majority in the United Nations. And he argued that the UN was, after all, based on the sovereign equality of all states (ibid.).

Yet only a few years later, under the government led by the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and Prime Minister Atal Vajpayee, India impressively demonstrated that different circumstances and overriding strategic interests could even render India's apparently dogmatic stance negotiable and that India did not intend to always comply strictly with its own high standards regarding the UN Charter. The country had started putting its relations with the USA on a new footing and conducted intense negotiations over ways to improve them. When the USA tried to win support from allies in 2003 –in an attempt to enhance the legitimacy of its unilateral war against Iraq, which had been criticised sharply by several Western allies – it therefore also turned to India, asking for 17,000 troops as stabilisation forces.

Advocates in India, among them the BJP and its prime minister, expected this to consolidate and promote India's position as a major regional power with global ambitions, economic advantages, and an enhancement of its position vis-à-vis China. The offer made for Indian military personnel to work at the US Central Command (CENTCOM), which would have reduced Pakistan's influence significantly, concerned other strategic interests. Nonetheless, due to the absence of a convincing UN mandate, differences within the government, a lack of support in the region for the US mission, and domestic opposition, the government finally decided against India's participation (cf. Mohan 2011: 4; Ramachandran 2003).

It can be said that in the 1990s, India gained the reputation of being a staunch anti-Western advocate of the Westphalian system that adhered rigidly to the UN Charter and, even in view of serious infringements of human rights, was unwilling to question the sovereignty and territorial integrity of nation states. Yet at the same time, the country was firmly committed to UN peacekeeping missions and experienced first-hand, especially in the case of Rwanda, the selective nature of Western and international commitment for the protection of human rights. With its rapid economic upswing, India's self-confidence increased. This development was accompanied by a considerable rapprochement with the USA, which found its most visible expression in the USA's *de facto* recognition of India as a nuclear power and strategic partner. India's foreign policy subsequently became more pragmatic and less dogmatic. Besides attaching importance to domestic policy factors, the relevance of the personality in India's foreign policy decisionmaking and the lack of an appropriate institutional foreign policy and diplomatic capacity, New Delhi demonstrated repeatedly that even the loftiest principles could be compromised if this served paramount strategic national interests. This view was last reflected in India's moderate stance on Russia's annexation of Crimea, a fact that can obviously only be accounted for by India's strategic interests vis-à-vis its old friend Russia, coupled with some degree of resentment about the Western interventions of recent years. Not only did New Delhi tolerate a case of military aggression here, but, at least ostensibly, did not object to the infringement of the territorial integrity of a sovereign

state either, which is in direct contradiction to the fundamental conviction that its foreign policy is supposedly based on (cf. Godehardt/Sakaki/Wagner 2014: 2f.).

## NONVIOLENCE AND TOLERANCE

Given India's history of interventions in its immediate neighbourhood, its society, and its domestic policy which, for a number of reasons cannot particularly be called nonviolent, the principle of nonviolence as a means of solving political disputes may not make sense at first glance. Yet the world's knowledge of 'nonviolent resistance and protest' would not have been moulded without Mohandas K Gandhi, the Mahatma. When seen as an active form of resistance and adherence to truth, nonviolence is intertwined with similar historical and religious traditions in both Buddhism and Hinduism and is thus deeply embedded in the Indian way of thinking. This form of nonviolence does not try so much to actively provide protection, but rather to passively avoid causing damage. Moreover, as a consequence of the state-centred view of politics in India, the application and observation of this principle are confined to resolving conflicts between states (cf. Pethiyagoda 2013: 9f.; Tharoor 2005: 41ff.). The principle is also included in the five principles of peaceful co-existence.

The above considerations provide examples of the existence of such a guiding principle, at least outside India's regional sphere of influence. The fact that India is actively involved in UN peacekeeping operations and in creating the conditions for these operations, while opposing peace-enforcement operations, is evidence of this. Another common assumption is that India's foreign policy in general is characterised by a preference for peaceful conflict resolution mechanisms at the global level, a situation that can be attributed not only to the reasons stated above, but also to a fundamentally risk-averse foreign policy culture, one characteristic of which is a reluctance to use force (cf. Mohan 2011: 7). During a UNSC debate on the subject of "Maintaining peace and security: Humanitarian aspects of issues before the Security Council", the Indian Permanent Representative emphasised the general position of his government:

"[T]he international community naturally focuses on the immediate problem, not on the longer-term consequences [of humanitarian crises]. Superior firepower [...] might check forced migration, unblock food aid or put an end to genocide by paramilitary gangs, but unless we secure the conditions from which a measure of stability and prosperity might emerge, these evils tend to return. This longer-term consequence [...] would imply that the United Nations should stay the course until a divided society heals itself. But, as with peacekeeping in the early 1990s, the number, size, complexity and duration of sustained humanitarian action would soon exhaust the coffers of the United Nations, forcing a sudden withdrawal. As then, that would make matters worse for the populations affected and for the United Nations" (UN Security Council 2000: 15).

Due to the lessons India learned in Sri Lanka, and its culture and history, India's political class is convinced that imposing rules on other societies yields little success and imposing social change by means of force, even less. This view is also based on a largely ideological pluralism that is not surprising given the diversity and differences within Indian society, with its countless religions, ethnic groups and languages. There is no denying that Hindu-nationalist tendencies exist, but even the religious majority of the Hindus are far from being a coherent group, considering the differences they encompass in terms of language, ethnicity, culture, and caste. Where else around the world, and especially in that region, could a country simultaneously have a Sikh as Prime Minister (Manmohan Singh), a Muslim as President (Abdul Kalam), and an Italian-born Catholic woman (Sonia Gandhi) as leader of the most traditional political party, as was the case in India at the turn of the millennium (cf. Tharoor 2005: 161–198)?

This tolerance and this pluralistic view, which are due to the need for social interaction on this multi-cultural, multi-religious, multi-ideological, and multi-ethical subcontinent that is often perceived as 'chaotic', are also rooted in Indian mythology. The fact that it has hardly occurred to the Indian people to see the world in black and white, or good and evil, can be traced back to Mahabharata, a more than 2,000-year-old epic that every Indian knows and that has an enormous influence to this day. The epic's heroes have both

positive and negative traits: They keep their word, but also break it where it suits them, and they are honest as well as sly. Enmities among them often arise from delusions and misperceptions, so they can be revised and turned into friendships. They do not have to be permanent where nations and people meet and strive to understand each other. Nehru and his followers were and are convinced that even in an anarchic system, problems can be solved, misperceptions corrected, enmities overcome and peace between states maintained by establishing contact at all levels (cf. Bajpai 2002: 245–260; Pethiyagoda 2013: 10; Roy 1986). This offer, this tolerance and this openness are generally directed at all nations, whatever their inner state may be. While compliance with democratic principles is important for India, it firmly believes that this is a domestic issue and not an international one. In the light of the largely undemocratic state that most countries in India's immediate neighbourhood and the large number of trading partners in the Near and Middle East and Africa are in, India's stance could also be seen as being pragmatic and – besides being deeply rooted in the country's history, culture and domestic pluralism – it certainly is, too (cf. Pethiyagoda 2013: 11–14; Virk: 2013: 61).

## **INDIA AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT**

The following sections will describe and analyse India's R2P policy, the evolution of which is divided by this paper into four phases. The first phase spans the years 2001 to 2005, from the release of the 'Responsibility to Protect' report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) (ICISS 2001) and to the inclusion of the concept in the World Summit Outcome Document of the UN General Assembly (UN General Assembly 2005). The second phase is devoted to the time after 2005, with a discussion of India's stance on the situation in Myanmar in 2007–08 and Sri Lanka in 2009. It concludes with the presentation of the Secretary-General's report, *Implementing the Responsibility to Protect* (UN General Secretary 2009) and the subsequent debate at the UN General Assembly (UN General Assembly 2009). The third phase deals with India's election to the UN Security Council (UNSC), and the Libya crisis and the controversy associated with it.

Finally, the fourth phase explores the extent to which this debate influenced, for example, the UNSC's handling of the conflict in Syria.

### **From 2001 to the 2005 World Summit**

In the initial phase of the evolution of R2P, India was sceptical about it at best, if not largely negative and/or uninterested. While some civil society organisations at least participated in the regional roundtable organised by the ICISS and reiterated India's long-standing reservations, not a single official representative of the Indian government accepted the invitation to attend the 2001 ICISS meeting in New Delhi. Even the evening reception hosted by the Swiss ambassador was merely attended by a Foreign Service protocol officer. One might argue that the government of India usually does not interact with non-governmental initiatives like the ICISS (cf. Banerjee 2015). Nevertheless it seems to be more important that the 'responsibility to protect' was still perceived as 'humanitarian intervention' merely by another name and thus India remained reluctant if not dismissive about the R2P norm, considering it to be a selective use of force and a pretext for intervention to enforce Western interests. Its view was mainly unaffected by the endorsement of the R2P concept in the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel Report released in 2004 (cf. Banerjee 2012: 97; Bellamy 2011: 22; Mohan/Kurtz 2014: 10; Thakur 2009; Virk 2013: 11). Beyond that, India was reaping the fruits of its economic liberalisation and its new political importance. In 2004, India linked up with Germany, Brazil and Japan to form an interest group called G4, two of whose demands were UN reform and permanent membership for the G4 nations in an expanded Security Council. Besides development and disarmament, it was more this permanent seat than R2P that figured among the Indian government's agenda for the 2005 UN World Summit (cf. Rotmann/Kurtz/Brockmeier 2014: 11).

However, this fact and the coalition constellation in New Delhi allowed India's then Permanent Representative to the UN to further the country's sceptical stance on R2P and to develop an ostensibly personal interest in excluding the concept from the World Summit Outcome Document. Ambassador Nirupam Sen, who tended to act along the traditional anti-Western and anti-imperialist lines of Indian foreign policy, made every effort

to bring down R2P, and at least until the final negotiation process during the summit—having brought about some important changes in the formulation and the notion of R2P—he had the backing of many non-aligned countries (cf. Murthy/Kurtz 2016). The 2009 General Assembly debate on R2P revealed that Sen's personal conviction—although basically in line with India's official position—was far more critical than the Indian government's already critical stance at that time. He had already attacked the endorsement of the R2P concept in then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's preparatory report, 'In Larger Freedom', at an informal General Assembly consultation ahead of the World Summit, commenting: "We do not believe that discussions on the question should be used as a cover for conferring any legitimacy on the so-called 'right of humanitarian intervention' or making it the ideology of some kind of 'military humanism'" (Sen 2005: 3).

Sen continued his criticism during the World Summit negotiations. In addition to voicing India's long-standing reservations about humanitarian intervention and the power politics of the major powers, Sen tried to constantly raise the threshold for the application of R2P and thus to add further prerequisites for its approval. He demanded that not only relevant regional organisations, but also a reformed and expanded Security Council should consent to the application of R2P so that a legitimate basis was established. Moreover, he tried to link India's approval to a reform of the UNSC. In this regard, however, Sen toed the government line (cf. Mohan/Kurtz 2014: 11ff.). He even threatened to bring down the document while the heads of government were preparing to land in New York. His "eleventh-hour attack" (Bellamy 2009: 88) was nothing less than an attempt to block the whole section on R2P. India thus became one of the last and most recalcitrant opponents of R2P. It must be noted that the internationally non-binding paragraphs 138-39 of the World Summit Outcome Document on R2P had already been substantially watered down from the original version to what some critics even call, "R2P light" (Bellamy 2009: 66; Weiss 2006: 750). In a recent article a compelling argument was made that this "watering down" in a complex negotiation process shortly before and during the World Summit shifted the notion of R2P from "coercive solidarism" to "consensual



solidarism". By emphasising on the primary obligation of the state and international assistance and capacity building, it reinforced and supported the principle of sovereignty which did a great deal to allay the apprehensions not only of the Global South and especially the NAM towards R2P and its further institutionalisation within the UN (Murthy/Kurtz 2016: 39f.). India followed this "discursive shift" (ibid.)—which made it much easier for most countries of the NAM to endorse R2P in the outcome document—only four years later in the 2009 General Assembly Debate and after the replacement of Sen, who kept his convictions and remained a staunch opponent of R2P. Though India backed down at the last minute, it had voiced its concerns quite clearly. Even in 2007, India refused to give its approval for the funding for the post of a Special Advisor on the Responsibility to Protect, pointing out that the R2P concept lacked acceptance in the UN General Assembly (cf. Virk 2013: 78f.; United Nations General Assembly 2007: 9).

### **From the World Summit to the R2P Debate in the General Assembly**

India maintained its critical foreign policy stance on R2P even after the World Summit and showed little interest in this topic. Yet, in the run-up to the General Assembly debate in 2009, India's dogmatic views began to soften. India's attitude towards the situation in Myanmar in 2007–08 and during the final months of the Sri Lankan civil war vividly illustrates its continued stance on the responsibility to protect, even if neither case can be considered an R2P situation.

While, in 2007, the majority of the international community strongly condemned the brutal crackdown on a peaceful protest movement by Myanmar's junta and many Western nations toughened sanctions, India emphasised its view that the troubles were a domestic affair and had to be solved by dialogue (Mukherjee 2007: 1664). At the same time, it unerringly continued to cooperate with the military junta due to its national interest in economic relations with its immediate neighbour and for strategic reasons, due to its rivalry with China of its relationship with Myanmar. "In fact during crises and even as Western countries tightened economic sanctions on the junta, India signed an oil and gas exploration agreement" (Virk 2013: 80). When, in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis that struck Myanmar in 2008,



Western states, in particular France, tried in vain to invoke an R2P situation so as to gain access to the isolated country, India impressively demonstrated its ideas of regional support and cooperation (cf. Asia-Pacific Center 2012: 3–4; Chowdhury 2009: 4). While Western organisations had to meet strict requirements to be granted what was even then highly restricted and late access to affected areas, India's relief supplies were delivered by military aircraft and warships. "India's soft and engaging approach, stressing capacity building and closed-door diplomacy, yielded concrete results" (Mohan/Kurtz 2014: 13).

During the final stages of the Sri Lankan civil war in spring 2009, the Indian government reaffirmed its sceptical attitude towards intervention. While it exerted considerable rhetorical and diplomatic pressure and appealed on several occasions to the Sri Lankan government to avoid civilian casualties and seek a political solution – giving rise to the frequently cited quote: "The Sri Lankan Government has a responsibility to protect its own citizens" (Krishna 2009), it steered clear of internationalising the conflict in any way. India offered support and mediation, yet categorically ruled out intervention. This pragmatic approach could be accounted for by the lessons learned from an earlier intervention in Sri Lanka and, in view of upcoming elections, by domestic considerations regarding the substantial Tamil population in southern India. Moreover, New Delhi was interested in stability in Sri Lanka and thus the disbandment of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

As indicated by the use of R2P terminology for Sri Lanka, India's stance on R2P became somewhat clearer and more open, as it became more nuanced. The landmark UN General Assembly debate on the Secretary-General's 'Implementing the Responsibility to Protect' report (UN General Secretary 2009) gave the new Permanent Representative of India to the UN, Hardeep Singh Puri, the opportunity to elaborate India's position on R2P which in many aspects now followed the "new notion of R2P" of 2005 like most of its NAM fellows which no longer automatically linked R2P with the so-called "humanitarian interventions". Like many other states, Puri referred to the three-pillar structure of R2P, which was meanwhile firmly established due to the Secretary-General's report, to explain India's agreement with and support for the first two pillars of the responsibility to protect. He underscored India's

view that the states concerned were best suited to protecting their citizens responsibly: "It has been India's consistent view that the responsibility to protect its population is one of the foremost responsibilities of every state" (Puri 2009). As stipulated in paragraph 138 of the World Summit Outcome Document, the international community should support the states in fulfilling their responsibility and work with them on early warning systems and capabilities. He then obliquely alluded to India's experience with international reactions to its own interventionism in Bangladesh and the selective interventionism and non-interventionism of Western powers in Rwanda, which has already been discussed in this article.

"Regrettably, despite all the safeguards and obligations, the international community has in the past failed in its duty to respond to mass atrocities even when they were a clear threat to international peace and security" (ibid.).

And more forthrightly:

"Even a cursory examination of reasons for non-action by the UN, especially the Security Council, reveals that in respect of these tragic events that were witnessed by the entire world, non-action was not due to lack of warning, resources or the barrier of state sovereignty but because of strategic, political or economic considerations of those on whom the present international architecture had placed the onus to act" (ibid.).

However, India agreed to discuss the further development of R2P and help shape the concept. It even refrained from contesting or rejecting the possibility of taking the controversial third-pillar measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. India merely insisted that such measures be taken only when all other means had failed, and then on a case-by-case basis, in full compliance with the Charter and in cooperation with the relevant regional organisations. He also openly expressed India's scepticism about the intentions of interventionist states and demanded appropriate safety mechanisms:

"We don't live in an ideal world and, therefore, need to be cognizant that creation of new norms should at the same time completely safeguard against their misuse. In this context, responsibility to protect should in no way provide a pretext for humanitarian intervention or unilateral action" (ibid.).

India warned that misuse of R2P "would not only give responsibility to protect a bad name but also defeat its very purpose" (ibid.). Although its stance remained critical, it was far from the destructive negotiation tactics it had adopted at the 2005 World Summit. India now appeared more self-confident and open-minded, assuming a clearer, much more elaborate and more eased stance on R2P.

In the run-up, Nirupam Sen, the former representative who had conducted the negotiations for India in 2005, had raised fears that India would again act as it had done at the World Summit. The President of the UN General Assembly, Ambassador Miguel d'Escoto Brockmann from Nicaragua, a man with a similarly critical stance on R2P, had appointed Sen, of all people, as his adviser on R2P issues. Later, Brockmann issued a position paper that clearly carried the thumbprint of Sen, including passages stating that R2P "found its roots in colonialism and interventionism" (Teitt 2012: 200). Besides that, it reiterated all the arguments brought forward in 2005 and questioned the Security Council's power to intervene in domestic affairs. Even if there had been little change in India's fundamental stance, it became clear that "Sen no longer represented New Delhi's position" (ibid.). Instead, India for the first time fully acknowledged the tenets of the concept, noticeably softened its tone and formulated its continuing caveats in a more objective and discriminating way. The main reasons for India's more open position were the change in the coalition constellation in New Delhi, to which the Left Front did not belong, India's growing perception of itself as an emerging power that was more interested in engaging and helping in shaping norms than in blocking them, and its wish to prove its readiness for fulfilling its own international ambitions, one of them being to gain a permanent seat on the Security Council (cf. Mohan/Kurtz 2014: 14–17). This modified, yet still cautious stance also found expression in India's support for the Secretary-General's second attempt to gain funding for R2P-related posts within the Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide (OSAPG) in December 2010. India refused to give its approval to an amendment proposed by Venezuela, which used the same arguments as Sen had in 2007 (cf. Teitt 2012: 201).

## **Membership in the UN Security Council and the Libya Conflict**

In October 2010, India was elected for two years as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. As many analysts have pointed out, it was indeed one of those strange coincidences in history that Brazil, South Africa, India and Germany held non-permanent seats on the supreme UN body just when dramatic events called for highly charged decisions to be made on various issues, including R2P. The reform of this body, the attainment of a permanent seat, and provision of evidence that it was worthy of such a seat—were among India's priorities for the upcoming term (cf. Mishra/Kumar 2013: 1).

When the Libyan crisis broke out in February 2011, India was not only faced with one of the first critical issues right at the beginning of its term on the Security Council. The crisis also provoked a lasting global debate on the responsibility to protect that was also conducted in India both in a depth and with an intensity that were previously unknown. The first UNSC Resolution 1970 (UN Security Council 2011a), which called for an immediate end to the violence in Libya, imposed an arms embargo and referred the situation to the International Criminal Court, was unanimously adopted by the supreme UN body. India voted in favour of the resolution for a variety of reasons. New to the Security Council, India was keen to participate and did not want to abstain from voting on the first resolution. Moreover, the resolution was approved by the non-aligned countries, in particular by those from Africa and the Arab world, which made things easier for New Delhi. Besides, India's main concern at the time was the safety of the 18,000 Indians working in Libya (cf. Hall 2013: 97; Mohan/Kurtz 2014: 17). When the situation in Libya worsened, pro-government forces marched on the rebel stronghold of Benghazi and Muammar al-Gaddafi openly issued threats, the UN Security Council reacted by passing Resolution 1973 (UN Security Council 2011b). This resolution called for an immediate ceasefire, condemned the Libyan regime and called for immediate negotiations responding to the legitimate demands of the Libyan people. The UN Secretary-General's special envoy and an African Union (AU) mission were dispatched to establish an immediate dialogue with the aim of achieving a sustainable solution that fostered peace and stability. In view of the massive atrocities and acts of violence against civilians that were actually or seemingly committed by the Libyan troops and the imminent attack on

Benghazi, the UN Security Council authorised its member states "to take all necessary measures [...] to protect civilians and civilian populated areas" (ibid.: 3). Not least due to the Arabic League (AL), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) voicing a similar demand, the Security Council authorised a no-fly zone to prevent the Libyan air forces from attacking civilians (cf. Morris 2013: 1272). UNSC Resolution 1973 expressly tightened and extended the arms embargo imposed under Resolution 1970 and foreclosed any occupation of Libyan territory by foreign forces (cf. UN Security Council 2011b).

Resolution 1973 was adopted by a vote of ten in favour and five abstentions. In addition to the USA, France and Great Britain, the countries that voted in the affirmative included Nigeria, Gabon, South Africa and the Lebanon. India abstained, along with Russia, China, Brazil and Germany. The Indian deputy ambassador to the UN, Manjeev Singh Puri, explained that one of the reasons for India's abstention was the lack of clarity of the situation in Libya and cautioned against taking any hasty action. He pointed out that neither had the report of the Secretary-General's special envoy been presented nor had the AU delegation had time to seek a peaceful settlement to the conflict (cf. UN Security Council 2011c: 5f). He also criticised the fact that the UN mandate was too vague and had to take account of Libya's sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity.

"The resolution [...] authorizes far reaching measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter with relatively little credible information. We also do not have clarity about details of enforcement measures, including who and with what assets will participate and how these measures will be exactly carried out. It is, of course, very important that there is full respect for sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Libya" (ibid.: 6).

In the last part of his speech, he reiterated India's fundamental scepticism about the prospects of success of military means and Western intentions.

"Moreover, we have to ensure that the measures will mitigate and not exacerbate an already difficult situation for the people of Libya. Clarity in the resolution on any spillover effects of these measures would have been very important" (ibid.).

Shortly after the NATO operation had started, External Affairs Minister S. M. Krishna expressed his regret about the air strikes, which he said would also hit bystanders, and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh underlined that he wanted the people in North Africa and the Middle East to be able to take their own decisions "free of outside interference" (quote taken from *Dawn* (2011)).

Not only critics in India have thus raised the question of why India did not vote against the resolution then. There were many reasons for its decision to abstain: The Arab League had clearly come out in favour of the no-fly zone and against Gaddafi. Moreover, many non-aligned nations had signalled their approval and Nigeria, Gabon and South Africa, three African countries on the Security Council, had voted in the affirmative. The security situation in Benghazi really did appear to be threatening and Gaddafi's threats seemed real. What is more, India had abandoned its fundamental opposition to R2P intervention, taken an increasingly pragmatic foreign policy line and did not want to block the resolution in view of its responsibility as an emerging power with ambitions for a permanent seat on the Security Council (cf. Banerjee 2012: 99; Gupta 2011; Pant 2011).

As the crisis in Libya and NATO operation 'Unified Protector' –an operation that to this day is evaluated quite differently by advocates and critics–evolved, criticism grew over the way NATO implemented the mandate. It must be said, however, that only a few NATO members actively engaged in the operation. Consensus was unable to be established at government level, not to mention parliaments, the public or scholars, either within NATO or in the West, as not only Germany's voting in the Security Council showed. South Africa, which had voted in favour of the resolution, became one of its most severe critics when it became clear that the anti-Gaddafi forces would continue to receive NATO support until a regime change was achieved. The key points of criticism, not only for India, were these: (1) The arms embargo was ignored, with some NATO coalition members even sending personnel to instruct the rebels in how to operate weapons. (2) Contrary to the resolution, no genuine attempt was made to achieve a ceasefire and peace talks. (3) The air strikes were not limited to protecting civilians, but deliberately targeted Gaddafi's retreating troops, civilian governmental structures and regime

leaders. (4) By supporting the rebels, the coalition became a party in a civil war. (5) The main objective of the operation became the achievement of a regime change only shortly after it began (Banerjee 2012: 100). The critics of R2P and Resolution 1973 felt vindicated.

India's Permanent Representative to the UN said he was worried about the divergence between the resolution adopted and the form taken by the intervention, concluding that "Libya gave R2P a bad name" (quote taken from Banerjee 2012: 100). On the occasion of an informal dialogue at the General Assembly, he added: "It is the pursuit of the objective of regime change that generated a great deal of unease among a number of us who support action by the international community [...] to implement the provisions contained in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit Outcome Document" (Puri 2012).

He sharply criticised the West, implying that the failure to intervene in Rwanda and Srebrenica might not have been due to a lack of information, but of oil and that the objectives of the intervention in Libya went beyond the protection of human rights. He said that R2P must not be misused for politically desired regime changes and the power politics of major powers. As mentioned earlier in this article, despite all his criticism, Puri clearly underlined India's fundamental support for the R2P concept, pointing out that there was no disagreement over pillars one and two. However, he said that there was a need to discuss the implementation of pillar three and to clarify the circumstances and strict conditions under which such measures could be applied after all other means had been used. In the same vein, he explicitly welcomed Brazil's proposal for a 'Responsibility while Protecting' (RwP) scheme and expressed India's support for it. "If R2P is to regain the respect of the international community, it has to be anchored in the concept of RwP" (ibid.). He proposed that priority be given to the aspect of support and capacity-building under pillar two rather than to focusing on pillar three (cf. ibid.). Puri had emphasised this at a General Assembly debate on the protection of civilians in 2011, criticising the policy on Libya:

"[W]e find several member-states all too willing to expend considerable resources for regime change in the name of protection of civilians. They are,



however, unwilling to provide minimal resources [...] to the UN peacekeeping missions, which are mandated to protect civilians and designed to strengthen capacity of state institutions as well" (Puri 2011).

During the General Debate of the General Assembly in September 2011, Prime Minister Singh reiterated his country's scepticism about the prospects of success of military means by emphasising that "[s]ocieties cannot be reordered from outside through military force" (Singh 2011: 2), adding that social ideas could not be imposed from outside, either.

"People in all countries have the right to choose their own destiny and decide their own future. The international community has a role to play in assisting in the processes of transition and institution building, but the idea that prescriptions have to be imposed from outside is fraught with danger" (ibid.: 3).

The instability throughout the region caused by the breakdown of the Libyan state and Libya's fate were soon to prove that the Indians were right. All in all, India maintained the pragmatic approach it had pursued since the General Assembly debate in 2009. It no longer fundamentally opposed military intervention to protect human rights, but argued that the measure should be merely used as a last resort when everything else had failed, claiming that the possibilities it offered were limited. Further, it pointed out the need for strict implementation criteria and underlined, in accordance with Brazil's RWP concept, the responsibility of those intervening under an international community mandate. India believed that states and their territorial integrity and sovereignty remained bedrocks of the international order. Broad international approval and the adoption of an at least non-negative stance by its classical allies among the non-aligned nations and affected and relevant regional organisations were conducive to India's positive stance on the application of R2P. For all the criticism voiced, New Delhi did not consider Libya to be the end of R2P. India, above all, felt that it had been vindicated in its long-standing scepticism about Western intervention and its views on the limited possibilities offered by military means. The upcoming debate on the Syrian conflict was to be overshadowed by this scepticism, which was shared by almost all the critics, and the negative



lessons learned from implementing R2P in Libya, where the intervening coalition had overstretched and violated Resolution 1973. This impression was further fuelled by the conflicts in neighbouring regions such as Mali that had been triggered by the instability in Libya and the collapse of the Gaddafi regime (cf. Morris 2013: 1274).

### **Syria and the Consequences of the Controversy over Libya**

In fact, the first UN Security Council debates on the Syrian conflict showed that the critics, including India, of course, were not willing to allow a 'second Libya' to happen. This view seemed to be confirmed when, on 4 October 2011, a resolution condemning the actions and documented crimes of the Assad regime in Syria failed to be passed in the Security Council. While China and Russia exercised their veto power, India, its IBSA partners South Africa and Brazil as well as the Lebanon abstained, referring to the case of Libya and the intent to actively prevent further Western military intervention (cf. Keeler 2011: 2f.). Justifying India's abstention, UN Ambassador Puri urged that "[t]he international community should facilitate dialogue and not threaten sanctions or regime change" (UN Security Council 2011d). Yet, the fears of a sustained concerted BRICS (op)position against "the West" soon proved to be unfounded. India insisted on its political autonomy and adhered to its attempt to adopt a pragmatic stance, mediating between the Security Council and its international partners (cf. Mishra/Kumar 2013: 1). Under India's presidency, success was achieved in issuing an initial statement on Syria which condemned the use of the regime's military force against civilians and the lack of protection for them. Another statement was issued proposing that a national solution be negotiated between the parties in the Syrian civil war and underlining the need for the protection of the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Syria (UN Security Council 2011d).

In February 2012, a second, milder resolution on Syria was backed by India after all, leaving China and Russia, which used their veto in the 13-2 vote, isolated. India said that the support of regional organisations and the explicit call for a non-military solution were the main reasons for it approving the draft text:

"India's support for the text was in accordance with its backing of the Arab

League's efforts to promote a Syrian-led, broadly inclusive political process", and "the text did not call for a military option and supported fully the Arab League's call for a national dialogue" (UN Security Council 2012a; cf. also Parameswaran 2012).

Finally, in July 2012, India even voted in favour of a draft resolution outlining non-military sanctions on the Assad regime. Yet, the draft was vetoed by Russia and China whereas South Africa abstained from voting. Once more, New Delhi reiterated the need for a peaceful solution integrating all the parties to the conflict under the lead of the UN. It said that peace could only be achieved by a Syria-led solution based on Kofi Annan's six-point plan (cf. UN Security Council 2012b). India's stance continued to waver between abstention and approval at various votes in the Security Council (until its term ended in 2012) and the General Assembly (cf. Stuenkel 2012, et al.). It constantly tried to balance the expectations of the West, diplomatic pressure on New Delhi, expectations of its BRICS partners – whereby it tended to be in line with its ISBA partners Brazil and South Africa – and other pragmatic foreign and domestic policy considerations.

Especially the traditionalist and more leftist supporters of Nehru's postcolonial foreign policy conducted the broader domestic debate on R2P and India's stance following the Libya conflict in quite a heated way (cf. Hall 2013: 98–105). With respect to Syria, B.S. Chimni, professor of international law at Nehru University in New Delhi, for example, called R2P "imperialism with a human face" (Chimni 2013). At the same time, it was this intensification in the public debate that helped to first bring R2P to the attention of India's scholars, media and interested public, and then to keep their attention on it. In October 2012, for example, New Delhi hosted a conference on the future of R2P (cf. World Federation of United Nations Association 2012).

On the whole, India has maintained its critical stance on the responsibility to protect concept, including its third pillar, but, since 2009, has been more approving of it, under certain conditions. It felt that its scepticism about the intervention policy of Western major powers was vindicated when the UN mandate in Libya was overstretched. At the same time, India is not alone in

taking a sceptical stance and in criticising the implementation of R2P, in general, and in Libya in particular. Indeed, critical observers in the West have raised similar criticisms. Consequently, India's position both on Libya and Syria can be accounted for by its fundamental convictions and own history, even if the lessons learned from the case of Libya have significantly influenced the Syria debate.

## CONCLUSION

India has acquired a reputation in international politics of being a country that finds it difficult to say "Yes" to global issues. Prime Minister Narendra Modi clearly reaffirmed this shortly after taking office in May 2014 when his new government allowed the WTO free trade agreement to fail—albeit quite understandable from an Indian point of view—after years of negotiation (cf. Endres 2014). Moreover, ever since Nehru's day, India has based its foreign policy statements and positions on high moral principles, in an attempt to become a post-colonial power that sets an example to the rest of the world of a country that is working for better policies for addressing international issues; sometimes thereby elegantly covering a lack of means and capacity. This foreign policy style, which has sometimes been accompanied by anti-imperialistic and anti-Western rhetoric, has not always met with favour everywhere (cf. Debiel/Wulf 2013: 31).

With respect to R2P, India has been regarded, not least because of its behaviour at the 2005 World Summit, as one of the most stringent opponents of this emerging norm and a staunch advocate of a state-centred Westphalian system, abiding by the subparagraphs of the UN Charter in an orthodox manner and obstructing any progress in human rights protection. As this article has pointed out, India's position is much more complex and nuanced than that in all respects. In its immediate neighbourhood, India has not hesitated to intervene in the internal affairs of other states if it deemed this necessary, using military means on more than one occasion and its domestic policy and society is far from being free of violence, which both might have an impact on the threshold for perceiving violence and intervention elsewhere a question of international concern. India's own experiences with

interventions and the international community's responses, the selectivity of Western human rights practices throughout history and of the interventions in the 1990s, with their failures, and finally the lessons learned from R2P in Libya—have all strengthened the following fundamental convictions: (1) A deep scepticism towards the use of military means for resolving conflicts and the awareness that they have limitations. (2) The realisation that all major interventions come at great expense, while their record of success is mostly negative, and that social order models can be neither imposed nor exported. (3) Belief in the principle of non-intervention in internal conflicts where all the parties are irreconcilable and pin their hopes on force. (4) Mistrust towards the intentions of Western major powers and their interventions in countries of the Global South.

As a consequence, India has simply not been convinced that a practice which in its view resembled the humanitarian interventions of the 1990s would bring about any progress in the prevention of mass atrocities and that it would cause less damage than yield benefit. Given the tensions between the concepts of sovereignty and R2P, India has also questioned whether sovereignty has actually been the often-cited obstacle to protecting human life from serious crimes. Not least because of the events in Rwanda and Srebrenica, the obstacle India has identified quite often is a lack of strategic interest and political will on the part of those states capable of intervening.


India is like Germany in that it pursues a generally risk-averse foreign policy that is primarily based on the use of peaceful means, pluralism, dialogue and tolerance to address international issues. This style of politics feeds on India's cultural, religious, ethnic and linguistic diversity as well as on its myths, history and traditions. With due respect for India's pride in its own democratic traditions, however, it must be added that this style is a necessity in such a difficult and largely undemocratic political and economic environment and that it is common for Asian foreign policy practices to be guided by the Five Principles. Whenever overriding strategic interests are at stake or domestic requirements have had to be met, they have almost always been given priority over the general guiding principles and a pragmatic style of politics has been adopted. At the same time, since its foundation as a state, India has pursued a committed and successful policy of participation in UN

peacekeeping operations, showing that the kind of military action it prefers is taken within the framework of peacekeeping and thus also of human rights protection. The conditions associated with peacekeeping operations, on the one hand, and on the other, India's standoff attitude towards peace enforcement operations, reveal the possibilities of India playing an active role in this and R2P, and the bounds.

As far as issues of international order are concerned, including new norms or better normative debates over concepts such as R2P, India has rather conservative views and has been unwilling to give up the basic bedrocks of a well-functioning global order if – as demonstrated above – it has not been convinced, its concerns have not been heard, and it has not been offered a direct say in the application of these principles. India has increasingly staked its claim on such direct say in international forums and together with its BRICS and IBSA partners.

The fundamental change that has taken place in the acceptance of the R2P concept since 2009 is quite remarkable. India's foreign policy is now far removed from the reflexive rejection of the R2P concept and the attempt to prevent it being passed at the 2005 World Summit. New Delhi has fundamentally and repeatedly acknowledged the concept in its entirety. It has declared that it fully agrees with the first two pillars and insisted that these aspects be given priority over R2P. Meanwhile, India takes a positive stance on the principle's institutionalisation within a UN framework, seeing this as a way to prevent its misuse and the unilateral imposition of regulations by the West. Due to its scepticism about the measures envisioned under pillar three, India rules out its participation in such interventions in the foreseeable future – as it does in certain aspects of peacekeeping—but, as it has already shown, does not preclude the possibility of it giving its approval, or at least tolerating such action if certain conditions are met. Not even the fact that NATO overstretched the UN mandate for Libya altered this critical acceptance, as India's subsequent actions in the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council demonstrated. Nonetheless, India, along with other critics, has declared that it will continue to reject the kind of practice adopted in Libya, including the forced regime change, and remains an independent and

sceptical observer. On the other hand, it explicitly welcomes and supports the Brazilian proposal for an RwP concept, a stance that shows that it does not reject R2P in general, but rather is working for a concept that is more in conformity with its own beliefs and a form of implementation that entails accountability and responsibility.

This change can also partly be accounted for by India's remarkable, but still ongoing transformation from a developing country into a regional power with global significance. The fact that India has almost entirely turned its back on non-alignment and its interests have moved further and further away from the developing countries is also reflected in its foreign policy and particularly good relationship with the USA. India is becoming an increasingly important factor and a significant power in international politics. That is why it can less and less afford to act in such a reactive or disapproving manner or refuse to get involved. Slowly but surely, New Delhi is beginning to understand that with greater clout comes greater responsibility, which it will not be able to live up to by pursuing a nay-sayer policy. While India has not yet made any conceptual contributions to R2P comparable to Brazil's, it has still brought about important changes, in particular to its own position, since the end of its turn on the UNSC. Moreover, India has tried time and again to bridge the gap between the Western democracies, the interests of the South, and the two veto powers China and Russia, alone as well as together with its IBSA partners. India's veto against the WTO free trade agreement, which it uses to voice the legitimate concerns of the developing countries in their fight against hunger, shows that no agreement on global issues and no consensus on internationally binding norms will be achieved in the future without due consideration being given to the interests of the South. 

## REFERENCES

- Asia-Pacific Center, "Burma/Myanmar Spring: Surreal or so real?" In R2P Ideas in Brief, AP R2P Brief 1 (2012), accessed July 30, 2014, <http://www.r2pasiapacific.org/r2p-ideas-in-brief>.
- Bajpai, Kanti. "Indian Strategic Culture," In *South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances*, ed. Michael R. Chambers (Carlisle:Strategic Studies Institute, 2002).
- Bajpai, Kanti. "The Global Commons and India's National Security Strategy," In *Grand Strategy for India 2020 and Beyond*, eds. Venkatshamy Krishnappa, and Princy George (New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 2012), 40–63.
- Banerjee, Dipankar. "India and R2P: Reconciling the Tension Between Intervention and State Sovereignty." In *The Responsibility to Protect – From Evasive to Reluctant Action. The Role of Global Middle Powers*, eds. Hanns Seidel Foundation/Institute for Security Studies/Konrad Adenauer Stiftung/South African Institute of International Affairs (Johannesburg/Pretoria, 2012), 91–110.
- Banerjee, Dipankar. Interview, New Delhi, December 4, 2015.
- Bellamy, Alex. *Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities* (Cambridge, 2009).
- Bellamy, Alex. *Global Politics and the Responsibility to Protect: From Words to Deeds* (London/New York, 2011).
- Chimni, B.S. "R2P and Syria: imperialism with a human face," [opendemocracy.net](http://www.opendemocracy.net), 2013, accessed August 02, 2014, <http://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/bchimni/r2p-and-syria-imperialism-with-human-face>.
- Chowdhury, Iftekhar Ahmed. "The Sri Lankan Situation and the Principle of the 'Responsibility to Protect'," *ISAS Insights* 61 (2009), accessed July 30, 2014, [http://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/Attachments/PublisherAttachment/ISAS\\_Insights\\_62\\_21102009210423.pdf](http://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/Attachments/PublisherAttachment/ISAS_Insights_62_21102009210423.pdf).
- Dawn, "Russia and China denounce West's attack on Libya," [dawn.com](http://www.dawn.com), March 21, 2011, accessed August 01, 2014, <http://www.dawn.com/news/614968/russia-and-china-denounce-wests-attack-on-libya>.
- Debiel, Tobias and Wulf, Herbert. "Indiens BRICS-Politik: Unentschlossen im Club," [India's BRICS policy: seesawing in the club.] In *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 63 (2013), 30–35.
- Endres, Alexandra. "Auch der Freihandel hat Grenzen," [Free trade has its limits, too.] In *Zeit Online*, August 01, 2014, accessed August 03, 2014, <http://www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/2014-08/indien-wto-recht-auf-nahrung>.
- Fidler, David P. and Ganguly, Sumit. "India and Estphalia," *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies* 17 (2010), 147–164.
- Ganguly, Sumit. "India in the Liberal Order," *Transatlantic Academy, Analysis*, November 2013, accessed July 23, 2014, <http://www.transatlanticacademy.org/publications/india-liberal-order>.
- Gaur, Mahendra. "Focus: India's Look East Policy," *Foreign Policy Research Centre Journal* 8



(2011), accessed August 02, 2014, <https://yadusingh.files.wordpress.com/2011/11/lep-fprc-journal.pdf>.

Godehardt, Nadine, Sakaki, Alexandra and Wagner, Christian. "Krise in der Ukraine – kaum Reaktionen in Asien," [Ukrainian crisis – hardly any response in Asia], SWP-Aktuell 33 (2014), accessed July 22, 2014, [http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/aktuell/2014A33\\_gdh\\_skk\\_wgn.pdf](http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/aktuell/2014A33_gdh_skk_wgn.pdf).

Gupta, Arvind. "Mind the R2P, The Indian Express," 2011, accessed August 01, 2014, <http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/mind-the-r2p/>.

Hall, Ian. "Tilting at Windmills? The Indian Debate over the Responsibility to protect after UNSC Resolution 1973," In *Global Responsibility to Protect 5* (2013), 84–108.

ICISS, "The Responsibility to Protect. Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty," 2001, accessed June 18, 2014, <http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf>.

International Monetary Fund, "World Economic Outlook Update: Slower Growth in Emerging Markets, a Gradual Pickup in Advanced Economies," Washington DC, July 2015, accessed November 28, 2015, <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/update/02/pdf/0715.pdf>.

Keeler, Chris. "The End of the Responsibility to Protect," *Foreign Policy Journal*, October 12, 2011, accessed August 02, 2014, <http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/10/12/the-end-of-the-responsibility-to-protect/>.

Krishna, S. M. "Statement by External Affairs Minister on the situation in Sri Lanka," April 22, 2009, Ministry of External Affairs, India, accessed July 30, 2014: <http://www.mea.gov.in/speeches-statements.htm?dtl/1011/statement+by+external+affairs+minister+on+the+situation+in+sri+lanka>.

Miller, Manjari Chatterjee (2013): "India's Feeble Foreign Policy. A Would-Be Great Power Resists Its Own Rise," In *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2013, accessed July 22, 2014, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139098/manjari-chatterjee-miller/indias-feeble-foreign-policy>.

Mishra, Saurabh and Kumar, Keerthi Sampath. "India's Two Years at the Horse-Shoe Table," Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, Issue Brief (2013), accessed August 02, 2014, [http://www.idsa.in/issuebrief/IndiasTwoYearsattheHorseShoeTable\\_KeerthiSaurabh.html](http://www.idsa.in/issuebrief/IndiasTwoYearsattheHorseShoeTable_KeerthiSaurabh.html).

Mohan, C. Raja. "India and the Balance of Power." In *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2006, accessed July 24, 2014, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61729/c-rajamohan/india-and-the-balance-of-power>.

Mohan, C. Raja. "India, Libya and the Principle of Non-Intervention," In *ISAS Insights 122* (2011), accessed July 23, 2014, [http://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/Attachments/PublisherAttachment/ISAS\\_Insights\\_122\\_-\\_Email\\_-\\_India,\\_Libya\\_and\\_the\\_Principle\\_of\\_Non-Intervention\\_19042011144243.pdf](http://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/Attachments/PublisherAttachment/ISAS_Insights_122_-_Email_-_India,_Libya_and_the_Principle_of_Non-Intervention_19042011144243.pdf).



- Mohan, C. Raja. "Raja-Mandala: The final burial of non-alignment," In *The Indian Express*, online, November 17, 2015, accessed November 28, 2015, <http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/raja-mandala-the-final-burial-of-non-alignment/>.
- Mohan, J. Madhan and Kurtz, Gerrit. "Singing the Tune of Sovereignty? India and the Responsibility to Protect," 2014, (Version of the same-titled article accepted for publication in the magazine "Conflict, Security and Development" in a special issue on "Major Powers and the Contested Evolution of a 'Responsibility to Protect'", King 's College London, September 2014).
- Mohan, Garima. "India and the Responsibility to Protect," In *R2P Ideas in Brief*, AP R2P Brief 4 (2014), Asia Pacific Center for the Responsibility to Protect, accessed August 01, 2014, <http://www.r2pasiapacific.org/docs/R2P%20Ideas%20in%20Brief/India%20and%20R2P%20Vol%204%20No%203.pdf>.
- Morris, Justin. "Libya and Syria: R2P and the spectre of the swinging pendulum," In *International Affairs* 89 (2013), 1265–1283.
- Mukherjee, Pranab. "Statement by External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee on the situation in Myanmar," September 26, 2007, In *India's Foreign Relations 2007*, ed. Avtar Singh Bhasin, Ministry of External Affairs, India, accessed July 28, 2014, [http://www.mea.gov.in/images/main\\_2007.pdf](http://www.mea.gov.in/images/main_2007.pdf).
- Murthy, C.S.R. and Kurtz, Gerrit. "International Responsibility as Solidarity: The Impact of the World summit Negotiations on the R2P Trajectory," In *Global Society* 30 (2016), 38–53.
- Obama, Barack. "Remarks by the President to the Joint Session of the Indian Parliament in New Delhi," India, November 08, 2010, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, accessed July 17, 2014, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/08/remarks-president-joint-session-indian-parliament-new-delhi-india>.
- Pant, Harsh V. "Libya Exposes New Faultlines in Indian Foreign Policy," *International Relations and Security Network (ISN)*, 2011, accessed August 01, 2014, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?ots783=4888caa0-b3db-1461-98b9-e20e7b9c13d4&lng=en&id=128595>.
- Parameswaran, Prashanth. "India's position on Syria: a tight balancing act," In *East Asia Forum*, March 08, 2012, accessed August 02, 2014, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/03/08/indias-position-on-syria-a-tight-balancing-act/>.
- Pethiyagoda, Kadira. "India's Approach to Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect," Working Paper, University of Oxford, 2013, accessed July 26, 2014, <http://www.elac.ox.ac.uk/downloads/pethiyagoda%202013.pdf>.
- Puri, Hardeep Singh. "Statement by Ambassador Hardeep Singh Puri," Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations at the General Assembly Plenary Meeting on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, New York, July 24, 2009, accessed August 02, 2014, [http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/India\\_ENG.pdf](http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/India_ENG.pdf).
- Puri, Hardeep Singh. "Statement by Ambassador Hardeep Singh Puri," Permanent Representative, Open Debate on Protection of Civilians at the United Nations Security Council, November 09, 2011, Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations,

accessed August 01, 2014, <https://www.pminewyork.org/adminpart/uploadpdf/61918ind1958.pdf>

Puri, Hardeep Singh. "Statement by H.E. Ambassador H. S. Puri," Permanent Representative of India to the UN, An informal interactive dialogue on the report of the Secretary General on Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Action at the 66th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, September 05, 2012, accessed August 01, 2014, <http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/India.pdf>.

Rajan, M. S. "The New Interventionism?" In *International Studies* 37 (2000), 31–40.

Ramachandran, Sudha. "India ready to sacrifice Iraq for the US," In *Asia Times Online*, August 14, 2002, accessed July 24, 2014, [http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South\\_Asia/DH14Df05.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/DH14Df05.html).

Ramachandran, Sudha. "India rules out its troops for Iraq," In *Asia Times Online*, July 15, 2003, accessed July 25, 2014, [http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South\\_Asia/EG15Df03.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/EG15Df03.html).

Rotmann, Philipp, Kurtz, Gerrit and Brockmeier, Sarah. "Major powers and the contested evolution of a 'responsibility to protect'," 2014 (Version of the same-titled article accepted for publication in the magazine "Conflict, Security and Development" in a special issue on "Major Powers and the Contested Evolution of a 'Responsibility to Protect'", King's College London, September 2014).

Roy, Biren. "Mahabharata: Indiens großes Epos" [Mahabharata: the great epic of India], Köln, 1986.

Sen, Nirupam. "Statement by Mr. Nirupam Sen, Permanent Representative," at the informal thematic consultations of the General Assembly on the report of the Secretary-General entitled *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All*" (A/59/2005) (On Cluster III Issues: Freedom to Live in Dignity), April 20, 2005, Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations, accessed August 01, 2014, <https://www.pminewyork.org/adminpart/uploadpdf/74929ind1085.pdf>.

Singh, Manmohan. "Statement as Prime Minister at the 66th Session of the United Nations General Assembly," September 24, 2011, New York, accessed July 27, 2014, [http://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/66/IN\\_en.pdf](http://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/66/IN_en.pdf).

Sixth BRICS Summit, "BRICS Summit – Fortaleza Declaration," 2014a, accessed July 16, 2014, <http://brics6.itamaraty.gov.br/declarations-action-plans-and-communiques/listadecplan>.

Sixth BRICS Summit, "Economic Data and Trade Statistics," 2014b, accessed July 16, 2014, <http://brics6.itamaraty.gov.br/about-brics/economic-data>.

Staack, Michael. "Multipolarität und Multilateralismus als Strukturen der neuen Weltordnung." [Multipolarity and multilateralism as structures of the new world order.] In *Asiens Aufstieg in der Weltpolitik* [Asia's rise in international politics], ed. Michael Staack (Berlin/Toronto: Opladen, 2013), 9–48.

Staack, Michael. "Ohne Ziel und Kompass? Anmerkungen zur neuen deutschen Außenpolitik." [No objectives and no compass? Remarks on Germany's new foreign policy.] In *Europa als sicherheitspolitischer Akteur* [Europe as security policy player],

- eds. Michael Staack and Dan Krause (Berlin/Toronto: Opladen, 2014), 173–200.
- Stuenkel, Oliver. "Identity and the concept of the west: the case of Brazil and India," In *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 54 (2011), 178–195.
- Stuenkel, Oliver. "Neither BRICS nor IBSA united on Syria question," In *Post-Western World* online, August 05, 2012, accessed August 02, 2014, <http://www.postwesternworld.com/2012/08/05/neither-brics-nor-ibsa-united-on-syria-question/>.
- Stuenkel, Oliver. "Emerging India: A Farewell to Multilateralism?" In *India Foreign Affairs Journal* 8 (2013), 413–427.
- Teitt, Sarah. "Paper Tiger or Platform for Action? South Asia and the Responsibility to Protect." In *The Routledge Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect*, eds. Andy Knight and Frazer Egerton (London/New York, 2012), 197–215.
- Thakur, Ramesh. "Responsibility to protect is universal," *The Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)*, 2009, accessed July 27, 2014, <http://www.cigionline.org/articles/2009/11/responsibility-protect-universal>.
- Tharoor, Shashi. "Eine kleine Geschichte Indiens," [A brief history of India], Frankfurt am Main, 2005.
- United Nations, "India and People's Republic of China: Agreement (with exchange of notes) on trade and intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India." Signed at Peking on April 29, 1954, In *United Nations Treaty Series* 299 (1958), 57–81, accessed August 02, 2014, <https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20299/v299.pdf>.
- UN General Assembly, "2005 World Summit Outcome." A/60/L.1, October 24, 2005, 30, accessed June 16, 2014, <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ods/A-RES-60-1-E.pdf>.
- United Nations General Assembly, "Fifth Committee, Summary Record of the 23rd Meeting," A/C.5/62/SR.23, December 17, 2007, accessed July 28, 2014, <http://responsibility2protect.wikispaces.com/file/view/Summary+Meeting+Record+23+Meeting.pdf>.
- UN General Assembly, "Sixty-fifth session, 28th plenary meeting," October 12, 2010, UN doc. A/65/PV.28, accessed August 01, 2014, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/1958,view\\_doc.1958,asp?symbol=A/65/PV.28](http://www.un.org/ga/search/1958,view_doc.1958,asp?symbol=A/65/PV.28).
- UN General Secretary "Implementing the responsibility to protect," January 12, 2009, UN doc. A/63/677, accessed August 01, 2014, <http://responsibilitytoprotect.org1958,/SGRtoPEng%20%284%29.pdf>.
- UN Security Council, "Resolution 678," S/RES/678, November 29, 1990, accessed July 25, 2014, <http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/2268975.22807121.html>.
- UN Security Council, "Resolution 688," April 05, 1991a, accessed July 25, 2014, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/596/24/IMG/1958,NR059624.pdf?OpenElement>.
- UN Security Council, "S/PV.2982," April 05, 1991b, accessed August 02, 2014, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N91/605/11/PDF/N9160511.pdf?OpenElement>.
- UN Security Council, "S/PV.3988," March 24, 1999, accessed 02 August 2014, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3->

CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/kos%20SPV3988.pdf.

- UN Security Council, "4109th Meeting, S/PV.4109 (Resumption 1)," 2000, accessed July 27, 2014, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.4109%20%28Resumption%201%29](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.4109%20%28Resumption%201%29).
- UN Security Council, "Resolution 1970," February 26, 2011a, accessed August 01, 2014, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/245/58/PDF/N1124558.pdf?OpenElement>.
- UN Security Council, "Resolution 1973," March 17, 2011b, accessed August 01, 2014, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/268/39/PDF/N1126839.pdf?OpenElement>.
- UN Security Council, "6627th Meeting," October 04, 2011c, New York, Department of Public Information, News and Media Division. Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution Condemning Syria's Crackdown on Anti-Government Protestors Owing to Veto by Russian Federation, China, accessed August 01, 2014, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10403.doc.htm>.
- UN Security Council, "S/PRST/2011/16," Statement by the President of the Security Council, August 03, 2011d, accessed August 02, 2014, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/442/75/PDF/N1144275.pdf?OpenElement>.
- UN Security Council, "Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution on Syria as Russian Federation," China Veto Text Supporting Arab League's Proposed Peace Plan, 6711th Meeting, February 04, 2012a, Department of Public Information, News and Media Division, New York.
- UN Security Council, "6810th Meeting," July 19, 2012b, Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution on Syria That Would Have Threatened Sanctions Due to Negative Votes of China, Russian Federation, accessed August 02, 2014, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10714.doc.htm>.
- Virk, Kudrat. "India and the Responsibility to Protect: A Tale of Ambiguity," In *Global Responsibility to Protect* 5 (2013), 56-83.
- Wagner, Christian. "Sicherheitskooperation in Südasien: Bestandsaufnahme, Ursachen, Perspektiven" [Southeast Asian security cooperation: current situation, causes, prospects], study by German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), accessed August 04, 2014, [http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/studien/2014\\_S02\\_wgn.pdf](http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/studien/2014_S02_wgn.pdf).
- World Federation of United Nations Association, "WFUNA and IFUNA hold a Conference on R2P in New Delhi," October 09, 2012, accessed August 02, 2014, <http://www.wfuna.org/news/wfuna-and-ifuna-hold-a-conference-in-new-delhi-the-responsibility-to-protect-what-next>.
- Wulf, Herbert. "India's Aspirations in Global Politics. Competing Ideas and Amorphous Practices," Institute for Development and Peace (INEF) report 107/2013, accessed July 23, 2014, <http://inef.uni-due.de/cms/files/report107.pdf>.

## ENDNOTES

1. The summit was held in July 2014. The acronym BRICS stands for the initials of the countries of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. In 2001, Goldman Sachs economist Jim O'Neill coined the term BRIC to provide a concise summary of what he thought were the major emerging economies. In 2006, these four countries agreed on closer diplomatic coordination in the form of dialogues and since 2009, their heads of state and government have regularly met once a year. In 2011, South Africa joined the meetings and the acronym changed from BRIC to BRICS.
2. The abbreviation IBSA stands for India, Brazil and South Africa. In 2003, these three emerging powers decided to create a forum for dialogue to improve the coordination of their positions on key international policy issues. Unlike their BRICS partners Russia and China, the IBSA states are democratic and based on a market economy and expressed their commitment to global democracy and human rights at the founding meeting in 2003. Regular summits of the heads of state and government have been held since 2006.
3. The IMF assumes that India's GDP will grow by 7.5 % in 2015 and 2016. By comparison, China's growth rate is projected to be 6.8 % and 6.3 %, respectively (International Monetary Fund 2015: 4).
4. These pillars are (1) the responsibility of each individual state to protect its population from mass atrocities such as genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity, and (2) the resolve of the international community to support and encourage the states in the fulfilment of their responsibility and help the UN in establishing an early warning capability (cf. UN General Assembly 2005: 30; UN General Secretary 2009: 2).
5. When visiting New Delhi in 2010, President Barack Obama said: "Indeed, the just and sustainable international order that America seeks includes a United Nations that is efficient, effective, credible and legitimate. That is why I can say today, in the years ahead, I look forward to a reformed United Nations Security Council that includes India as a permanent member" (Obama 2010).
6. This statement had been nearly unanimously confirmed during the interviews conducted by the author of this article in November 2015 in New Delhi.
7. United Nations Protection Force in former Yugoslavia from 1992 to 1995.
8. Staack offers a comprehensive, yet condensed, overview of the events leading up to UNSC Resolution 1973 (Staack 2014: 181–184). For more information on this matter and the Libya debate, refer to the paper by August Pradetto published in this edited volume.
9. A detailed description of the debate on R2P among India's political authorities and media can be found in Hall (2013).

**Observer Research Foundation (ORF)** is a public policy think-tank that aims to influence formulation of policies for building a strong and prosperous India. ORF pursues these goals by providing informed and productive inputs, in-depth research, and stimulating discussions. The Foundation is supported in its mission by a cross-section of India's leading public figures, academic and business leaders.



**Ideas • Forums • Leadership • Impact**

---

20, Rouse Avenue Institutional Area, New Delhi - 110 002, INDIA  
Ph. : +91-11-43520020, 30220020. Fax : +91-11-43520003, 23210773  
E-mail: [contactus@orfonline.org](mailto:contactus@orfonline.org)  
Website: [www.orfonline.org](http://www.orfonline.org)