



Rethinking Security in the 21st Century

JODHPUR SECURITY DIALOGUE 2014



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About the Jodhpur Security Dialogue

The Jodhpur Security Dialogue is a joint initiative of the Sardar Patel University of Police, Security and Criminal Justice, Jodhpur, and the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi. Its aim is to broaden the scope of current discourse on security in the South Asian and Indian context. Envisioned as an annual conference, the Dialogue seeks to serve as a platform for India's strategic community, police and police practitioners, along with members of the academe, to discuss the core internal and external security challenges confronting the region and formulate appropriate policy responses.

The first edition of the Dialogue was held at the Rajasthan Police Academy, Jaipur, on 11 and 12 April 2014.

The Sardar Patel University of Police, Security and Criminal Justice, Jodhpur, is a State University created by the Government of Rajasthan. The Act of the University mandates the University to focus on teaching and research in the field of police, security, criminal justice, public safety, and related domains.

About the Organisers

About Sardar Patel University of Police, Security and Criminal Justice

India's criminal justice system in general, and policing, in particular—though ubiquitous and familiar—remains poorly understood and under-researched. Our policies and practices are generally guided by either the practitioners' impressionistic thinking or by the pulls and pressures of swaying popular opinion. The University is a unique forum for engagement between field practitioners and researchers for generating new knowledge and innovations in policy and practice in the above-mentioned areas.

In addition to the ongoing academic programmes, the University has established various centres to encourage and facilitate the development of think-tanks in various fields. The 'Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies' is one such centre, established in view of the critical importance of the subject for national security in a globalised world constantly in a flux. More information about the University is available at its institutional website: www.policeuniversity.ac.in

About the Observer Research Foundation

The Observer Research Foundation (ORF) is a not-for-profit, multidisciplinary, public policy think tank engaged in developing and discussing policy alternatives on a wide range of issues of national and international significance. Set up in 1990 during the troubled period of India's transition from a protected economy to its new engagement with the international economic order, ORF examines critical policy problems facing the country and helps develop coherent policy responses in a rapidly changing policy environment.

ORF aims to influence policy formulation for building a strong and prosperous India in a globalised world. It pursues these goals by providing informed and productive inputs, in-depth research and stimulating discussions. As an independent think tank, ORF develops and publishes informed and viable inputs for policy-makers in the government and for the political and business leadership of the country. It maintains a range of informal contacts with politicians, policy-makers, civil servants, business leaders and the media, in India and overseas.

As a platform for policy advocacy, ORF hosts close to 200 events a year, across India and in other countries, with the objective of providing a common space for stakeholders from diverse backgrounds to engage and share critical perspectives on contemporary policy issues.

Some of ORF's key areas of research include international relations, traditional and non-traditional security, politics and governance, digital economies, resources management, and economy and development.

With headquarters in New Delhi, ORF has chapters in Chennai, Mumbai and Kolkata.

All of the ORF publication formats are available online, and are archived on the official website (www.orfonline.org). ORF also has a significant online presence with around half a million website visitors every month and thousands of Facebook and Twitter followers (@orfonline).

Welcome Remarks

Mr. M L Kumawat, Vice Chancellor, Sardar Patel University of Police,
Security and Criminal Justice

Rethinking security in the 21st century implies that security dynamics and challenges are fast changing and becoming more complex in the current, integrated world. There are a number of challenges in newer areas like space and cyber while traditional security threats in the domain of maritime security and cross-border terrorism have acquired new dimensions. Moreover, the threats posed by cross-border smuggling, chemical, biological and radiological weapons, and skewed socio-economic indicators, continue to confront India and the region as a whole. In light of these evolving security challenges, it is critical to constantly rethink the State's policy approach.

But while it would appear that the world today is mostly insecure, this is hardly so. The fact is that the world in the 21st century is comparatively more peaceful than during any other period in human history. We should celebrate, for example, that inter-state wars have decreased considerably as the stakes for countries to get involved in conventional warfare have increased substantially.

At the same time, though inter-state wars are decreasing, there has been a spurt in intra-state conflicts. It is a worrying development, especially for India. For instance: Some 8,800 Indian soldiers died in the five wars that India has fought since Independence; more than 15,000 Indians have perished as a result of Left Wing Extremism; and a staggering 45,000 persons have been killed in Kashmir due to militancy. India has the largest number of banned terrorist organisations, with many of them being aided and abetted from across the border, adding to the complexities of the country's security challenges. The use of weapons of mass destruction by these actors is a possibility that cannot be completely ruled out.

A number of security experts have also flagged as potential future security threats, the increasing youth population in India and the unfavourably high rates of unemployment among them.

The Jodhpur Security Dialogue, envisioned as an annual conference, aims to examine these security challenges and explore viable policy options. It is hoped that the best brains in the security domain

can use the Dialogue as a platform for the formulation of appropriate policy responses to current and emerging security challenges.

Omendra Bhardwaj, Director General of Police, Rajasthan

It is important to initiate a dialogue that can focus on all aspects of security with relevance to India in order to discuss the possible and necessary policy responses, but also to identify and address the gaps in India's preparedness to meet such challenges. It has been rightly claimed that wars between countries have practically come down to zero, but wars within have increased. India has been bearing the brunt of terrorism for over two decades now and insurgent movements continue to pose a threat in different parts of the country. India has been fairly successful in dealing with these challenges: such success alone, however, does not guarantee success in the future as well.

Things may appear peaceful at times. Yet the recent arrests of some Indian Mujahideen activists in Rajasthan have shown us how deceptive this superficial peace is. It is important to sensitise the security personnel, and the public at large, about the ever-present threat and ensure that they remain prepared to deal with these challenges.

The State has a major role to play in eliminating the grievances that exist among certain communities, but the security agencies will also have to be better geared to identify people who exploit such grievances. Many misguided youth are determined to act on orders of some remote person who is just a virtual entity as far as they are concerned, and they are willing to do anything. That level of determination and dedication is what the state is fighting against in this war within the state.

This dialogue could serve as a stepping stone. It should sensitise the Rajasthan Police to a far greater extent to the challenges that lie ahead as well as the policymakers, who are expected to make India a far more secure place in the 21st century.

Keynote Address:

Security and Development Challenges in an Unstable Neighbourhood

A. K. Doval, Former Director, Intelligence Bureau; and Director, Vivekananda International Foundation*

The age of wars is not over. The nature of warfare has changed and the entire international community has to gear up to face this new challenge. It cannot be disputed that developments in a state's neighbourhood have become critical for its own security. Internal developments in a particular state can have long-term ramifications for the security of other states in the region as well. For instance, Pakistan's internal problems have had an impact on India as well. Similarly, problems in the former East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, had led to a huge influx of refugees into India. The emergence of violent groups can also have a spill-over effect. This has been evident from developments in Syria and Iraq. These are factors that the State has to take into account while formulating a coherent strategy.

India's neighbourhood is unique: It has about 15,106 km of international border; 7,000 km of it with two nuclear powers, who share close strategic ties with each other. With most of the remaining neighbouring countries, India has long-standing bilateral security-related problems. The scope of resolving such issues through a multilateral organisation like the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is limited. It is, instead, important to address such concerns at a bilateral level.

The unstable situation in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region is a matter of concern for India. The situation in Afghanistan seems to have completed a full circle. In 2001, the Taliban claimed that they had nothing to do with al-Qaeda and were keen to engage with the international community, especially the US. However, this was not reciprocated by the US, which went on to attack and eventually overthrow the Taliban-led regime in Afghanistan. Today, the situation is different as everyone—from the US to the European Union to Pakistan—finds it in their interest to engage the group in dialogue. The situation with respect to Pakistan has also changed drastically. Before 2001,

**AK Doval is currently National Security Advisor to Prime Minister Narendra Modi.*

Pakistan did not suffer from any internal terrorism. Today the threat of the 'Talibanisation' of Pakistan has become extremely real.

The future for the Afghanistan-Pakistan region also looks bleak. Afghanistan cannot keep its army going without substantial international aid. The economy of Afghanistan is not capable of sustaining itself. The economic situation in Pakistan is not much better. The economy is stagnant, there has been very little development, and Karachi, the financial capital, is faced with severe security threats. Moreover, India should carefully take note of two patterns involving Pakistan: its unfavourable civil-military balance, and its strategic partnership with China.

Bangladesh is also undergoing a shaky political transition. Although India supported and recognised the most recent election results, the legitimacy of the present government has been heavily questioned on account of a massive boycott of the elections by a number of political parties. There is also the emergence of radical Islamist groups within Bangladesh that have gained significant political leverage within the country.

China, meanwhile, is stable and driven by a one-party system and seems to have everything under control. However, the Tibet issue, and the presence in India of Tibet's spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, could determine the extent of China's position towards India.

How should India react to such developments in its neighbourhood? What should its approach be? India should support the democratic forces in its neighbourhood and ensure that any political vacuum in the region is not filled by groups that are adverse to democratic principles, in general, and to India in particular. Similarly, India should be looking at strengthening economic ties with its neighbourhood and invest in developing their capacities. This can help India gain a certain amount of influence as well. At the same time, India should be looking at developing its own capabilities and capacities to not only deal with these challenges, but also to be able to assert itself at the regional and global level.

Special Address:

Address by Her Excellency, **Margaret Alva**, Governor of Rajasthan

Over the years, the concept of 'national security' has undergone a dramatic change. It is no longer just about police officers maintaining law and order, and soldiers with guns guarding the borders. Today, internal and external security issues have become inextricably linked with each other. They have complex, often global, ramifications that touch upon financial flows, cyber war, satellite monitoring capabilities, maritime and air patrolling, besides media protection. Technology has unleashed the creative potential of humanity both for good and for evil. It has also enfolded motivated groups or non-state actors to attempt to force their agenda on the world through their terrorist activities.

In this new technology-driven environment, nation-states have to contend with two kinds of threat perceptions. Firstly, from hostile nation-states and secondly, from powerful non-state actors who may be either domestic or international. Though the threat of large-scale war between nations seems have to have receded, there are ever increasing hostile actions in different parts of the world that compel each nation-state to keep itself prepared to face any eventuality. The threats to security from motivated groups, the non-state actors, supported from across national borders continue to loom large and are a reality. These are distinct in nature and they have to be handled accordingly.

The so-called 'non-state actors' who often work closely with or under direct control of the state as in India's neighbourhood, receive ideological, financial and arms support from international networks. The manifesting ability of these terror groups to produce and plant bombs on the ground, attack from the air, or take maritime routes as has been noticed in the recent past, is taking an obvious toll on India's resources. Huge infrastructural and human resources have to be diverted to secure not just the territorial borders, but also the air space, sea routes, railways, bus stations, and strategic installations. The cost of conventional wars—which are presumed to have a beginning and an end—can be estimated. But the 'low intensity wars' on terror continue to inflict a heavy cost on victim nations for long periods of time.

These security threats necessitate close coordination between policing, intelligence gathering, defence and foreign policy, different branches of the government as also clarity of vision and continuity in strategic thinking. In democracies, how can continuity of policy and timely response to

emerging threats be maintained? These threats need to be dealt with under a broad consensual national policy executed firmly and consistently. It is important to insulate those at the helm of security affairs, political leaders, and key personnel, from political vagaries and an incursive public. It is worth considering new mechanisms to ensure security and continuity of tenure for such personnel while ensuring accountability to elected representatives. The bureaucracy also needs to realise that national security is not a matter of turf war or ego battles.

Modern-day terrorism seeks sustenance from the mass media. Live 24x7 broadcasting creates new pressures on governments in the midst of unfolding security crises. Terror strikes, hostage crises, and attacks on key installations, instantly become live events for television channels. During the Mumbai terror attacks of 2008, for instance, the handlers of the terrorists were watching the TV coverage—most of them, highly irresponsible—and relaying instructions to their men. The security agencies should have drawn lessons from the Mumbai attack and evolved a considered approach on how to handle the mass media in similar events. The media, too, on its path must consider evolving a code of conduct on how to cover and report such situations. Moreover, given that terror groups are increasingly becoming technology savvy, we need to constantly upgrade the surveillance capabilities of our agencies. Bhatkal, on India's western coast, represents a fine example of failed surveillance.

The Bhatkal market is one of the best international markets, where smuggled goods—arms, drugs and foreign currency, among others—can be obtained. This is highly significant since this is part of the district with Karwar, which today has one of India's most sensitive areas for defence, where even atomic submarines are supposed to be launched. Significant amounts of money have been invested in this place, but there is absolutely no sense of surveillance or monitoring of activities in the surrounding area. Of late, with the clampdown on the illegal foreigners staying in Goa and the pressure which has come, these actors have started moving down the coast to Om Beach, which is within 10 km of the naval base. There has been no effort to control the entry of such people and there is also very little information about their actual numbers in the region.

India is indeed very poorly equipped to deal with these kinds of situations. This is particularly the case with border areas. In Uttarakhand and areas adjoining Nepal, there is very little monitoring of the movement of people across the border. The same is true with India's Northeast region, where the open borders have led to a lot of illicit activities. The alienation and lack of development of the region has pushed the younger men into secessionist movements, membership in which provides them with a uniform, a designation, regular income, and an identity. There seems to be a total disregard from New Delhi about these areas. In order to deal with these challenges, it is imperative for the Central Government to step in and effectively equip the agencies working in these areas.

In the final analysis, all threats to peace emanate from the inability of people to get along with each other or, when faced with differences, settle them amicably. Even a small minority of misguided citizens can cause widespread havoc. Lasting peace is possible only through the widest possible

consensus in favour of non-violent means to separate differences. India is a land that has taught the world the virtues of love, tolerance, non-violence, and accommodation, and yet it is so often turned into a battleground, stoned with blood and bodies over petty differences and disputes. Even as the state—through police and defence services—deals with criminality and terrorism, one is left wondering: Should society as a whole be exerting more effort to foster a spirit of peaceful dialogue in every sphere? Is it possible to build on the best of India's traditions, culture, and religions to work towards an unequivocal consensus to accord utmost respect to human life?

Thus wrote Mahatma Gandhi in 'Young India' in 1931: “If we are to reach real peace in this world and if we are to carry on a real war against war, we shall have to begin with children. If they will grow up in their natural innocence, we won't have to struggle and we won't have to pass fruitless idle resolutions, but we shall go from love to love and peace to peace until at last all the corners of the world are covered with that peace and love for which consciously and unconsciously the whole world is hungry”. This may sound idealistic but ways have to be found to ensure that this vision materialises.

Session I: New Areas of Contestation

Oceans

Vice Adm. Anup Singh (Retd.), Former Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Naval Command

The seas are an integral driver of the world economy. An estimated 50 percent of the world's population resides within 200 km of the coast. Some of the most important financial centres of the world are located near the coast, including New York and Mumbai. In that respect, India is fortunate, as it has a vast coastline which provides it with great opportunity to access the world.

India has roughly 200 major, intermediate and minor ports, which serve as its windows to the world. This provides India with an opportunity to harvest fish, fossil fuels, and millions of tonnes of strategic material, which lies to be harvested. The east coast of India, in particular, is seen as being significantly advantageous for the setting up of industries, deep-water ports and shipbuilding yards. Moreover, as a result of the UNCLOS III, which was signed in 1982, India has the advantage of an exclusive economic zone of 2.02 million square kilometres, which is set to be expanded to about 2.54 million square kilometres.

Given India's vast coastline, the Indian Ocean is one of the country's most important strategic assets. This enhances India's potential for its coastal and Ocean domination in the region. The threshold for crises in the Indian Ocean region is low, but incidents like the Mumbai terror attacks of 26/11 have highlighted India's responsibility, given its location, for providing security in the region. Significant volumes of commercial activity are conducted through the Indian Ocean, which has further enhanced India's responsibility. Over 100,000 ships, nearly two-thirds of the world's oil, and nearly half of the world's cargo, pass through this area every year.

The one prominent example of a global common that is likely to be contested in the future is the South China Sea. China claims 90 percent of the 3.6 million sq. km. of South China Sea on the basis

of a map that it published in 1947 and revised in 1949. For China, this area is important given the vast reserves of natural resources—oil and gas—in the region. The area is said to have at least 11 billion barrels and 190 trillion cubic metres in that area.

This area, however, has been contested by five other countries: China; Taiwan; Malaysia; Brunei; and Vietnam. All of them claim parts of certain islands and territories around them. This friction among the countries has prevented regional cooperation in the area that could have enabled an effective exploitation of the opportunities provided by the South China Sea.

Space

Dr. Rajeswari Rajagopalan, Senior Fellow, ORF

Outer space has become extremely critical in the strategic and security sphere and has emerged as a new area of contestation for a variety of factors. For starters, the growing dependence of outer space for a variety of utilities in the social, economic, military and developmental spheres is likely to lead to a significant spurt in the number of players in outer space. There are already more than 60 such operators including non-state or private players as well as educational institutions; this number is likely to grow in the future.

As of January 2014, there were about 1,167 satellites in outer space. The US has the largest share at 502; Russia follows at 118; and China is close at 116. Moreover, there is a proliferation of small and mini or nano satellites which weigh anywhere between 1 kg to 500 kg.

With an increase in the number of players and the proliferation of small satellites, there is a lot of difficulty in tracking and detecting objects in outer space. Such an increase in numbers has also given rise to problems with respect to radio frequency interferences.

The growing satellite debris is another factor that has led to space becoming a major area of contestation. Increasing space debris poses serious threats to the Indian assets. Detection of such debris in order to prevent it from damaging or threatening civilian assets is a huge challenge. Given the threat posed by space debris, it is important to put in place measures that can avoid additional satellite debris while finding new ways to remove some of the debris from outer space.

The militarisation of space has already happened as most of the militaries use space assets for a variety of military operations, such as intelligence gathering and surveillance. However, there is an increasing trend towards weaponisation. For instance, there are advanced military space programs even in Asian neighbourhood including anti-satellite capabilities which are inherently destabilising.

Development and testing of anti-satellite capabilities are picking up again. This potential of using ground-based assets to target outer space capabilities is a worrying development.

Given all these different challenges, there are no clear rules governing the conduct of actors in outer space. There are five basic treaties concerning outer space; of them all, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 is the most comprehensive. However, there are loopholes which can be exploited by states to pursue their own narrow interests and the lack of clarity of certain definitions also raises concerns. Moreover, a treaty that was formulated in the 1960s has become far too distant from the range of new and emerging threats that are being faced by the world today.

Similarly, there has been much debate about preventing an arms race in outer space. The most recent was the draft treaty proposed by China and Russia in 2008: the Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Outer Space Treaty (PPWT). This could be a good measure if there is sufficient political will to implement it effectively. However, one of the problems with this draft treaty is that it does not cover ground-based assets that can target assets in outer space. Another good initiative that has been taken up under the UN is the creation of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on outer space. The group generally promotes mutual trust, encourages cooperation and openness, while reducing tensions and misperceptions as a means to prevent intended or unintended conflicts. However, the reports of this group are more recommendatory in nature and do not have a binding impact on states. Moreover, these reports also have yet to get into the process of defining some of the key concepts in outer-space security.

What does this all mean for India and what policy approach should the country adopt? If India wants to emerge as a major space power, it is critical that the political leadership acquires a better understanding of what 'outer space' means and how best India can exploit its potential. There needs to be a better focus on outer space from both a commercial and national-security perspective. As for framing new rules, India should take an active role and it needs to come up with a comprehensive approach to outer-space security.

Cyberspace

Mr. Sachin Deodhar, Independent Consultant on Cyber Conflict

Cyberspace can no longer be considered a 'new or emerging' area of contestation; rather, it is very much established. The US' technical intelligence agency, the National Security Agency (NSA), and its capabilities bear testimony to this fact.

NSA's collection, exploitation, and analysis capabilities extend to possibly all domains: VPNs, VOIP, Mobiles, Network, Web and the whole large network of websites such as Gmail, Yahoo, and

Outlook. The scale extends from what is called 'targeted access' which implies a specific organisation or individual, all the way to mass-scale exploitation at the ISP and even the nation state level.

The possibility of smartphones and tablets being subjected to a cyber attack has also risen in recent years. Till about five years ago, the use of such devices was low. This has changed drastically since then. In fact, India's efforts to conduct offensive cyber operation attacks in the recent past failed because most of those attacks and attack vectors targeted not smartphones and tablets, but conventional computers and laptops. These attack vectors were impotent against smartphones and tablets, which the targeted adversaries were using at the time. The time has come to shift focus to smartphones and tablet platforms.

This is a platform that has already been exploited by the NSA. Even before the iPhone was officially released in the US market in 2007, the NSA had already developed the capability to exploit iPhone platforms. They had also developed similar expertise to exploit the Android phones.

The NSA also has a framework in place to analyse vast quantities of data—called 'Boundless Informant'—collected from countries of interest. The NSA possesses immense capability to extract meta-data from India, which is seen as a country of extreme importance to the US, but also a 'friendly' country.

Finally, there is the NSA Quantum, which is among the most worrying concern at present. This is the NSA's mass-scale target exploitation platform. This platform allows the NSA to exploit potentially hundreds of millions of computers at the same time; that is the scale the NSA operates at: Quantum. Quantum started with very basic types of exploitation or hacking activity and then it has moved down from there to more advanced forms of hacking activities. Now, they have experimental categories. For example, the file download disruption which intercepts the file download by the target, replaces the file with its own file which has a malware embedded inside and thereby can infect the target's system. There is no way somebody who is downloading the file could tell that the file has been intercepted and replaced by something else. There are many other such programmes in place.

The NSA started such efforts 30 to 40 years ago, even before it was envisaged that the internet could have become as popular as it is today. They had the vision to expand their capabilities and call it 'cyber intelligence'. Such cyber intelligence occurs in other countries as well, but is nowhere as organised or as structured as the programmes of the NSA.

Session II: New Security Challenges

New Challenges in Drug Law Enforcement

Mr. K. C. Verma, Former Chief, Research & Analysis Wing

India's approach to the issue of drugs and narcotics is often ambivalent, and may even be said to be hypocritical. We adopt contradictory positions, and thus, as a society, we might frown on smoking, but we accept ritual and recreational use of banned substances like cannabis and opium.

Drug trafficking and addiction are serious problems confronting India that impact on organised crime, juvenile delinquency, and cross-border threats. However, in the case of India, the fear of narco-terrorism is overstated, because trafficking of drugs does not finance terrorism in the country, unlike in some others part of the world.

Conventional wisdom says that India suffers because of cross-border trafficking of drugs, given its geographic location between the two major opium growing areas of the world. But it also needs to be recognised and acknowledged that the drug problem in India does not arise solely from external sources. The increasing illicit cultivation of opium in several parts of the country is the result of a failure of governance. It is also a fact that there is substantial diversion of opium from licit cultivation. Hence, it would be incorrect to pass on the blame to other countries and believe that nothing can be done to rectify the problem. India is very much a part of the drug problem, as far as opium and heroin are concerned.

Synthetic drugs and abuse of pharmaceutical preparations are major emerging concerns. These need a focused approach, which is unfortunately lacking.

An example of our confused approach is the position of opium in our Constitution, which needs to be reviewed. Opiates such as morphine, which have tremendous medicinal value, need to be made available for palliative care.

The Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act needs to be re-examined, for properly re-defining and re-identifying the threats posed to our society by substance abuse. The present Act is heavily loaded against the fact of possession, whereas big traffickers are able to evade the law. There is also distrust of the law within the legal fraternity because of the perceived draconian provisions of the NDPS Act.

An associated problem in enforcement of drug laws, treatment of drug addicts and policy formulation, is the lack of proper statistics. Thus, the extent of the drug problem affecting India is not known. Agencies have to rely mostly on anecdotal evidence. Even with the available information, drug issues are addressed in piecemeal fashion by different agencies of the government, leading to skewed allocation of resources and patchy emphasis on counter narcotics efforts.

Apart from the lack of statistics, corruption in the case of drug administration is a serious problem, which has been growing but remains mostly under-reported. Anecdotal evidence indicates that abuse of pharmaceutical preparations and synthetic drugs, which are manufactured and prepared locally, have emerged as huge problem areas. Yet there is little or no oversight as regards pharmaceutical products. It is time that India install a more robust infrastructure to supervise pharmaceutical preparation.

To avoid a segmented approach, India should consider the establishment of a Department of Drugs and Narcotics, as well as a National Drug Commission, in order to deal with the issues more effectively.

Illicit Cross-Border Trade

Mr. Banshi Dhar Sharma, Special Director General (Eastern Command),
BSF

The India-Bangladesh border is extremely hard to patrol. A difficult terrain—including rivers, mountains and the heavily forested Sundarbans—and human habitations right up till the border in areas like North Bengal add to the complexity of this international border. In some areas the border is extremely porous and there are large swathes of territory that are completely unfenced. All this has enabled an increasing amount of infiltration, smuggling, and trafficking across the border.

This cross-border smuggling has been greatly abetted by the religious and linguistic affinities that exist among the population on both sides of the border and their unhindered communication. The economic marginalisation and rampant poverty prevalent in the border areas has made the lure of quick and easy money through illicit cross-border activities extremely attractive.

Human trafficking, drug-trade and cattle smuggling are the most common cross-border crimes taking place along the India-Bangladesh border. Cattle smuggling, in particular, is extremely lucrative. A cow purchased for INR 5,000 fetches the smuggler five times that amount in Bangladesh, where the demand for beef is extremely high. It is an extremely organised system and network, and there have been incidents of violence in the past on account of cattle smuggling. There are several instances of endangered animals being smuggled into India from Bangladesh.

Legalising cattle trade with Bangladesh, enhancing the auction value of cattle trade, allowing the export of beef from India itself, and setting up a joint task force—comprising the BSF, Police and the Customs—could prove to be effective measures to curb cattle smuggling. Another example is pharmaceuticals: Around 2 lakh bottles of Phensedyl and other cough suppressants enter Bangladesh from India every day, according to media reports. This again has a huge profit margin for the smugglers, allowing them to earn as much as five times the original cost price of the bottle. As there is a ban on liquor in Bangladesh, the youth in particular use Phensedyl as an intoxicating drug. There is a huge influx of drugs, like Ganja, from Bangladesh into India's Northeast states like Tripura and Mizoram as well.

There is also the huge influx of counterfeit currency into India. It has been estimated that as much as INR 160 billion worth of fake currency originating in Bangladesh is already in circulation in India. Some of the methods of concealing the fake currencies have included hiding the notes in the sole of shoes or inside knee-caps. Proper fencing of the India-Bangladesh border, along with more stringent patrolling and operations by the BSF, police and other agencies, and the use of counterfeit note detection machines, can act as effective measures to curb the smuggling of fake currency.

Better fencing and patrolling can help curb cross-border smuggling in general. However, the development of the necessary infrastructure to curb smuggling should be accompanied by the introduction of non-lethal strategy and use of non-lethal munitions like Pump Action Guns, Stun Grenades, Dye Marker Grenades, Chilli Grenades, 90 Grenades and Rubber bullets. Along with arrests and proper legal procedures against the miscreants, it is also important to develop a 'Coordinated Border Management Plan' with Bangladesh to ensure better protection along the border.

Unequal socio-economic indicators as potential sources of conflict

Mr. Saurabh Johri, Programme Advisor, ORF

In the US, the 'Terrain Mapping System' is followed, wherein intelligence is drawn out of socio-economic indicators. These indicators help policy-makers understand the potential triggers for

domestic insecurity. However, this is an area where India lags behind and it is critical that greater attention is paid to such indicators by Indian policy-makers as well. There are a number of areas within the Indian context—demographic threats, rural-urban divide, and rampant poverty—where the indicators paint an unfavourable picture and can be seen as sources of conflict.

For instance, India has one of the largest educational infrastructures and one of the largest youth populations in the world, yet nearly 200 million people remain outside the country's formal education system. Moreover, a large number of people, despite being in the formal education system, are illiterate. Data suggest that there is a direct correlation between propensity to crime and the lack of education.

Similarly, the sex ratio in India is heavily in favour of the male population. This is likely to tilt further in their favour in the future. At present, the sex ratio in India is 940 females for every 1000 males, which is likely to go down to a worse 930 by 2026. The unfavourable sex ratio and higher incidences of rapes in states like Punjab, Haryana, Delhi, and Uttar Pradesh, suggest that there is a direct link between the two.

Furthermore, analysing the lack of development and poverty-ridden conditions in India's so-called Red Corridor, there is a discernable link between poverty and anti-state aggression. For instance, large parts of Orissa, Jharkhand, and Chhattisgarh, where as much as 40-50 percent of the population live below the poverty line, are also among worst Naxal-affected areas in India. At the same time, large parts of Rajasthan, Gujarat, and Punjab—which have only 0-10 percent of the population below the poverty line—are free of the Naxal threat.

The available data for urban population also throws considerable light on the prevailing economic disparity in urban areas. This disparity is evident between different religious and caste-based communities in terms of their purchasing power and in terms of access to basic public goods. The analysis of such data could possibly help in determining potential trigger points in such areas.

A careful analysis of the available data—for both rural and urban areas—can also throw light on certain interesting developments. For instance, in certain parts of Jammu and Kashmir and Assam, as well as in certain parts of Jharkhand and Bihar, which belong to the Red Corridor, the expenditure of certain communities has increased significantly in the past few years as compared to the expenditure of other communities in the region. However, the rate of unemployment among such communities has also increased in the same time. This raises questions regarding the source of their revenue that has enabled such an increase in expenditure.

Session III:

Neo-Conventional Security Threats

Non-State Actors and New Capabilities

Mr. Ambar Sen, Special Secretary (Retd.), R&AW

There has been a significant decline in the overall strength of terrorist groups worldwide. Al-Qaeda, for instance, has more or less been wiped out, at least its top leadership. There has been tremendous attrition in their top leadership and Osama Bin Laden has been killed in possibly one of the finest covert anti-terrorist operations ever. However, while the al-Qaeda core may have been weakened considerably, a number of smaller groups have emerged, which continue to pose a challenge, albeit less lethal than the al-Qaeda core.

Some of these groups include al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and the Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, which have been incorporated from Al-Qaeda in Algeria, Al-Qaeda in Iran, and Al-Qaeda in Libya, Yemen and Algeria. There is also the Boko Haram in Nigeria and al-Shabaab in Somalia. Such groups have the capacity to mount large-scale operations. Some of the significant incidents in recent times were the attacks on the Westgate mall in Nairobi, which saw many similarities with the attacks carried out on Mumbai in November 2008, and the hostage crisis that took place in Amenas in Algeria orchestrated by al-Qaeda-affiliated militants.

It is the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, Central Asia and northern Africa that continue to remain hotbeds for terrorism. These are the areas where significant political turmoil and transition is taking place, providing ideal conditions for terrorist groups and violent non-state actors to thrive.

Although the overall strength of such groups may have decreased, the networking and coordination among these groups, and their areas of operation, have only strengthened significantly. For instance, captive Chechen rebels have revealed upon interrogation that they had been trained by the Lashkar-e-Tayebba. Similarly, al-Qaeda's relations with South Asian groups like the Haqqani Network and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and the linkages between the Afghan Taliban and the TTP, further highlight this growing connectivity. Apart from this, the use of the cyberspace by such

groups to pursue their targets and reach out to a larger audience is yet another phenomenon that has to be dealt with.

A new trend that seems to have emerged is that of individuals acting on their own without any instructions from a central leadership. The bombing at the Boston marathon in April 2013, carried out by two brothers, highlights this new trend.

In South Asia, terrorism and insurgency-related casualties have seen a significant decrease: from a peak of 29,638 in 2009, of which 15,565 were in Sri Lanka alone, to about 6600 in 2013. Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Nepal, especially, have done remarkably well in reducing terrorism-related casualties. In India as well there has been a drop in total insurgency and terrorism fatalities from a peak of 5839 in 2001 to 885 in 2013; the most dramatic plunge was registered in Jammu & Kashmir from 4507 in 2001 to 181 in 2013. Pakistan-backed Islamist terrorist attacks outside J&K which resulted in 364 fatalities in 2008 went down to 29 in 2013.

Pakistan has, however, seen at least 5,379 terrorism-related fatalities in 2013. Civilians pay the price for state inaction; the civilian casualties in Pakistan in 2013 were 3,011. The number of civilian fatalities in Pakistan now exceeds the number of civilian casualties in Afghanistan, where it is estimated that about 2,959 were killed in 2013. The drawdown of US troops from Afghanistan would not only have an impact on the future stability of Afghanistan, but could have a significant impact on Pakistan as well as on the South Asian region as a whole.

Non-State Actors and Challenges to Maritime Security

Dr. Prabhakaran Paleri, former Director General, Indian Coast Guard

The oft-used term, 'non-state actors' is indeed a misnomer: These actors hardly ever act independently or in isolation; rather they are normally backed by recognised states and agencies. Hence, to address the challenges posed by such actors, it is important for governments to take on such states and agencies under strategic terms, nationally and internationally.

Maritime security is the all-encompassing complimentary fraction of national security of a maritime nation from an ocean-specific terrain assessment applicable to that nation (Paleri, 2007). To that extent, every nation has a maritime perspective. There are a number of maritime crimes and threats that confront states today. The foremost among them include smuggling, trafficking, environmental violations, piracy, and espionage. Every state, including the landlocked ones, has no other option but to confront this challenge.

These threats will continue at various levels. Some, such as trafficking and environmental crimes, are likely to increase significantly in the future. For example, human trafficking can rise with sea level rise when the displaced citizens seek the assistance of traffickers to move to new places in the absence of international facilitation. The seas will be the medium. Similarly, terrorism and the use of maritime routes by terrorists, as in the case of the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, cannot be ruled out. However, it is unlikely that such an option will be availed by militants on an increasing basis, given the availability of better options in other terrains.

The alleged shooting of two Indian fishers off the coast of Kerala by serving Italian marines has highlighted a new form of maritime transgression that needs to be addressed by international organisations. Such incidents could also impact on geostrategic relations.

Maritime crimes such as piracy may decline in the future as socio-political situations improve in the caught-up nations. Poaching, which includes illegal harvesting, exploration and exploitation of the ocean, is also likely to be on the decline.

Unlawful activities at and from the sea are global issues that can be suppressed through integrated maritime security as long as the states have focused and coherent strategies, and a clear understanding of what constitutes them.

India has the capacity to deal with such challenges provided there is favourable political will supported by clear thinking.

The Changing Demographic Profile of Non-State Actors

Wilson John, Senior Fellow, ORF

Pre-empting terrorist strikes and activities remains one of the most daunting challenges facing an effective counter-terrorism (CT) strategy. This requires multiple capabilities of intelligence and military interventions, of which profiling of terrorists and terrorist groups is a key element. Profiling of groups and individuals provide CT policy-makers with an instrument to understand their motivations, attitudes, inclinations, strengths and flaws, and, perhaps most important of all, their social network.

A good profiling exercise could add to the pre-emptive strategy if enough care is taken to avoid the most common pitfalls caused by ignorance, bias and lack of training. Profiling of a suspect or a criminal is an old tool in policing. Such profiling has often been bare skeletons of a biodata, and in

cases of hardened criminals, their past criminal record. This kind of profiling is hardly of any use in CT operations. An effective CT needs a comprehensive profile which can help police and intelligence agencies to identify individuals, groups and their social network. Since in India much of the CT work uses local police infrastructure, there has been an over-riding tendency to adapt profiling methods used in criminal work. In the past, this singular flaw had undermined CT and COIN operations in different parts of the country, often resulting in wrong detentions, public anger and gross human rights violations. There has since been, with experience of dealing with insurgency and terrorism since the '80s (and even before that in case of the north-east), changes in CT practice. Information technology revolution brought in dramatic changes in the instruments and the scope of intelligence gathering and operations.

Despite these changes, a significant flaw in profiling has been noticeable in recent times. This is largely due to excess reliance on speculative profiling. This kind of profiling relies essentially on religion, ethnicity, and socio-economic background and has indeed been useful in tracking down terrorist modules in the past. But such profiles have limited value in today's world which has witnessed a dramatic shift in social attitudes, behaviours and demographic contours. India is a young country with 60 percent of its population below 30 and most of them hooked on mobile platforms and social media; those who are not, aspire to be. These changes have had their impact on terrorism as a whole with younger men, and women, joining terrorist groups and that, too, in faraway lands. There is today much more than in the past, a closer kinship between terrorist groups, linked by the ubiquitous internet; the educational and social profile of terrorists are far different from the madrasa-educated cadres of Afghan mujahideen.

Terrorists today are adept at using sophisticated communication tools, know much more about bomb-making, assaults, hostage-taking, and other activities, courtesy incessant video projections of terrorist ideology, methods and attacks on the internet. Earlier, hunting down a terrorist or his group was like searching for a needle in a haystack; that haystack has now grown in size and there are too many needles out there. This makes profiling even more important in counter-terrorism, and much more complex. An effective profiling should be informed by global terrorist environment, its likely implications on India and its neighbourhood, domestic factors, and past investigations.

Session IV: Technology

Low-Level Technology for Internal Security

Mr. Subimal Bhattacharjee, Former Country Head (India), General Dynamics

The security threats in different parts of India—whether it is Jammu and Kashmir, India's Northeast or the Naxal-affected areas—have not decreased. The violent incidents have continued and the nature of threat has changed slightly over the years. There is an urgent need to bring in the best quality technology for enhancing internal security. It is important to note that technology has always been a force multiplier for security forces. However, the Indian security system is not evolving fast enough to meet these changing demands.

The attacks of 26/11 were a wakeup call for India. But very little modernisation of the police forces has taken place since that incident. Since 2001, there has been an increase in the allocation of funds for this modernisation to take place. For the first ten years since 2001, this was about INR 1200 crores per year, which has now increased to INR 3000 crores per year. An effective modernisation of the police forces, however, cannot happen within such a limited budget. It does not guarantee, for example, the purchase of the best equipment.

Moreover, even if one is to analyse the actual spending, questions can be raised about how much investment has actually been made in modernising the forces. Most of such funds have gone into improving the police stations, buildings or buying soft-skinned vehicles. Progress has been slow in the purchase of the best-quality equipment. There are inadequate armoured vehicles for the police and the communication equipment used is not ideal either for normal policing or disaster management. India should be thinking along the lines of deploying some software defined radios or look at the possibility of using meshed radio networks.

Bharat Electronics Limited over the past decade—backed by the DRDO—has been attempting to develop software defined radios, but the progress in that area has been slow. Improved means of

communication becomes essential even with respect to coordinating operations. Increasingly there are instances of the armed forces being used either as backup to police forces in certain areas or actually leading operations in order to maintain internal security and law and order. In such cases, coordination between the different institutions also requires better technology.

The quality of the surveillance equipment has also not been up to the mark. There have been several instances of the camera still being in place physically, but are not in proper working condition. There seems to be no accountability of institutions tasked to set up these cameras and maintain them.

There has definitely been an increase in security-related expenditure in India over the years. For instance, in the Northeast this expenditure has gone up from INR 150 crores in 2004-05 to INR 2037 crores in 2013-14. The region continues to remain insecure, however. Once again the problem lies with the lack of modernisation of the forces in the region. Thus, there is an urgent need to improve the procurement process and purchase equipment that can help the security forces deal with the challenges more effectively.

CBR Terrorism and the Threat to India

L V Krishnan, Former Director, Safety Research and Health Physics Group, Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research, Kalpakkam

Radiological terrorism is a growing concern today as radiation sources used in industry and medical practice are available in plenty, are found all over India and are easily accessible. The acquisition and exploitation of such material does not require any extra effort on the part of the terrorists. All that needs to be done is to access the source, mix it with the high explosive and it is ready to be used.

Both high and low-level radiations sources are in use. High intensity sources are used in hospitals, in research centres, and for food preservation. Note that the US agreed to import mangoes from India only if they were irradiated. Low level ones used for industrial and manufacturing processes. In industries, large numbers of radiation sources are used for measuring levels, thickness and density.

The most important materials used in these radiation sources are cesium, cobalt, and radium. It is important to look at the forms in which these sources are used. Some of them are soluble sources like caesium chloride, some are powders. Both can spread in the environment. Some are also metals like Cobalt, which are used in the form of pencils.

Security concerns arise when such sources are not properly stored, or are stolen or mismanaged. They can then lead to common people being exposed to radiation. Several such instances involving high-intensity sources are known from countries like Brazil, Estonia, Peru and Iran. Instances of

radiation exposure to innocent public have happened in India as well. Exposure to high-level sources even for a brief second could prove to be very fatal for the handlers. However, in case of low level sources, exposure will lead to a certain amount of contamination but will not prove fatal if discovered and cleaned up in good time. In such cases, while the health of the exposed will not be impacted, the bigger threat is likely to come from the panic and fear likely to be created.

In India, while the threat of radiological terrorism is recognised and acknowledged, it has not been a priority security concern. Many in India may not even be able to recognise the sources of radiation. A good first step to prevent future threats from sources like these is to equip the security forces with radiation detectors, increase the number of ports with radiation detectors, equip more security boats with such detectors and undertake measures to educate first responders and the people at large about such threats. The last measure, in particular, has seen some success in places like Fukushima, where following the accident, large numbers of private medical practitioners helped in monitoring the general public. .

It will not be possible to eliminate radiological threat completely unless substitutes for the sources are found. Till then, the state has to be better prepared to deal with it.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Border Reconnaissance

Siddharth Sivaraman, Senior Advisor, Kadet Defense Systems

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are no longer limited to defence or homeland security purposes. They are increasingly being used for civilian and commercial purposes as well. In India, the category of UAVs commonly used is the medium altitude long endurance system. These UAVs have capability to fly at 30,000 feet with an endurance of up to 30 hours and a range of 250 km. If the satellite communications come into place then these UAVs can have extended distances as much as the fuel they can carry.

UAVs can be used for intelligence gathering, surveillance and reconnaissance purposes, as well as to supplement maritime patrolling. They are also useful as far as target acquisition, designation and elimination is concerned. UAVs have now also been configured to detect nuclear, biological, and chemical-related accidents. UAVs will essentially hover over an area with advanced sensors and will be able to pick up molecules or atoms emanating from the source, the target area, and analyse remotely about the material of which the object is made. UAVs are also going to be important in the coming future, especially in India as the defence forces move towards a network centric warfare.

The main advantages of UAVs are the 3D missions: dull, dirty, and dangerous. Dull because a UAV, in comparison to a manned aircraft can stay in the air for much longer, sometimes as long as 30 hours. This is why a UAV is able to provide a persistent capability as it stays on target for a really long time. 'Dirty' because the UAV can do a fantastic job in case of an accident. For instance, it is able to hover over the nuclear reactor collecting all sorts of data, the source of radiation, the level of radiation, and also send back real-time images as to how bad the accident was. It is 'dangerous' because the UAVs can be used to undertake intelligence and reconnaissance missions in enemy territory. The use of drones by the US to conduct such missions in Iran from its base in Pakistan is an example of such UAVs.

The main advantages of UAVs is that they act as force multipliers as they have better tracking capability as compared to stationery sensors and can improve coverage along the remote sections. Moreover, the extended range of a UAV also puts fewer burdens on human resources and is far quieter than a conventional aircraft. The possibility of being able to detect a UAV depends on its size; if the UAV is very small, it becomes extremely hard to detect it.

However, there are limitations to UAVs as well. For one, the accident rates among them are multiple times that of a manned aircraft. Another limitation is that the remote pilot who is handling the UAV cannot always determine accurately the weather conditions through which the UAV has to be flown. Sometimes the weather conditions can hamper the sensor and the controller may not be able to see or get a sense of what is happening. The cost of operation is also double that of manned aircraft. There is a significant logistical support required to maintain a UAV in the air versus a manned chopper where one pilot and one observer can do the job.

The integration of UAVs with the Indian border security agencies must happen. The BSF, the Indian Coast Guard, and other dedicated border security agencies should have dedicated assets. More importantly, the UAVs should be developed and manufactured, the related sensors should also be developed and manufactured in India and this will help bring the cost down.

Session V: India's Response to Security Challenges

Evaluating India's Counter-Terrorism Policy

Mr. Saikat Datta, Editor (National Security), The Hindustan Times

The biggest problem with India's counter-terrorism strategy lies in the fact that it does not have a stated policy. India's approach to fighting terrorism has often been shaped by the approach adopted by other countries such as Australia, Canada, and the US. India mostly seeks to adopt ideas and concepts from abroad and mould it within the Indian socio-economic context. As a result, there is a lack of clarity in India's approach to the issue. India's response to terrorism has been episodic to a significant degree. This is problematic as counter-terrorism should be an evolving strategy. It is important to have a status strategy, which can be constantly refined instead of just waiting for an episode like 26/11 to occur before a strategy can be devised.

This has been a pattern since 1947. Following the 1962 War with China and the 1965 War with Pakistan, the Research and Analysis Wing was set up in 1968. The 1999 Kargil conflict led to NTRO, Strategic Policy Group, Intelligence Coordination Group, and the National Information Board, and so on. The 26/11 attacks led to the creation of the National Investigation Agency. Does this pattern suggest that India is following a well thought out comprehensive strategy towards battling terrorism? Or does it indicate a huge amount of confusion and India's approach depends on which political personality is calling the shots?

While it cannot be discounted that intelligence is an effective preventive mechanism, the framework of counter-terrorism in India needs to change to bring in greater value to evidence-based framework. Many times India's dossiers sent to the international community are not taken seriously because they lack evidentiary value, even though they may be of great intelligence value. In a democratic society like India, there is no greater deterrence to terrorism than having full evidence

based investigations and intelligence prediction. Thus, a good counter-terrorism matrix needs to be based on both intelligence- and investigation-based foundations.

Another problem has been the predominance of information gathering in some form or the other, which tends to overshadow the analysis of the information that has been gathered. Within India's counter-terrorism matrix, there is a serious lack of understanding as well as capacity to deal with data. India also does not have the necessary infrastructure in place at the moment to be able to properly analyse the data. Unless and until the analysis of the intelligence gathered is institutionalised, it will not be possible to obtain relevant intelligence material.

In addition to data analysis, there also needs to be greater coordination and sharing of intelligence among the various relevant agencies in India.

There is a popular perception that the US is India's greatest counter-terrorism ally and it has been seeking to strengthen this cooperation with the US. However, the cooperative role played by Nepal and Bangladesh should not be overlooked as they have done much for India in this field than any other country. Some of the credit for this should go to R&AW for the role it has played in establishing and maintaining a relationship with the intelligence communities in these countries.

A Legal Response to Security Challenges (Case study: Armed Forces Special Powers Act)

Dr. Manoj Joshi, Distinguished Fellow, ORF

Counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency operations go through three stages. The first stage involves having to deal with terrorist activities at its peak. It is during this stage that the state is forced to apply special measures like the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA). In the second stage, this military pressure brings about a certain degree of success as it enables the return of administration and the provision of basic services like education. It is during this stage that the Army tends to more or less move back into the barracks. It is in the third stage that the government is able to wrestle back its control over the area or affected region. There is obviously no clear dividing line in these stages as there can be some setbacks every now and then. These stages sometimes tend to merge into each other and require decision-making at strategic and operational levels.

During transition from one stage to another, particularly between the second and third stages, it is common to see debates coming up about the applicability of laws like AFSPA. The AFSPA came into being in September 1958 and through this act the Armed Forces were accorded special powers in what are designated as disturbed areas. The heritage of AFSPA is a terrible one. It was the Armed Forces Special Power Ordinance of 1942, which was meant to crush the Quit India Movement. The

basic point was that it indemnified if a policeman or a soldier who in the exercise of his duty may kill some civilian or he could also have power of arrest or search houses without a warrant. There can be no prosecution, suit, or any legal proceeding against anyone acting under that law.

Over the years, human right activists and the media have dubbed the AFSPA as a draconian power given to the military against the civilians. There is definitely some element of truth in the claims that AFSPA is a draconian measure. In the 1990s, at least, disappearances, torture and random shootings under the cover of AFSPA undeniably took place. From the perspective of activists, AFSPA should be revoked once the law and order situation has been brought under control. This is not unnatural in democratic societies because in a democratic society no one welcomes the large-scale presence of armed police and the army all around.

However, while there are genuine concerns about the misuse of AFSPA, some of the denunciations of the act have also been on account of the over-ground organisation and activities of the militants, who have exploited the sensitive nature of the act to shame and corner the government in power.

There have been efforts in the past to either amend or change such laws. For instance, in 2004 following an agitation in Manipur due to the death of P. Manorama in the custody of the Assam Rifles, the government set up a commission to review the act. Although the commission did submit its recommendations, no effective measure was undertaken. Subsequently, there was also the Santosh Hegde Commission which was created to probe six encounter deaths in Manipur, which claimed that innocent people had been shot.

All efforts to either repeal the act or make it more humane have been opposed by the Indian military. It is very clear that as a democracy India needs legal means to counter terrorism and draconian legislation to deal with terrorism and insurgency become important at times. At the same time, however, such draconian measures should not be enforced at the cost of justice. Thus, it is important to implement stringent provisions of review and stringent measures to protect the innocent from the misuse of such acts. For instance, an effective review mechanism to look into both the cases of misuse as well evaluate situations during which AFSPA can be invoked will be a prudent step ahead.

Need for a regional strategy to tackle the security challenges?

Dr. Sheel Kant Sharma, Former Secretary-General, SAARC

India's neighbourhood is relatively peaceful at the moment. With the exceptions of Afghanistan and Pakistan, none of the other countries are going through any significant turmoil that could have an

impact on India or the region as a whole. From India's perspective, it is critical that the region remains stable and India maintains its good relations with neighbouring countries. For India to be seen as a significant player in the region and for it to have a realistic chance of being a permanent member of the UN Security Council, it cannot afford to have hostile relations with its neighbouring countries.

The nature of security challenges that confront states today are extremely complex. Even countries like China and the US cannot afford to go it alone. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary for India to forge alliances in order to meet the security challenges in the 21st century.

In order to forge such alliances, India has to enhance both its hard power and its soft power assets. India is already in a favourable position to forge such alliances given its size, geographical location, economic potential and demographic dividends. Moreover, the policies that India has followed over the years has created a perception within the international community—with the obvious exception of Pakistan—that India does not pose a threat to any country of the world. It has managed to develop strong linkages and effective working relations with countries in its extended neighbourhood. This includes member nations of ASEAN, Japan, South Korea, and countries in the Persian Gulf.

At the same time, India has not properly managed to harness the potential of its soft power. Considerably more effort is required with respect to enhancing India's soft power potential. However, much still needs to be done to enhance India's hard power in military, space and cyber assets.

The rise of China and its regional initiatives is definitely a concern for India. It has created a number of ports around India, is seeking to strengthen ties with ASEAN and other SAARC countries, and is also reaching out to countries like Australia and South Korea. In particular, its relations with and indulgence of Pakistan is incomprehensible. Moreover, India needs to develop a multi-tiered strategic matrix for its neighbourhood in the manner that China has. Similarly, India needs to begin asserting itself in the region in order to have a leading role in the decision-making and delivery process concerning the region's security.

