India has almost blinked to the King of Nepal on the question of arms supply. These supplies were put on hold on February 1, 2005, following King Gyanendra's coup against the democratic system and leadership. Following the first direct contact between King Gyanendra and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in Jakarta during the Afro-Asian commemorative conference, India agreed to release arms supplies if the King moved on the road to the restoration of political and democratic processes in Nepal.
The King's regime, however, embarrassed India by taking contrary steps after the Jakarta "understanding". Former Prime Minister Deuba and other political leaders and activists were arrested in Kathmandu in a rather shabby and humiliating manner. This sting of the offence has, however, been blunted somewhat by the King through the withdrawal of the emergency - which in any case was about to lapse in two days' time - after the King's return to Kathmandu on April 30.
But while withdrawing the emergency, the curbs and controls on political activities and freedom of expression have been left intact. India has welcomed this as a first step towards democracy, and may perhaps use it as a pretext of "compliance" by the King to start arms supplies to the Royal Nepal Army (RNA).
The King has, no doubt, been keen to get the arms supplies from India restored. But the Manmohan Singh government had built up its own case to respond positively to the King's request. Two arguments are being advanced by the interested sections in this respect. One, without these supplies, the Maoists will gain the upper hand in Nepal's internal conflict. Two, the stoppage of arms supply will not only alienate nearly one lakh-strong Gurkha soldiers (61 battalions) in the Indian Army and the pro-India sections within the RNA, but will also allow Pakistan and China to step into the vacuum to India's long-term disadvantage. These arguments may look persuasive on the face of it, but they do not hold much water on closer scrutiny.
By no objective assessment can the Maoists be seen to be in a position to militarily overwhelm the Nepali State. They are in command in the rural areas, but have not demonstrated any will or capacity for military offensive. The one that they tried in Khara in Rolpa district in March was badly beaten by the RNA, resulting in the Maoists collecting nearly 200 dead. They have, however, been successful in road blocks and closing of schools. To counter such challenges, the RNA and the King's regime need credibility and will power, not arms.
There have not been many instances where the RNA has shown any credible initiative to engage the Maoists militarily. The prospects exist that some of the arms supplied to the RNA may fall into the hands of the Maoists if they manage to take the RNA by surprise as it happened many times in the past.
There is yet another aspect to the King's confrontation with the Maoists. The King's regime has been trying to widen the theoretical and personality-based divisions within the Maoists. That is why serious differences that have cropped up between the Maoist chief, Prachanda, and his ideological colleague, Baburam Bhattarai, were exposed by the army in public. There have been reports that the Royal regime, since the breakdown of talks with the Maoists in August 2003, has been using all possible resources, including huge transfers of money, to get the factionalism widened among the Maoists and to get Baburam Bhattarai, an uncompromising ideologue and leader, marginalised.
The regime has assiduously been trying to exploit these differences and explore the possibilities to strike a deal with a section of the Maoists' dominant group. It is in the hope of cutting such a deal that the RNA has desisted from undertaking any major operations against the Maoists, particularly since the King's coup. Therefore, any sense of urgency shown by the RNA for the supply of arms with reference to the Maoist gains must be taken with caution.
The argument of Pakistan or China taking advantage of the freeze on Indian arms supplies to the RNA must also be taken with a pinch of salt. Pakistan and China need to be approached diplomatically by India in this respect. China surely will think hard before doing something that can vitiate its improving bilateral relations with India. In any case, these two countries cannot be of any substantial help to the RNA in the immediate context.
China is also not insensitive to the fact that by going out of the way in helping a King who is isolated from its people as well as the international community, Beijing will only become unpopular with the Nepalese people. It is the monarchy that has time and again played the China and Pakistan cards more to force India to compromise rather than to increase Nepal's dependence upon these two neighbours.
India has several other means to thwart this ploy of the King rather than to succumb to it. Foreign Minister Natwar Singh should know this well on the basis of his experience under Rajiv Gandhi's Prime Ministership during 1988-89 when he carried a stern message to the Nepal King to desist from seeking Chinese anti-aircraft guns and other weapons. Following this message, trade and economic restrictions were imposed by India on Nepal, resulting in the roll-back of the Panchayat system.
Similarly, the argument of the Indian Gurkha soldiers getting alienated by the non-supply of arms to an authoritarian King is untenable. The Gurkhas in the Indian Army are the Indian recruits and they have to function under Indian policy parameters. They cannot be allowed to become a pressure group on India's Nepal policy.
India's reconsideration on the arms supply issue even without any firm indication on the King's part for the restoration of democracy is driven by other factors. That includes American preference that in Nepal fighting terrorism should be given priority over the restoration of democracy.
There is also the influence of Indian princely houses with strong matrimonial relations with the Nepal royalty. And the King has been carefully cultivating other political constituencies, and decision-and-opinion-makers in India. The confusion and inconsistency in India's Nepal policy are the result of these weaknesses. If India allows them to dictate its wider national interests in relation to immediate neighbours, its aspirations to play a major role in shaping Asian and global events will lose strength and credibility.
The writer is Professor, South Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and Honorary Director, Research, Observer Research Foundation.
Courtesy: Tribune, Chandigarh, May 3, 2005.
* Views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Observer Research Foundation.
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