Expert Speak Raisina Debates
Published on Nov 19, 2025

The Nag-II ATGM adds useful lethality to the Zorawar Light Battle Tank, but it remains only an incremental upgrade

Zorawar and Nag II: Combined Arms Remain Indispensable

The anti-tank weapon, the Nag, has been adapted for integration with the Zorawar Light Battle Tank (LBT). The Zorawar underwent an augmentation in its firepower with the Nag-II Anti-tank Guided Missile (ATGM) integration. While this represents progress, it is a limited augmentation of the tank’s capabilities. The Nag II integration is laudable; it cannot substitute or obviate combined arms warfare. Blending weapons systems into a single arm is not new. For instance, the fusion of self-propelled artillery gun and armour dates back to World War II, proposed by the Austrian General Ludwig Ritter von Eimannsberger and British General J.F.C. Fuller during the inter-war years (between World War I and World War II). Indeed, the Germans, in their North African campaign, did deploy capabilities along the lines prescribed by Eimmansberger. However, it was the campaign against Poland and France where the use of the combined arms proved effective and why it has no real substitute despite weapons being blended into a single platform.

The fusion of self-propelled artillery gun and armour dates back to World War II, proposed by the Austrian General Ludwig Ritter von Eimannsberger and British General J.F.C. Fuller during the inter-war years

The integration of the Nag-II missile represents a meaningful upgrade to Zorawar’s firepower, and a closer examination of its features illustrates why Zorawar fires the Nag II missile from the side mountain container, similar to an Infantry Fighting Vehicle, providing both elements of survivability and flexibility. It’s a third-generation anti-tank missile. The advancements in design, such as a unified single booster for both booster and sustained motors, make it compatible for integration with various systems. Instead of a thrust vector control, Nag II has a Jet Vane Control (JVC). It has a ‘fire and forget’ guidance feature wherein the ATGM system can autonomously track and destroy targets. This feature is integrated with a top-down attack capability to target the weaker roof armour of a heavily armoured target such as a tank, thereby bypassing the majority of its passive protection. Nag II brings two critical advantages: precision strike capability from a stand-off range and lethality. It has a maximum range of 4 km with the most accurate precision and can be aimed to target a range of armoured targets. Two missiles are housed within the launcher container. Overall, the Nag II system in combination with other features of the Zorawar tank that balance firepower, mobility and armour elements packs a punch. Finally, a combination of an indigenous Nag II ATGM integrated with the Zorawar tank would facilitate an enhanced and secure Command, Control, Communications and Computer Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) networked targeting capability. The Nag’s integration also dovetails with the IA’s post-Galwan strategy of offensive defence with a more offensive shift to deter Chinese aggression along India’s Himalayan frontiers, especially in Ladakh.

The Nag II system in combination with other features of the Zorawar tank that balance firepower, mobility and armour elements packs a punch.

The NAG-II Integration Insufficient: Combined Arms Indispensable

Regardless of the Defence Research and Development Organisation’ (DRDO) accomplishment, the Nag II’ integration, which makes the Zorawar more lethal, is not adequate. What will improve its effectiveness for battlefield operations would be infantry-armour teaming. Regardless of the terrain, the role of infantry in armoured operations is indispensable. Indeed, without teaming with infantry, the Nag-II’s integration and the firepower it provides will be ineffective. Both mounted and dismounted infantry will be vital in mountain terrain, as well as other environments, for the optimal performance of the Zorawar. Beyond the use of infantry, armour will need artillery support. This is especially true of mobile artillery. Embedding mobile artillery with tanks was among the chief innovations of combined arms warfare that was developed during the inter-war years by the Germans. Credit for that goes especially to the German general Heinz Guderian. Even traditional field artillery was critical to providing indirect fire in Guderian’s conception of combined warfare. However, it was motorised artillery that was the key innovation. These innovative warfighting practices developed by the Germans remain relevant to this day. Mobile and field artillery are critical to breaking up contact between enemy tanks and “force concentrations.” This firepower can be suppressive and also disorient the enemy. The Nag-II’s integration with Zorawar is no panacea or game-changer. Simply put, as was the case with the integration of a self-propelled artillery gun onto a tank geared for direct fire onto a single platform (tank), the mere merger of the Nag-II missile on the Zorawar is no solution to the demands of combined arms warfare, irrespective of how potent other features of the Zorawar are likely to be. Complexities of the enemy’s capabilities, adversary’s use of combined arms tactics, terrain, battlefield and operational demands will require that shoulder-fired man-portable anti-tank missiles, such as the Javelin, which some Indian Army (IA) infantry units will be equipped are likely to be indispensable. Well-trained dismounted infantry units geared for operations in mountainous terrain, where the Zorawar Light Battle Tank (LBT) will be deployed alongside other ATGMs are likely to be most effective. Self-propelled mobile artillery such as the K9 Vajra, now deployed in Ladakh, will also play an equally consequential role as the ATGM-equipped infantry, despite the Nag II’s integration with the Zorawar. Thus, the Nag II’s integration cannot dispense with synchronising infantry, mobile artillery and now the ubiquitous employment of drones for Electronic Warfare (EW), Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), as well as for kinetic attack missions against adversary ground forces. Close cooperation and coordination between infantry, armour, artillery and drones is crucial for effective combined arms warfare. Indeed, close air support from manned airpower can also prove vital for the effective application of combined arms warfare.

Embedding mobile artillery with tanks was among the chief innovations of combined arms warfare that was developed during the inter-war years by the Germans.

If anything, the Nag ATGM only reflects an incremental enhancement to the Zorawar’s capabilities, which makes it more lethal, but it will not help dispense with combined arms.


Kartik Bommakanti is a Senior Fellow at the Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation and Rahul Rawat is a Research Assistant with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.

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Authors

Kartik Bommakanti

Kartik Bommakanti

Kartik is a Senior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme. He is currently working on issues related to land warfare and armies, especially the India ...

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Rahul Rawat

Rahul Rawat

Rahul Rawat is a Research Assistant with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme (SSP). He also coordinates the SSP activities. His work focuses on strategic issues in the ...

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