Winning Without Fighting? How Russia Is Shaping China’s Taiwan Playbook

Though the timeline may differ, the end goal is clear—forceful unification of Taiwan with the People's Republic of China. The course of action, however, may vary in degree, ranging from gradual coercive signalling to the real-time use of force. To this end, building robust capabilities and operational art for compellence remains key for the PLA. An 800-page set of leaked documents by the Black Moon hacktivist group, verified by RUSI, a London-based think tank, highlights how the Chinese PLA, with support from the Russian military, aims to enhance its operational capabilities. These capabilities would be scaled up by the PLA to explore and devise robust methods to strengthen its coercive posture against Taiwan.

The Russia-China military partnership seeks to develop the capabilities and operational art required to design and execute large-scale campaigns through military exercises and the sharing of real combat experience, enabling the PLA to learn and conduct such campaigns effectively. Thus, the partnership aims to move beyond signalling to secure a rapid and less costly victory, with or without actually fighting a costly war over Taiwan. The anticipation of these developments carries implications for Taiwan and beyond.

Deepening Military Alignment and Capabilities

The Russia-China strategic partnership is a case of alignment between two great powers. Owing to this structural condition, the relationship manifests differently from an overtly asymmetrical alignment between a strong and a weak partner (such as the China-Pakistan equation). Both militaries possess sufficient capabilities to manage threats; however, for a non-compromising, costlier, and successful invasion of Taiwan, the Russia factor remains critical for China. Despite the constraints of their strategic partnership, the militaries of both countries also maintain a non-aggression pact, eliminating the conditions for direct conflict between them. 

China has maintained either neutral or carefully balanced positions on Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the Ukraine war. Russia, by contrast, has adopted a more supportive posture toward China’s core security concerns, including Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Taiwan.

The tacit understanding between China and Russia regarding their respective territorial disputes and the use of force is a central element of this alignment. China has maintained either neutral or carefully balanced positions on Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the Ukraine war. Russia, by contrast, has adopted a more supportive posture toward China’s core security concerns, including Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Taiwan. This understanding has led the PLA and the Russian military to engage in a series of military exercises, military-technical exchanges, and procurement arrangements to supplement critical operational capabilities and enhance preparedness toward their respective end goals.

To support PLA modernisation plans, Russia has, over the past decade, supplied high-technology military systems ranging from Su-35 fighter aircraft and S-300 and S-400 air defence systems to turbofan engines — critical for keeping J-10 fighters and H-6K medium-range bombers (for cruise missile strikes extending to the second island chain) operational — as well as Mi-171 helicopters, a potent platform for air assault campaigns. These trends point to Russia’s peacetime support in helping China fill operational gaps aimed at contesting US presence in the western Pacific.

Amid these developments, China’s growing reliance on Russian oil imports and energy supplies also serves as an alternative source, reducing vulnerabilities in maritime supply chains in a worst-case scenario.

Military Exercises: Trends and Implications

Russia-China military cooperation, particularly over the last decade, has helped plug gaps in Chinese military capabilities. Given China’s expansive defence-industrial base, these capabilities can be scaled up domestically to further enhance the PLA’s capacity, especially in the context of a potential seizure of Taiwan. Beyond capability development, Russia-China military exercises also reflect a deepening strategic alignment. Military exercises serve as tools for geopolitical signalling, interoperability, and learning to design and execute complex, large-scale military campaigns. 

According to a CSIS database tracking Russia-China military exercises between 2003 and 2025, the frequency of such exercises has increased over the past decade. A notable example is the 2017 anti-ballistic missile defence exercise, named Aerospace Security,   which aimed to enhance cooperation and consultation on advanced air and missile defence technologies. This exercise underscores the depth of mutual understanding and, at the same time, signals preparation against a plausible targeting scenario by the United States.

Russia has shared technology and expertise in the development of interceptors and sensor architecture to help China secure a robust missile defence system vis-à-vis US capabilities. This, in turn, could enable Chinese leadership and the PLA to escalate with greater confidence, including by transitioning toward a more credible launch-on-warning (LOW) posture and securing second-strike capabilities in the event of real-time US military intervention. The result would be a significant increase in potential costs for the United States and its allies.

The military exercises add an element of signalling and resolve aimed at deterring the US and its allies from supporting a more costly, attrition-based defence of Taiwan. These activities are intended to learn, rehearse, and develop robust operational art to devise the best means and methods for an invasion of Taiwan.

The characteristics of these military exercises include training drills and scenario-based contingency operations. They often involve large forces on both sides to simulate the conditions of large-scale military campaigns. Exercises featuring multi-domain strike capabilities further demonstrate both the capacity and the intent to project power in the event that a serious competitor, such as the United States, becomes involved in a Taiwan scenario. Past exercises show a trend toward areas where China faces maritime tensions — including the East China Sea, the Yellow Sea, and the South China Sea — which are in the immediate vicinity of Taiwan. China and Russia have engaged in both bilateral and multilateral exercises to strengthen jointness and coordination, advancing learning objectives by simulating possible allied responses in a Taiwan contingency scenario.

The existing set of military exercises provides the PLA with access to wartime lessons drawn from Russian campaigns in the North Caucasus, Georgia, Syria, and Ukraine, particularly in the deployment and manoeuvre of large-scale combat forces in expeditionary operations. These exercises also enhance interoperability with the Russian military in terms of operational processes, as well as familiarity with (mainly Soviet-origin) equipment that has demonstrated battlefield effectiveness.

Finally, the military exercises add an element of signalling and resolve aimed at deterring the US and its allies from supporting a more costly, attrition-based defence of Taiwan. These activities are intended to learn, rehearse, and develop robust operational art to devise the best means and methods for an invasion of Taiwan. As a consequence, they raise the costs for defenders to the point of undermining the deterrence logic established by the US and its allies.

A set of leaked and verified documents reveals a 2023 Russia-China deal specifically tailored to a Taiwan contingency, which includes transfers of military capabilities and specialised training (listed in Table 1 below). In a Taiwan scenario, an air assault — among other options — may offer a more cost-effective means of invasion than a large-scale amphibious assault. However, the Chinese airborne corps would remain vulnerable in such an operational environment. The leaked documents note that the proposed training and arms transfers would provide China’s air force with “expanded air manoeuvre capability,” offering “offensive options against Taiwan”.

Table 1: Russia Providing China with Capabilities and Training for a Plausible Taiwan Contingency

Source: Oleksandr V Danylyuk and Dr Jack Watling, RUSI

Most significantly, Russia’s wartime adaptations and lessons in campaign execution from the battlefield in Ukraine have become indispensable for refining the PLA’s operational art. These measures are intended to consolidate China’s strategic posture and military resolve, address plausible challenges in conducting a multi-domain campaign against Taiwan, and offset the associated costs in terms of will, manpower, and capabilities. In other words, such an arrangement contributes to greater risk acceptance among Chinese policymakers. Overall, Russia’s willingness to support and endorse Chinese positions and policy actions in Asia remains a serious indicator to monitor when assessing near- to mid-term scenarios.

Implications of the Military Alignment

The Russia-China strategic partnership in the operational-cum-strategic domain is likely aimed at leveraging the current environment, marked by wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, to consolidate China’s objective of unifying Taiwan. China’s efforts to plug gaps in its military capabilities, alongside the increasing frequency of joint military exercises in the western Pacific, reveal Beijing’s ability to extract tangible benefits from Russia in pursuit of its core interests regarding Taiwan. Although Russia does not seek direct involvement in the Taiwan contingency, the plugging of capability gaps in the Chinese military through Russian transfers helps strengthen Beijing’s deterrence posture.

Amid the war in Ukraine and the US-Israel war on Iran, Russia and China could seek to strain the strategic focus of the United States and its allies through “separate but simultaneous” engagements. For Washington, this could translate into a “two-front war” scenario. Russia’s assistance in capability development and in enhancing operational art could ultimately prove critical in helping the PLA compensate for its limited combat experience. The PLA’s attainment of a superior, near full-spectrum combination of capabilities under a nuclear shadow could affect the willingness and ability of external actors to provide aid or intervene in support of Taiwan’s sovereignty.  The prospect of managing two near-peer escalation challenges simultaneously cannot be discounted for the United States. 

Taken together, these trends could create conditions approximating “winning without fighting.” In terms of US credibility, a Beijing-controlled Taiwan would be well-positioned to impose a blockade of its own on Japan or South Korea. Indeed, for the US, its broader Indo-Pacific power projection is closely tied to Taiwan.

Although Russia does not seek direct involvement in the Taiwan contingency, the plugging of capability gaps in the Chinese military through Russian transfers helps strengthen Beijing’s deterrence posture.

For New Delhi, the appropriate course of action warrants serious assessment. India and China are locked in a structural rivalry that extends beyond their territorial land border disputes, even as Russia shares defence and strategic ties with New Delhi. The seizure of Taiwan would carry significant implications for India’s maritime strategy and its growing ambitions in the Indian Ocean Region and the wider Indo-Pacific. Indeed, China could subsequently turn toward the forceful resolution of its territorial claims against India. Balancing Chinese ambitions, therefore, becomes a strategic necessity for Indo-Pacific partners. Therefore, India’s strategy would need to factor in the materialisation of Russia-China military alignment over Taiwan, as well as the commitments of the United States and other regional partners.

Rahul Rawat is a Research Assistant with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.

Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash is a Junior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.

• International Affairs
• China
• china taiwan conflict
• russia china bilateral ties
• russia china military cooperation
• russia china military exercises
• russia china military partnership
• russia china relations
• russia china strategic partnership
• russia oil imports to china
• russia role in china taiwan conflict

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