At a time of acute diplomatic friction with Washington, “Will for Peace 2026” forces a reassessment of whether South Africa’s strategic signalling serves its long-term national interests
At a moment when South Africa’s relations with the United States stand at an all-time low, Pretoria appears to have added further friction to an already delicate relationship. Following joint maritime exercises in South African waters involving fellow BRICS members such as China, Russia, and Iran, Washington’s accusation that South Africa is “cosying up” to Iran has further strained their relations. The episode, centred on the naval drills dubbed “Will for Peace 2026”, raises a larger question: does this controversy signal emerging fault lines within BRICS, or does it underscore the complexities of South Africa’s diplomatic positioning?
This downturn in South Africa–US relations did not begin with Iran. Ties started deteriorating when Pretoria brought Israel, a close US ally, before the International Court of Justice over alleged violations of the Genocide Convention in Gaza. While the move was welcomed in parts of the Global South, it was deeply resented in Washington.
The situation worsened when South Africa was accused of indirectly supporting Russia’s war in Ukraine. While Pretoria never provided material assistance to Moscow, its pattern of neutrality in UN votes and the docking of a US-sanctioned Russian vessel near Cape Town were interpreted by the Trump administration as tacit support for Russian President Vladimir Putin. The decision to relocate Taiwan’s liaison office from Pretoria to Johannesburg further reinforced perceptions in Washington that South Africa was drifting decisively away from Western strategic preferences.
US officials described South Africa’s decision to host Iranian naval forces as morally indefensible, arguing that Pretoria could not credibly lecture the world on justice while engaging militarily with a regime violently repressing its own citizens.
These tensions reached a nadir in May 2025, when US President Donald Trump hosted South African President Cyril Ramaphosa in the Oval Office and openly accused Pretoria of allowing what he described as a “white genocide”, alleging that the government was failing to protect white farmers. Against this already fraught backdrop, the announcement of fresh naval exercises involving Iran was bound to provoke a reaction.
Will for Peace 2026, conducted between 9 and 16 January near Simon’s Town, featured participation from China, Russia, and Iran, among other BRICS members. China and Iran deployed destroyers, Russia and the United Arab Emirates sent corvettes, while South Africa contributed a frigate. Indonesia, Ethiopia, Brazil, and Egypt attended as observers. For Washington, the most alarming element was Iran’s inclusion, particularly given the timing.
The exercises coincided with one of the most severe waves of domestic unrest Iran has experienced since the 1979 revolution. Protests that began in late December 2025 over inflation and currency collapse escalated into a nationwide uprising. Iranian security forces responded with lethal force. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei acknowledged that several thousand people had been killed, while activists claimed the death toll was even higher. Another tens of thousands were reportedly arrested.
In this context, US officials described South Africa’s decision to host Iranian naval forces as morally indefensible, arguing that Pretoria could not credibly lecture the world on justice while engaging militarily with a regime violently repressing its own citizens.
South Africa attempted damage control after the backlash. While initial government statements defended the exercise as routine and non-aligned, Ramaphosa reportedly ordered Iran’s exclusion on 9 January. Pretoria later shifted blame onto China, claiming Beijing had taken the lead in inviting Iran and that South Africa had merely provided the maritime space. On 16 January, Defence Minister Angie Motshekga announced an inquiry to determine whether the president’s instructions had been ignored or miscommunicated, an admission that civilian oversight over defence diplomacy may be fraying.
India, the current chair of BRICS, stayed away entirely and publicly distanced itself from the event, clarifying that it was neither institutional nor representative of the bloc. New Delhi emphasised that not all BRICS members participated and that India had never joined similar ad-hoc exercises in the past.
Crucially, despite Pretoria’s rebranding effort, calling the drills “Will for Peace” did little to alter perceptions. Neither can the exercise credibly be described as a BRICS initiative. India, the current chair of BRICS, stayed away entirely and publicly distanced itself from the event, clarifying that it was neither institutional nor representative of the bloc. New Delhi emphasised that not all BRICS members participated and that India had never joined similar ad-hoc exercises in the past.
India’s absence is telling. New Delhi was careful to underline the difference between this exercise and IBSAMAR, which is the institutionally established trilateral India–Brazil–South Africa maritime drill. Ironically, the last IBSAMAR in October 2024 also took place in Simon’s Town, a strategic naval hub housing one of South Africa’s most important bases. This contrast underscores that Will for Peace was likely not an extension of the BRICS mandate but a South African choice.
Domestically, the political fallout has been equally damaging for Ramaphosa. Opposition parties, particularly the Democratic Alliance, accused the government of sidelining Parliament and failing to disclose key details about the exercise, including its costs, legal basis, and command structure. Coalition partners warned that South Africa risked abandoning its long-standing non-aligned posture in favour of closer alignment with authoritarian states. The controversy also revived criticism of Defence Chief Rudzani Maphwanya, who had previously drawn backlash for visiting Tehran and praising shared strategic goals shortly after heightened Iran–Israel tensions.
Ultimately, Will for Peace 2026 does not represent a formal split within BRICS. Instead, it likely highlights the absence of a shared strategic vision within the grouping and, more pointedly, exposes South Africa’s growing difficulty in navigating great-power politics.
The international consequences may be more severe. The United States has already imposed tariffs of up to 40 percent on certain South African exports. Despite South Africa’s role in the G20 troika, Washington has signalled reluctance to support Pretoria’s participation in the 2026 G20 summit in Miami. The Iran episode only deepens this estrangement and reinforces the perception in Washington that South Africa is an unreliable partner.
Ultimately, Will for Peace 2026 does not represent a formal split within BRICS. Instead, it likely highlights the absence of a shared strategic vision within the grouping and, more pointedly, exposes South Africa’s growing difficulty in navigating great-power politics. As BRICS expands and geopolitical polarisation sharpens, Pretoria’s choices raise urgent questions about the meaning of non-alignment, the cohesion of emerging blocs, and the real costs of diplomatic signalling.
If this pattern continues, South Africa risks finding itself diplomatically isolated, misunderstood by allies — old and new alike, and paying a tangible economic price for symbolic gestures that offer little strategic return.
Samir Bhattacharya is an Associate Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Dr. Samir Bhattacharya is an Associate Fellow at Observer Research Foundation (ORF), where he works on geopolitics with particular reference to Africa in the changing ...
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