While the Quad Foreign Ministers chart the group’s agenda for the year, securing a leader-level summit must remain a key priority
After nearly a year, the Quad will convene a high-level ministerial meeting in New Delhi on 26 May 2026. Arguably, the Quad is currently going through its most turbulent period of diplomatic synergy since the group’s resuscitation in 2017, following a high-level meeting between India, Australia, Japan, and the United States (US) on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit in Manila. This meeting marked the beginning of the Quad’s return after the group had withered due to differences in geopolitical compulsions and strategic approaches of the four countries vis-à-vis the China question in the earlier part of the previous decade. Since 2017, the Quad has convened at the foreign minister level as its primary forum for dialogue, paving the way for the first leader-level summit, held virtually in March 2021.
The continued momentum stagnated in 2025, when the group failed to convene a leader-level summit, scheduled to be held in New Delhi, the first hosted by India since 2021.
Signifying the growing momentum in the group to strengthen cooperation, the Quad leader-level summit was held twice between 2021 and 2023. The continued momentum stagnated in 2025, when the group failed to convene a leader-level summit, scheduled to be held in New Delhi, the first hosted by India since 2021. The arrival of US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in India for a visit across several cities from May 23–26, culminating in the Quad Foreign Ministers’ meeting in New Delhi, ushers in a new opportunity to set in motion a critical reset and inject fresh momentum into the group.
Since President Trump’s return to the White House, speculation has remained rife about Washington’s commitment towards the Quad, given that it has expanded its agenda beyond maritime security and initiatives to safeguard freedom of navigation. The onset of AUKUS (Australia-UK-US) and the Squad (Philippines, Japan, Australia, and the US), seen as security-oriented minilateral initiatives during President Joe Biden’s tenure, was expected to align with President Donald Trump’s security and foreign policy agenda. However, the Quad Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Washington in January 2025, the first major engagement of the newly appointed Secretary of State, Rubio, reassured observers that President Trump saw merit in the group.
However, a glance at the US’ engagements across the Indo-Pacific would suggest that, despite tensions and uncertainties, there has been minimal operational disruption within the Quad and other military engagements undertaken by Washington. The Quad has remained operational throughout the year, including the Malabar Exercise held near Guam. More recently, the US-Philippines Balikatan Exercise, aimed at enhancing interoperability and combat readiness, has demonstrated the resilience of Washington’s operational focus on the Indo-Pacific.
Even though the Quad Foreign Ministers convened in July 2025, arguably at the height of the turbulence that marked the group’s trajectory, the grouping was unable to secure a leader-level summit that year.
Subsequent events in 2025, including the US’ imposition of tariffs on all countries, which, according to President Trump, were unfairly exploiting America, including its Quad partners; the placement of AUKUS under review; President Trump’s claims to have played a role in brokering a ceasefire between India and Pakistan following Operation Sindoor in the aftermath of the Pahalgam attacks in April 2025; and continued adversarial commentary from the Washington administration regarding India’s purchase of Russian energy—resulted in a diplomatic nadir among the members of the group. Even though the Quad Foreign Ministers convened in July 2025, arguably at the height of the turbulence that marked the group’s trajectory, the grouping was unable to secure a leader-level summit that year.
A churn is currently underway in the Indo-Pacific. Washington’s changing foreign policy and security priorities, driven by its shifting posture in the region and its preoccupation with wars in the Middle East, in which the US remains embroiled, have resulted in growing uncertainty about the broader security architecture in the Indo-Pacific. Importantly, for many of Washington’s partners in the Indo-Pacific, this shift has prompted a slow but of how the evolving security architecture in the region might develop. Given that most of these countries remain embedded in the security architecture designed and fostered by the US, Washington’s seeming retreat may create a void, especially at a time when China is increasingly expanding its political and military influence across the region.
While the US retreat has been sought to be mitigated by ushering in new coalitions and partnerships, the security bandwidth and capabilities that Washington represents remain hard to match. Therefore, countries in the Indo-Pacific must strike a careful balance between remaining embedded within US frameworks and diversifying through new coalitions on selective issue areas. Relying solely on Washington to provide a cohesive security architecture in the Indo-Pacific may no longer be a pragmatic approach for countries interested in sustaining a rules-based order in the region. However, writing the Quad off on account of the unpredictability characterising the US approach to the Indo-Pacific does not augur well for countries such as India, which continue to see value in the group as a critical template for cooperation in the region.
Even though much of the resuscitation of the Quad in 2017 is credited to President Trump, the fact remains that he has never attended a Quad Leaders’ summit.
The success of the Quad is measured by its ability to adapt promptly to the challenges emanating from the Indo-Pacific and the synergy of cooperation on issues of convergence between its member countries. Despite significant pushback against the Quad over its apparent lack of security focus, the group has demonstrated steady progress in the Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness Partnership, the Quad Partnership on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief, and the Quad Indo-Pacific Logistics Network. These initiatives have sought to deepen the Quad’s synergy in the domain of maritime security in ways that are meaningful for the wider Indo-Pacific.
The upcoming Quad Foreign Minister-level meet in New Delhi is expected to take stock of the group’s progress and lay the groundwork for its agenda for the coming months. Coordinating a successful leader-level summit ought to remain a key priority for the group. Secretary Rubio’s role in ensuring that Washington finally puts its diplomatic weight behind the group will be crucial. Importantly, even though much of the resuscitation of the Quad in 2017 is credited to President Trump, the fact remains that he has never attended a Quad Leaders’ summit. Similarly, Japan’s Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has not attended a Quad summit since her election following the snap elections earlier this year. Therefore, the focus of the meeting in New Delhi must remain anchored in efforts to overcome the diplomatic nadir in which the Quad currently finds itself.
Sayantan Haldar is an Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at Observer Research Foundation.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
Sayantan Haldar is an Associate Fellow with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme. At ORF, Sayantan’s work is focused on Maritime Studies. He is interested in questions on ...
Read More +
PREV
