While recent tensions among the US and its Quad partners point to a nadir in diplomatic ties between the Quad countries, the group appears to be transitioning through an interregnum, making it premature to suggest an imminent withering.
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The Quad’s resilience as an effective minilateral grouping in the Indo-Pacific has stood the test of time. The initiative began as a collaboration to coordinate humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) efforts following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. In 2007, former Japanese Prime Minister (PM) Shinzo Abe envisioned this collective effort as an effective way to enhance cooperation and establish a rules-based order in the broader Indo-Pacific theatre. While the group saw limited success with member states being seemingly reluctant to further engage under a framework that appeared to be perceived as a strategy of containment by China, it regained momentum in 2017, with Foreign Minister-level dialogue. Since 2021, the Quad has deepened its cooperation via annual leader-level summits and a range of initiatives, facilitating actionable strategies to strengthen multifaceted cooperation in the increasingly complex Indo-Pacific region.
Since the onset of the second Trump administration in the United States (US), the world has embraced a new reset in the nature and character of American involvement in various strategic theatres. President Trump’s foreign policy has therefore driven all major powers to recalibrate their strategies to maximise cooperation in their continued pursuit to fulfil their strategic interests. In this context, the Quad’s case appears to be rather complex. While there has been no formidable development to suggest an imminent withering of the group, the tacit tensions between the US and the other member states—India, Japan, and Australia— have prompted anxieties about the group’s future. In this sense, the Quad appears to be undergoing a period of interregnum, where all member countries are reorienting strategies to ensure that the broader challenges of the region are addressed effectively and its common interests are pursued efficiently.
The Quad appears to be undergoing an interregnum, with all member countries recalibrating strategies to ensure that the region’s broader challenges are addressed effectively and common interests are pursued efficiently.
Despite a positive resumption of bon homie between PM Narendra Modi and President Donald Trump, the US administration’s continued emphasis on its role in allegedly ushering in a ceasefire between India and Pakistan in the aftermath of ‘Operation Sindoor —the repeated hyphenation of India and Pakistan on Kashmir, at a global scale, and the imposition of tariffs for India’s oil purchases from Russia—have resulted a nadir in India-US diplomatic relations in a long time. The underlying tensions between the US and India, as well as the other Quad partners, have raised questions over the likelihood of a Quad leaders’ summit expected to be hosted by India later in 2025. Amidst the increasing tensions, the evolving security dynamics in the Indo-Pacific must serve as a reminder of the vital utility of the Quad as a group, which has, over the years, expanded its remit of cooperation to multifaceted security issues in the Indo-Pacific.
While the initial resuscitation of the Quad in 2017 was anchored in the idea of shaping and preserving a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific, the group has systematically expanded its cooperation into various other facets, which remain inextricably interlinked with the overall security architecture in the region. The normative essence of this dynamic and multifaceted view of maritime security in the Indo-Pacific was pegged on the idea that the Quad sought to emerge as a player delivering global good in the region. This view of supporting maritime security as an international good in the Indo-Pacific also made the group more effective and acceptable to other smaller players by avoiding an overt contestation with China.
Various initiatives announced and undertaken by the Quad over the years—including the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness, Quad-At-Sea Ship Observer Mission, Indo-Pacific Logistics Network, among others—the group has sought to advance actionable strategies via which it has strengthened the maritime security architecture in the Indo-Pacific. Given the nature and character of China’s diplomatic and strategic presence across countries in the Indo-Pacific, the Quad rightfully sought to provide an alternative model of maritime security and development partnership without prompting competition with China. This ensured that the states in the Indo-Pacific do not find themselves in the midst of competition and conflict in the region.
As the US recalibrates its ties with the other Quad partners, the need for cooperation and collective action in the Indo-Pacific underscores the group’s continued utility.
Notably, the Indo-Pacific theatre is emerging as a complex region with the need for continued efforts to enhance cooperation on a multifaceted maritime security agenda. This makes the role of the Quad in shaping a favourable maritime security environment in the Indo-Pacific indispensable. Importantly, all the Quad partners play a vital role in shaping and cementing cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. While India’s role in as a preferred security partner significantly enhances Quad’s presence in the Indian Ocean, the US also plays a vital role in the wider Indo-Pacific. With heightening tensions in various strategic theatres in the Indo-Pacific, such as the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, it remains imperative for Washington to continue fostering a greater degree of cooperation across the Indo-Pacific. The Quad, in this regard, is a vital framework for the US to remain embedded in the Indo-Pacific security architecture. While critics might argue that the Quad is not militarily involved in the South China Sea tensions or the Taiwan Strait, the group’s continued advocacy regarding the need to mitigate the worsening security environment in these geographies indicates its involvement in the overall maritime security environment in the Indo-Pacific.
As the US recalibrates its ties with the other Quad partners, the need for cooperation and collective action in the Indo-Pacific must serve as a reminder of the group’s utility. The multifaceted agenda developed by the Quad has been successful in initiating actionable strategies to mitigate the complex maritime security agenda in the Indo-Pacific. As challenges mount in the region, it will remain imperative for countries holding strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific to foster cooperation. The Quad has evolved as an effective mechanism to mitigate challenges and strengthen cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Although diplomatic relations between the US and its Quad partners may appear to be at a low point, it is still too early to suggest that the group is fading away. This phase of transitioning must be effectively utilised to serve as a reminder of why the Quad is essential for Indo-Pacific security.
Sayantan Haldar is an Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at Observer Research Foundation.
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Sayantan Haldar is an Associate Fellow with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme. At ORF, Sayantan’s work is focused on Maritime Studies. He is interested in questions of ...
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