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Singapore’s nod to India’s Malacca Strait Patrol bid signals a shift in regional trust—but sovereignty sensitivities still block New Delhi’s entry into the crucial waterway.
Image Source: Getty Images
Singapore Prime Minister (PM) Lawrence Wong’s three-day visit to India from 2-4 September 2025 was marked by deepening trust in the relationship between the two countries. During the visit, the two sides unveiled the Roadmap for Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and signed five Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs). The most noteworthy development was Singapore’s formal acknowledgement of India’s interest in joining the Malacca Strait Patrol (MSP).
India has offered to provide security to the Strait since 2004. However, it has faced resistance from other patrolling countries. This is the first time an MSP member acknowledged India’s interest. Although Singapore has backed New Delhi’s aspirations, the prospects of the Indian Navy patrolling the strait appear slim.
The MSP is a framework comprising four littoral countries of the Strait of Malacca and Singapore (SOMS) – Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. Born to curb piracy and sea robbery, it tackles multiple maritime threats from terrorism to trafficking. It includes three key components: the Malacca Straits Sea Patrol (MSSP), the “Eyes-in-the-Sky” (EiS) Combined Maritime Air Patrols, and the Intelligence Exchange Group (IEG). Any arrangement for joint patrolling or including a fifth partner would require the agreement of all four countries.
The very reason MSP was established, or rather, hastily established, was to forestall the United States' (US) proposal of policing the strait to curb rising piracy.
The MSP countries have long rejected the involvement of any non-littoral countries in patrolling the strait. The very reason MSP was established, or rather, hastily established, was to forestall the United States' (US) proposal of policing the strait to curb rising piracy. Following an attack on the Japanese-owned tugboat Idaten in March 2005, Tokyo also proposed dispatching the Japan Coast Guard to help police the strait. However, Malaysia rejected it.
There have been earlier precedents of including India in the MSP. Following Lloyd’s Joint War Risks Committee classification of the Strait as a “high-risk war zone” on 1 July 2005, a new Tripartite Technical Experts Group on Maritime Security was formed. Here, the need to engage states bordering the “funnels” leading into both straits, including countries such as Thailand and India, was highlighted. While Thailand was included later, India was excluded due to sovereignty issues. India faced its latest rejection to join the patrolling in 2018, when Indonesia declared it as ‘non-feasible’.
The littoral countries of SOMS have been sensitive towards maintaining their sovereignty in the strait, especially Indonesia and Malaysia. They scaled down the initial plan of joint patrols and confined it to a coordinated patrol format respecting the mutual sovereignty of member countries. Even the EiS Combined Maritime Air Patrol does not involve respective aircraft patrolling the length of the straits. Instead, officials of the member countries board the same plane to patrol. In the 1970s, they established the legal principle, giving them exclusive jurisdiction over the SOMS. Later, in 2005, during the Shangri-La Dialogue, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore – the initial members of MSP – reached a consensus that littoral states bear primary responsibility in securing the strait, and that user states and the international community have a significant role based on respect for national sovereignty and adherence to international law. However, Singapore has always been amenable to the idea that the waterway could be policed by all the stakeholders involved.
The littoral countries of SOMS have been sensitive towards maintaining their sovereignty in the strait, especially Indonesia and Malaysia.
The narrative that the MSP should remain exclusive to the MSP members overlooks the growing challenges the Strait faces. In the first six months of 2025, there have already been 72 incidents of armed robbery in SOMS. This surpasses the 62 recorded in all of 2024. The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) has issued warnings about increased piracy activity in the South of the Malacca Straits. While earlier most piracy incidents in the region were non-violent, with boarders fleeing upon discovery, recent cases indicate a higher likelihood of pirates carrying weapons.
India’s quest to join the MSP is both beneficial and natural. Unlike the US and Japan, India is a contiguous state. The Indian Navy vessels maintain a strong presence in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, which lie just 600 km from the Strait. About 60 percent of India's sea-based trade and a significant amount of its liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports pass through the Malacca Strait. The Indian Navy has proved itself to be the ‘first responder’ and ‘preferred security partner’ in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). From the 2004 Tsunami to the 2025 fire on a Singapore-flagged ship, India has been the first determinant in humanitarian operations carried out in the Indian Ocean littorals. It has the greatest deployment of Naval forces in the Gulf of Aden and the Western Arabian Sea. Its 100-day anti-piracy mission east of the Red Sea in 2024 resulted in the capture of 35 Somali pirates. India’s “mission-based deployments” – being stationed at places where “action is taking place,” as opposed to staying in ports – have enabled the Indian Navy to engage with other regional navies beyond India’s immediate neighbourhood.
The assumption that India’s participation in MSP will imply loss of sovereignty for littoral states misunderstands the ‘coordinated’ rather than joint structure of the Malacca Strait. Even current members of the MSP, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, do not intrude into each other’s territorial waters, and India will also adhere to this principle. India can conduct coordinated patrols while respecting territorial boundaries. Additionally, it can assist with intelligence and surveillance sharing, as well as provide Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). It can also use the Andaman and Nicobar Command as a forward post for rapid response.
The assumption that India’s participation in MSP will imply loss of sovereignty for littoral states misunderstands the ‘coordinated’ rather than joint structure of the Malacca Strait.
Furthermore, while India previously lacked clarity in articulating its role in MSP, notably in 2018, the Indian Navy expected to hold patrols inside the strait; it has since refined its position. P. Kumaran, India’s Secretary (East), spoke of “coordination” and “synergy” rather than formal membership. This adaptable language reflects India’s understanding of regional sensitivities and its aim to foster trust rather than assert dominance. India’s consistent goodwill gestures from multilateral exercises to naval diplomacy in Southeast Asia reflect its long-term commitment to regional maritime security. The Indian Navy Eastern Fleet's goodwill visits to Singapore, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei in 2024 demonstrated its intent and efforts to deepen its growing network of maritime partnerships.
Inclusion in MSP does not mean intervention, and coordination does not erode the sovereignty of Strait’s littoral countries. For Southeast Asia, engaging India more deeply in the Malacca Strait may not just be desirable, but necessary.
Prisie L. Patnayak, PhD student at the Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies, SIS, Jawaharlal Nehru University.
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Prisie L. Patnayak, PhD student at the Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies, SIS, Jawaharlal Nehru University ...
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