Why India's Military Needs Integration First

After almost a decade of efforts towards ‘theaterisation’, which has yet to yield any tangible outcome, it is time for some bipartisan introspection. The current drive towards theaterisation began after the first two Combined Commanders Conferences that Prime Minister Narendra Modi attended in 2014 and 2015. Observing a lack of synergy and the presence of excess overhead in the armed forces, the broad political directive was to improve integration and the ‘teeth to tail’ ratio, freeing up more national resources for development.

‘Integration’ involves the operational orchestration of diverse resources and capabilities that is exponentially greater than the sum of individual service efforts. Historically, particularly in the post-World War II era, most modern militaries invested decades in improving jointness and synergy among all stakeholders of national security (not just the military) before pursuing integration. Wherever required, integration has progressively led to theaterisation depending on geographical compulsions and great power competition, as seen in the US and China.

Bereft of new ideas and innovative thinking, leaders across the national security landscape embraced theaterisation without adequate brainstorming or alignment between all stakeholders.

Existing Landscape 

Four initiatives have contributed significantly to the integration over the past two decades. These have been the creation of the HQ Integrated Defence Staff (IDS), the operationalisation of the Strategic Forces Command (SFC), the incremental scaling up of the Defence Space Agency (DSA), and the establishment of the Department of Military Affairs (DMA). While HQ IDS was tasked with several integrating functions across intelligence, training, staffing, procurement and planning, its mandate remained clear of operational orchestration of capabilities. On the other hand, the niche and strategic flavour of the SFC and DSA, and the limited assets involved, saw minimal erosion of service control. While the erstwhile structure of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) was split with several functions ceded to the DMA, this has not fulfilled the long-standing suggestion for complete integration of the MoD, in line with the top-down approach adopted by the government toward integration.

That the Indian Navy agreed to a rotational command structure was forward-looking; however, the template cannot be replicated across the proposed large land-focused and maritime theatres. Consequently, the three services remained in a comfortable ‘command and control’ zone till the demands of theaterisation of capability-sharing and even capability-shedding emerged.

Several strategic commentators point to the relatively smooth functioning of the Andaman Nicobar Command (ANC) as a model for the working of larger theatre commands. However, what is overlooked is the fact that the ANC was predominantly a maritime experiment driven by an operational vacuum that needed to be plugged in an emerging maritime space of contest. Comprising only a modest joint force with a preponderance of naval power, turf issues in ANC have been relatively easy to resolve. That the Indian Navy agreed to a rotational command structure was forward-looking; however, the template cannot be replicated across the proposed large land-focused and maritime theatres. Consequently, the three services remained in a comfortable ‘command and control’ zone till the demands of theaterisation of capability-sharing and even capability-shedding emerged.

Faultlines and Reality 

For over five decades, India's pursuit of jointness has rested on the camaraderie fostered by the National Defence Academy (NDA) and the war college ecosystem, comprising the Defence Services Staff College (DSSC), Higher Command (HC) structures and the National Defence College (NDC). These relations rarely contributed to operational integration because of insecurities, turf issues, and the continued battle for a share of scarce resources at higher leadership levels.

Integration goes beyond the involvement of the three services; the political establishment, apex national security structures, the bureaucracy, and the military leadership are all critical stakeholders in this process. Progress would require greater introspection at each level to realise the strategic objectives the PM laid out in 2015.

Although joint structures have been in focus in the recent past, and it has become imperative to serve in joint institutions and operational structures for upward mobility,  these are merely low-hanging fruit and have failed to maximise the potential of the individual services in joint exercises. Joint training is not realistic enough, and similar technology and networks do not permeate across the three services. An example of the slow pace in integration is the suboptimal progress in realising the potential of the Integrated Battle Groups (IBG) put together by the Indian Army. The reason initially seemed to be the inability to merge and maximise the potential of air power, without which the whole concept would hardly be ‘integrated.’ Another example of dissonance is the shrill debate over the orchestration of maritime air power, even when it is quite clear that in a resource-constrained environment, only a collaborative construct between the IAF and the Indian Navy will work.

Integration goes beyond the involvement of the three services; the political establishment, apex national security structures, the bureaucracy, and the military leadership are all critical stakeholders in this process. Progress would require greater introspection at each level to realise the strategic objectives the PM laid out in 2015.

Recommendations 

• Adopting a top-down approach to integration that not only includes the three services but also the entire edifice of the MoD. Focus on structures that first examine medium-term threat-based models, and then on aspirational long-term capability-based ones.
• Concurrently, focus on a ‘bottom-up’ approach that helps young officers understand the other services. Increase the frequency of short cross-attachments to understand each other’s operational ethos and philosophy.
• Eliminate single service mid-career training regimen at the Defence Services Staff College. All attending officers must have adequate knowledge of their own service and a good working knowledge of the other two services.
• Scale down the number of unnecessary individual service exercises and demonstrations. The objectives of such initiatives can easily be achieved by robust in-house training models. Scale up only when services want to benchmark capabilities and assess outcomes in an integrated and combined arms environment.
• Dissect the overall ‘Delhi-centric Command and Control’ model that was successfully exercised during Operation Sindoor and develop an operational structure around it. Notwithstanding the existing narrative of ‘full operational freedom to the forces,’ it is unlikely that the flavour of tight strategic control over the military and the paramilitary forces by the political executive will change in the foreseeable future.
• Develop more collaborative and robust apex and secondary Operational Command and Control structures based on the Chiefs of Staff Committee and Commanders-in-Chief (C-in-Cs), with the CDS as the single-point interface with the political executive.
• Operate on a ‘contingencies’ model; allocate resources accordingly and encourage the paradigm of Centralised Command, Distributed Control and Decentralised execution by well-integrated joint forces.

A more feasible approach in the medium term would be to create more integrated structures, such as the Special Forces Command, a Space Command, and a Cyber Command, by adopting a flexible resource allocation policy that is based on capabilities, likely threats, and contingencies.

Back to the Drawing Board 

Considering the rapidly changing nature of national security threats and the ‘subjective control’ approach of the political executive towards managing the armed forces, the straightjacketed resource-intensive and distant ‘theaterisation’ model suggested over the last few years must give way to an integrated model that caters to specific Indian imperatives. A more feasible approach in the medium term would be to create more integrated structures, such as the Special Forces Command, a Space Command, and a Cyber Command, by adopting a flexible resource allocation policy that is based on capabilities, likely threats, and contingencies. Theaterisation is not the solution to improved integration and accelerated transformation within India’s armed forces.

Arjun Subramaniam is a retired Air Vice Marshal of the Indian Air Force and a strategic commentator.

• Defence and Security
• Indian Defence
• India
• armed forces theatre commands
• integrated theatre command
• operational commands
• theaterisation model
• theaterisation of armed forces
• theatre commands in india

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