Trump 2.0 will maintain the strong US-Japan partnership, with the US likely to push for increased militarisation and active deterrence in the Indo-Pacific
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This article is part of the series, "Reignited agendas: Trump’s return and its global repercussions"
Historically noted to be a strategically essential partnership, ties between Tokyo and Washington have weathered several notable geopolitical shifts. The Republican party candidate and former president Donald Trump’s return to the White House on a significant mandate raises questions and speculations over what the relationship between the United States (US) and Japan (a key ally in the Indo-Pacific) might look like in the forthcoming presidential term.
Trump’s ‘America First’ approach during his first term brought forth trade imbalances, transactional diplomacy and defence burden-sharing, leading to both challenges and opportunities for Japan. Japan’s snap elections on 27 October failed to provide the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) with a majority for the first time in over a decade, highlighting shifts in the country’s domestic politics. In an international landscape that is growing increasingly complex with China’s military assertiveness and North Korea’s unpredictability, the US-Japan alliance can hope for a renewed emphasis on trade, technology and security, even as shared strategic interests underscore the partnership’s future.
Japan’s snap elections on 27 October failed to provide the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) with a majority for the first time in over a decade, highlighting shifts in the country’s domestic politics.
Ishiba congratulated Trump on his electoral victory and expressed an eagerness to strengthen the Japan-US alliance. He highlighted that this was his first exchange with Trump, and also expressed his intent to have robust discussions on advancing their bilateral relationship.
The Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy, a cornerstone for both countries, is expected to get more attention, particularly in light of growing strategic threats in the East and South China Seas. Trump is likely to push Japan to increase its defence spending further and take on more responsibility in the US-Japan security alliance. He may seek to reinforce the US military presence in Japan, potentially demanding higher financial contributions to the US troops stationed there. Trump’s administration may also emphasise direct deterrence strategies against China, including more frequent military exercises and enhanced missile defence cooperation with Japan.
It must be noted that Japan currently hosts close to 54,000 active-duty US military troops and stands as one of the most strategically important island nations in the Pacific, in part due to its proximity to China and North Korea. The previous Trump administration famously made the case to Japan to increase its payments for US troops to US$ 8 billion in 2019, coupled with advisories to allies to increase general defence budgets internally. Over the past five years, Japan has steadily increased its defence budget, leading to a US$ 57 billion military investment plan in 2024. Should the Trump administration decide to escalate military engagement with important allies, Japan’s strategic direction may shift even further towards defence, self-reliance, and alignment with the American objective of increased regional responsibility.
Trump’s administration may also emphasise direct deterrence strategies against China, including more frequent military exercises and enhanced missile defence cooperation with Japan.
Trump’s approach to China has historically been confrontational, involving trade sanctions, tariffs and diplomatic pushback. Japan was a central partner in this vision, aligning with the US concerns over China’s military activities in the South and East China Seas, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its economic practices that were seen as undermining international rules. Trump 2.0 is, therefore, likely to continue intensifying efforts to isolate China economically and militarily by urging Japan to limit its economic engagement with China. Japan would be placed in a challenging position as it seeks to maintain its security alignment with the US while also managing its own trade ties with China, a critical economic partner. While Trump may remain supportive of the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, a grouping of Australia, India, Japan, and the US), he may prioritise direct, high-stakes alliances with individual states like Japan, aiming for a larger influence over joint military and economic initiatives. Nonetheless, the Quad and AUKUS (a trilateral partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom (UK) and the US) initiatives remain central to the US Indo-Pacific strategy. Under Trump 2.0, the strategic orientation and agenda of these groupings will likely shift towards deeper military cooperation. Japan’s role in these alliances, especially in the Quad, would remain vital.
North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and capabilities present a key security challenge for Japan, intensifying its expected alignment with the US. Donald Trump’s first administration saw his unprecedented direct engagement with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, even though Japan expressed concern over the limited security gains of such engagement. Under Trump 2.0, Japan may push for a cautious, result-oriented approach, insisting that the US’s diplomacy with North Korea prioritise concrete denuclearisation steps to avoid potential security complications. With Japan steadily bolstering its own defensive capabilities, it is expected to work further to align its security strategy with the US while still ensuring that its interests remain protected. How this unfolds in Trump 2.0 will be followed closely by both Tokyo and Seoul, the latter of which is also deeply concerned with North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and capabilities.
Trump 2.0 will re-emphasise his ‘America First’ trade agenda, potentially revisiting some aspects of the US-Japan Trade Agreement, and pushing for more favourable terms in any new trade deals. While he may encourage Japan to reduce its trade surplus with the US, Trump’s main economic focus would be on decoupling from China and securing Japan as a partner in critical supply chains, particularly for technology and manufacturing.
The 2019 Japan-US Trade Agreement, focussing on Japanese industrial goods and American agricultural exports, highlights Trump’s initial plan to reduce trade imbalances.
Trump’s first term saw the US’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, causing significant upheaval among the Pacific rim countries, and leading to Japan forming the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership as a way to counterbalance China’s economic influence in the region. Additionally, the 2019 Japan-US Trade Agreement, focussing on Japanese industrial goods and American agricultural exports, highlights Trump’s initial plan to reduce trade imbalances. In the event of the Trump administration’s renewed interest in reducing the trade deficit between both countries, Japan would likely face increased demand to import US agricultural and manufacturing goods. While Japan may cooperate to a certain extent, it might also reinforce its commitment to regional trade partnerships as a means of balancing its own economic security. Such a position would allow Japan to maintain its autonomy in the economic sector while simultaneously working on beneficial terms with America.
In technology and cybersecurity, the US-Japan relationship is expected to continue flourishing. As the global technological market competition intensifies, particularly in the 5G and artificial intelligence sectors, Trump’s return to office could see renewed American efforts to restrict Chinese companies’ access to critical technological infrastructure in North America. Japan, having already aligned with the US in excluding Huawei from its 5G network and ZTE equipment in government procurement, may come under increased pressure to join broader technological countermeasures, including tighter export controls on sensitive technologies.
As the global technological market competition intensifies, particularly in the 5G and artificial intelligence sectors, Trump’s return to office could see renewed American efforts to restrict Chinese companies’ access to critical technological infrastructure in North America.
Japan’s importance as a reliable technology partner underscores this cybersecurity collaboration's high stakes. As both nations continue to invest in secure infrastructure, technology will likely become central to their relationship. Both parties recognise Japan's importance in technology supply chains, particularly with semiconductors, and a change in the administration could lead to new frameworks for technological cooperation.
Personal diplomacy played an outsized role in US-Japan relations during the previous Trump administration, largely due to the rapport between Trump and then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Abe was one of the first foreign leaders to meet with Trump after his election, and he made significant efforts to maintain strong personal ties. This relationship helped smooth over some potential policy conflicts and allowed Japan to navigate Trump’s foreign policy with few disruptions. While the pandemic strained many international relationships, US-Japan ties remained strong, with both countries looking at the crisis as an opportunity to strengthen their cooperation on economic security, health, and technology. With Ishiba being reconfirmed as the Prime Minister in the special Diet session vote on 11 November, he will look to replicate the favourable ties that the two countries shared during the previous Trump administration.
Japan’s commitment to a stable regional order and its status as a trusted US ally will remain foundational to the alliance’s strength, ensuring that shared objectives balance any friction. As Japan simultaneously bolsters its defence, strengthens its technological infrastructure, and fosters regional economic ties, the US-Japan alliance remains poised to address the mutual challenges posed by an increasingly complex geopolitical landscape.
Pratnashree Basu is an Associate Fellow, Indo-Pacific with the Strategic Studies Programme and the Centre for New Economic Diplomacy at the Observer Research Foundation.
Tripti Neb is a Research Intern at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Pratnashree Basu is an Associate Fellow, Indo-Pacific at Observer Research Foundation, Kolkata, with the Strategic Studies Programme and the Centre for New Economic Diplomacy. She ...
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