-
CENTRES
Progammes & Centres
Location
The detention of an Indian citizen in Shanghai illustrates how Beijing uses civilian administrative tools to assert its territorial claims over Arunachal Pradesh while remaining below the threshold of overt confrontation
On 21 November, an Indian citizen from Arunachal Pradesh, Prema Thongdok, was detained for eighteen hours at Shanghai’s Pudong Airport after Chinese immigration officials declared her valid Indian passport “invalid”. When she asked why, an officer reportedly told her that, because she was born in Arunachal Pradesh, her passport could not be accepted since the region is “part of China”. The incident triggered strong public and political reactions in India. While the episode appeared to be a routine immigration dispute, it fits into a long pattern of China using bureaucratic tools to reinforce its territorial claim over Arunachal Pradesh.
Rather than constituting routine consular disputes, these actions function as calibrated instruments through which Beijing asserts its territorial claims while remaining below the threshold of overt confrontation.
This article argues that such actions are part of a deliberate political signalling strategy that China has maintained for decades. These signals do not involve military force; instead, they operate through civilian-facing administrative systems, including but not limited to visas, passports, permits, and now airport checks. Rather than constituting routine consular disputes, these actions function as calibrated instruments through which Beijing asserts its territorial claims while remaining below the threshold of overt confrontation.
To understand the political significance of the Shanghai incident, it is necessary to situate it within China’s long-standing visa practices toward residents of Arunachal Pradesh, which Beijing refers to as “Zangnan” or South Tibet. China has historically employed two overlapping approaches in its consular treatment of Arunachali residents, each grounded in its territorial claim: asserting that no visa is required, and issuing stapled visas. These practices are not bureaucratic anomalies but a non-military means designed to assert its claim over Arunachal and challenge India’s sovereignty.
The first approach rests on China’s claim that Arunachal Pradesh is an inseparable part of its territory, and therefore, by implication, its residents are Chinese citizens who do not require visas to enter China. This logic has been periodically operationalised for decades. An early example dates to the late 1980s, when the then Chief Minister of Arunachal Pradesh, Gegong Apang, and the state assembly speaker, T.L. Rajkumar, were denied visas on the grounds that they did not need them. A similar pattern emerged in 2007, when four members of a 48-person Indian delegation invited to a science and technology fair suddenly had their invitations withdrawn because the Chinese side classified them as Chinese nationals. In that same year, an IAS officer from Arunachal Pradesh, Ganesh Koyu, was denied a visa for a study tour planned for 100 Indian civil servants. Unlike in previous cases, the Indian government cancelled the entire visit, signalling a firmer refusal to accept such treatment of its citizens.
China has historically employed two overlapping approaches in its consular treatment of Arunachali residents, each grounded in its territorial claim: asserting that no visa is required, and issuing stapled visas. These practices are not bureaucratic anomalies but a non-military means designed to assert its claim over Arunachal and challenge India’s sovereignty.
A second method began to emerge around 2011, when China began issuing stapled visas to residents of Arunachal Pradesh. This practice similarly communicates China’s non-recognition of India’s sovereignty, but through a different administrative device. In January 2011, a weightlifting coach and an athlete from Arunachal received stapled visas for a sports event in Fujian. Indian immigration officials at the New Delhi airport refused to clear them for travel. In June that year, members of an Indian karate team encountered the same issue, although diplomatic intervention eventually led the Chinese authorities to replace the stapled visas with regular stamped ones. The most recent such case was in 2023, when three wushu players from Arunachal Pradesh were issued stapled visas by the Chinese embassy ahead of the World University Games in Chengdu.
In response to the recent detention of Ms Thongdok, India’s Ministry of External Affairs lodged a strong protest with China. The government stated that Arunachal Pradesh is an integral part of India and that the state’s residents have the right to travel using Indian passports. The government also asked Chinese authorities to ensure that Indian citizens would not be unfairly singled out when they travel to or pass through China.
While the Indian government’s strong protest has been welcomed domestically, these episodes make it clear that China selectively varies the method of signalling its territorial claim. This is done sometimes by denying visas, sometimes by asserting they are unnecessary, and sometimes by issuing stapled visas. This variation is not the result of confusion or goodwill, but a deliberate attempt at maintaining strategic ambiguity.
This strategic ambiguity has become a political tool that China deploys when it wishes to exert pressure on India while staying below the threshold of overt confrontation. A common interpretation is that such actions reflect contradictions or administrative lapses. However, inconsistency itself is the strategy. By alternating between the claim that no visa is needed, the issuance of stapled visas, and the occasional granting of normal visas, China communicates three messages simultaneously: that the territory is disputed and that China asserts maximal claims; that the enforcement of these claims remains entirely at China’s discretion; and that India cannot reliably predict China’s administrative behaviour, thereby complicating routine interactions.
The recent case, albeit somewhat different from the two Chinese approaches discussed above, is a clear example of such a strategy. Thongdok noted that she had previously travelled the same route without difficulty in October 2024. However, during this visit, which was just a year after her previous travel through the same route, she was told that her passport was invalid because she was born in Arunachal Pradesh. This selective enforcement reveals the political character of the act. The Chinese foreign ministry reinforced this interpretation when spokesperson Mao Ning reiterated that “Zangnan is China’s territory” and that China has “never recognised the so-called Arunachal Pradesh,” while framing the detention as a routine legal procedure rather than an act of harassment. Such statements are consistent with China’s long-standing narrative, underscoring that the incident was not an isolated consular dispute.
China selectively varies the method of signalling its territorial claim. This is done sometimes by denying visas, sometimes by asserting they are unnecessary, and sometimes by issuing stapled visas. This variation is not the result of confusion or goodwill, but a deliberate attempt at maintaining strategic ambiguity.
The timing of the Shanghai incident heightens its political significance. Over the past year, both India and China have taken measured steps to prevent further deterioration in bilateral relations. India resumed issuing tourist visas to Chinese citizens worldwide; direct flights restarted after nearly five years; governments resumed the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra; and military and diplomatic engagements continued in an attempt to resolve remaining friction points along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). These moves suggested a cautious drift toward limited normalisation, with many observers interpreting them as reflecting a thaw in bilateral relations. However, the detention of an Indian citizen solely because she was from Arunachal Pradesh reveals a different reality regarding Beijing’s intentions and commitment to stabilising ties.
Some argue that Beijing’s renewed assertiveness on territorial issues is linked to Washington’s attempts at détente with China. Recently, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi stated that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan could constitute an existential crisis for Japan and force its Self-Defense Forces to intervene, which triggered a sharp backlash from Beijing. Chinese diplomats went as far as threatening to “cut off the dirty neck,” Chinese citizens were advised to avoid visiting Japan, and bans on Japanese seafood imports were reinstated. The escalation led to a call between Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump, after which Trump reportedly told Tokyo to “lower the volume” on Taiwan. While China confronted Japan openly, it has, in the case of India, relied on subtler, non-military means to push its territorial claims. In both cases, the pattern is the same: China’s territorial assertiveness has resurfaced, and many link it to Washington’s outreach to Beijing.
While apprehension remains about Beijing’s intentions and commitments, incidents of this kind also carry pronounced domestic consequences within India. Events involving Indian citizens abroad do not remain confined to consular channels alone; they quickly reverberate through public discourse. Since the 2020 Galwan Valley clash, Indian public opinion towards China has hardened significantly. Surveys underscore this shift: ORF’s Foreign Policy Survey 2024 found that among the Indian public, China is viewed as India’s biggest challenge, and a 2023 Pew Research study found that 67 percent of Indians hold an unfavourable view of China. The Shanghai incident, therefore, dovetailed with an already prevalent narrative that China routinely challenges India’s sovereignty and dignity.
Small-scale provocations can generate outsized disruptions, compelling governments to signal firmness, reducing space for engagement, and raising the diplomatic costs of accommodation. Together, these factors shrink the diplomatic room for manoeuvre.
Consequently, these incidents constrain India’s policy options even when New Delhi seeks stability with Beijing. Small-scale provocations can generate outsized disruptions, compelling governments to signal firmness, reducing space for engagement, and raising the diplomatic costs of accommodation. Together, these factors shrink the diplomatic room for manoeuvre. Even if policymakers wish to maintain communication channels or pursue selective cooperation, episodes like the Shanghai incident make such efforts more difficult to justify domestically.
In conclusion, the Shanghai detention reinforces that China’s actions are not isolated consular lapses but part of a sustained strategy of administrative signalling. By selectively weaponising civilian procedures, Beijing continues to assert its territorial claims while avoiding overt confrontation, revealing the limits of recent stabilisation efforts in India–China relations.
Tushar Joshi is a Visiting Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
Tushar Joshi is a Visiting Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation. During his fellowship, his research will examine the domestic drivers of India’s foreign policy ...
Read More +
PREV
