US Presence Tests China’s South Asia Strategy

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China is closely observing South Asia's reset in the geopolitical landscape. For all these years, China, through its flagship Belt and Road Initiative and ‘minus-India’ multilateral forums like the Kunming trilateral summit, has sought to form its own circle of friends to challenge India’s traditional dominance in the region. However, in recent years, the intensifying United States (US) presence in the area has complicated Chinese choices.

Nowhere else is China’s dilemma more pronounced than in the case of Pakistan. As is known, Pakistan has been China’s key strategic fulcrum in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region, and China-Pakistan relations are a key determinant or major facilitator of China’s relations with other South Asian countries.

Lately, China-Pakistan relations have experienced some bumps, primarily due to the US. A deluge of negative news and commentaries about Pakistan is floating across Chinese media and social media, highlighting the growing mistrust and anger building up among Chinese netizens over Pakistan’s sudden proclivity toward the US.

This followed the recent India-Pakistan conflict, as US-Pakistan interactions at the leadership level intensified. China was evidently upset that the Pakistanis were flying Chinese jets, using Chinese weapons against India, but lauding the US president for his role in the conflict.

A deluge of negative news and commentaries about Pakistan is floating across Chinese media and social media, highlighting the growing mistrust and anger building up among Chinese netizens over Pakistan’s sudden proclivity toward the US.

And the anti-Pakistan campaign on the Chinese internet continued thereafter. There are allegations galore vis-à-vis Pakistan.

First, Beijing is upset with Pakistan for reportedly handing over the Pasni port to the US, which is only a few hundred kilometres away from China’s Gwadar port. They fear that the port will not only serve as a mineral export hub, allowing Pakistan to trade rare earths with the US, but also enable the US to monitor Gwadar Port and observe China's logistics and industrial development.

Second, some accuse Pakistan of selling China's advanced fighter jet technology to Türkiye for the development of its fifth-generation fighter jets. They argue that, given the changing geopolitical landscape, China needs to exercise caution in further military technology sharing with Pakistan, including the J-35 agreement

Others accuse Pakistan of fighting Afghanistan to help the US military return to Afghanistan. Chinese officials have expressed “concern” over the conflict, which comes at a time when China has been striving hard to broker peace between the two estranged neighbours and extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to Kabul.

Furthermore, over the recent weeks, there has been much hue and cry in China’s strategic circles about Pakistan ‘stealing China's rare earth resources and handing it over to the US’, thereby weakening China’s trump card in US-China competition. Chinese public opinion came down heavily on Pakistan for “burning the bridge”, “aiding China’s enemy”, and “harming the interests of the Chinese people”. In the public opinion space, some have changed the word “巴铁” (China-Pakistan iron-brother) to “芭比Q” (China-Pakistan barbequed/cremated) to address Pakistan.

Chinese public opinion came down heavily on Pakistan for “burning the bridge”, “aiding China’s enemy”, and “harming the interests of the Chinese people”.

In fact, many in China believe that it is Pakistan using Chinese equipment and technology to deliver rare earths to the US around 2 October 2025, which triggered China to introduce new regulations on 9 October to strictly control the export of rare earth-related technologies. Such has been the uproar in China against Pakistan that the Chinese government had to intervene, reaffirming that China and Pakistan are all-weather strategic partners, and have an ironclad friendship and that there has been prior communication between China and Pakistan regarding Pakistan-US mineral cooperation.

There has also been some domestic crackdown on anti-Pakistan news and views in China, categorising them as rumour mongering. For example, former Global Times editor Hu Xijin’s recent article criticising Pakistan for stealing China’s rare earth resources has been removed from leading media spaces (Guancha.com), but is still doing the rounds in China’s internet circles. Noted Chinese scholars such as Liu Zongyi of the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, Wang Shida of the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), have been shifting the blame to vested interests both within and outside China (including the US and India) to pacify Chinese public opinion on Pakistan.

An alternate argument is being promoted on the Chinese internet that since Pakistan’s economy is on the brink, there is no harm in allowing it to make some short-term profit by drawing the US into its financial hole. After all, US-Pakistan cooperation projects are difficult to take off, and Pakistan can do little without China’s support, particularly while facing New Delhi. Considering China’s high-stake relationship with Pakistan, it is being argued that China does not need to overreact to Pakistan’s current turn towards the US, albeit maintaining caution.

Further, many in China are also pinning their hope on India to prevent an even tighter US-Pakistan embrace. They point out that India is already upset about the current bonhomie displayed by the leadership in Washington and Islamabad. It will certainly make efforts to sabotage further deepening of US-Pakistan ties. From that perspective, it is argued that China does not need to make a high-profile intervention and complicate its ties with Pakistan.

China had a similar stance during the Bangladesh crisis in 2024. Although it remained concerned about the US role in the crisis and its ambition for a military base in the region, Beijing maintained a low profile and hoped to leverage the India-US discord over the Bangladesh issue to its benefit. Chinese commentariat initially labelled the Yunus government as a pro-American (pro-Biden administration) entity and was uncertain about the future of its BRI investments in the country. Only after the change in government in Washington, the leadership in Bangladesh and China began interactions. Even though lately there have been talks of Bangladesh seeking to purchase J-10 fighter jets from China, the Chinese side remains suspicious of deep American inroads in Bangladesh’s polity and military.

The situation is changing rapidly from a bipolar landscape driven by Sino-Indian competition to a tri-polar or multipolar set-up where China-US great power competition is becoming an important factor

In comparison, the Chinese reaction was much more high-pitched when the Nepalese parliament ratified the US$500 million MCC (Millennium Challenge Corporation) infrastructure aid deal on 27 February 2022, and China suspected that India coalesced with the US on the issue. More recently, sections within Chinese society once again suspected a US role behind the collapse of the pro-China Oli government and have been bracing up for  uncertainty emanating from Kathmandu. In Myanmar, too, China-US competition over its rare-earth resources has been on the rise, and many Chinese news outlets accuse India and the US of teaming up with Myanmar's local armed forces in an attempt to jointly break China's rare-earth dominance

Overall, the Chinese assessment is that South Asia is at a critical juncture of transition. The situation is changing rapidly from a bipolar landscape driven by Sino-Indian competition to a tri-polar or multipolar set-up where China-US great power competition is becoming an important factor, making South Asia's future more complex and dynamic. Will there be a new regional trend of greater US-India cooperation targeting the Chinese presence in the region (as the Chinese side often suspects), or will intensifying China-US great power competition eventually override the traditional China-India competition and open up new avenues for India-China cooperation in the region ? This is surely something to watch out for.

Antara Ghosal Singh is a Fellow at the Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation.

• International Affairs
• China
• India
• Pakistan
• USA and Canada
• china Pakistan relations
• china south asia strategy
• chinese investment in Pakistan
• india china relations
• rare earth materials in Pakistan
• us china relations
• us south asia strategy

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