Author : Manoj Joshi

Expert Speak Raisina Debates
Published on Jan 09, 2026

The US’s precision warfare in Venezuela delivered battlefield results, but its broader roadmap remains unclear

US Operation in  Venezuela: Modern Conflict Lessons

Image Source: Getty Images

 The past year and the current year have witnessed numerous conflicts. These include —among others—the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine, the Hamas–Israel conflict, the India-Pakistan clashes, the Israeli and American strikes on Iranian military facilities, the tensions between Thailand and Cambodia, and the various civil wars in Central Africa. Some of the features of the wars—their violence and brutality—are not new. Yet they offer new lessons about how armed conflicts are likely to evolve in the future. Ukraine has provided important insight into the use of unmanned systems, a trend that is likely to intensify in the future. Israel’s campaign in Gaza offers a bleaker picture of what the end state of conflicts could look like when vast urban areas are subjected to sustained bombardment.

The US characterising the operation as one aimed at fighting drug trafficking and transnational organised crime, posing a potential risk to US security.

In this, the American“special operation’ in Venezuela stands out for its apparent success. It was meticulously planned and involved a high degree of complexity, amounting to a display of military and intelligence prowess. With minimal force and great dispatch, the operation achieved its goals—the detention of Nikolas Maduro and his wife. Its primary justification was self-defence, with the US characterising the operation as one aimed at fighting drug trafficking and transnational organised crime, posing a potential risk to US security.

At the 3 January 2026  press conference, following  President Donald Trump’s announcement of the results of Operation Absolute Resolve,  Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Dan Caine said that more than 150 aircraft were involved, including fighter aircraft, bombers, surveillance aircraft, intelligence aircraft, and helicopters. He added that the entire joint force was involved in the mission—including the army, navy, air force, marines, space force, and intelligence agencies.

The aircraft involved comprised fighter jets—F-35s, F/A-18s, E/A-18s, F-22s—bombers, notably B-1 bombers, as well as unmanned aircraft and E-2 Hawkeyes.

Caine said the aircraft departed from 20 different land- and sea-based locations,   and that support aircraft were involved as well. The helicopters carrying the force flew at an altitude of 100 feet above sea level as they approached Venezuela. As they approached the area, air defence systems were disabled to ensure the secure transit of the helicopters to Maduro’s compound. Upon arrival, they came under fire and responded in what US officials described as self-defence.  One of the helicopters was hit, but remained flyable. As the helicopters departed the compound, they were protected by fighter aircraft and drones that provided suppressive fire.

Caine indicated that non-kinetic effects from the US Space Command and the US Cyber Command were used to suppress the Venezuelan air defence before the kinetic action was undertaken. Earlier, Trump indicated that the grid was brought down “due to a certain expertise we have.” There are claims that, thereafter, Venezuelan military communications were jammed and the radar system spoofed to show clear sky conditions. With the command chain’s communications reportedly compromised, Maduro was unable to contact his generals.

Videos of blasts across Caracas caused by US strikes do not show any counter-fire, suggesting that the Venezuelan military was standing down or refraining from engagement.

However, many are questioning the finer points of the operation. One analyst notes that the jamming of the Venezuelan systems was unlikely. Other questions also arise regarding the American success in suppressing Venezuelan air defences, including the S-300 system. Besides fighter aircraft, Venezuela possessed S-300, Buk-2  and S-125 Pechora surface-to-air missiles, around 500 L-70 anti-aircraft guns, sourced from Sweden, the US, and Russia. It also had 5,000 MANPADS, which are hand-held anti-aircraft missiles from Sweden and Russia. Yet, none of them were even fired at the low-flying US helicopters. Videos of blasts across Caracas caused by US strikes do not show any counter-fire, suggesting that the Venezuelan military was standing down or refraining from engagement.

This raid, marked by a high degree of operational precision, was only the endpoint of a process that may have begun months earlier, with a CIA source inside the government tracking Maduro. The agency used stealth drones to monitor his movements and inserted a team into the country to build Madurao’s “pattern of life” to track him. This was accompanied by a campaign to attack alleged drug boats. It may also have co-opted Maduro’s associates and ensured that the security machinery remained inactive through the event. The raid on the heavily defended compound was a culmination of this campaign.

What we do know is that there have been around 80 dead on the Venezuelan side, including 32 Cuban bodyguards of Maduro. There is considerable speculation surrounding the circumstances of their deaths. These were highly trained individuals, and the absence of any reported American casualties raises questions about how the engagement unfolded. The other 48 may have been killed in the strikes on the close air defence systems in the military facility Fuerte Tiuna and at the Franciscode Miranda air base.

But ultimately, the military prowess was more tactical than strategic. This is also true of the US attack on Iran last June, and historically, of the opening days of the Gulf wars of 1991 and 2002.

The US performance in the opening phase of operations is often highly effective, but it has not always fully articulated what will happen thereafter. This is what led to the outcomes in Iraq and Afghanistan fiascos.

Where the US has faced challenges is in its strategic approach, which has led to the less-than-optimal outcomes in Iraq and Afghanistan. As Franz-Stefan Gady notes, large-scale conventional warfare requires political and economic strategic depth. American presidents have been reluctant to get their people involved in industrial mobilisation, logistics, and display the political resilience needed to prosecute the long wars. The American strategic culture has therefore increasingly prioritised highly skilled tactical operations or raids.

This reflects the logic that has underpinned US military interventions over the past half-century—the “day after” problem. The US performance in the opening phase of operations is often highly effective, but it has not always fully articulated what will happen thereafter. This is what led to the outcomes in Iraq and Afghanistan fiascos.  A similar pattern is evident in Venezuela in terms of how the US intends to shape the next phase. The US has said it will “run” the country, but there is no publicly articulated roadmap to do so. In the meantime, what it has succeeded in doing is signalling to its potential adversaries its military capabilities—especially in non-kinetic areas and the functioning of its joint force.


Manoj Joshi is a Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.

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Author

Manoj Joshi

Manoj Joshi

Manoj Joshi is a Distinguished Fellow at the ORF. He has been a journalist specialising on national and international politics and is a commentator and ...

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