The unfolding US-Israel war on Iran has exposed a shift in African diplomacy, where pragmatic calculation and strategic flexibility increasingly outweigh ideological positioning in foreign policy responses
The ongoing US-Israel War on Iran since February 28, whereby Washington and Tel Aviv launched a joint large-scale military operation against Iranian targets and Tehran’s subsequent missile strikes across the Gulf, has reverberated far beyond West Asia. For African states, still grappling with the economic aftershocks of the Russia–Ukraine war, the crisis raises fears of renewed spikes in energy prices, supply chain disruptions, and financial volatility.
Yet rather than reacting ideologically, the responses from various African governments reflected a striking degree of pragmatism. Their diplomatic positioning underscores a rise of African agency, shaped less by rigid alliances and more by national interest and strategic calculation.
Initially, drawing from Africa’s historical support for the Palestinian cause and its legacy of anti-colonial solidarity, a sharper criticism of Israel and its allies was anticipated. Contrary to this belief, most African governments actually refrained from directly condemning either Washington or Tel Aviv. Instead, most of them openly criticised Iran’s missile strikes on neighbouring Gulf states. This selective framing illustrates a careful balancing act. African nations are actively seeking to avoid alienating key economic and security partners while preserving diplomatic flexibility.
African nations are actively seeking to avoid alienating key economic and security partners while preserving diplomatic flexibility.
The Horn of Africa offers a particularly revealing case study. Governments in the region swiftly condemned Iranian attacks targeting Gulf countries, while remaining silent on the role of the United States and Israel in initiating the confrontation. In Ethiopia, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed described Iran’s strike as an “atrocious attack” on the sovereignty and airspace of a fellow state. Addis Ababa’s stance is consistent with its longstanding ties to Israel, rooted in both historical narratives and modern strategic cooperation.
Ethiopia’s civilisational links to Israel are embedded in the Kebra Nagast, which recounts the legendary connection between the Queen of Sheba and King Solomon, and the lineage of Menelik I. Beyond mythology, the relationship has been reinforced by security cooperation; Israel has historically provided military assistance to Ethiopia during periods of regional tension. Today, a significant Ethiopian Jewish community resides in Israel, while millions of Ethiopians work in Gulf countries, sending back remittances that remain vital to the domestic economy. Given these interdependencies, Ethiopia’s condemnation of Iranian strikes and silence regarding US–Israeli actions reflect a clear hierarchy of interests.
The evolving geopolitics of the Red Sea further complicates matters. Ethiopia’s 2024 memorandum of understanding with Somaliland, promising eventual recognition in exchange for access to the port of Berbera, stirred controversy across the continent. Neither Somalia nor the African Union recognise Somaliland as a sovereign state. Yet Israel’s diplomatic recognition of Somaliland in December 2025 created overlapping strategic incentives aligned with its economic model and quest for international legitimacy. Unsurprisingly, Somaliland authorities condemned Iranian attacks on Gulf states as “unprovoked aggression” and expressed complete solidarity with Arab Gulf countries.
Somalia also criticised Iran’s strikes and expressed solidarity with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Jordan, Bahrain, and Oman, notably omitting the United Arab Emirates. This calibrated wording underscores Mogadishu’s sensitivity to its complex regional relationships, especially amid tensions linked to perceptions of Emirati support for Somaliland.
Across these responses, a consistent pattern emerges: condemnations are narrowly directed at Iranian actions against Arab states, accompanied by relative silence on US–Israel military operations.
Egypt adopted a similarly cautious tone, offering mixed messages. On the one hand, Egypt maintains a strategic partnership with the US and a cold peace with Israel. On the other hand, Egypt also has a history of pragmatic engagement with Tehran. President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi voiced solidarity with Gulf partners without directly endorsing the broader US–Israel campaign. Across these responses, a consistent pattern emerges: condemnations are narrowly directed at Iranian actions against Arab states, accompanied by relative silence on US–Israel military operations.
In West Africa, caution has likewise prevailed. Nigeria called for restraint and adherence to international law, refraining from condemning either Iran or the US–Israel coalition. This balanced posture reflects domestic considerations as well. Nigeria hosts Africa’s largest Shia population, many of whom regard Iran’s Supreme Leader as a spiritual authority. Nationwide protests following the killing of Ali Khamenei underscore the sensitivity of overt alignment. The government’s restraint thus serves both external and internal stability.
Chad, Ghana, and The Gambia adopted similarly measured language, emphasising de-escalation and the protection of civilians. Senegal stood out by expressing concern over unilateral military actions by major powers, warning that the erosion of established international rules threatens global stability. Yet even Dakar stopped short of explicitly siding with Tehran.
Israel’s development agency, Mashav, has forged partnerships across the region, embedding cooperation in agriculture, technology, and security. These ties, combined with Gulf investments and security assistance, constrain the willingness of West African governments to antagonise Israel openly.
Israel’s diplomatic footprint in West Africa partly explains this reticence. In 2017, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu became the first non-African leader to address a summit of the Economic Community of West African States. Israel’s development agency, Mashav, has forged partnerships across the region, embedding cooperation in agriculture, technology, and security. These ties, combined with Gulf investments and security assistance, constrain the willingness of West African governments to antagonise Israel openly.
South Africa remains the principal outlier. President Cyril Ramaphosa questioned the legality of anticipatory self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter, implicitly criticising US–Israel action. Pretoria’s stance is consistent with its broader foreign policy posture, including its decision to bring a case against Israel before the International Court of Justice over alleged violations of the Genocide Convention in Gaza. South Africa thus continues to foreground normative and legal arguments, even as most other African states prioritise strategic caution.
Collectively, these responses reveal a continent neither uniformly pro-Iran nor unequivocally pro-Israel. Instead, African governments are navigating a complex matrix of economic dependencies, diaspora linkages, security partnerships, and domestic political sensitivities. Heavy reliance on Gulf remittances, vulnerability to energy disruptions, and trade exposure shaped by US policy constrain overt positioning. Simultaneously, few wish to undermine their longstanding rhetorical support for Palestinian statehood or alienate domestic constituencies sympathetic to Iran.
African foreign policy is increasingly defined by pragmatic autonomy. In a world marked by intensifying great-power rivalry and regional conflict, African states are resisting pressure to take binary positions.
The decision by many governments to criticise Iran while avoiding explicit condemnation of Washington or Tel Aviv reflects geopolitical calculation rather than ideological alignment. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that the African Union (AU) as a collective body would endorse Washington and Tel Aviv’s war against Iran. Continental consensus remains cautious and non-aligned.
Clearly, African foreign policy is increasingly defined by pragmatic autonomy. In a world marked by intensifying great-power rivalry and regional conflict, African states are resisting pressure to take binary positions. The US–Israel war on Iran, rather than exposing divisions or dependency, has highlighted the continent’s capacity for calibrated engagement. As ideological solidarity has given way to interest-based diplomacy, this marks the rise of African pragmatism.
Samir Bhattacharya is an Associate Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Dr. Samir Bhattacharya is an Associate Fellow at Observer Research Foundation (ORF), where he works on geopolitics with particular reference to Africa in the changing ...
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