Expert Speak Raisina Debates
Published on Dec 28, 2020
Biden will seek to capitalise on the ‘America First’ approach’s uninhibited emphasis on divergences that have long been at an impasse.
US-India ties under Biden — Leveraging Trump’s disruptions This article is part of the series — What to Expect from International Relations in 2021.
US President-elect Joe Biden has committed to place “high priority” on strengthening US-India ties. Moreover, while he will seek to restore relations with US partners after President Donald Trump’s disruptive ‘America First’ approach, Biden’s priority on India will be to reflect continuity given Trump’s constructive record on US-India ties. On defence ties, for instance, Trump only built on Barack Obama’s record, by classifying India under the Strategic Trade Authorisation-1 and finalising the Industrial Security Annex. Trump also oversaw finalisation of the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) with India. However, Biden will also seek to capitalise on the ‘America First’ approach’s uninhibited emphasis on divergences that have long been at an impasse. Under Obama, the US stressed on strategic ties with India, while preventing divergences on matters like trade to outshine minimal-yet-positive developments. Trump, however, departed from that precedent by vocalising apprehensions against “tariff king” India and imposing tariffs on Indian steel and aluminium — in an effort to exact a “fair and reciprocal” trade deal. Biden will most definitely eschew Trump’s rhetoric. However, it is unlikely that Biden will instantaneously reverse Trump’s policies, like his termination of India’s GSP benefits, without seeking some market-access concessions possibly in the form of a “mini deal” (talks for which derailed ahead of Trump’s February 2020 visit) or striking a bargain on India’s e-commerce regulations.

However, it is unlikely that Biden will instantaneously reverse Trump’s policies, like his termination of India’s GSP benefits.

On India’s ties with Iran, Trump used the threat of punitive sanctions to wean India away from importing Iranian oil. The effort also fit squarely with his administration’s policy of “unleashing American energy dominance” with new export opportunities for US oil producers. In 2019, with India importing four times more US oil than in 2018, Washington swiftly became New Delhi’s sixth largest oil supplier. In Biden’s effort to rejoin the Iran nuclear deal and even push for “follow-on negotiations,” it is unlikely that he will do away with the bargaining chip presented by Trump’s “maximum pressure” policy of limiting Iran’s oil revenue. Moreover, with Trump overseeing America’s emergence as a net exporter of oil (a step beyond Obama’s goal of energy independence), it will be hard for Biden to ignore the strategic relevance of energy exports, despite his long-term push for clean energy and tighter regulations for the oil industry. Hence, with US-India energy ties on a promising trajectory, Biden won’t reinstate the 2019 sanctions exemption for purchasing Iranian oil anytime soon.

In Biden’s effort to rejoin the Iran nuclear deal and even push for “follow-on negotiations,” it is unlikely that he will do away with the bargaining chip presented by Trump’s “maximum pressure” policy of limiting Iran’s oil revenue.

To reduce India’s dependence on Russian weaponry, Trump encouraged US arms exports by completing his predecessor’s deals (like that over AH-64E Apache helicopters), yielding to requests for particular platforms (like MH-60 Romeo Seahawk helicopters), and adopting a policy to ‘front-load’ clearances (like in the case of ancillary equipment for India’s fleet of P-8 maritime surveillance aircraft). Moreover, on India’s purchase of the S-400 missile defence system from Russia, Trump threatened to impose sanctions under the Countering America's Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). Despite the US Congress even passing a provision to exempt India, Trump put off requests to grant the waiver. With the US now being India’s second-largest arms supplier, it is unlikely that Biden will reverse Trump’s gains by granting the CAATSA waiver. Especially since the continued uncertainty around the waiver has only opened-up new avenues for arms exports, as New Delhi is expected to also acquire the US-made National Advanced Surface to Air Missile System-II to allay apprehensions over the S-400 purchase. Hence, while Biden will pursue considerable continuity on US-India ties, there will be a concurrent effort to leverage Trump’s disruptions and thereby exact progress on divergences with India.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.

Contributor

Kashish Parpiani

Kashish Parpiani

Kashish Parpiani was Fellow at ORFs Mumbai centre. His interests include US-India bilateral ties US grand strategy and US foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific.

Read More +