Rising US-China tensions over biosecurity and chemical threats create risks and opportunities for India to strengthen its role in global biotech and security
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In April 2025, the United States (US) Federal Government created a government resource titled “Lab Leaks”, alleging that the ‘real’ origin of the coronavirus was from a lab in the Wuhan Institute of Virology, China, removing older resources that directed users to healthcare facilities. Over the past few years, the US has begun to view China as a persistent and systemic threat. This rings true even in the domain of biosecurity, as evident in the Trump administration's retrospective response to the COVID-19 pandemic. For India, the threat of a changing dynamic between the US poses risks in biosecurity, given its shared borders with a country that has been highly controversial in this area. However, this also presents opportunities for interaction with the US to achieve significant global influence in biotechnology.
In June 2025, Chengxuan Han, a doctoral student from Wuhan, was apprehended by US Border Protection at Detroit Metropolitan Airport for carrying undeclared biological material into the US. The material, according to initial federal accounts, contained samples associated with parasitic roundworms, organisms that have significant implications for both public health and agricultural biosecurity. Han had also sent packages to an individual at the University of Michigan before the detainment. While roundworms are commonly worked with in biological and genetic science research, their unlicensed smuggling without proper biosafety documentation or institutional approval was the cause for concern cited.
The material, according to initial federal accounts, contained samples associated with parasitic roundworms, organisms that have significant implications for both public health and agricultural biosecurity.
What makes the incident more than an outlier is its timing and the recognition of a pattern. It came on the heels of another arrest earlier in the same month. The accused were smuggling biological materials linked to Fusarium Graminearum, a fungus pathogen infamous for its role in head blight in cereal grains, specifically wheat and barley. This pathogen was also brought in for research at the University of Michigan. The two cases raised suspicions among US officials who alleged Chinese funding and a possible trend of surreptitious bioresearch that threatens national food security.
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director, Kash Patel, publicly alleged the suspicions around these incidents as part of a larger context of unauthorised bioresearch activity that may be connected to state-sponsored knowledge acquisition, although the case and intentions are still under investigation.
The two cases, occurring in quick succession and associated with the same research labs in Wuhan, have raised suspicions among agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security, the National Institutes of Health, and the FBI, resulting in them rethinking lab access controls and expanding screening procedures for overseas researchers. It also highlights the challenging task of striking a balance between national security and scientific freedom.
Smuggling of research biological materials is not the only concern the US has expressed regarding China. The opioid crisis of the US has deepened into a full-blown national emergency that public health experts and national security officials now characterise as an epidemic. During 2023, fentanyl was linked to 75,000 deaths, a number that not only indicates the strength of the drug but the growing complexity of international supply chains that fuel the epidemic.
Numerous operators relocated to operate within legal loopholes, selling unregulated analogues or structurally related chemicals not yet scheduled.
The US had delineated China as one of the biggest sources of fentanyl before 2021. As US officials began cracking down on specific precursors through chemical scheduling and penalties targeting particular individuals and companies, Chinese manufacturers and sellers quickly adjusted their operations. Numerous operators relocated to operate within legal loopholes, selling unregulated analogues or structurally related chemicals not yet scheduled. Despite a decrease in the reliance on direct purchases from China of the drug since 2021, the production and supply of these lethal drugs, which rely on China-based chemical precursor networks to Mexican drug cartels, was still an indicator of the increasing concern around synthetic drugs. India was also said to play a secondary role in this process. China and India have yet to ban the sale of Nitazene, a precursor drug for fentanyl. Such sales are often conducted on e-commerce sites, encrypted messaging services, and using anonymous digital payment networks, making them difficult to track and control.
In late 2024, US officials associated more patterns with Wuhan-centred companies, this time a chemical company, where top executives were accused of intentionally bringing fentanyl precursors to the US. In March 2025, a similar indictment of an Indian and an official and an Indian chemical company was made for the unlawful import of fentanyl precursors. Washington has since imposed more stringent chemical export controls.
Although there has been no direct evidence of Beijing's complicity, Beijing has failed to conduct any significant crackdowns on known perpetrators, and its constant deflecting of concerns from Washington in diplomatic circles has only further entrenched distrust. The US response is no longer domestic addiction treatment alone or border interdiction; it now encompasses a focus on reassessing its bilateral relationship with China in terms of biosecurity, narcotics, and chemical trafficking.
China's (approx.) US$3.28 trillion (2021-25) bioeconomy is perceived as a potential global threat. With massive investments in genomic sequencing, health information, and biomanufacturing, Beijing is poised to redefine the biotechnology revolution. American policymakers worry that China might use its control over pharmaceuticals and health data as a form of coercion to limit exports or control supply chains, as was already seen with its control over rare earth minerals.
China is now classified as the best-equipped biosecurity threat actor, not solely because it has resources, but also because of non-state actors who have been detained as threats.
The 2025 Defence Intelligence Assessment (DIA) Report presents the threats seen in these instances projected onto a set of broader geopolitical concerns, including military modernisation, cyber warfare, and international alignment with adversarial regimes. China is now classified as the best-equipped biosecurity threat actor, not solely because it has resources, but also because of non-state actors who have been detained as threats.
Fentanyl smuggling networks, commonly from China, are now among the leading US national security threats, equal to or even greater than drug cartels. This intersection of criminal business and strategic confusion makes old-school diplomacy and enforcement more difficult.
There are voices in Washington, like Gordon Chang, an American lawyer and conservative commentator, who has even called for the US and China to be separated due to biothreats that would surpass COVID-19. However, the larger focus that has been recommended is on domestic resilience, including the formation of a national biosecurity architecture that integrates drug supply chains, agricultural defence, and data management.
These burgeoning tensions between the US and China, in the space of biosecurity, and specifically in the narcotics and chemical security domain, have an unambiguous impact on India:
To ensure global support, India can capitalise on this gap in chemical precursor production and offer domestic companies a competitive edge by establishing a bilateral partnership for responsible trade that does not compromise the production of illegal synthetic drugs.
With increased Washington vigilance over China, India could be pushed further into America's strategic sphere. Biosecurity cooperation, pharmaceutical supply chains, and key infrastructure collaboration are likely to increase. To ensure global support, India can capitalise on this gap in chemical precursor production and offer domestic companies a competitive edge by establishing a bilateral partnership for responsible trade that does not compromise the production of illegal synthetic drugs.
India, already in the spotlight for its lesser but substantial part in the fentanyl precursor business, may be subject to additional regulation. Tightened scrutiny from the US and its multilateral partners can result in stricter export control regimes, which will impact the Indian chemical and pharmaceutical industries. India must prioritise its chemical production industry and remove any association with illegitimate fentanyl precursor production. India can now seize this opportunity to emerge as a reliable alternative to Chinese supremacy in biotech and pharma. For that, though, it will have to upgrade safety standards, bolster lab security, and establish strong genomic data governance frameworks.
The US no longer regards China's rise in the biosecurity and chemical security space as merely a competitive innovation narrative; instead, China is increasingly viewed as a multifaceted, hybrid threat. The increasing overlap between biosecurity and national security indicates that the world has entered a new era of strategic competition. India can utilise this newly created gap to enhance its country-level biosecurity, thereby contributing to global biosecurity, pharmaceutical, and chemical needs.
Shravishtha Ajaykumar is an Associate Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Shravishtha Ajaykumar is an Associate Fellow at the Centre for Security, Strategy, and Technology. Her research areas include Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) strategy ...
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