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The UN Security Council’s role in shaping global counter-terrorism norms is eroded by power asymmetries and political manoeuvring, limiting its ability to respond to emerging threats effectively.
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Pakistan, currently a non–permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC), was recently elected to chair the Taliban Sanctions Committee. It will also serve as the Vice Chair of the 1373 Counter-Terrorism Committee and preside over the UNSC in July. The developments come at a time when India is pushing its diplomatic case at the UN to denounce Pakistan’s sponsorship of terrorism post the Pahalgam attack. Within the global counter-terrorism regime, the UNSC occupies a crucial institutional position vis-à-vis building international consensus. But political manoeuvring triggered by the imbalance of ‘veto’ vested in the five permanent members (P5) often leads to an impasse, much to the disadvantage of states countering terrorism. Driven by geopolitical competition, the UNSC’s response has been focused on passing resolutions condemning terrorism, rather than building a resilient normative regime.
Driven by geopolitical competition, the UNSC’s response has been focused on passing resolutions condemning terrorism, rather than building a resilient normative regime.
While terrorism was an established threat, discussions on formulating a normative counter-terrorism framework began at the UN only in the late 1980s, given the uptick in terrorist activities the world over. During this time, major initiatives included UN General Assembly (UNGA) declarations on measures to eliminate terrorism and proposals such as the Comprehensive Convention against Terrorism (CCIT), advanced by India in 1996 to strengthen the international legal frameworks.
However, it was the UNSC that initially consolidated the ‘anti-terror’ norm in 1999 by adopting Resolution 1267 under Chapter VII, which imposed targeted sanctions on the Taliban. The 9/11 terrorist attack in the US further strengthened the regime with the adoption of Resolution 1373 in 2001. The resolution established the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and mandated states to undertake measures to deny safe haven to those who finance, support, or commit terrorist attacks. Concurrently, the UNGA also took measures such as the adoption of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, formulation of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), and establishing the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT). These frameworks apart, it was the UNSC that exercised the ‘de facto’ legal decision-making authority on strategic counter-terrorism measures.
| Major Developments in the UNSC on Counter-Terrorism since the 1990s | |
| UNSC Resolution 731 (1992) | Focused on international condemnation of the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103; elimination of international terrorism, and urged Libya to cooperate in the investigation. |
| UNSC Resolution 1267 (1999) | Imposition of sanctions on Taliban, including an arms embargo and freezing of assets. Establishment of 1267 ‘Taliban committee’ for monitoring implementation. |
| UNSC Resolution 1373 (2001) | Adopted under Chapter VII post 9/11 attacks. Mandated states to criminalise terrorist financing, freeze terrorist assets, and deny safe haven to terrorists. Established the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC). |
| UNSC Resolution 1535 (2004) | Established the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) to support the work of the CTC. |
| UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) | Barred states from providing support to nonstate actors that could develop, acquire, manufacture, transport, or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons for terrorism. Established the 1540 Committee. |
| UNSC Resolution 1624 (2005) | Called upon states to take action against incitement to commit terrorism by prohibiting, preventing, and countering incitement motivated by extremism. |
| UNSC Resolution 2178 (2014) | Called upon states to prevent and suppress recruiting, organising, transporting or equipping foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) recruited by or joining ISIL, ANF and all groups associated with Al-Qaida. |
| UNSC Resolution 2341 (2017) | Called upon states to address the risk to and protect critical infrastructure from terrorist attacks. |
| UNSC Resolution 2462 (2019) | Focused on Terrorist Financing, underscored the central role of the UNSC, and urged states to implement Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations. |
Over the past two decades, the UNSC has been at the forefront of standard-setting on counter-terrorism frameworks. A few of its measures, such as Targeted Financial Sanctions (TFS) and expansion of the sanctions list, have been instrumental in bolstering the counter-terrorism regime. Yet, the organisation’s approach towards terrorism, particularly the threats faced by rising powers such as India, has been asymmetrical. As many structural realists argue, present-day counter-terrorism norms emerged from the threat perception of powerful states. While states agreed on the need for counter-terrorism norms, not all members exerted similar influence on shaping their principles. The norms that did emerge ‘unanimously’ were often a result of normative consensus between major powers. China and the US have pushed for a sectoral approach towards terrorism, centred on countering specific types of terrorist activities, even when other countries proposed formulating an international convention. Most non–permanent members, including India, have frequently abstained from resolutions that authorised the use of force as a counter-terrorism measure if it conflicted with the principle of maintaining a state’s sovereignty.
China and the US have pushed for a sectoral approach towards terrorism, centred on countering specific types of terrorist activities, even when other countries proposed formulating an international convention.
The effects of power politics and influence asymmetry are also evident in the UNSC’s response towards recent terror attacks. Since 2023, the US, supported by the UK and France, has blocked several resolutions on a humanitarian ceasefire in Gaza as the drafts did not explicitly refer to Hamas as perpetrators of ‘terrorism’. More recently, when India submitted a dossier linking The Resistance Front (TRF) with the terrorist attack in Pahalgam, China and Pakistan were able to block any mention of TRF in the UNSC statement. India also had to fight a decade-long battle at the UNSC to get Jaish-e-Mohammad chief Masood Azhar listed as a designated terrorist. Efforts to list Azhar were consistently blocked by Beijing, with some arguing that the removal of China’s 'technical block' in 2019 was also a result of backchannel negotiations with India.
The global counter-terrorism regime today, in the absence of a comprehensive legal convention or an administrative body, demonstrates what Krasner (1983) refers to as ‘security regimes’—where formal and informal norms guide state behaviour. However, given the ‘unreformed’ composition and politically-driven workings of the UNSC, two major implications for the counter-terrorism regime arise.
Firstly, the influence of P5 politics on decision–making that hinders a timely response to deadly terrorist attacks will propel states to rely on and prioritise their respective national counter-terrorism doctrines. As seen following the terror attack in Pahalgam, India, operating within the broader confines of international norms, took retaliatory action by striking cross–border terrorist infrastructure while signalling that the strikes were non-escalatory.
The influence of P5 politics on decision–making that hinders a timely response to deadly terrorist attacks will propel states to rely on and prioritise their respective national counter-terrorism doctrines.
Secondly, despite deliberations and overlapping mechanisms, there is no internationally accepted legal definition of what constitutes ‘terrorism’. The existing UN committees perform a supportive role rather than an efficient operational one. As terrorist groups delve deeper into developing infrastructure and engage with tools such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), mere listing of individuals or sanctions will not prove to be a sturdy deterrent. In order to consolidate the global counter-terrorism regime and forge consensus, the functioning of the UNSC must rise above political gerrymandering to develop a framework suitable to current geopolitical realities.
Heena Makhija is an Associate Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
Dr. Makhija is an Associate Fellow with ORF’s Economy and Growth Programme. She specializes in the study of International Organizations, Multilateralism, Global Norms, India at ...
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