The Taliban's failure to address regional issues like security and migration has hindered their recognition, highlighting the need for multilateral solutions
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When the Taliban seized power in August 2021, few anticipated that they could have conquered Kabul without the support of regional and international powers. In those early days and months, Pakistan seemed to be the Taliban’s closest neighbour. However, it was not long before Pakistan found itself beset by numerous problems caused by its newly enthroned neighbour. Ethnic tensions spread from border regions to major cities, and the ever-increasing influx of refugees exacerbated the difficulties of being neighbours with the Taliban.
From the outset, Iran found itself caught in a dilemma. While the government sought to portray the Taliban's victory as a defeat for the United States (US) and the expulsion of foreign forces, attempting to position Kandahar within the so-called “Axis of Resistance,” Iran’s civil society, particularly its academics, viewed the rise of a force hostile to Shia Islam, the Persian language, and the rights of Afghan women and girls as a clear threat to Iran and other countries sharing a common cultural heritage. As time progressed, the Taliban’s words and actions tipped the scales in favour of the arguments put forth by Iranian academics, and the Taliban failed to prove their mettle in their relations with Iran.
Ethnic tensions spread from border regions to major cities, and the ever-increasing influx of refugees exacerbated the difficulties of being neighbours with the Taliban.
The Taliban’s northern neighbours—Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan—were initially fearful of the spread of Islamic fundamentalism and refrained from any interaction with Kabul. Gradually, though, and as extremist ideologies gained ground in the form of the ISIS-Khorasan, they pursued dialogue, cooperation, and economic interaction with the Taliban, believing it would fend off greater harm. However, in the past three years, not only has security not improved for them, but the Taliban’s water resource control projects in Afghanistan have further heightened neighbouring governments’ concerns, and the economic and environmental crises have further compounded the insecurity concerns in these countries.
China, with the shortest shared border with Afghanistan, adopted an engagement approach with the Taliban from the beginning, and the exchanges between the two capitals, discussions on economic cooperation, investment in mines, expanding the transport section, and other topics of mutual interest have also progressed smoothly. Nevertheless, which Chinese project has been seriously implemented in Afghanistan over the past three years? Why has China refrained from recognising the Islamic Emirate? Have the relations between Beijing and Kabul truly improved compared to the republican period?
Afghanistan has distant neighbours too. In the southeast, there is India; in the north, Russia; in the west, Türkiye; and in the southwest, the Arab states of the Persian Gulf—all are considered the country’s distant neighbours. The Taliban have engaged in dialogue with each of them across various domains. Promises have been exchanged regarding investment and economic and security cooperation. However, over the past three years, none of the close or distant neighbours have managed to become the Taliban’s primary ally, recognise the Islamic Emirate as the legitimate government in Kabul, and establish expanding ties with the Taliban.
Afghanistan’s current rulers have been content with merely expanding foreign relations with neighbours and other countries without having a defined foreign policy.
But where does the problem lie? What is the source of this stagnation in the Taliban’s regional relations?
It seems that the Taliban have yet to clarify their governance approach. The Islamic Emirate is considered an interim government, and essentially, no administration has yet taken office in Kabul that could define mechanisms for cooperation with other countries. The previous constitution has been discarded, but no new law has replaced it. For three years now, Afghanistan’s current rulers have been content with merely expanding foreign relations with neighbours and other countries without having a defined foreign policy.
To expand economic relations and attract investment to initiate development programmes, a country must first determine its economic structure and investment and trade regulations. In the past three years, neither the economic structure of this country nor its development programmes have been designed or implemented, resulting in a daily increase in the number of impoverished and struggling people.
Even before implementing joint economic programmes, social, and political security must be ensured within Afghan society. What the Taliban refer to as security today is the suppression of all political and social groups and classes. Yet, we continue to witness various uprisings, from peasants to women, and not a day goes by without reports of armed clashes in different parts of the country.
On the other hand, after three years, the Taliban still refuse to recognise the civil and religious rights of a large number of people in this country and, by enforcing tribal traditions that contradict the established customs, laws, and Islamic Shariah, they have deprived themselves of the possibility to be recognised by the international community.
The Taliban are well aware that they can only survive by preventing the formation of any coalition at the domestic, regional, and international levels.
Nevertheless, the rulers of Kabul and Kandahar have followed a consistent pattern in their relations with other countries. While they have closed all avenues of dialogue with other Afghan political and social parties and groups and have kept their opponents in difficult circumstances, they have adopted a model of bilateral dialogue in their neighbourly relations. The Taliban are well aware that they can only survive by preventing the formation of any coalition at the domestic, regional, and international levels. This is why they have always rejected multilateral dialogues or participated in such programmes reluctantly, instead constantly seeking bilateral talks with their near and far neighbours and other countries around the world.
However, the main point is that the issues that neighbours have with the Taliban are collective in nature. Topics such as migration, transboundary waters, drug trafficking, the environment, extremist groups, security, and other matters all have regional impacts, and comprehensive solutions cannot be found through bilateral dialogues. Therefore, it seems Afghanistan’s near and distant neighbours will only achieve their goals through joint mechanisms.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) encompasses almost all of Afghanistan’s neighbours as full members or dialogue partners. Although an Afghanistan Contact Group has been formed within the SCO, it has not yet managed to properly carry out its responsibilities. Revitalising the contact group and pursuing the collective demands of the neighbours will undoubtedly yield greater results for them compared to the past three years. Perhaps the era of bilateral dialogue has come to an end, and it is time to open a new chapter to address the Afghanistan issues.
Mandana Tishehyar is a faculty member at the Department of Regional Studies Allameh Tabataba'i University Tehran Iran.
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Mandana Tishehyar is a faculty member at the Department of Regional Studies Allameh Tabataba'i University Tehran Iran. She holds a PhD from Jawaharlal Nehru University ...
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