Battlefield necessity drove Ukraine’s shift from volunteer drones to AI-enabled, mass-scale unmanned warfare
The Russian blitzkrieg in 2022 demanded that Ukraine adopt an unconventional response against a militarily superior adversary. Russia’s air superiority, in particular, forced Ukraine to revise its combat tactics. The latter relied on its fragmented drone ecosystem—including improvised commercial drones, limited stockpiles, and volunteer-built platforms. This adaptive resilience reshaped modern warfare, with Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) evolving from an improvised countering mechanism into a structured component of Ukraine’s strategy against Russian aggression.
Until 2014, the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) possessed no modern UAVs, relying instead on a few outdated Soviet-era drones, such as the Tupolev Tu-143, which were largely ineffective for modern-day military operations. The annexation of Crimea and the subsequent conflict in Donbas marked an inflexion point, rendering UAVs a regular feature of Ukrainian military operations thereafter. However, Ukraine’s drone programme remained underdeveloped and suffered from significant capability gaps.
The annexation of Crimea and the subsequent conflict in Donbas marked an inflexion point, rendering UAVs a regular feature of Ukrainian military operations thereafter.
In response, Ukrainian manufacturers and civilian groups began supplying the military with off-the-shelf commercial and homemade drones. Volunteer-led initiatives, such as the People’s Project crowd-funded commercial UAVs, and the Aerorozvidka project, launched in 2014, supplied modified reconnaissance drones. Private actors such as Artem Vyhunnuk emerged as key suppliers of Ukraine’s drone assets.
However, this bottom-up approach, while displaying battlefield resilience, exposed institutional limitations. The process of integrating these drones into the military inventory was slow and uneven. For instance, the Furia reconnaissance UAV developed in 2014 by Kyiv-based company Athlon Avia was not officially adopted until 2019-20.
A major shift occurred when Ukraine acquired the Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones in 2019. These drones entered operational service in 2021, when they engaged a Russian artillery system in October of the same year, signalling Ukraine’s transition from makeshift drone usage to more structured unmanned capabilities.
Ukraine’s Drone Ecosystem (2014-2022)
| NAME | VARIATION | FEATURES | NOTES |
| Athlon Avia A1-CM FURIA (2014) |
- Indigenous ISR drone - Flight time: 3 hours - Range: 30 miles |
- Resistant to electronic warfare (jamming) | |
| LELEKA-100 (2015) | - Reconnaissance drone; used for artillery spotting | - Most common military-grade small drone | |
| COMMERCIAL QUADCOPTERS | DJI drones (Mavic, Mini, Phantom) (in use since 2014) |
- Made by a Chinese company - Used primarily for ISR |
- Donated by civilians and volunteers as part of the war effort |
| PEOPLE’S DRONE (PD SERIES) | PD-1 (2015) |
- Developed using commercial components - Equipped with multiple take-off options - Used for target spotting for artillery and movement tracking |
- Led to the creation of the startup Ukrspecsystems |
| PD-2 (2020) |
- Upgraded version of the PD-1 drone - Contains anti-jamming technologies |
||
| R18 (2019) |
- Indigenously developed octocopter - Attack drone; can also be used for reconnaissance and intelligence gathering - Used primarily for night operations - Includes a thermal imaging camera - Resistant to electronic jamming |
- Developed by a volunteer group: Aerorozvidka | |
| BAYRAKTAR TB2 (2019) |
- Medium Altitude long endurance UAV (MALE) - Performs both target strikes and recon roles - Flight time: Up to 20 hours - Range: 150 kms |
- Turkish origin - Resistance symbol for Ukraine |
Source: Compiled by the authors from multiple sources
By the launch of the Russian special military operation in early 2022, Ukraine had developed a decentralised but effective drone ecosystem. Despite some limitations regarding reliance on civilian technology and the limited availability of attack UAVs, Kyiv’s strengths in small tactical drones were a crucial element of the early Ukrainian resistance.
In the initial phases of the war, Ukraine relied heavily on the Bayraktar TB2, which performed the dual role of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and precision strikes. Despite its relatively modest capabilities, the TB2s delivered operational gains with their effective strikes on Russian armour and supply convoys. However, with Russia optimising its air defences and deploying electronic warfare (EW) measures, the TB2s’ effectiveness declined.
By the launch of the Russian special military operation in early 2022, Ukraine had developed a decentralised but effective drone ecosystem. Despite some limitations regarding reliance on civilian technology and the limited availability of attack UAVs, Kyiv’s strengths in small tactical drones were a crucial element of the early Ukrainian resistance.
This prompted Ukraine to pivot towards deploying small, low-cost drones as part of its operational tactics. Commercially available off-the-shelf platforms, such as DJI Mavic drones, were rapidly repurposed for military operations. At the same time, Ukraine leveraged its pre-existing ecosystem of volunteer-led drone start-ups. The R18 drone, developed by the Aerorozvidka group, emerged as a notable example, playing a critical role in the Ukrainian defence of the Hostomel Airport.
The failure of Russia’s initial campaign objectives led to a shift in its strategy, pushing the conflict into a prolonged phase of attrition warfare. Russia deployed Shahed attack drones, aiming to impose economic and operational costs through sustained strikes, depleting Ukraine’s air defences. In response, Ukraine adopted a multi-layered counter-strategy. A key early boost came from the United States, which supplied approximately 700 Phoenix Ghost drones along with hundreds of Switchblade loitering munitions. The Switchblade drones, in particular, enhanced Ukraine’s anti-armour capabilities, enabling precision strikes against armoured vehicles and tanks. To further scale its domestic drone capabilities, Kyiv launched the ‘Army of Drones’ programme, which provided a thrust to Ukraine’s homegrown defence manufacturing base, accelerating innovation and production of unmanned systems. The development of long-range drones marked a shift from defensive operations to offensive strikes, as Ukraine conducted deep strikes against Russian infrastructure such as airfields, oil depots, and command posts.
By 2023, Ukraine introduced First-Person View (FPV) drones, marking a critical evolution in its battlefield adaptation. Equipped with live video transmission, FPV drones enabled precision strikes, particularly against mobile targets, effectively extending situational awareness and strike capability—functioning as ‘boots on the ground’. Despite their relatively low cost—ranging between US$500-700—FPV drones proved effective against both infantry and armoured platforms. While vulnerable to electronic warfare and jamming, it enhanced battlefield transparency across a depth of approximately 10–20 kilometres. Meanwhile, to support its efforts to scale up strikes on Russian territory, Ukraine accelerated the development of indigenous long-range UAVs, such as the UJ-22 Airborne and the Beaver drones.
The development of long-range drones marked a shift from defensive operations to offensive strikes, as Ukraine conducted deep strikes against Russian infrastructure such as airfields, oil depots, and command posts.
The year also marked a doctrinal milestone with the AFU establishing unmanned-systems assault companies, signalling the institutionalisation of unmanned warfare as a structural part of its armed forces.
In 2024, Ukraine continued mass production and technological advancement of UAVs, aiming to manufacture approximately 1 million FPV drones alongside 10,000 strike drones, signalling Kyiv’s continued reliance on high-attrition, drone-intensive tactics along the frontlines. However, this approach hit a roadblock. Although reported FPV effectiveness rates improved to nearly 70 percent, an estimated 60-80 percent of FPV drone strikes were ineffective, especially against armoured vehicles. Russia leveraged this gap through its deployment of increasingly sophisticated EW systems. As a countermeasure, Ukraine began developing fibre-optic and AI-integrated drones. Fibre-optic drones are un-jammable because they rely on fibre-optic cables for data transfer rather than radio signals. AI-guided drones further improved target strike effectiveness through autonomous tracking and target identification using an image recognition algorithm. The AFU launched its AI-enabled Saker Scout drones, which are capable of independently identifying Russian military assets.
Alongside these technological adaptations, the AFU also restructured operationally with the establishment of Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), a dedicated military responsible for the deployment and integration of uncrewed systems.
Drone warfare has now become an integral component of Ukraine’s offensive and defensive strategy.
Strategically, Ukraine has continued to target critical Russian infrastructure, particularly defence-industrial facilities, including drone production sites, aiming to cripple its UAV ecosystem. Operation Spiderweb marked a milestone in Ukraine’s campaign, as it hit five Russian air bases in a synchronised attack, reportedly causing significant damage to 41 Russian aircraft, including important surveillance aircraft and strategic bombers.
Ukraine has continued to target critical Russian infrastructure, particularly defence-industrial facilities, including drone production sites, aiming to cripple its UAV ecosystem.
Ukraine has inducted drones as part of its defensive strategy to construct a ‘drone wall’, producing a 15 km “kill-zone” along key sections of the frontline, enhancing battlefield visibility. These systems have evolved to offer persistent surveillance and precision strikes, in some areas serving as a partial replacement for the infantry.
Ukraine’s progress in drone warfare has been remarkable, shaped by battlefield necessities and operational realities. Drones have reshaped war and how it is fought; however, they have not yet replaced traditional military capabilities such as artillery and air power. Drones can deliver decisive effects at the tactical and operational levels even without securing overall victory.
Kartik Bommakanti is a Senior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
Mohammad Mustafa Ayez is a Research Intern at the Observer Research Foundation.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
Kartik is a Senior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme. He is currently working on issues related to land warfare and armies, especially the India ...
Read More +
Mohammad Mustafa is a Research Intern at the Observer Research Foundation. ...
Read More +
PREV
