Amid global turmoil, Kim Jong Un leverages ties with Moscow and Trump’s return to weigh his next move—seeking legitimacy or holding back.
Image Source: Getty Images
Ever since Russia invaded Ukraine, although developing countries experienced struggles with food and energy security, with the Western world focused on putting an affront to Russia, one country that benefited rather considerably from the entire situation was North Korea. It capitalised on the global chaos, taking strategic steps that benefited it both economically and militarily. By leveraging its diplomatic ties with Moscow, North Korea has effectively emerged from its isolation phase, establishing itself as a vital player in the Northeast Asian geopolitical theatre. Kim Jong Un has tapped into yet another exceptional opportunity at achieving global legitimacy and international recognition, courtesy of Donald Trump’s re-election and political outreach. This piece examines whether Pyongyang’s leader will pull off a hat-trick by leveraging the existing disarray following the signing of a treaty with Russia and reaping the benefits of its ties with Moscow.
Since 2022, Russia's invasion of Ukraine and Israel's war on terror have captured the strategic mindscape and resources of several countries in the western hemisphere—especially the United States (US). This has helped North Korea in two key ways: first, it has diverted Washington’s attention away from North Korea’s nuclear weapon programme expansion; second, the existing wars and conflicts have further strengthened North Korea’s strategic ties with Russia and China. Kim Jong Un, the leader of North Korea, has made the most out of the chaos.
Conversely, there has been a de-hyphenation and a softening of the US's approach to North Korea. For instance, Trump and his cabinet’s statements on North Korea and their past handling of North Korean negotiations, as stated in John Bolton’s memoir, signal that under his second term, North Korea will likely have better chances to get a favourable deal.
Global flux has further encouraged Kim Jong Un to advance his agenda on the domestic front, shifting the long-held, imminent objectives of the Kim dynasty. For instance, sensing an opportunity during the crisis, Kim enacted some changes in his country, including constitutional amendments to its nuclear policy and a reworked stance on unification. Furthermore, he has sought to portray South Korea as the new enemy, utilising this strategic characterisation to justify the regime’s continuing engrossment in military modernisation and strategic projects. These steps demonstrate that Kim Jong Un’s regime has made efforts at the local and diplomatic levels to turn crises into opportunities, and so far, has succeeded. Trump’s re-election has provided Kim another opportunity; however, unlike previously, he holds the advantage.
Unlike the first Trump tenure, the current situation varies for two reasons. First, this time, North Korea is better positioned to negotiate, as it no longer faces the constraints of strict sanctions from Russia and China. Second, because of his cordial relations with Kim, Trump's perception of North Korea is more positive today. In his recent statements, he has expressed his intention to re-engage with North Korea, which reflects this positive sentiment. At a press conference, Trump said, “I've had a good relationship with Kim Jong Un and get along with him, really great. So we'll see what happens.” This was further reiterated by Karoline Leavitt, White House Spokesperson, when she said, “The president remains receptive to correspondence with Kim Jong Un and would like to see progress made at the Singapore summit.” Beyond statements, Trump has also sent a letter to Kim Jong Un urging him to rekindle dialogue.
However, Kim's refusal to accept Trump’s invitation showcases his trust in the strategic heft that Pyongyang enjoys today. His disinterest in engaging Trump is part of his wait-and-watch strategy—treading cautiously by testing waters, gauging Trump’s behaviour and negotiation tactics. Kim Yo Jong’s statement (Kim Jong Un’s sister), acknowledging that the relations between Trump and Kim are “not bad”, hints at the possibility of the two leaders reopening their lines of communication. Nonetheless, this time around, Kim is on a better footing and will not budge on any of his demands, primarily the one where the US accepts North Korea as a nuclear-weapon state.
Conversely, there has been a de-hyphenation and a softening of the US's approach to North Korea. For instance, Trump and his cabinet’s statements on North Korea, as well as their past handling of North Korean negotiations, as stated in John Bolton’s memoir, signal that under his second term, North Korea will likely have better chances to get a favourable deal. One that may likely include acknowledging North Korea's status as a nuclear-armed state. Trump’s tight control over US foreign policy decision-making, as seen through his actions on the Iranian, Ukrainian, and Israeli conflicts, solidifies the case.
Considering the current US-North Korea ties, the possibility of reaching a win-win deal without an extensive diplomatic engagement seems unlikely. However, the emerging geopolitical dynamics between the US and Russia hold the potential to sway it in a positive direction. The Trump and Putin meeting in Alaska on 15 August 2025 is likely to be received positively in Pyongyang, and may create an opening for Trump to engage with Kim down the line. Additionally, Lee Jae Myung, the South Korean President’s support engaging North Korea further incentivises Trump’s diplomatic outreach.
While Kim burned his finger negotiating with Trump the last time, he also knows that Trump is the only President who has the power to legitimise his authority and recognise North Korea’s status as a nuclear-weapons state.
Some have argued that Pyongyang is no longer interested in negotiating with the US, citing its closer ties with Moscow and recovering relations with Beijing. However, this argument is based on the premise that the Kim regime is betting on the changed geopolitical situation to continue. This assumption overlooks a crucial rule in Kim Jong Un’s authoritarian playbook: Kim always seizes opportunities to protect the regime's interests. Consequently, he will closely examine the details of the meeting between Putin and Trump. For Kim, a better deal for Moscow would mean the US would be cognisant of his regime’s interests.
While Kim burned his finger negotiating with Trump the last time, he also knows that Trump is the only President who has the power to legitimise his authority and recognise North Korea’s status as a nuclear-weapons state. The most crucial example is the Trump administration's support of Ahmed al-Sharaa's government in Syria, which features a jihadist-turned-president. Conversely, Trump is also looking desperately to seal an extraordinary deal, crystallising his legacy in the annals of US history, and North Korea would be the perfect deal for him if it comes.
Abhishek Sharma is a Junior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
Abhishek Sharma is a Junior Fellow with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme. His research focuses on the Indo-Pacific regional security and geopolitical developments with a special ...
Read More +