Trump’s second presidency is likely to continue Biden’s South Asia policies, but his emphasis on China and unpredictability might pose challenges for smaller South Asian nations
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This article is part of the series, "Reignited agendas: Trump’s return and its global repercussions"
The much-anticipated 2024 United States (US) elections concluded with Donald Trump being elected as the 47th president of the country. Like any other region, South Asia seems to be bracing to face the many contradictions in Trump’s foreign policy. His push to ‘Make America Great Again,’ to inculcate reciprocity in foreign policy, and to increase US presence in the Indo-Pacific against China, has often sent confusing signals. His rash, ignorant and erratic actions, seen during his first term, have only exacerbated these concerns. Trump’s second term is likely to demonstrate more continuity with Biden’s presidency when it comes to South Asia—with countries like Afghanistan and Pakistan taking a backseat, others like Bangladesh, Nepal, Maldives and Sri Lanka will have opportunities and challenges.
Donald Trump’s South Asia policy is a product of two mutually inclusive strategies: His South Asia strategy focused primarily on Afghanistan, Pakistan and India—especially the US’s ‘forever war’ in Afghanistan. It aimed to create favourable ground conditions to enhance stability in Afghanistan, pressure Pakistan to curb its terror ecosystem, and cultivate a strategic partnership with India. As a result, Trump’s approach started with enlarging military capacity in Afghanistan. By 2019, however, he decided to end the endless war in Afghanistan through a conditional withdrawal of US troops. The Trump government also engaged with the Taliban to find a political solution, while reducing foreign aid to the government of Afghanistan, accusing them of corruption. Despite taking on its help to the deal with the Taliban, Pakistan was also considered one of the major hindrances in finding a sustainable solution to fighting terrorism and securing Afghanistan. In January 2018, Trump accused Pakistan of “lies and deceit,” following which security aid to Islamabad was frozen. Through Trump’s lens, relations with Pakistan had no transactional benefits.
The Trump government also engaged with the Taliban to find a political solution, while reducing foreign aid to the government of Afghanistan, accusing them of corruption.
At the same time, Trump’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy focused on pushing back against China by emphasising sovereignty, peace, free and reciprocal trade, and international rules and norms. While India was deemed a vital partner to uphold this values-based order, smaller countries like Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, the Maldives and Nepal were also given due importance. In tandem with this policy, the US announced its diplomatic mission in the Maldives in 2020, and also became one of the top sources of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Bangladesh. Sri Lanka and Nepal were also shortlisted for Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) projects, to help them with infrastructure development. Trump’s lack of a focus on human rights and democracy also ushered in positive ties with these countries, especially Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.
His insistence on increasing his security posture and accessing logistics in the region paved the way for defence- and security-related assistance, cooperation and negotiations. The Maldives signed a Defence and Security agreement, while Sri Lanka signed the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) and discussed renewing its Status of Forces Agreement. With Bangladesh, the US expressed interest in signing the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) and ACSA. Nonetheless, these strengthening ties, trade wars, consistent calls to diversify away from China, geo-economic responses to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and stronger ties with India have brought South Asia to the forefront of geopolitical contestation, forcing smaller countries to practise a cautious balancing act with the US.
Trump’s successor, Joe Biden, had a similar outlook with his Indo-Pacific strategy. During this time, Afghanistan and Pakistan’s strategic prominence reduced. Following Biden’s rushed and haphazard withdrawal from Afghanistan on 30 Aug 2021, the US reduced its engagements with the region to a bare minimum. Nevertheless, Biden did restart humanitarian aid. In February 2022, he signed an executive order to split frozen Afghan funds between relief and 9/11 victims. The withdrawal, moreover, saw an end to the US’s tolerance of Pakistan and its sponsoring of terrorism. Biden contacted Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif for the first time since the previous Trump presidency only in March 2024, underscoring the country's diminishing value.
The US sanctioned the Rapid Action Battalion and continued to advocate for free and fair elections against Sheikh Hasina, clearly diverging from Delhi.
On the other hand, Biden also pushed India to take on a leadership role in the region, with projects like the Nepal MCC and Colombo Port City seeing closer cooperation and collaboration. While Biden’s administration was less concerned with reciprocity and transactional benefits than Trump, it also had its own policy that focused on democracy, especially in Bangladesh. The US sanctioned the Rapid Action Battalion and continued to advocate for free and fair elections against Sheikh Hasina, clearly diverging from Delhi.
Trump’s return will likely see a continuation of his predecessor’s policies, but will also feature some contradictions, as seen in his first term.
As far as Pakistan and Afghanistan are concerned, the US lacks a coherent plan for the countries in its Indo-Pacific strategy. While cooperation on counter-terrorism and development will likely continue, the US seems to be more interested in deterring Chinese presence and influence, and pushing back the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and its expansion. Trump’s lesser regard for democracy and nation-building will likely benefit the Taliban. The extent to which Trump will invest in these two countries, which hold no economic or strategic benefits for the US, remains unclear.
For other countries of the region that are yet to recover from their economic shocks, there is relatively little economic benefit to the US. Given their geopolitical importance and positioning in the Indo-Pacific, however,the US w ill continue with its defence cooperation, development assistance, and FDIs. This could also leave its trade deficit with Sri Lanka and Bangladesh unnoticed. Trump's lack of concern for democracy and human rights will also negate a potential irritant. That said, this might still be a challenge for Bangladesh, which has seen a recent regime change. With his ‘Make America Great Again’ vision, Trump will possibly let India play a leading role in the region.
The countries’ criticism and distancing from the US Indo-Pacific strategy, despite benefitting from it, is likely to provoke criticism and pressure from the White House.
Trump’s cooperation with India and confrontational approach to China will continue to pressure South Asian countries to pick sides. Trump would like these smaller countries to play a central role in maintaining a free, open, and prosperous Indo-Pacific, even as they continue to have good relations with China. The countries’ criticism and distancing from the US Indo-Pacific strategy, despite benefitting from it, is likely to provoke criticism and pressure from the White House. Similarly, several projects and negotiations started during Trump’s time have either been suspended or are still due to be implemented. This includes defence agreements with Bangladesh, and MCC and Status of Forces (SOFA) agreements with Sri Lanka. The politicisation of investments, defence, and development cooperation in South Asia, as well as Trump’s transactional and erratic foreign policy approach, will only exacerbate these existing challenges.
Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy is an Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme’s Neighbourhood Studies Initiative.
Abhishek Kumar is an intern at ORF
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Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy is an Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme’s Neighbourhood Studies Initiative. He focuses on strategic and security-related developments in the South Asian ...
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Abhishek Kumar is a Research Intern at the Observer Research Foundation ...
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