Author : Abhishek Sharma

Expert Speak Raisina Debates
Published on Jan 31, 2025

Trump 2.0’s America First policy and its diplomatic engagement with North Korea risks alienating the US’s Northeast Asian allies—a move that could cost Trump in his economic battle against China

Trump's presidency and the future of the US-South Korea-Japan security alliance

Image Source: Getty

With Donald Trump becoming the 47th President of the United States (US), there is a lot of anxiety among its allies, who fear the return of an America First agenda prioritising US security interests over its allies' concerns. While European allies are particularly apprehensive about the impact of Trumpism on the Ukraine-Russia war and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) future, Northeast Asian allies are equally concerned about the future of the Trilateral Security Cooperation (TSC). South Korea and Japan fear the return of the Trump era, symbolising the arrival of a transactional US foreign policy that prides itself on threatening allies with their security. In contrast to the previous term, however, the regional geopolitical dynamics make the current situation more complex due to strategic, political, and economic challenges.

While European allies are particularly apprehensive about the impact of Trumpism on the Ukraine-Russia war and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) future, Northeast Asian allies are equally concerned about the future of the Trilateral Security Cooperation (TSC).

Trilateral Security Cooperation evolution

While the US, South Korea, and Japan TSC made significant progress during the Biden administration in the past four years, the Agreed Framework, signed in 1994 under the Clinton Administration, provided the groundwork for the TSC. Through the Trilateral Coordination Oversight Group (TCOG), which was in place until 2003, the US recognised the value of policy coordination with its Northeast Asian allies to solve the North Korean nuclear issue. The Bush administration, however, preferred multilateral processes to resolve the issue because they were dissatisfied with the outcomes of bilateral and trilateral engagement (TCOG). He enlisted Beijing to mediate the Three-Party and Six-Party Talks, which lasted until 2007 without producing concrete results.

However, with the rebalance strategy, the Obama administration reinvigorated the TSC by emphasising the development of collaboration with its Asia-Pacific allies, which included trilateral engagement with Tokyo and Seoul. Additionally, Biden crystallised the TSC’s potential by prioritising a diplomacy-first approach and concentrating on a lattice-fence structure framework. Furthermore, Biden contributed to accomplishing two critical milestones by broadening the TSC's focus beyond the North Korean issue and its institutionalisation. He ended his tenure by building, expanding, and strengthening a web of interlinking minilaterals in the Indo-Pacific—Quad (The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, a grouping of Australia, India, Japan, and the US), TSP, Squad (US, Japan, Australia and the Philippines), IPEF (Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity), and AUKUS (Australia, the United Kingdom, and the US)—ensuring that the US adapts to the changing regional order. These changes to US foreign policy accounted for its allies’ security and economic interests.

Biden crystallised the TSC’s potential by prioritising a diplomacy-first approach and concentrating on a lattice-fence structure framework.

In contrast to Biden, Trump does not like working in a multilateral setup. As seen during his first administration, he believed that protecting American interests was still of utmost importance, and this could be achieved more effectively through bilateralism rather than multilateralism. However, this strategic approach did not augur well with South Korea and Japan, two allies of the US. Therefore, to safeguard its accomplishment, Biden, working with his allies, made the TSC impervious to political developments in the three countries. Nonetheless, even after its institutionalisation, the future of the TSC remains uncertain, given Trump's unpredictability. 

Trump, trilateral, and the de-hyphenation of North Korea

In its decade-long evolution, three factors have primarily contributed to the TSC’s success: the nature of US leadership, the status of South Korea-Japan ties, and the US’s threat perception of North Korea. Out of the three, changes in the first two factors have primarily determined the TSC’s course, with the third remaining constant under successive presidents until Trump. With him, the equation changed as the perception of North Korea shifted, bringing the third factor into play.

Therefore, the possibility of improving US-North Korea ties under Trump raises serious questions over US reliability as a leader in the trilateral. Even though Trump did not achieve much in his earlier attempt to woo North Korea, the shift underlined the US leadership's impact on TSC's success and its direct effect on its ally's (South Korea’s) national security. Hence, the role of US leadership under Trump becomes a vital factor. Therefore, as Trump returns, the US’s North Korea policy has again become a topic of debate, particularly for its allies.

Even though Trump did not achieve much in his earlier attempt to woo North Korea, the shift underlined the US leadership's impact on TSC's success and its direct effect on its ally's (South Korea’s) national security.

As highlighted by media reports and public comments, Trump will likely resume his summit diplomacy during his second tenure. Additionally, he is also considering accepting North Korea as a nuclear weapon state, a departure from long-adhered US foreign policy. While addressing the 2024 republican national convention, he boasted about his warm relations with Kim Jong Un, stating, “[W]e stopped the missile launches from North Korea. Now, North Korea is acting up again. But when we get back, I get along with him [Kim Jong Un].” This signaled Trump’s intention to get back into negotiating      with Kim Jong Un as soon as he became president. He has proven everyone correct since taking office by referring to North Korea as a "nuclear power" and declaring his desire to resume diplomatic relations with the country, which has prompted a strong reaction from South Korea.

Besides Trump himself, this sentiment also resonates with his cabinet and senior diplomatic nominees, who have expressed support for his North Korea policy. In his senate confirmation hearing, Trump’s pick for Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, proposed a change from existing North Korea policy, stating, “I think there has to be an appetite for a very serious look at broader North Korean policies.” His stance not only marks a shift from his position six years ago but also from the US’s decadal-long opposition to accepting North Korea as a nuclear weapon state. Similarly, Pete Hegseth, US Secretary of Defense called North Korea a “nuclear power”, a Freudian slip that characterises the shifting US policy on North Korea. Additionally, the appointment of Richard Grenell (Trump’s Presidential Envoy for Special Mission), Alex Wong (Deputy National Security Adviser), and Elbridge Colby (Undersecretary of defence for policy), all bodes well for the resumption of diplomacy with North Korea and its de-hyphenation from the US-South Korea alliance and trilateral cooperation.

The bilateral disagreement over trade imbalances, the defence budget, and the status forces agreement, further complicates the scope of cooperation and collaboration.

While this policy shift doesn’t guarantee diplomatic success with Kim, it highlights the allies’      uneasiness over differing threat perceptions with the US, which is a grave national security concern for their nations. This disagreement is neither a good sign for the alliance nor the trilateral. Besides this, the bilateral disagreement over trade imbalances, the defence budget, and the status forces agreement, further complicates the scope of cooperation and collaboration. Another point of contention pertains to Trump’s anti-China agenda, which will likely become a point of contention for the trilateral because, this time, Seoul and Tokyo will be less likely to compromise on their interests.

What is the future of Trilateral Security Cooperation under Trump?

While the Trump administration’s proposed post-inauguration Quad meeting signals its renewed commitment to work with its Indo-Pacific allies and partners, taking Biden’s mantle forward, the engagement’s shape, contour, and agenda remain uncertain. This ambiguity extends even to trilateral security cooperation with Japan and South Korea. Challenges like South Korea's continuing political quagmire and Japan’s easing ties with China, on top of Trump’s America First agenda, will complicate the working of Trilateral Security Cooperation.

In addition, Trump’s approach stands in stark contrast to Biden. Biden worked to address his      Northeast Asian allies’ security concerns by establishing multilateral efforts through the Multilateral Sanction Monitoring Team—an 11-member inter-governmental effort to monitor North Korean sanctions—and institutionalising the TSC. Both initiatives aimed to strengthen deterrence against North Korea. However, under Trump, the progress of these initiatives will likely be contingent on his administration’s North Korea policy (expected to change). Despite uncertainty about the upcoming administration’s North Korea policy, Seoul and Tokyo will carefully observe two red lines. First is whether Trump will officially accept North Korea as a nuclear weapon state, and second, whether he will continue to show firm security commitments to his Northeast Asian allies.

Russia and China are not as interested in following strict sanctions mechanisms as they were during Trump’s first tenure, giving Kim more space to breathe. This new reality decreases the likelihood of any possible settlement between Kim and Trump.

Even though Trump attempted to push the red lines during his first term, prioritising US interests over its allies, the second term will differ as the context and conditions are different, and the stakes are high for US allies. Besides, this time, Pyongyang is in a much stronger position to negotiate with Trump due to its renewed quasi-alliance with Russia. Additionally, Russia and China are not as interested in following strict sanctions mechanisms as they were during Trump’s first tenure, giving Kim more space to breathe. This new reality decreases the likelihood of any possible settlement between Kim and Trump. However, despite this, if Trump wants to continue his diplomatic engagement with Pyongyang, it will be a high-risk bet. Besides, adopting such an approach would risk losing support from his allies on the issue of China-US competition. Alienating them at this juncture would be a wrong decision.

Therefore, before reinventing his North Korea policy, Trump will have to decide early in his administration’s tenure whether to invest political capital in an initiative bound to fail, or work with his allies to resolve the complex regional security situation, taking them into confidence. This decision will be critical not just for the future of the TSC but also for its alliance in Northeast Asia.


Abhishek Sharma is a Research Assistant with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.

The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.

Author

Abhishek Sharma

Abhishek Sharma

Abhishek Sharma is a Research Assistant with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme. His research focuses on the Indo-Pacific regional security and geopolitical developments with a special ...

Read More +