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Although India is mentioned sparingly in the NSS, the document’s focus on burden-shifting, Indo-Pacific security, and competition with China presents New Delhi with both risks and strategic opportunities
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On 5 December, the Trump administration released its long-awaited National Security Strategy (NSS). The document drew sustained attention among policymakers and national security analysts worldwide, dominating headlines for days. The NSS lays out a vision for US national security that bucks historical trends by narrowing the definition of core US interests, focusing on the Western Hemisphere as the primary geopolitical priority, lashing out at Europe’s so-called cultural erasure, and directly linking US culture wars to broader national security concerns at home and abroad.
Amid this narrowing definition of core US interests, India appears to have been pushed to the margins, with only four mentions. India watchers have noted that the country is only referenced through the lens of broader US strategic priorities, and that there is no clear-cut approach laid out for the world’s fourth-largest economy. The ambiguity, however, is not necessarily a bad thing.
The NSS lays out a vision for US national security that bucks historical trends by narrowing the definition of core US interests.
Keeping the Indo-Pacific region free and open, preserving freedom of navigation across all critical sea lanes, and maintaining secure and reliable supply chains, including access to critical materials, are listed as core and vital national interests for the Trump administration. This assertion acknowledges that the US will continue to work with friends, partners, and allies, but it also situates US strategy within a framework of flexible realism — one that is conscious of what is realistically possible and desirable in dealing with other countries. These contours of the National Security Strategy present both opportunities and challenges for India.
While defence cooperation between the US and India has often been labelled the strongest pillar of their bilateral relationship, cooperation within the Quad framework has frequently stood out as its most effective minilateral component. The Trump administration’s NSS, however, challenges some of the assumptions underpinning these earlier frameworks. In particular, it emphasises the necessity of both burden-sharing and burden-shifting, signalling that the US will increasingly expect its allies and partners to assume primary responsibility for security within their respective regions. This language of burden-shifting, historically reserved for the Trump administration’s approach to Europe, is now a clear global priority for the United States.
The Indo-Pacific, where the US lacks an alliance structure comparable to that of Europe, is likely to be affected by this repositioning, albeit in a distinct manner. Rather than disengaging entirely, the US is likely to assume the role of a convener and supporter, bringing together a network of burden-sharing partners in the Indo-Pacific. India, as one of the region’s major economies and strategic actors, will be expected to shoulder greater responsibility.
The Trump administration’s NSS, however, challenges some of the assumptions underpinning these earlier frameworks. In particular, it emphasises the necessity of both burden-sharing and burden-shifting,
How India steps up in the Indo-Pacific will ultimately be determined by its own strategic interests. India’s challenge, however, may stem from the extent to which the Trump administration pushes New Delhi to do more in the region. As the NSS remains consistent in framing China as the central challenge in the Indo-Pacific — specifically in its objective of “preventing domination by any single competitor nation” — expectations for India to assume a greater security role could clash with New Delhi’s reluctance to position itself overtly against Beijing. This hesitation is particularly pronounced at a time when Washington itself has appeared less reliable, be it through the imposition of high tariffs or the opening of new diplomatic channels with Pakistan.
At the same time, any calibrated contraction of US power in the region could create space for New Delhi to carve out an expanded role. It will be instructive to observe how India redefines its position in the Indo-Pacific in response to the US’s calculated stepping back, especially as the Trump administration appears to be linking commercial, technological, and defence cooperation to the willingness of partner countries to assume greater regional and extra-regional responsibilities.
Although this NSS shifts the US’ primary geopolitical focus away from the Indo-Pacific in some ways, there remains a clear sense that the US is focused on prevailing in economic competition with China. The Trump administration’s assessment of the Indo-Pacific remains tethered to the region’s economic potential, which accounts for half of the world’s GDP in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, and to its continued ties with regional countries in areas such as commerce, culture, technology, and defence. As the US seeks long-term economic viability, with economic ties as the ultimate stakes, the NSS appears acutely aware of the challenge posed by China, especially in relation to the low- and middle-income economies of the Indo-Pacific.
As the NSS remains consistent in framing China as the central challenge in the Indo-Pacific — specifically in its objective of “preventing domination by any single competitor nation” — expectations for India to assume a greater security role could clash with New Delhi’s reluctance to position itself overtly against Beijing.
For the US, the challenge lies not only in competing with the sheer scale and speed of China’s engagement with these economies, but also in doing so in a manner that may not align with these countries’ own approaches or with globally accepted market principles.
As the US looks to augment its economic power internally, it recognises the importance of remaining tethered to the Indo-Pacific. Within this conception, the distinction between allied and competing economies is one that the Trump administration draws to de-hyphenate its relationships with Beijing and New Delhi. As the US seeks to expand private-sector engagement in regions driving global economic growth — while acknowledging that it still lacks a clear strategy for effectively engaging the Global South — India stands out as a potential opportunity.
It is also no secret that the Trump administration has a fraught relationship with Europe. Although high-level officials such as Secretary of State Marco Rubio and the US Permanent Representative to NATO, Matthew Whittaker, have signalled US commitment to NATO’s Article 5 — easing concerns that the US might abandon its treaty obligations — this NSS makes it clear that the Trump administration is no friend to the EU. It speaks of Brussels’ bureaucratic overreach, overregulation, stifling of free speech, and uncontrolled migration, and places the EU squarely on a list of organisations non grata.
Both India and the EU should view this as an opportunity. As Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, plans her second trip in a year to New Delhi in January, the NSS should offer the final push both sides need to get the long-awaited free trade agreement across the finish line. It should also offer the necessary justification for a security and defence pact. Taken together, both would unlock a new era of cooperation at a time when India and the EU are seeking to expand their partnerships beyond the United States.
As Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, plans her second trip in a year to New Delhi in January, the NSS should offer the final push both sides need to get the long-awaited free trade agreement across the finish line. It should also offer the necessary justification for a security and defence pact.
Finally, two key repositions may be weighed as potential opportunities in New Delhi. First, the strategic stability that the US seeks with Russia could be viewed as a welcome approach in Delhi, although tariffs imposed by the Trump administration on India continue, and the Russia-Ukraine war appears far from a ceasefire. Nonetheless, to the extent that the NSS offers a glimpse into the Trump administration’s approach rather than a concrete policy blueprint, a volte-face in Trump’s approach to Russia remains plausible.
Second, with a renewed push to make the Middle East a hub for future technologies such as AI, quantum computing, and robotics, there appears to be fresh momentum for connecting the West with the East via the region. India sits at the centre of this strategic reformulation. It maintains existing bilateral frameworks with the US, as well as with key Middle Eastern countries, in technology cooperation — frameworks that could be scaled under the aegis of enhanced US engagement in the Middle East.
Rachel Rizzo is a Senior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
Vivek Mishra is Deputy Director of the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Rachel Rizzo is a Senior Fellow with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme. Her work focuses on US foreign and defence policy, the transatlantic partnership, and US-Europe-India ...
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Vivek Mishra is Deputy Director – Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation. His work focuses on US foreign policy, domestic politics in the US, ...
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