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As Trump escalates with Iran, backlash brews at home and abroad—raising questions about whether his boldest move may become his biggest misstep.
Image Source: Getty
In his second term, the United States (US) President Donald Trump continues to project a tough-as-nails image, rallying his ‘Make America Great Again’ (MAGA) base with a bold rhetoric, invoking law and order in new ways inside the country, and re-posturing internationally as an interventionist superpower. Trump’s decision to bomb three critical nuclear sites in Iran—Natanz, Esfahan and Fordo—on 22 June 2025 marks a new era of American military assertion. The move represents the culmination of successive US administrations’ assessments to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, ever since knowledge about Tehran’s secret nuclear facility became public during the Obama administration in September 2009.
Global assessments weighed Trump’s threats against Iran—ranging from empty to only a remote possibility. This attack against Iran has also become a key sparring issue in the US government machinery, including Trump’s Republican base and the US Congress. Within the government, the dissenting opinions between Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Tulsi Gabbard and President Trump surfaced when the latter quipped, ‘She is wrong’, even as speculations are rife that even J.D. Vance was not onboard with the idea of attacking Iran. Countering such sentiments, Vance quickly put out a statement to appear on the President’s side while adding latent sub-contexts to justify unfavourability for war with Iran.
Trump’s decision to bomb three critical nuclear sites in Iran—Natanz, Esfahan and Fordo—on 22 June 2025 marks a new era of American military assertion.
Staunch Trump supporters such as Tucker Carlson and Marjorie Taylor Greene, a Representative from Georgia, openly advocated against the attack on Iran. Trump’s Republican base may be at a critical juncture with growing ideological dissonance between the Neoconservatives (Neocons) and the MAGA wing. The Neocons have traditionally supported a strong US military presence and a robust foreign policy that allows for interventions when necessary. Ted Cruz and Lindsay Graham are possibly the best representations of this group in Trump’s current circle. On the other hand, the MAGA base of the Republican party represents a certain faction of the party which advocates nationalistic and populist policies with a greater focus on domestic issues alongside a cautious approach to foreign entanglements in wars and military interventions. Greene, Gabbard, and Carlson exemplify this group most clearly.
Furthermore, the US Congress members from the Democratic party are up in arms against Trump for neither notifying nor seeking Congressional approval before attacking Iran and are now vowing support for revisions to the US War Powers resolution. According to the War Powers Act—introduced in 1973 following the Vietnam War—the US is obligated to notify the US Congress within 48 hours of troop deployment; is compelled to withdraw US troops within 60 days if the Congress fails to approve continued deployment and allow a grace period of 30 days for troop withdrawal should the initial deadline of 60 days fail.
Democrats in the US Congress are criticising Trump and calling for revisions to the War Powers Act to rein in presidential authority, as the US may soon be compelled to expand its military commitments in the Middle East following its formal entry into the conflict by bombing Iran. Representatives Ro Khanna and Thomas Massie have introduced the bipartisan war powers resolution to prohibit involvement in Iran. These initiatives in the US Congress are expected to pressure President Trump. However, Trump will likely circumvent these challenges, provided no American boots are deployed in the region. The 40,000 American troops in the area already give the US resident strategic advantages, relegating the need to put boots on the ground in the short term. Much will depend on how regional dynamics play out concerning external support to Iran, both from within the region and beyond. While Iran’s proxies are at their weakest, they may find themselves between a rock and a hard place as they may have been largely incapacitated by Israeli strikes but retain their pledge to their patron Iran, which has backed them in difficult times. Moreover, Yemen has declared that it is joining the war against Israel and the US. Externally, Russia and China remain potentially decisive outliers, albeit with little desire to get involved. Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s visit to Moscow on 22 June 2025 received an assurance from Putin: “For our part, we are making efforts to assist the Iranian people.”
Iran’s response with retaliatory attacks against Israel almost immediately after the US attacks and its warning of ‘everlasting consequences’ suggests that the US could be involved in a long-drawn conflict in the Middle East, especially in its support of Israel.
Trump himself may have intended the overnight attacks on Iran’s three critical nuclear sites as a one-off event to increase pressure on Iran. However, Iran’s response with retaliatory attacks against Israel almost immediately after the US attacks and its warning of ‘everlasting consequences’ suggests that the US could be involved in a long-drawn conflict in the Middle East, especially in its support of Israel. This contrasts with Trump’s initial campaign promise and signals that America may have moseyed into a new war in the Middle East. America’s commitments in the region will depend on at least two factors: the nature, intensity, and duration of the Iranian response and whether Iran joins peace talks under pressure and agrees to US demands on enrichment at all. The initial tell-tale signs on all these fronts appear pessimistic. Furthermore, if the Iranian response targets American bases, soldiers or assets, the nature of escalation in the region could go haywire much sooner. The Iranian parliament has already voted and decided to cordon off the important Strait of Hormuz to choke oil supply routes passing through the region.
Iran—a country faced with the binary of enforced peace and escalation—is likely to choose the latter, albeit with a graded response, and any attack on American assets in the region directly may be symbolic at best. Iran may have reached a point where its conviction that nuclear weapons are the ultimate guarantor of peace from external threats has only further concretised. The fact that Iran most likely moved its enriched Uranium to another location, as it was informed by the US of the incoming attacks and acknowledgement by US officials themselves that the American attacks failed to destroy the underground facility at Fordo completely, points to a return to enrichment in the future. In the long run, Iran may choose to bank on an axis of assurance by involving Russia and China.
If Iran does manage to sustain military response—especially ballistic missile attacks against Israel, for some time—Trump’s position will be tested.
For Trump, direct attacks on Iran constitute his biggest foreign policy gamble. Israel and the US may have been aided by the fact that the attack on Iran represents the culmination of violence which started on 7 October 2023, where Iran’s proxies in the region have become weaker than ever before, making regional coordination of response impossible. If Iran does manage to sustain military response—especially ballistic missile attacks against Israel, for some time—Trump’s position will be tested. Iranian missile attack on US military bases in Qatar and Iraq after warning the Americans and Qataris of the attack suggests that an off-ramp may be in the offing. Domestically, Trump’s self-proclaimed anti-war stance will be challenged by the Democrats, even as his international credibility takes a hit, particularly since, on at least two occasions, he deliberately misrepresented goals and timelines to the Iranians. Not surprisingly, Iranian attacks after Trump’s latest claims about a ceasefire agreement between Iran and Israel resulted in three Israeli fatalities. This is likely to draw an Israeli response, and any anticipation of cessation of hostilities hangs by a thread. This mix of factors could make the emerging Trump doctrine’s toughest streak—attacking Iran—also its weakest.
Vivek Mishra is the Deputy Director of the Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation.
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Vivek Mishra is Deputy Director – Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation. His work focuses on US foreign policy, domestic politics in the US, ...
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