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Trump’s NSS 2025 signals a postliberal turn—retreating from liberal hegemony, reframing alliances transactionally, and exposing contradictions of a declining power
The second Trump presidency’s National Security Strategy (NSS) 2025 augurs a radical reformulation of the American self-conception of its place in the world. The first Trump presidency had initiated a firm break from the post-Cold War bipartisan consensus on economic and foreign policy. The Trump 2.0 NSS repudiates certain policy aspects of his first presidency, cements the fate of the rule-based order, and potentially affirms a renewed sphere of influence arrangement. The strategic document’s radical shift in the United States’ (US) priorities is reflected in the Trump corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, which upgrades the homeland and hemispheric defence as the most vital concern. The focus on hemisphere undermines the previous administrations' Indo-Pacific pivot against China's regional dominance.
The strategic document’s radical shift in the United States’ (US) priorities is reflected in the Trump corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, which upgrades the homeland and hemispheric defence as the most vital concern.
The Trump corollary is distinct from the original Monroe Doctrine in that it does not define the US’s immediate stake in terms of preventing extra-regional military interventions in the region. Instead, the Republican administration is preoccupied with the non-traditional threats to economic prosperity and the American way of life, including illegal immigration, drug cartels, and supply chain vulnerabilities. In a worrisome signal for regional powers in the Indo-Pacific, the document defines the primary nature of the US’s regional interest in economic terms. While critical minerals, open Sea Lanes of Communications, and reliable supply chains remain a priority, China’s power advantage and coercive tactics do not prefigure much. The First Island Chain allies are expected to shoulder a larger share of their own defence burden, even as the US reaffirms its commitment to deterrence by denial. At the same time, the NSS expects allies to help rebalance the US’s current account deficit, both by pressuring China to rebalance towards domestic consumption and re-routing its own exports away from the US to middle-income countries.
The NSS envisages the Indian role in the US strategy in transactional terms. New Delhi’s security provider role in the Indo-Pacific region is seen as a desirable outcome, which requires the US provision of commercial and other unspecified inducements. Furthermore, India will be enlisted to help keep the shipping lanes in the South China Sea open, strengthen the US position in the Western Hemisphere, and secure critical minerals in Africa. While enshrining the peculiar presidential preoccupation with peace deals as a formal strategic tool in the US arsenal, the NSS risks irking New Delhi by repeating ad nauseam the mediation claims in the Indo-Pak conflict of summer 2025. Also, unlike the Biden NSS of 2022, conspicuously absent in the document is any direct reference to a strategic partnership with India to address the PRC’s coercive behaviour.
Beset with internal contradictions, though, the peculiar ideological preoccupation of the NSS risks undermining the desirable goals of American security and prosperity.
As discussed in detail below, the NSS stands out for its reflection of a postliberal ideological attitude, limited resonance with the realist restraint grand strategic approach, and potential internal contradictions. The preoccupation with reigniting economic dynamism stems from the recognition of structural pressures that a declining hegemon faces in a competitive international environment. The unconventional focus on tackling non-traditional threats on the southern border, the repudiation of both the dominant centrist liberal and woke progressive paradigms, and the insistence on patriotic virtues stem from the postliberal ideology’s grip on the ruling Republican establishment. Beset with internal contradictions, though, the peculiar ideological preoccupation of the NSS risks undermining the desirable goals of American security and prosperity.
Beyond Trump’s erratic pronouncements, the intellectually sophisticated efforts at the conservative makeover of the American social contract emanate from the ascendant postliberal strand. The postliberal academic-non-profit-social media complex’s diagnosis attributes the malaise of the American body politic to the enlightenment liberalism project of individual autonomy. Both the centrist liberalism of the free market variant and the woke progressivism of identity politics are held responsible for the evisceration of the social fabric and the destruction of the working class. The remedies include economic nationalism to revitalise the domestic industrial base, strict anti-immigration rules to preserve cultural mores and economic opportunities, and an appeal to the virtues of the traditional family, nationalism, and religion. Within the Trump echelon, Vice President J.D. Vance's self-proclaimed adherence to the New Right creed is a testament to its growing influence.
In a sense, the NSS’s inordinate focus on economic dynamism reflects the oversized role of the neo-mercantilist, economic nationalist wing of the postliberal camp. To the extent that economic dynamism translates into military power and prosperity, the reliance on industrial policy and technological innovation mirrors the policy priorities of managed competitors in the Biden administration. Rather, the striking prominence of cultural grievances and solutions in the NSS captures the agenda-shaping power of postliberal ideologues more succinctly.
To take a few examples, the NSS traces the taproot of national morale to the boilerplate conservative insistence on reinstating the institution of traditional children-rearing families. European liberal elites are singled out for chastisement for their adversarial response to the far-right ascendancy. Vance’s support for the German far-right political party, Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), now stands codified as a doctrinal approach. In a demonstration of the partisan ideological framing, the strategic document frames the rise of far-right ‘patriotic’ parties in optimistic terms. As the open migration policy of liberal elites supposedly risks the erasure of European civilisation, Washington’s national security concerns warrant cultivating resistance to Europe’s current trajectory within European nations. Back home, the imperative of economic dynamism entails curtailing the anti-meritocratic, woke Diversity, Equality, and Inclusion (DEI) agenda.
As the open migration policy of liberal elites supposedly risks the erasure of European civilisation, Washington’s national security concerns warrant cultivating resistance to Europe’s current trajectory within European nations.
In its assessment of the world order, this postliberal framing discards the bipartisan purchase of the Wilsonian liberal internationalist project. The NSS does not refer to the rules-based order and also avoids the democracy vs. authoritarian framing. Furthermore, in a departure from the liberal crusading spirit that sought to remake the world in its own image during the post-Cold War period, the document explicitly affirms the legitimacy of non-liberal cultures and undemocratic governance systems.
On core strategic issues involving the use of force, the NSS moves beyond the postliberal framing to exhibit an affinity with the restraint realism. Restraint has remained the preferred US grand strategic approach for strategic experts in leading universities and think tanks. These realist strategic thinkers have consistently critiqued successive US administrations’ grand strategic preference for liberal hegemony, predicated on a belief in the beneficial impact of democracy promotion by force and the pacifying impact of economic interdependence. The wasteful wars in the Middle East and the rise of an illiberal China have bolstered the domestic receptivity to the restraint school’s critique and advocacy efforts. The realist restrainers generally advocate for US troop drawdowns from the Middle East and Europe, balancing against China in the Indo-Pacific, and encouraging greater burden-sharing among allies.
The restraint adherents in the Trump administration include Elbridge Colby, Alex Velez-Green, Austin Dahmer, and, formerly, Dan Caldwell. In line with the realist prescription, the NSS recognises the long-standing US interest in preventing the rise of a regional or global hegemon that could challenge the US preeminence. The realist tempo of the document is further visible in the sovereigntist treatment of the nation-state as the default unit of world politics. The US approach towards multilateral institutions should prioritise considerations of national interest over quotidian commitments to the provision of global public goods.
The wasteful wars in the Middle East and the rise of an illiberal China have bolstered the domestic receptivity to the restraint school’s critique and advocacy efforts.
The alliance politics of the NSS, which advocates for Europe to take primary responsibility for its defence, requests burden sharing from Korea and Japan, and makes a rhetorical push for greater defence spending from Australia and Taiwan, would sit well with the restraint realists. In the European theatre, the restraint school argue that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)'s gradual expansion has led to Russian insecurity and provoked conflict. The NSS’s explicit commitment to end NATO’s open-door policy, then, reaffirms another policy purchase for these realists.
Due to the peculiar ideological preoccupations, the NSS risks undermining the intended goals of American security and prosperity. A hardline stance on immigration sits uneasily with the meritocratic commitment to reinstate the US lead in advanced technology, which requires attracting the best talent from around the globe. Furthermore, the outmoded obsession with fossil fuel dominance in the face of the climate crisis and the green transition imperative risks squandering both American economic dynamism and strategic advantage. The lack of federal interest in renewables would likely put the US at a disadvantage in the cutting-edge energy sector, with developing nations increasingly poised to look towards China. In the face of continued Chinese insistence on manufacturing dominance, the payoff from the neo-mercantilist bid for manufacturing revival also remains speculative at this stage.
The lack of federal interest in renewables would likely put the US at a disadvantage in the cutting-edge energy sector, with developing nations increasingly poised to look towards China.
At one level, the NSS 2025 rehashes much of the earlier rhetoric and policy commitments of the Trump administration. Nonetheless, in terms of anticipated reactions, the document stokes concern in both European and Asian capitals. The European strategic elites are likely in for a rude shock over the strategy’s strong antagonistic tone toward Europe. Although there are concerns about the potential rise of a rival competitor, the NSS’s priority focus on the Western Hemisphere, the portrayal of the economistic nature of the China challenge, and a transactional bid to extract concessions from allies would not inspire confidence among Asian allies and partners. From a structural realist perspective, retrenchment from unnecessary commitments may come across as an appropriate response for a declining hegemon. On the contrary, the peculiar framing of threats in the Western Hemisphere, the muting of the great power competition framework, and the transactional attitude towards allies reflect a sub-optimal response to structural pressures.
Sanjeet Kashyap is a PhD candidate in International Politics at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He has also interned with the Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation.
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Sanjeet Kashyap is a PhD candidate in International Politics at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He has also interned with the Strategic Studies Programme, Observer ...
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