Enduring weaknesses in urban governance and the limited effectiveness of existing reform pathways point to the need for more structural approaches, including city-state models for large urban centres
Indian cities continue to reflect significant infrastructural and service delivery challenges, even as the Government of India (GoI) has made sustained efforts to strengthen urban development. Since the launch of the JNNURM (Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission) in 2005, the GoI has introduced a range of central schemes aimed at strengthening urban infrastructure. However, despite this sustained effort, outcomes remain uneven across cities. Waste collection and segregation systems remain weak in most cities. There are only 10 cities in India where tap water is considered safe for drinking. No city has full stormwater drainage coverage, and existing systems are often choked, leading to waterlogging during rainfall. No Indian city treats all the sewage it generates. Air quality in most cities remains poor, with many major cities falling in the ‘unhealthy’ range. Moreover, 65 percent of cities have no master plan, and where plans exist, implementation remains limited.
In light of these facts, urban academicians and observers broadly agree on the causes of this situation: local functional ambiguity, financial distress, fractured leadership, and weak capacity. If these causes are well understood and long-standing, it follows that corresponding solutions are also well established: fully empowered cities with statutorily guaranteed domains of finance and function (as envisaged in the 74th Amendment Act), and strong mayoral leadership (as recommended by the Second Administrative Reforms Commission), along with transparency, accountability, and adherence to good governance principles.
It is increasingly observed that the 74th Amendment Act promised a revolution in spirit but largely retained the status quo in practice. The corpus of urban literature in the country has commented on the state of affairs in cities and has continued to highlight the need for reform in municipal architecture. This article departs from this line of discussion and instead examines possible paths to reform in the urban sector.
It is increasingly observed that the 74th Amendment Act promised a revolution in spirit but largely retained the status quo in practice.
There are four possible ways in which municipal architecture could be restructured:
The first step towards radical municipal reform is to undertake a further amendment to the Indian Constitution. Its advantages would be that it would bring statutory uniformity to municipal governance and urban planning in the country, and would foreclose backdoor state efforts to dilute the independence of ULBs. This, of course, depends on the content of the amendment. It is expected that Parliament would consider its clauses with ULB self-empowerment as an objective.
However, urban development is a state subject and comes within the purview of the states and not the Union. Parliament can, of course, take up an amendment regarding a State List subject. Once such a bill is introduced in Parliament, it must receive assent in each House by a special majority, with a majority of the House’s total membership and a two-thirds majority of members present and voting. It would thereafter need to be ratified by the legislatures of at least 50 percent of the states (Art 368), after which Presidential assent would follow. To complicate matters further, there is no stipulated time frame within which the states need to ratify the amendment. This method may, therefore, be categorised as a highly difficult option.
Urban development is a state subject and comes within the purview of the states and not the Union. Parliament can, of course, take up an amendment regarding a State List subject.
The second possibility is that states may be exhorted to amend their statutes and empower ULBs. This option has always been available, but has not been exercised as expected. In practice, it has often been employed to reduce the functional and financial autonomy of ULBs and consolidate authority at the state level. In fact, its repeated use has served to curtail the functional and financial independence of ULBs and transfer power to the state. Despite substantial evidence from other countries, as well as recommendations by expert bodies and reform commissions, states have largely ignored these in their own self-interest. Hence, pinning one’s hope on the good behaviour of the states would be unwise.
The third possibility is for the GoI to introduce substantial financial incentives for states, conditional upon the implementation of urban reforms. His approach should not be tied to a specific scheme, as has been the practice in the past. Rather, the reform itself must constitute the scheme. This means that the GoI prepares a draft bill that has all the elements of good governance and comprehensively empowers ULBs in the areas of function, finance, leadership, and manpower to deliver self-governing local institutions. States that pick the draft bill and convert it into a statute receive that incentive. This method has been partially attempted in the past but has not achieved sustained success.
Given the considerable difficulties in the first three alternatives, the fourth alternative appears to be the most viable pathway and could substantially advance the objectives of urban reform. This is based on the premise that the GoI is interested in such reforms, drawing on past statements by the national leadership. This alternative proposes converting the largest urban agglomerations with populations over 5 million into new states.
From a national perspective, India’s largest cities account for the biggest share of the urban population and are therefore the most significant demographically. Economically, these cities are also the largest contributors to the national GDP. Together, the top 15 cities contribute over 30 percent of the national GDP. Hence, if the top fifteen cities, given their population size and economic strength, are carved out into separate states, the issue of urban reform is resolved. This would resolve the persistent tension between state governments and city administrations, as the geographical entity would simultaneously function as both state and city. Issues of function, finance, and leadership would be addressed: city and state functions would merge, and the fiscal resources of the state would directly serve the city.
The idea of creating city-states for large urban agglomerations emerges as a possible pathway to address persistent challenges of urban governance, particularly those relating to function, finance, and leadership.
This should be, constitutionally, a relatively simple exercise. Article 3 of the Indian Constitution empowers Parliament to form new states by separating territory from any state, uniting states or territories, or altering state boundaries or names. In this instance, carving out a separate state from an existing one has to be accomplished—an exercise that has been repeatedly and successfully undertaken in the past. Key examples include Chhattisgarh (2000), Uttarakhand (2000), Jharkhand (2000), and Telangana (2014). The process for such an excision is clearly laid out. A bill is introduced in either House of Parliament on the recommendation of the President, who then refers it to the concerned state legislature for its views within a specified period. Since Parliament is not bound by the state legislature’s views, it may proceed to pass the bill in both Houses. Its passage requires only a simple majority.
This experiment would not be without precedent. The state of Delhi and the Union Territory of Chandigarh are almost fully urban, and we also have examples such as Singapore, Berlin, Hamburg, and Bremen as city-states. In the Indian context, therefore, the idea of creating city-states for large urban agglomerations emerges as a possible pathway to address persistent challenges of urban governance, particularly those relating to function, finance, and leadership. It deserves serious consideration in India’s urban reform discourse.
Ramanath Jha is a Distinguished Fellow at Observer Research Foundation.
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Dr. Ramanath Jha is Distinguished Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, Mumbai. He works on urbanisation — urban sustainability, urban governance and urban planning. Dr. Jha belongs ...
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