The Tianjin SCO summit signalled a shift from security to economic cooperation, with a proposed development bank underscoring the organisation’s ambitions, even as internal rifts limit its cohesion.
Image Source: Wikipidia
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Tianjin in early September garnered a great deal of attention due to extensive representation from the Global South and a series of important bilateral meetings. Ever since India and Pakistan stepped onto a path to joining the organisation in 2015, the expansion of the SCO has been a matter of intense debate. A decade later, it is clear that the organisation’s stretched geography and complicated internal dynamics, including critical divergences between some of the member states, prevent smooth decision-making, particularly on the core agenda of combating “the three evils” — terrorism, extremism, and separatism. However, owing to the recent thaw in India-China relations and a trade dispute that has strained Indo-US relations, the Tianjin summit was marked by a number of trade-offs and concessions, including on security and geopolitical matters.
Over the past three years, the expansion of the SCO has been a key agenda item, with Iran and Belarus gaining full membership in 2023 and 2024, respectively. The SCO’s geographical expansion is well underway, with 10 more countries expressing interest in joining the organisation. While the Tianjin summit showcased the organisation’s extensive reach, stretching from Egypt in the west to Cambodia in the southeast, most countries currently hold merely a dialogue partner status, demonstrating varying degrees of willingness to further elevate their involvement. Laos was the latest country admitted to this category.
While China and Russia are clearly eager to demonstrate the extensive outreach of the SCO Plus, it remains uncertain whether other member states will be willing to host such large-scale festivals of diplomacy.
In a step to ease the process of integrating new members, the SCO announced that it would merge the “dialogue partner” and “observer” statuses into a new one — “an SCO partner”. This means that going forward, all the SCO Plus countries, including the two observer states (Mongolia and Afghanistan) and 15 dialogue partners, will be able to participate in the SCO summit proceedings and join certain cooperation initiatives. An important caveat, though, is that “SCO partners” will only join the events pending invitation by the host country.
While China and Russia are clearly eager to demonstrate the extensive outreach of the SCO Plus, it remains uncertain whether other member states will be willing to host such large-scale festivals of diplomacy. Additionally, many states of the Global South may be willing to stay within the SCO orbit without taking on any additional commitments. This approach makes the prospect of their transition to full-fledged membership uncertain. For example, the SCO-ASEAN dialogue, which has been in place for more than two decades, has not resulted in any considerable agreements or integrations. Even though several ASEAN members (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar) are part of the SCO Plus, the organisation’s security focus appears to be off-putting for most Southeast Asian states, which adhere to a non-alignment approach in their foreign policies.
As the SCO broadens its reach, it may need to reconsider its bureaucratic rigidity as well as its branding.
Another cleavage is the contradictory approach to Afghanistan. Although Afghanistan is an important agenda topic, as reflected in the special SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group, and is formally part of the SCO Plus, there is no consensus on how to engage with the Taliban regime. This makes Afghanistan’s ascension to full membership of the organisation unrealistic. Moreover, Taliban representatives are not even invited to SCO summits, which likely reflects the varying stances of member states. As well as being excluded from the Tianjin summit, the absence of Taliban representatives from the SCO Consultations on Afghanistan in Dushanbe on 11-12 September 2025 was quite illuminating. In both cases, the Taliban’s presence may have been blocked by Tajikistan, which is known for its harsh position on the current dispensation in Kabul.
The organisation’s grappling with its geographic enlargement is evident in its emblem, which still features the map of original member states and leaves India, Pakistan, Iran, and Belarus out of the picture (see Figure 1). This suggests that, as the SCO broadens its reach, it may need to reconsider its bureaucratic rigidity as well as its branding.
Figure 1. The SCO Emblem
Source: SCO website
Beyond geographic expansion, there is an inherent and underlying trend of the SCO shifting its primary focus away from its security-related agenda and toward economic, trade, and even cultural cooperation. This can be attributed to two reasons.
First, the SCO, in its expanded version, is finding it increasingly difficult to reach consensus on security and geopolitical matters. The Tianjin declaration was rather an exception, demonstrating successful diplomatic efforts. Notably, the outcome document reconciled Indian and Pakistani positions on terrorism, mentioning terrorist attacks in Pahalgam, in Khuzdar, and on the Jaffer Express. It also decried “military strikes by Israel and the United States of America” against Iran as “aggressive actions,” terming them “an infringement” on Iran’s sovereignty. This was followed up by an SCO statement, calling Israel’s attack on Doha “unacceptable”. India’s alignment with the organisation’s position in both cases indicates an evolution of New Delhi’s diplomatic stance since June 2025, when the country “distanced” itself from an SCO statement that “strongly” condemned Israel for its air strikes during the 12-day Israel-Iran war. Although the Tianjin meeting saw significant give-and-take, it could hardly resolve the entrenched antagonism among certain SCO member states.
Second, a more prominent economic focus stems from an evolution in Russia’s position. Before 2022, Moscow was often reluctant to support significant economic initiatives, viewing them as playing into China’s hands. However, sanctions and ensuing financial and payment hurdles following the war in Ukraine have made Russia much more amenable to discussing Beijing’s economic projects. An example of this willingness is the decision to proceed with the establishment of the SCO Development Bank, a key outcome of the Tianjin summit.
Although the Tianjin meeting saw significant give-and-take, it could hardly resolve the entrenched antagonism among certain SCO member states.
This initiative dates back to 2010, when China was actively promoting the bank as a means of providing loans to member states and funding infrastructure projects. As part of its proposals, Beijing also considered lending to small businesses across member states — which would presumably bring significant profits to China and the bank as a whole — but which could also lead to an increase in the indebtedness of member economies. While most Central Asian members endorsed the proposal in anticipation of Chinese funding, Russia opposed it, recognising the potential consequences of Beijing’s growing economic clout within the Eurasian space. In response, Russia proposed setting up a Development Fund or a Special Account to finance projects in fields such as energy, transport, and high technology, with lower capital requirements. Seeking a compromise, Moscow also proposed utilising the Astana-based Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) as the foundation for the SCO bank. This would grant Russia an advantage, as Moscow clearly anticipated retaining a majority stake in the EDB, whereas Beijing was vying for parity in the bank’s share distribution.
If the past is any indication, a new financial institution will be faced with the same important questions. What model will be used to establish charter capital, and what principles will govern share distribution? What criteria will be used to select projects? The Russian government anticipates that the new institution will manage new types of payments, digital currencies, and digital financial assets, with the primary objective of “being independent” of Western financial infrastructure. As Russia and China also consider the SCO Development Bank to serve as a new securities depositary — an alternative to Euroclear and Clearstream — the questions surrounding the operation of this new institution multiply further.
While the Tianjin summit highlighted the potential for an evolving SCO, grand allusions to and dramatic interpretations of the organisation as the bedrock of a new world order remain exaggerated and premature.
The discussions over the bank’s establishment illustrate how the organisation’s agenda is still dominated by and dependent on the dynamics within the China-Russia dyad. However, even though Beijing and Moscow appear to be in sync, the approach taken by other members, particularly their central banks, will play an important role. As the idea of a development bank has now been accepted and passed on to experts for “conceptual elaboration,” the situation resembles that of BRICS, where the mechanisms for an alternative financial infrastructure, proposed during the Russian presidency in 2024, stalled at the consideration stage during Brazil’s chairmanship of the group in 2025. This suggests that it may take years for the development bank initiative to be fully rolled out.
As the SCO embarks on a new path of geographic and agenda expansion, the organisation’s deep institutionalisation appears to be both an asset and a liability. The future of the SCO will seemingly hinge on how efficiently China and Russia can bridge their differences bilaterally, and on the extent to which other members, including India, are willing to accept their proposals at face value. These factors leave much space for further discussion, with outcomes reliant on the evolution of the broader geopolitical situation.
While the Tianjin summit highlighted the potential for an evolving SCO, grand allusions to and dramatic interpretations of the organisation as the bedrock of a new world order remain exaggerated and premature.
Aleksei Zakharov is a Fellow – Russia & Eurasia with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Aleksei Zakharov is a Fellow with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme. His research focuses on the geopolitics and geo-economics of Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific, with particular ...
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