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In recent weeks, the leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran has been compelled to cope with mounting challenges on multiple fronts, and typically, the Iranians have responded with their penchant and affinity to indulge in playing multi-dimensional chess. Good on paper but difficult to pull off. In a series of visits and outreach, senior Iranian officials have been lobbying capitals across the region. In parallel, there has been carefully choreographed posts on social media platforms, including X (formerly known as Twitter).
Both tracks are moving in tandem and are characteristically a mix of bravado and obfuscation. But this heightened Iranian diplomatic activity masks growing concerns within top leadership levels, of Iran’s deep seated but well concealed structural vulnerabilities which now stand exposed like never before.
First and foremost, the most obvious cause for Iran’s anxiety is Donald Trump’s re-election. The main actors tasked to drive President-elect Trump’s foreign policy have been announced, giving an insight into the policy priorities and preferred direction of Trump’s second term. All pointers are of continuity of the avowedly pro-Israel stance witnessed in the first term. A resumption of the muscular approach towards Iran is certainly in the offing. This is bound to be compounded by allegations of Iran’s involvement in an alleged plot to assassinate Trump.
The main actors tasked to drive President-elect Trump’s foreign policy have been announced, giving an insight into the policy priorities and preferred direction of Trump’s second term.
Not surprisingly, statements emanating from Iran soon after Trump’s election signal a carefully calibrated yet nuanced dialing down of their hitherto confrontationist approach. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi took to X, rejecting the FBI’s assassination charges and advising that for the US the “The path forward is (also) a choice. It begins with respect.” In the same post, Araghchi categorically assures that “Iran is NOT after nuclear weapons, period.”
Given also the tumultuous precedence of Trump’s cabinet during his first term, the regular parade of dismissals and resignations, Trump’s appointments would need to be viewed with a degree of caution as regards the longevity of each appointee and consequently of policy consistency. But then Trump thrives on pulling off the unpredictable.
Second are widespread assessments that Trump’s foreign policy priorities will include ending the war in Ukraine and restoring the maximum pressure on Iran witnessed in his first term. Any outcome on the former is likely to impinge on the latter, given the transactional relationship which Russia and Iran have established in recent years. Cessation of hostilities in Ukraine could free up the US to re-engage Russia and potentially enlist Russian support in the UNSC/IAEA on the Iran file.
Trump’s foreign policy priorities will include ending the war in Ukraine and restoring the maximum pressure on Iran witnessed in his first term.
Third, the recent months have seen Iran suffer a series of devastating if self-inflicted setbacks. Israel has reestablished its military dominance by inflicting irreparable damage to Iran’s Axis of Resistance across Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria. The targeted decimation of top commanders and cadres of Hamas and Hezbollah, along with their weapons and missile stores, and disruption to Iran’s ability to use the Syrian land-route for supplies has severely crippled the Axis. Consequently, Iran’s pursuit of a forward defense strategy, of encircling and cornering Israel through these proxy militia groups as part of its “ring of fire” strategy, has been eroded, perhaps irreversibly.
Related to this, and yet another cause of concern for Iran, has been Israeli intelligence’s deep penetration and compromise of the Axis. Israel’s HUMINT assets were important inputs leading to the assassination of high value targets such as Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut and Hamas’ Ismail Haniyeh in a safehouse in Tehran guarded by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). The rate of attrition has been such that the IRGC even decided to pull back several of its field commanders due to these losses including the death of its commander Mohammad Reza Zahedi in Israel’s bombing of the Annex housing the Iranian consular section in Damascus.
That an Iranian fingerprint is present across every trouble spot in the Levant is further evidenced by the fact that Iran has enabled the rise of a new Axis benefactor in the form of the Houthis in Yemen. Houthi missiles have repeatedly struck deep inside Israel and disrupted shipping in the vital sea lanes along the Red Sea and Suez Canal routes. The latter has had a global impact, effecting supply chains and raising the cost of shipping and insurance.
Houthi missiles have repeatedly struck deep inside Israel and disrupted shipping in the vital sea lanes along the Red Sea and Suez Canal routes.
Fourth is the dangerous emergence into the open of the long running hostility between Israel and Iran. Both have shed their decades long shadow war and have, till date, exchanged two rounds of direct attacks on each other’s territory, the latest being the October 26 Israeli strikes on Iran. While reports from within Iran are typically difficult to discern as to their factual accuracy, Israel has claimed that it has decapacitated much of Iran’s air defenses giving it freedom to operate at will within Iran.
Last but not the least are the rapid strides in Iran’s nuclear programme. Its stockpiles of enriched uranium are well beyond the limits set by the now defunct JCPOA, including 164 kg of uranium U-235 enriched to 60% (data is as per IAEA’s quarterly report for August 2024). These levels are within touching distance of the vital threshold of 90% enriched U-235 needed for a nuclear weapon. These capabilties make Iran the only non-nuclear weapon state to enrich uranium to levels well beyond that needed for peaceful purposes.
In dealing with Iran, the in-coming Trump Administration will have to contend with the reality of the unprecedented changes that have taken place in the preceding four years in the stubbornly challenging West Asia landscape. Trump will have to contend with and shape his policies around several new factors which have emerged and are now driving regional dynamics.
The most important of these, representing a fundamental shift, is the mutual courtship between Iran and its neighbors. Iran’s late President Ebrahim Raesi, a surprise ascendent to the presidency in August 2021, put in place the twin foreign policy pillars of stabilizing Iran’s neighborhood and pursuing a pronounced anti-west policy in the guise of a look east policy. Thus, Iran’s pursuit of its version of neighborhood first, received initially with caution by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), gave way to the current sustained and wider engagement led mainly by the Saudis and the Emiratis.
Iran’s late President Ebrahim Raesi, a surprise ascendent to the presidency in August 2021, put in place the twin foreign policy pillars of stabilizing Iran’s neighborhood and pursuing a pronounced anti-west policy in the guise of a look east policy.
Here, two inter-related dynamics are at play. From Iran’s perspective, normalizing relations with the GCC enables it to address the latent threat posed to its regional ambitions by the Abraham Accords. And, from the GCC’s perspective, setting aside deep-seated historic and sectarian divisions by engaging Iran frees them up from the threat of potentially damaging strikes Iran had previously demonstrated viz. in 2019 Iran was widely held responsible for sabotaging shipping in the Hormuz Strait, the audacious shooting down of a US RQ-4 Global Hawk UAV and the impressively precise drone strikes on Saudi’s Aramco oil facilities at Abqaiq and Khurais).
The GCC’s overarching calculus is to avoid a confrontation with a near neighbor, one that would have incalculable economic costs and set back the ambitious reform agendas being pursued by Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman and the Emirates’ Mohammad bin Zayed. As political scientist Avron Oshtavar posits: “Iran’s improved regional standing and strengthening ties with Saudi Arabia and the UAE in particular, will make it difficult for the Trump administration to replicate its previous strategy toward Iran. Although Washington might try, Iran can no longer be as easily marginalised, and America’s Arab partners are unlikely to want to assist in the reinforcement of existing sanctions on Iran.”
On Iran’s nuclear programme, Trump will have to contend with the consequences of his disastrous May 2018 decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal or JCPOA. This time around, he can take advantage of several fortuitous developments. First, Iran’s weapons program appears to have been dealt a severe blow by recent Israeli strikes. Reports have claimed that in its strikes carried out in late October, Israel had successfully struck a top-secret Iranian nuclear weapon’s research facility at Parchin (near Tehran).
These reports perhaps help explain Araghchi’s post conveying a categorical assurance that Iran is not seeking nuclear weapons. Parsing beyond the standard Iranian trait of bluster and combative rhetoric, this is a reasonable opening for all sides to address Iran’s nuclear issue. This is evident from Iran’s hasty green lighting of the long-delayed visit to Tehran by DG-IAEA Rafael Grossi. It is no coincidence that the Grossi’s visit took place within weeks of Trump’s reelection and Israeli claims of striking the Parchin nuclear research facilities. In fact, during his visit to Tehran, Grossi said: "I made a request for Iran to stop increasing the stockpile of 60% and this was accepted. This is what we agreed and I hope this will hold. We will see."
It is no coincidence that the Grossi’s visit took place within weeks of Trump’s reelection and Israeli claims of striking the Parchin nuclear research facilities.
The JCPOA legally expires in October next year. Foreign Minister Araghchi and others in Iran have signalled a willingness to negotiate a new deal based on the JCPOA but taking into consideration the changed realities. Trump the archetypical dealmaker, with his uniquely unconventional approach to international relations, can tease out the ‘bazaari’ in the Iranians and cajole them to settle for a deal.
We have before us some interesting scenarios. The fact is, Iran is in a much weaker position than ever since the 1979 revolution. While its brutal internal repression has secured it against domestic challengers, its external overreach through its Axis proxies has proved costly. Iran is clearly hurting from the series of setbacks dealt by Israel in recent months. This is therefore an opportune time to be seized by all sides.
Gaddam Dharmendra was India’s Ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Iran from 2019 to 2023. He served in the Indian Foreign Service from 1990-2024 heading the Disarmament and International Security Affairs Division and the Policy Planning and Research Division.
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Gaddam Dharmendra was India’s Ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Iran from 2019 to 2023. He served in the Indian Foreign Service from 1990-2024 heading ...
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