A fragile ceasefire and a US-backed plan to disarm Hezbollah have set the stage for a showdown between Tehran’s key proxy and a coalition seeking to reshape Lebanon’s security order.
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The aftermath of the October 7 terror attack against Israel reoriented Tel Aviv’s security architecture. While the strike was conducted by Hamas, Hezbollah in Lebanon, seen by Israel as a more consequential threat, was also caught in the crosshairs. After months of military exchanges — which included the killing of Hezbollah founder and ideologue Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut’s Shia Muslim suburb of Dahieh — a ceasefire was brokered, coming into effect in November 2024 with the help of the US. This has largely held up since.
As part of its actions against Hezbollah, Israel militarily created a buffer zone in the country’s south, the long-standing stronghold of the militant group, from where regular rocket attacks into northern Israel were conducted. In the first week of August, Lebanon’s cabinet — under the new presidency of Joseph Aoun, who had previously served as the commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces — approved a US-backed plan which would lead to the disarmament of Hezbollah. This is seen as a central demand for the long-term maintenance of a ceasefire with Israel. In exchange, Israel committed to a phased withdrawal of its military presence inside Lebanon. Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has made his military’s withdrawal conditional on Hezbollah’s disarmament before the end of the year.
Hezbollah has suffered significant setbacks since Nasrallah was replaced by a comparatively unassuming and demure Naim Qassem. However, the group’s institutional ties to its patron-state Iran remain steady despite the loss of supply routes for weapons and finance.
Hezbollah has suffered significant setbacks since Nasrallah was replaced by a comparatively unassuming and demure Naim Qassem. However, the group’s institutional ties to its patron-state Iran remain steady despite the loss of supply routes for weapons and finance, which were built through Syria. Ali Larijani, hailed as Iran’s new ‘security czar’ since assuming the role of the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, visited Lebanon and Iraq shortly after the Lebanese cabinet approved the disarmament of Hezbollah. Larijani, in effect, seems to be taking over the legacy of the slain head of Iran’s Quds Force, Qassem Soleimani, who was the architect of Tehran’s regional policies and once noted by US intelligence as the “most powerful operative in the Middle East”.
Since the early 1980s, Hezbollah has served as a critical tactical and strategic asset for the Iranians, both as a representation of Shia political interests and as a counterbalance to Israel. Since 1992, Hezbollah has been an active political party, representing Shia interests in the complex web of sectarian and religious crevasses demarcating Lebanese politics. This political foray, interestingly, created barriers for the group, necessitating a more strategic use of its militant wing than in earlier times. In 2018, Hezbollah, bolstered by its popularity among sections of the Shia population, won elections and solidified its presence in the parliament, thereby becoming a power-broker in government formation. This victory, ironically, also drew criticism from other Islamist organisations in the region, which have derided the idea of electoral politics as a Western construct and instead pushed for Islamic government structures. Politically, it brought Hezbollah closer to its support base and made it more accountable to them.
However, Hezbollah’s need to strengthen its position within Lebanon has often trumped the demands imposed by regional geopolitics on its leadership. For example, following Hamas’s terror attack against Israel in October 2023, Hezbollah was reluctant to engage in the conflict despite repeated calls from Hamas to operationalise the northern front. Nasrallah had previously hinted that the proverbial ‘Axis of Resistance’ still lacked the strength to deliver a decisive blow to Israel. “We still need time…but we are winning in increments…our battle is one of resilience and patience,” Nasrallah had said.
Hezbollah’s nuanced manner of recognising political realities, strengths, and weaknesses has made it a far more fundamental threat to Israel than any other group, including Hamas and the Houthis in Yemen.
Hezbollah’s nuanced manner of recognising political realities, strengths, and weaknesses has made it a far more fundamental threat to Israel than any other group, including Hamas and the Houthis in Yemen. Nasrallah was widely known to have been uncomfortable sending thousands of his personnel into Syria as part of Soleimani’s design to deploy proxies as the first line of defence and offence alike. In 2009, Hezbollah described its relationship with the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Damascus as one based on common security, political, and economic needs. However, following the Arab Spring, having to deploy considerable personnel to back the Assad regime posed a challenge to maintaining strength at home. Beyond this, Hezbollah has previously played a key role in negotiating Lebanon’s maritime dispute with Israel, showcasing its aptitude for political negotiation when need be.
Fast forward to 2025, and the US, along with Arab partners such as Saudi Arabia, sees a rare opportunity to defang Hezbollah without engaging in any military action, piggybacking on Israel’s military response following October 7. Saudi state media outlets have openly criticised Hezbollah for sowing instability, highlighting the underbelly of the ever omnipresent Shia–Sunni contestation. Aoun has advocated for non-state entities to be stripped of weapons or a military wing. External powers, such as the US and France, have committed to funding and developing the Lebanese Armed Forces to swiftly fill in the security vacuum that will arise. Hezbollah has pushed back, rejecting the disarmament plan and accusing the new government in Beirut of ‘handing over’ Lebanon to Israel. The process of disarmament, if implemented, will be chaotic. The group’s arsenal consists not only of small arms but also includes long-range missiles and rockets with ranges exceeding 400 km, as well as drones that can cover a 2,000 km radius. Furthermore, the expertise extends to the rank and file, who possess the knowledge to independently construct these systems; much of the technology involved, particularly for missiles, dates back to the 1970s and 80s. More recently, the transfer of such capacities to the Houthis has transformed what was once a ragtag militia into a force capable of targeting international shipping with missiles and drones across the Red Sea, creating a new chokepoint in an already volatile international trade system. In essence, the Soleimani blueprint has arguably remained functional — despite his assassination by a US drone strike in Iraq in January 2020.
Disarming Hezbollah will not be an easy task, despite the support Aoun enjoys. Hezbollah is too vital for Iran to face such a fate, and Tehran will do everything within its power to keep the militia alive, even as it grapples with severe capacity depletion and other challenges.
Finally, Lebanon stands at a crossroads. Beirut, once known as the ‘Paris of the East’, is economically starved. Previous attempts to revive the Lebanese economy have failed; external pressures, both regional and otherwise, have often kept the country in a chokehold. Keeping all these realities in mind, disarming Hezbollah will not be an easy task, despite the support Aoun enjoys. Hezbollah is too vital for Iran to face such a fate, and Tehran will do everything within its power to keep the militia alive, even as it grapples with severe capacity depletion and other challenges. Alongside Iraq, Lebanon is a theatre for power contestations. While both Baghdad and Beirut have differing prognoses on how and why they find themselves in such precarious situations, Lebanon is currently perceived as an opportunity by the US, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and others on one side to completely reset its geopolitical landscape. On the other side is Iran, which will not abandon Hezbollah and will work to rebuild its regional influence following setbacks inflicted by Israel in the “12-Day War”.
Kabir Taneja is a Deputy Director and Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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