There is growing alignment on minerals among Quad members, but only credible implementation will distinguish it from existing efforts
Image Source: ANDREW CABALLERO-REYNOLDS/Contributor Getty Images
On 1 July, the Quad Foreign Ministers released a joint statement announcing the Quad Critical Minerals Initiative, an ambitious expansion of the partnership to strengthen economic security and collective resilience by collaborating to secure and diversify critical minerals supply chains. Without naming China, the statement outlined concerns over abrupt constriction and future reliability of critical minerals supply chains. It also raised the issue of the use of non-market policies and practices for critical minerals, derivative products, and mineral processing technology. Overreliance on a single country exposes industries to economic coercion, price manipulation, and supply chain disruptions.
Approximately 30 to 40 companies from Quad countries met on the sidelines of the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting to discuss private sector cooperation, including under the planned initiative.
The Quad Critical Minerals Initiative plans to strengthen cooperation on priorities such as securing and diversifying reliable supply chains, and electronic waste critical minerals recovery and reprocessing. Approximately 30 to 40 companies from Quad countries met on the sidelines of the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting to discuss private sector cooperation, including under the planned initiative. While explicitly framing critical minerals through the lens of national security sets this move apart, it remains one among a growing set of parallel efforts to diversify supply chains away from China.
China holds an extremely dominant position in global critical mineral supply chains. Along with having significant domestic reserves, it is a major investor in mines in Africa and South America, and has a stronghold on mineral processing. This includes accounting for an estimated 60 percent of lithium, 90 percent of rare earth elements, and 62 percent of cobalt refining materials, among others.
China first leveraged its dominance in 2010, during a dispute over the Senkaku Islands. Japan has since made concerted efforts to restart some of its minerals processing industry. But as tensions in the South China Sea escalate, Japan is trying to further diversify sources of critical minerals. The Australian, Indian, and American industries hold potential due to the availability of natural resources, but are too underdeveloped to bypass China. The latter has used this to its advantage during the ongoing technology competition and trade war with the US. In 2024, in response to a series of US policies restricting China’s access to semiconductor technology, China banned exports of gallium, germanium, antimony, and graphite to the US, citing their potential dual-use applications. In 2025, as a part of the US-China tariff war, China suspended exports of seven heavy rare earth metals, including samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium, and yttrium, as well as rare earth magnets.
The Australian, Indian, and American industries hold potential due to the availability of natural resources, but are too underdeveloped to bypass China.
Alarm over supply chain security, especially since the 2020 pandemic, has led to an avalanche of strategic action. All four Quad countries have identified critical minerals as a policy priority and released national lists of minerals designated as critical. There is significant overlap in these lists, making them well-suited for cooperation.
Figure 1: Common critical minerals between Quad members
Source: ORF
Along with domestic efforts to increase onshore capacity, over the last five years each of these countries has also deepened international engagements to secure and diversify critical mineral supply chains. This includes forging bilateral agreements, securing long-term offtake contracts, investing in resource-rich third countries, and participating in multilateral forums.
The United States has led with a combination of bilateral deals and multilateral frameworks. A major pillar of its strategy has been the Mineral Security Partnership (MSP), launched in June 2022. The group now includes all four Quad members alongside 10 other key partners. The initiative aims to pool public financing and coordinate responsible sourcing. Other multilateral initiatives on minerals include the Sustainable Critical Minerals Alliance (with Australia and Japan as members) and the Energy Resource Governance Initiative (with Australia as a member). The G7 members (which include the US and Japan) agreed upon a Critical Minerals Action Plan in 2025, which was also endorsed by India.
Mineral access is increasingly becoming a key lever in the US’s diplomatic strategy, shaping its recent international interventions. In 2025, it signed a landmark minerals agreement with Ukraine and brokered a peace deal between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda to increase its access to strategic minerals. Minerals have also been used as levers in its trade negotiations with countries like Indonesia.
Mineral access is increasingly becoming a key lever in the US’s diplomatic strategy, shaping its recent international interventions.
Australia, with its geological endowments, has emerged as a key supplier for allied partners. Its collaboration with the United States has intensified under the Climate, Critical Minerals and Clean Energy Transformation Compact. In parallel, Australia has signed critical minerals partnerships with Japan and South Korea. In 2022, it formalised the Australia-India Critical Minerals Investment Partnership.
India, long dependent on mineral imports, has moved decisively to diversify its mineral acquisition. Khanij Bidesh India (KABIL) was created in 2019 with the sole aim of securing upstream access abroad. In 2024, KABIL concluded a lithium agreement with Argentina, one of several such deals across Latin America, Central Asia, and Africa. India also joined the MSP in 2023, becoming the first developing country in the coalition. Its trilateral engagement with Japan and Australia under the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI), launched in 2021, is aimed at reducing dependence on Chinese-controlled networks. The India-US TRUST (Transforming Relationship Utilizing Strategic Technology) also has a focus on strategic minerals processing and recovery.
Japan used to be a leader in processing and has worked to regain its footing since 2010. Because it is resource-constrained, it has been a consistent advocate for stable supply chains through multilateral coordination. It is an active member of MSP and SCRI, and has committed USD 25 million to the World Bank-led RISE (Resilient and Inclusive Supply-Chain Enhancement), which focuses on helping developing countries enhance their midstream and downstream manufacturing capabilities.
The Quad Critical Minerals Initiative is an extension of the broader global effort to reduce dependence on single points of failure. Countering China today includes reducing global dependence on its dominance in strategic mineral supply chains. This makes the Quad a particularly well-suited forum for addressing the issue. Cooperation under the Quad has a greater emphasis on security. This framing may prioritise de-risking over commercial considerations and reinforce the perception of these assets as strategic.
US tariffs have affected its trade relations with all three partners, India suspended a 13-year-old rare earth export agreement with Japan, and the US has placed AUKUS under review as part of its foreign policy reset.
However, substantial challenges remain to ensure that the initiative evolves into a credible instrument for supply chain resilience, rather than yet another symbolic or underperforming multilateral effort. US tariffs have affected its trade relations with all three partners, India suspended a 13-year-old rare earth export agreement with Japan, and the US has placed AUKUS under review as part of its foreign policy reset. Long lead times, tension between partners, and unresolved trade issues may derail the momentum and effectiveness of the initiative.
The Quad Critical Minerals Initiative arrives at a moment when strategic convergence is real, but trust and coordination remain uneven. Setting this initiative apart from previous efforts will require reconciling competing domestic priorities for the sake of a common long-term vision. All four members need to commit to investments and timelines that reflect their shared threat perception and translate their strategic convergence into tangible benefits for the Indo-Pacific.
Amoha Basrur is a Junior Fellow at the Centre for Security, Strategy, and Technology at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Amoha Basrur is a Junior Fellow at ORF’s Centre for Security Strategy and Technology. Her research focuses on the national security implications of technology, specifically on ...
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