Russia’s actions in Ukraine highlight the paradox of spheres of influence, an enduring logic of great-power security that ultimately deepens rivalry, instability, and obstacles to lasting peace
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As the Russia–Ukraine war has passed its fourth anniversary, this moment calls for renewed analysis of its underlying causes. In the era of intensifying great power competition, states are increasingly recalibrating their national interests in response. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has remained a prominent power in the international system. With its capabilities increasing, Moscow gradually moved to redefine and assert its interests more forcefully.
As states accumulate power, they often seek to establish a ‘sphere of influence’—a regional space where they expect political, strategic, and security primacy—to maximise their security and improve their chances of survival. Russia’s experience in its ‘near abroad’ provides an apt example of the sphere of influence logic articulated by Stephen M. Walt, who argues that it is “both an inevitable result of international anarchy and an imperfect solution to the competitive incentives that anarchy creates.” On the one hand, the American-led Western alliance’s continued involvement in what Russia views as its sphere of influence contributed to the conditions that precipitated the war in Ukraine. On the other hand, adherence to this same logic creates a cycle that risks generating further conflict rather than lasting peace.
There has been a recurring discourse on ‘spheres of influence’ in global politics. As long as great powers exist in the international system, competition for influence is likely to persist. Liberal internationalists argue that, under the UN Charter, all states possess equal sovereignty and that powerful countries should not impose their will on weaker ones. In practice, however, global politics rarely conforms to this ideal. The norm of non-intervention often proves difficult to sustain when confronted with geopolitical realities. At the same time, the realist embrace of sphere of influence logic is not without its shortcomings. The exercise of overwhelming control by a powerful state over weaker ones does not inherently define how spheres of influence function in practice.
A great power typically has stronger interests in its immediate neighbourhood than a distant power does. In this regard, Russia’s strategic interest in Ukraine is far deeper than that of the United States (US).
A more nuanced framework for understanding Russia’s actions in Ukraine highlights three key factors. First, asymmetric interests among great powers play a crucial role in shaping strategic behaviour. A great power typically has stronger interests in its immediate neighbourhood than a distant power does. In this regard, Russia’s strategic interest in Ukraine is far deeper than that of the United States (US). Moscow perceives the presence of a hostile great power in Ukraine, given its geographic proximity and historical ties, as an ‘existential threat’. Although this heightened sense of insecurity may partly stem from historical memories of invasion, Russia has demonstrated a willingness to deploy military force in ways that other European powers might hesitate to do. Second, even in an era of globalisation, trade follows the logic of geographical proximity; the trade patterns of great powers often remain regionally concentrated. Ukraine was a significant trade partner for Russia in sectors such as energy and food grains. Although Kyiv halted natural gas imports from Moscow in 2015, its broader energy architecture remained deeply entangled with Russian supply chains before 2022.
Third, great powers possess power-projection capabilities, and it is generally easier and more tempting for them to demonstrate their strength in their immediate vicinity than across distant regions. Moscow has repeatedly reflected this logic, from the 2008 war in Georgia to its subsequent military interventions in Ukraine in 2014–15 and 2022. Moreover, Russia’s deployment of military force in defence of its perceived strategic interests has demonstrated Moscow’s willingness to bear significant costs, including sanctions, international isolation, and military casualties, to maintain influence in its neighbourhood.
At the end of the Cold War, a compromise was envisioned in which the West would cooperate with Russia as the successor state of a superpower on relatively equal terms. However, subsequent developments in Europe’s security architecture were perceived in Moscow as disregarding Russian interests. Russia’s grievance over the alleged broken promise associated with James Baker’s “not one inch eastward” remark, alongside the West’s emphasis on the sovereign choices of Eastern European states, helped shape the tensions that culminated in the war in Ukraine. In practice, however, competition among great powers would likely have persisted regardless of whether the West had formally acknowledged Russia’s sphere of influence. Moscow’s involvement in Syria, Africa, and Latin America suggests that great powers rarely confine themselves strictly to their own regions and are often “inevitably tempted to interfere in various ways in other spheres.”
Whenever the international order enters a period of turmoil, power-driven strategic thinking tends to take precedence. Some strategists have argued that dividing the world into clearly defined spheres of influence among great powers could reduce conflicts of interest and promote lasting stability. That is a misperception; great powers do not usually agree to the principle of ‘live and let live’. If the logic of spheres of influence were fully accepted, Ukraine—given its geographic proximity and historical ties—might have been expected to maintain relatively stable relations with Russia. However, framing the issue solely through the lens of Russia’s sphere of influence offers only a partial explanation. At the same time, it would be inaccurate to view Western policies as entirely detached from the dynamics that shaped Russia’s strategy toward Ukraine. Moscow’s efforts to limit external involvement in what it considers its immediate neighbourhood have been contested, just as European support for the Euromaidan movement has been viewed differently by various actors.
Military force within a sphere of influence often proves largely counterproductive. Spheres of influence work best when ‘barely visible’ and perceived as benevolent.
As the Balance of Power theories explain, “weak states resent dominance and look for ways to reduce it.” This dynamic is amplified by great power rivalries, as they often seek to exploit each other’s weaknesses. The harder Russia tried to establish dominance over more of these countries, the more the rival West intervened, supporting colour revolutions and democracy promotion and creating a vicious cycle of mistrust between the host country—in this case, Ukraine—and Russia. Moreover, military force within a sphere of influence often proves largely counterproductive. Spheres of influence work best when ‘barely visible’ and perceived as benevolent. Russia’s overt aggression in the region has pushed Sweden and Finland toward a Western security alliance, strengthened nationalist sentiment in Ukraine, and eroded Russia’s claim of influence in the region.
The analysis suggests that great power politics remains inherently tragic: driven by rational security concerns that nonetheless produce instability, suffering, and conflict. Spheres of influence are likely to remain an enduring feature of the international system as long as states differ in capabilities. Russia’s experience reflects the underlying logic of spheres of influence—while they may be real and persistent, they are ultimately ill-suited as a foundation for lasting peace.
Russia’s experience reflects the underlying logic of spheres of influence—while they may be real and persistent, they are ultimately ill-suited as a foundation for lasting peace.
A pathway to peace would require a security architecture grounded in shared security concerns while moving beyond the traditional paradigm of spheres of influence. Such a framework should avoid presenting the issue as a binary choice between Western institutional expansion and Russian hegemony. Instead, a viable peace architecture would need to ensure guarantees of Ukrainian sovereignty and its agency to pursue economic and political ties with the West, while maintaining a degree of military autonomy as a responsible regional security actor and avoiding further NATO expansion. This decoupling of economic integration from military alignment will create space to address Moscow’s security dilemma and define Kyiv by its capacity, not by alignment.
The path ahead requires prudent statecraft that avoids both the tendency to dismiss the logic of spheres of influence and the opposing impulse to institutionalise them. To lead the world toward a more prosperous and peaceful paradigm, great powers need to recognise that challenging others’ spheres of influence and legitimising their own claims solely based on geographic proximity are equally dangerous.
Aleksei Zakharov is a Fellow, Russia & Eurasia, with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
Nitish Kumar is a Research Intern with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Aleksei Zakharov is a Fellow with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme. His research focuses on the geopolitics and geo-economics of Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific, with particular ...
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Nitish Kumar is a Research Intern with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation. ...
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