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The latest episode of India-Pakistan hostilities exposes the erosion of nuclear deterrence in the face of proxy warfare and political brinkmanship
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On 10 May 2025, Pakistan and India agreed to a ceasefire after four days of missile and drone strikes. The military escalation between the two nuclear powers has raised concerns among observers about the potential use of nuclear weapons. The ceasefire did not alleviate these concerns, and its violations have only deepened them. Following India’s strikes in Rawalpindi on 9 May 2025, Pakistan officially launched ‘Operation Bunyan al-Marsoos,’ which included missile attacks against Indian cities. This escalation was accompanied by reports that Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif had called an emergency meeting of the National Command Authority (NCA), the country’s highest strategic body, responsible for decisions concerning its nuclear arsenal. The Defence Minister of Pakistan, Khawaja Asif, however, later stated that no such meeting was held or was scheduled, and nuclear tensions need to be reduced.
Following India’s strikes in Rawalpindi on 9 May 2025, Pakistan officially launched ‘Operation Bunyan al-Marsoos,’ which included missile attacks against Indian cities.
Pakistan’s continued military escalation has heightened fears regarding the potential use of its nuclear arsenal, further undermining the fragile deterrence between the two countries. This threat of nuclear escalation, though primarily rhetorical, is significant - not only as a means of preventing further Indian escalation, but as a reflection of the desperation within Pakistan’s leadership. This crisis demonstrated how the threat of nuclear war, however exaggerated, can influence real-time decision-making on both sides and complicate any path towards linear de-escalation.
The call for the NCA meeting came shortly after India’s “focused, measured and non-escalatory” response to the 22 April 2025 attacks in Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir by members of The Resistance Front (TRF), a terrorist organisation with links to the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). The TRF first claimed responsibility for the attack, only to backtrack four days later. Pakistan has employed plausible deniability in its dealings with non-state actors like the LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). While tactically sound in avoiding direct blame, this strategy has ultimately entrenched instability. India’s retaliation saw the launch of Operation Sindoor on 7 May 2025, involving precision strikes on terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK) and Pakistani Punjab. On 8 May 2025, India employed 25 Kamikaze drones, targeting logistical and non-strategic infrastructure while deliberately avoiding military bases to signal restraint. Pakistan's response on 9 March 2025 involved deploying 50 drones to attack 26 locations across India, from Baramulla to Bhuj. On 10 May, Pakistan escalated dramatically by launching Operation Bunyan al-Marsoos, involving missile and drone strikes on over 25 Indian military sites across Gujarat, Punjab, Rajasthan, and Jammu and Kashmir, using Fateh missiles and combat drones. In retaliation, India launched a series of airstrikes, leading to intense aerial and artillery exchanges.
On 10 May, Pakistan escalated dramatically by launching Operation Bunyan al-Marsoos, involving missile and drone strikes on over 25 Indian military sites across Gujarat, Punjab, Rajasthan, and Jammu and Kashmir, using Fateh missiles and combat drones.
Pakistan has consistently demonstrated a disproportionate response to India’s actions, steadily escalating the stakes. The proposed NCA meeting, coupled with such references to existential risks and the posturing for global support, indicates that Pakistan is transitioning from signalling at the conventional military level to signalling at the strategic levelpotentially including the dispersal of nuclear assets, elevated alert status, and/or battlefield nuclear posturing.
Deterrence is persuading an adversary not to initiate hostile action by making them believe that the repercussions of the action would outweigh the benefits. Nuclear deterrence limits war and conflict because the use of nuclear weapons can result in mutually assured destruction. Deterrence, however, is an implicit concept because its effectiveness is measured by the absence of conflict rather than the extent to which conflict is limited. The continued occurrence of incidents such as the Pahalgam attack highlights how the outbreak of even limited conflicts undermines the credibility of nuclear deterrence.
The Pahalgam attack has surpassed past attacks with respect to escalation and hints at strategic nuclear use, including the 2016 Uri attack and the 2019 Pulwama suicide bombing. The Pakistani military, through its engagement with groupings such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba, arguably possesses characteristics akin to those of an insurgent organisation despite its formal institutional structure and control over a nuclear arsenal. This posture continuously asserts its relevance, resilience, and oppositional stance, particularly during perceived Indian stabilisation in the Kashmir region. The Pahalgam attack served precisely this function, undermining the incremental return to normalcy and demonstrating Pakistan’s continued influence over the Kashmir Valley’s security environment.
The Pakistani military, through its engagement with groupings such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba, arguably possesses characteristics akin to those of an insurgent organisation despite its formal institutional structure and control over a nuclear arsenal.
The NCA meeting represents not just a warning, but a deliberate shift into the nuclear domain, with implications for readiness and escalation thresholds. This action, similar to the escalation in 2019, when then-Prime Minister Imran Khan also called for a meeting of Pakistan’s nuclear authorities during the Balakot attack, is evidence of an evolution in Islamabad’s conflict playbook. Pakistan’s full-spectrum deterrence doctrine, which includes battlefield nuclear options to counter conventional Indian superiority, lowers the threshold for nuclear use. While these actions constitute low-probability threats, they cannot be entirely dismissed. The danger lies in intent and misperception, where tactical movements or drone exchanges may be read as preludes to nuclear escalation.
India’s response to attacks on its soil has always been measured, as evidenced by the post-Balakot doctrine of limited kinetic retaliation. India signalled political will and military capability without crossing thresholds that would provoke broader war. India has also called out Pakistan’s ‘nuclear bluff,’ as occurred during the Balakot strikes. India and Pakistan walk a tightrope, constrained by nuclear deterrence and international diplomatic caution. However, this deterrence is being slowly chipped away at, given Islamabad’s willingness to climb the ‘escalation ladder,’ as evidenced by PM Sharif calling the NCA meeting and the country’s politicians claiming that its nuclear capabilities pose an “existential threat” for India.
India signalled political will and military capability without crossing thresholds that would provoke broader war.
Pakistan needs to change its strategic approach in the aftermath of the Pahalgam attack and Operation Sindoor. Instead of using the LeT and JeM as proxies and resorting to its usual ‘nuclear bluff’, Pakistan must either take direct responsibility for terror groups operating from its territory or credibly distance itself by assisting India and the international community in dismantling those very networks. In doing so, it must also hold them accountable for their repeated acts of violence.
India, too, must respond with strategic posturing and sustained investments in long-term deterrence. This can be achieved by securing domestic defence systems, including enhancing intelligence coordination and using advanced border-monitoring systems to tackle terrorist organisations' cross-border actions.
Shravishtha Ajaykumar is an Associate Fellow at the Centre for Security, Strategy, and Technology at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Shravishtha Ajaykumar is Associate Fellow at the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology. Her fields of research include geospatial technology, data privacy, cybersecurity, and strategic ...
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